Bivalence and future contingency

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter


This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics. All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that propositions
concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value (true or false). We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T x W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbook of Formal Philosophy
EditorsVincent Hendricks, Sven Ove Hansson
StateAccepted/In press - 2014
Publication categoryResearch