A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

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Abstract

Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics

Keywords

  • repeated, noncooperative game theory, weak renegotiation-proofness, bertrand games
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)398-401
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume95
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2007
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes