Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.

Details

Authors
Organisations
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Health Care Service and Management, Health Policy and Services and Health Economy

Keywords

  • Bayesian equilibrium, Genetic tests, Informativeness, Value of information
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)435-452
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume16
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1997
Peer-reviewedYes