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Chapter Seven

Establishing an “Uzbek Mahalla” via Smartphones and Social Media

Everyday Transnational Lives of Uzbek Labor Migrants in Russia

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Uzbekistan became an independent state in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the leaders of other newly independent states of the former USSR, Uzbek authorities made it clear from the beginning that the “big bang” or “shock therapy” approach to transition was not suitable for them. Instead, Uzbekistan adopted a “gradualist” approach, following Uzbek authorities’ decree that Uzbekistan would find “its own path” to political and economic independence. Uzbekistan remained dependent on imported consumer goods, currency controls, and the exploitation of rural labor. The authorities were aware that a rapid transformation of the economy would affect the lives of millions, probably leading to social unrest. Hence, the Uzbek model of transition clearly reflected the concerns for political stability and the peculiarities of the post-planned economy. Preserving economic stability and social and political order became the overarching rationale for rejecting all manner of economic and political reforms recommended by international institutions and for developing a strict border regime.

As a result of these gradualist policies, Uzbekistan’s cumulative decline in GDP between 1989 and 1996 was the lowest of all the former Soviet republics. Although the gradualist approach to transition helped prevent a sharp loss of output and consequential rise in unemployment and social unrest during the early years of transition, by 2000 it became evident that the economy had become stagnant. This was largely due to active government intervention that created significant administrative barriers and a high tax burden, thereby causing high transaction costs for national business and fueling the informal economy. As Kandiyoti maintains, the partial market reforms that the government implemented in pursuit of stability paradoxically resulted in inefficient resource allocation and widespread corruption that required
increased recourse to coercion. These developments eventually led to a significant retrenchment of the welfare state in Uzbekistan, since the tax revenue was very low compared with the scope of social welfare programs promised by the government.

At the same time, the government took a series of severe measures to liquidate, or formalize, informal economic activities (bazaars and petty cross-border trade), which provided alternative means of survival for hundreds of thousands of people, thereby leaving little room for informal income earning strategies. Although the Uzbek economy is said to have experienced above-trend rates of growth (about 7–8 percent) since 2004, these indicators hardly reflect everyday life in Uzbekistan where many people, especially in rural areas, are compelled to search for job opportunities abroad. Thus, economic motives and the broken social contract between the government and population eventually led many to turn to labor migration as the main livelihood strategy.

Russia is the main destination for Uzbek labor migrants due to the country’s visa-free regime, relatively better wages, and high demand for foreign labor. According to April 2016 statistics of the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), there were around 1,756,000 Uzbek citizens present in the territory of Russian Federation. Due to the predominantly economic character of the migration, the majority of Uzbek migrants are young, low-skilled workers from rural areas or small towns. Most of them are from the densely populated Fergana Valley, where the unemployment rate is high. As Ilkhamov describes, the average Uzbek migrant in Russia is a young married male with a secondary school education, whose main purpose is to earn money for wedding expenses and/or building a house. Uzbek migrants mainly work in construction sector (23 percent), retail trade (18 percent), services (19 percent), as well as in agriculture, industry, and transport. Due to high accommodation costs and precarious working conditions, migrants rarely bring their family members to Russia. A migrant’s family (wife, children) and other relatives (parents, siblings) remain at home, and he usually sends his earnings to provide for their daily needs and other expenses (building a new house or car, life-cycle rituals, medical treatment, education). Hence, for the majority of Uzbek migrants, resettlement or integration into Russian society is not a primary goal. They arrive in Russia as temporary labor migrants, leaving home for Russia in the spring to do temporary seasonal work, and then return home in autumn. Even those migrants who spend most of their time in Russia and rarely visit home regard their situation as “temporary” and maintain close ties with their family and mahalla (local community), assuming that they will eventually return to their homeland.

Accordingly, these post-Soviet migratory trends can be viewed as an indication of social changes currently taking place in Uzbekistan, since mil-
lions of Uzbeks (mainly men) for the first time are moving (i.e., becoming “nomad”) to Russia, leaving behind their families and community. Historically, Uzbeks have always been the most sedentary nation in Central Asia, preferring to seek their livelihood in their home country.18 Even during the Soviet era, ethnic Uzbeks displayed the lowest mobility rate among the Soviet republics.19 In the 1980s, experts attributed Uzbeks’ reluctance to migrate voluntarily to a presumed innate and incorrigible cultural attachment to their families and mahalla.20 Hence, due to their settled lifestyle, Uzbeks were able to preserve their traditional structures and social hierarchies despite Soviet modernization efforts, while nomadic nations of the region such as the Kazakh and Kyrgyz were more receptive to Soviet modernization policies.21

However, we can no longer divide the Central Asian ways of life into settled and nomadic categories. Today, in both urban and rural areas of Uzbekistan, migration has become a something of a norm: a widely accepted livelihood strategy used by households to secure their basic needs and generate resources for life-cycle events, construction, and entrepreneurship projects. Thus, the lifestyle of Uzbeks is becoming increasingly transnational since more and more households are sending musofir (migrants) to Russia. Castles and Miller note that “migration is a collective action, arising out of social change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas.”22 There is a growing academic debate on “migrant transnationalism” that revolves around the argument that migrants who live their lives across the border of two (or more) nation-states, become part of the fabric of everyday life and social relations in their home state, while simultaneously becoming part of the socioeconomic processes in their receiving state.23 Socio-legal studies of migration have demonstrated that migrants carry their own “legal culture” (i.e., customary practices and unofficial laws based on indigenous or religious laws) to the host country, leading to the formation of a plural legal environment in the host country.24 At the same time, migrants’ societies of origin are themselves being transformed by migration: neighborhood-based forms of identity are becoming transnational along with national and regional identities.25 Migrants bring home not only money, gifts, and consumer products but also knowledge, ideas, values, and norms—what could be called “social remittances.”26 In addition, existing gender relations are being fundamentally challenged and changed through female labor migration,27 and migrant remittances, in addition to their economic impact, fulfill an important social role by keeping absent migrants “present” in their sending communities, serving as a means to alter or retain social status and producing new “elite” class and network connections.28 Using the insights from international migration literature, it seems reasonable to assume that the large-scale migration of Uzbeks to Russia might produce social changes in both migrant-sending and receiving societies.
Much of the prevailing research related to Uzbek migrants in Russia (also covering Kyrgyz and Tajik migrants) focuses on issues such as the push-and-pull factors of labor migration, the economic impact of migration and remittances in sending societies, migrant strategies for dealing with the law and informality in the host country, sexual risks, difficult living and working conditions, xenophobia and discrimination, the political impact of labor migration in sending societies, and the effects of migration and remittances on the ritual economy, gender-based power relations, traditions, social norms, status, and hierarchies in sending communities. Despite the diversity of scholarly literature, one idea common to these studies is that they tend to explore “Central Asian labor migration to Russia” as two separate processes. They focus on developments that occur either in places of departure or places of arrival, but not both. Put another way, the study of migration is confined to processes and variables that occur within the boundaries of a single nation state, ignoring the increased transnational links between migrant sending and receiving countries. Hence, with a few exceptions, not much has been said about the everyday transnational connections between places of departure and arrival and how these transnational processes trigger social changes in sending and receiving countries. Without applying a transnational perspective, we cannot satisfactorily understand the impact of migration on social change. This is particularly important when considering the growing use of smartphones and social media among Uzbek migrants, which may facilitate the daily exchange of information and reduce the importance of distance between sending and receiving countries, thereby making migrants part of everyday life and socioeconomic processes “here” (in Russia) and “there” (in Uzbekistan).

This chapter explores the everyday transnational lives of Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their left-behind families and communities in rural Fergana. Unlike Western countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, United States, Canada) where it is possible for migrants to establish relatively functional transnational and diasporic communities, there is little in the way of an “Uzbek migrant community” in Russia as it is considered a form of temporary migration. Despite these features, rapid improvements in communication technologies (e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled Uzbek migrants to stay in touch with their origin societies as well as to create some form of permanent, telephone-based “Uzbek mahalla” in Moscow, which usually gathers together migrants from the same mahalla or village in Uzbekistan. Hence, Uzbek migrants’ transnational place-making practices take place via smartphones and social media. The existence of such telephone-based mahalla helps migrants cope with the challenges of musofirchilik (being alien) and avoiding or maneuvering around structural constraints such as
complicated residence registration and work permit rules, social exclusion, racism, and the lack of a social safety net. This further suggests that mahalla institutions are also undergoing changes due to migratory processes as they are becoming increasingly involved in shaping the livelihoods of their residents both locally and transnationally.

These processes will be investigated using an ethnographic study of the everyday life and experiences of Uzbek migrants who work in the construction sector in Moscow and their family members and community who stay behind in Shabboda village in rural Fergana. By ethnographically attending to the experiences of Uzbek migrant workers and their families, I demonstrate the “everydayness” of material, emotional, social, and symbolic networks and exchanges that connect Shabboda village and its mahallas to Moscow. More specifically, I will show how the bonds of mahalladoshlik (shared mahalla origin) and mahalla-level social relations (e.g., reciprocity, trust, obligation, age hierarchies, gossip, and social sanctions) are reproduced and maintained across distance, through smartphones and social media, and have identifiable impact on the outcomes of many practices that Uzbek migrants (and other actors) engage with in Moscow. This chapter is based on ethnographic material gathered between January 2014 and July 2016 in Moscow, Russia, and Fergana, Uzbekistan.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRANT LABOR MARKET IN RUSSIA

After the United States and Germany, Russia is the world’s third-largest recipient of labor migrants, with 11 million foreign-born people present in its territory.40 The majority of labor migrants (approximately 5 million) originate from three Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and generally come to Russia under the visa-free regime.41 This is due to Russia’s declining population and increasing demand for cheap foreign labor, on the one hand, and poverty and unemployment in Central Asia, on the other.42 As the economies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have no extractive sectors, Tajik and Kyrgyz migrants arrived in Russia earlier than the inhabitants of resource-rich Uzbekistan, where labor migration started in the mid-2000s.43 Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg have the largest concentration of labor migrants.44

Although Uzbek migrants have visa-free access to Russia, they are required to obtain a residence registration and proper documentation for employment within seven days of arrival. The work permit is expensive and difficult to obtain, especially since legislative changes in 2015. Migrants will spend at least 22,000 rubles for a work permit, as well as a 4,000 ruble (€54) monthly fee. In
addition, they must purchase health insurance, provide proof of medical tests, and pass a test on Russian language, history, and law. However, many of them can barely comply with these requirements due to their poor knowledge of Russian language and laws and extremely low salaries. As Reeves asserts, even those migrants who possess all the required paperwork cannot be sure that they will not experience legal problems when stopped or caught by Russian police officers and migration officials. Under these circumstances, the status of being “legal” or “illegal” becomes contingent on contextual factors, such as how, when, and where the interaction between migrants and Russian state officials take place. Hence, it is almost impossible for a migrant to be fully formal. Due to exorbitant work permit fees and the arbitrariness of the law, many migrants end up working in the shadow economy where they can survive with limited language skills and no particular formal qualifications. This information seems to be partly confirmed by the Russian Federal Service’s 2015 statistics showing that nearly 3 million foreign nationals in Russia have already violated the legal terms of their stay, and 40 percent of these foreigners are citizens of Uzbekistan.

One indication of the size of the shadow economy is the efforts that Russian authorities spend to limit the phenomenon through draconian laws and border control infrastructure, for example, widening the grounds for issuing re-entry bans to migrants who have violated laws during their previous stay. This regime is applied even for minor infractions. In September 2014, the FMS announced that nearly 1 million foreigners were banned from re-entry to Russia in 2014. However, there is no evidence that these measures have produced the desired effects. In fact, Uzbek migrants work in an environment that is notorious for corruption and disregard for the rule of law, which allows them to invent various strategies and tactics in order to maneuver around restrictions. Given the large gap between legal theory and practice in Russia and the idiosyncratic nature of the Russian legal system, migration laws are just part and parcel of the absence of the rule of law. Hence, the more restrictive the migration laws are, the higher the value of bribes that migrants give to police officers, migration officials, and border guards in order to continue working in Russia. Moreover, the risk of not re-entering Russia prompts many Uzbek migrants to limit their returns home and concentrate on one long stay, during which they try to earn as much as possible, knowing that this might be the only opportunity they have for a long time. A small decrease in the number of Uzbek migrants is more the result of recession in Russia in autumn 2014 and the drop in workplaces and income than proof of the efficiency of the prohibitive measures.

This restrictive legal environment can be seen as an outcome of the clash between the economic need for cheap labor and xenophobia in Russian so-
The rise of anti-migrant attitudes is partly connected with the lack of formal migrant integration in Russia. Instead of introducing migrant integration measures, the Russian authorities balance these conflicting social and economic demands by tightening migration control policies that further push migrants into the shadow economy. These measures intensify xenophobic and pejorative attitudes toward migrants. A survey conducted by the Levada Center in 2012 showed that the majority of Russians (56 percent) agreed with the statement, “Russia for ethnic Russians,” and no less than 70 percent of respondents answered that government should restrict the influx of migrants and that undocumented migrants should be expelled from Russia. Accordingly, racism has become an integral part of everyday life for Uzbek and other Central Asian migrants. Reporters and human rights activists have extensively documented the difficult living and working conditions of Uzbek labor migrants in Russia. The prevailing research also describes Central Asian labor migrants as victims subject to human rights abuses, such as exploitation, discrimination, unsafe working conditions, wage theft, and physical violence. On top of this, Uzbek migrants have to deal with corrupt police officers who regularly extort money from them. Today anyone walking on the streets of large Russian cities (e.g., Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg) will quickly notice police officers checking the documents of Uzbek and other Central Asian migrants. This is especially visible on the Moscow metro where the police officers usually stand at the top of escalator to catch migrants.

There are very few civil society organizations in Russia that Uzbek migrants can approach for protection. Although Uzbek diaspora groups in Russia are assumed to be the first port of call for migrants seeking assistance, their role and usefulness in Uzbek migrants’ lives is quite limited. Media reports indicate that certain members of Uzbek diaspora groups have actually facilitated the exploitation of migrant workers, at times acting as middlemen between abusive employers and potential migrants. A rare example of a more effective migrant rights organization is a Civic Assistance Committee in Moscow that assists migrants in obtaining unpaid wages and appealing deportation orders. But their resources and reach are limited only to a very small portion of the migrant population. Uzbek migrants often complain about the reluctance of the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow to hear and address their grievances. Unlike the governments of neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that have attempted to set up legal mechanisms to protect their citizens in Russia, Uzbekistan’s official policy completely ignores the scale of migratory processes and their economic role. Uzbek migrants are usually described as money chasers or victims in their home country’s mass media and pop music. For example, the well-known Uzbek singer Yulduz Usmonova recorded the
song “Ketdi” (My husband left to Moscow), while Ulug’bek Baxshi sings “Xato qildik” (We made a mistake). Hence, Uzbek migrants cannot rely on host country institutions, diasporic organizations, nor their home country’s government. Nevertheless, from the perspective of migrants, the possibility of working in Russia provides a vital economic lifeline for their families back home, which leads them to accept everyday injustices, exploitation and racism.

As shown above, the everyday life of Uzbek as well as Tajik and Kyrgyz migrants in Russia is characterized by a constant sense of insecurity, with the threat of exploitation, deportation, police corruption, racism, physical violence, and even death. This total lack of security compelled Central Asian migrants to create informal networks and structures for coping with the risks and uncertainties of their precarious livelihoods. As Abashin notes, the majority of labor migrants belong to diverse networks revolving around kinship, region of origin, or ethnic affiliation that reproduce many “domestic” practices, adapted to the conditions of migration and temporary residence. The existence of such informal infrastructure allows migrants to establish some form of integration in an otherwise restrictive socio-legal environment, for example by devising specific survival strategies, creating intra-group solidarity, distributing information about jobs and building up an informal social safety net for stretching the livelihood risks and dealing with emergency situations (e.g., medical treatment, repatriation of a deceased to home country). These networks, possessing their own infrastructure of trust, security, and mutual aid, constitute an important social safety net for migrants.

Some commentators refer to such migrant networks as Uzbekskiy Peterburg, Kyrgyztown, and Moskvaobod. However, due to prevalent xenophobic attitudes, these networks are hidden from the public eye and based on a low-profile social order. Thus, the distinctive feature of migration in Russia is the presence of a hidden world of migrants that is based on its own economy, legal order, and welfare infrastructure.

A growing body of literature indicates that migrants do not necessarily depart from a place of origin and permanently settle at a receiving country. Rather, they remain situated in one “translocal social field” that emerges through daily cross-border exchanges among migrants, former migrants, and migrants’ left-behind families and communities. Hence, if a migrant belongs to translocal social field (i.e., “translocal community”), he/she has “translocal social capital” and can thus ask the members of this community for advice, a favor, or help. However, translocal social capital can also significantly restrict migrants’ freedom. This is due to the existence of collective expectations and social sanctions affecting individual behavior. Any deviation from general shared values, normative reciprocity, and trust may result in
an individual’s exclusion from the community. Seemingly, the maintenance of the translocal community takes place through the extension of affective regimes of guilt, shame, gossip, neighborliness, and obligation. One of the most pertinent works in this respect is Velayutham and Wise’s study of a “translocal village” in which they show how the village-defined moral economy (e.g., traditional modes of trust, obligation, shame, and neighborliness) extends across borders. Thus, “translocal social capital” and place-based identities play important roles in organizing the livelihoods of both migrants and their left-behind community.

Like other Central Asians in Russia, Uzbek migrants also have their own community. However, due to the restrictive socio-legal environment, Uzbek migrants do not organize in public places and try to make themselves as invisible as possible, keeping a low profile and avoiding interactions with state institutions. Instead, they use smartphones and social media as means of community building and socialization. Migrant communities usually include migrants that hail from the same mahalla, village, or town. This mahalla-based networking makes up for the absence of a formal protection system. The fact that their families are from the same place and regularly interact at social events acts as a guarantee that social pressure can be applied onto a family if their member in Moscow is not acting fairly. This means Uzbek migrants’ interpersonal relationships in Moscow are influenced by the social processes and pressures that come from their left-behind communities. This situation recalls Etzold’s study of the street food vendors in Dhaka in which he argues that the “translocal social capital” (networks based on common places of origin and kinship ties) can become important in times of crisis. As will be shown in the empirical section, it is actually the existence of everyday transnational interactions between migrants and their left-behind mahallas that create strong moral bond and serve as a main social safety net and risk-sharing institution for Uzbek migrants whose have little access to the formal system due to multiple structural factors. This implies that the study of migration and social change cannot be confined to the political and geographical boundaries of a particular nation-state and that we also need to focus on the intersection between the practices, exchanges, and experiences of those who have migrated and those who have stayed in place.

**NOTE ON METHODOLOGY**

This chapter is based on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Moscow, Russia, and Fergana, Uzbekistan. The fieldwork took place from January 2014 to July 2016 for a total of eleven months. The fieldsites were
chosen because Moscow is the city with the largest number of Uzbek migrants, whereas Fergana is one of the main migrant-sending regions in Uzbekistan because of its population density and high unemployment rate. Due to my own village background and Uzbek ethnicity, I was well-connected to the Uzbek migrant worker community in Moscow. This enabled me to participate in migrants’ daily lives and thereby become a typical migrant worker.

First, observations and interviews with migrants were conducted at construction sites, bazaars, on the streets, farms, apartments (rezinovye kvartiry), dachas, parking garages, dormitories, car washes, auto service centers, and Uzbek cafes and chayhanas in Moscow city and Podmoskovye (Moscow province), where Uzbek migrants live, work, and socialize. These observations and interviews gave me first-hand information on: (a) how migrants create and maintain social networks, (b) the strategies and tactics that migrants utilize to cope with the risks and challenges of working in Russia, (c) the role of common mahalla origin (mahalladoshlik) in migrants’ everyday life, (d) the “street laws” (ko’cha qonunlari) and masculinity (erkakchilik) rules, (e) the role of social media and smartphones in migrants’ (and their left-behind communities) everyday life, and (f) migrants’ informal social safety nets.

Second, while keeping abreast of developments in the Uzbek migrants’ lives in Moscow, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Fergana region, in the village I call “Shabboda,” which produces a large portion of the migrant population. My aim was to explore the processes of everyday material, emotional, social, and symbolic exchanges between Shabboda village and Moscow and how these transnational interactions impact the outcomes of practices that Uzbek migrants (and other actors) engage with in Moscow. During the field research, I regularly visited migrants’ left-behind families and carried out observations and informal interviews with village residents at “migration-talk hotspots” such as the guzar (mahalla meeting space), choyxona (teahouse), gaps (regular get-togethers) and life-cycle events (e.g., weddings, funerals) where the bulk of mahalla information exchange regarding remittances and migration takes place. Informal interviews with mahalla residents were, in this respect, as useful as the Moscow fieldwork to better understand the evolution of dynamics between actors.

During the field research, I strived for spontaneity and sudden discoveries and therefore went to fieldsites “blank”; that is, without any pre-designed fieldwork strategy or theoretical understanding. Moreover, I treated migrants as experts on the migration situation in Russia, thereby refraining from bringing in my own perspective. The informants were asked for their consent to participate in the study. Due to the sensitivity of the data, I have changed the names and locations of all informants and omitted any information that could be dangerous to the concerned actors.
EVERYDAY TRANSNATIONAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SHABBODA AND MOSCOW

Shabboda is a village in the Fergana region, consisting of 28 mahallas, and it has a population of more than 18,000 people. The income-generating activities of the village residents are made up of multiple sources, ranging from cucumber and grape production, raising livestock for sale as beef, and informal trade, to construction work, daily manual labor (mardikorchilik), fruit-picking, and brokerage. However, remittances sent from Russia constitute the main source of income for many households. Hence, migration is a widespread livelihood strategy, a norm for young and able-bodied men in Shabboda village. Inhabitants are mostly elderly people, women, and children during the “migration season.”

Most village residents have sons or close relatives working in Russia. Shabboda, in the words of my informants, is a “Moscow village,” as the majority of villagers work in Moscow due to the existence of village networks there. Several villagers work as a middleman in Moscow’s construction sector, serving as a gatekeeper to villagers seeking access to the labor market. Most villagers have smartphones with internet access, which enables them to exchange daily news with their co-villagers in Moscow. Absent migrants are “present” in the village through social media (Telegram Messenger, Viber, Odnoklassniki, Facebook) and regular phone calls. Odnoklassniki is the most popular social media site among migrants.78 As other studies have shown, cheap telephone calls, in addition to facilitating daily information exchange between migrants and their left-behind families, also have considerable impact on community life, gender relations, religious and other social practices, and local economic development in both migrant sending and migrant-receiving contexts.79 Similarly, everyday mahalla life and social relations in Shabboda village are being transformed due to migratory processes. Whoever I went and whomever I talked with, the central topic of conversation was migration and remittances. Young men who prefer to stay in the village were usually seen as lazy and abnormal by villagers, while those who migrated to Russia and regularly send money home acquired higher social status. The share of women migrating to Russia was also increasing in the village. While observing everyday life, I felt that there was always someone leaving for Moscow, someone waiting there to receive them, and someone returning to the village to attend a wedding or funeral ceremony. Thus, Shabboda has become a truly “translocal village”80 as everyday material, family, and social exchanges directly connected it to Moscow.

Labor migration from Shabboda village to Moscow should be situated in the context of Uzbekistan’s centuries-old mahalla tradition, which is based on
ties of kinship, reciprocity, and good neighborliness. Derived from the Arabic *mahali*, meaning “local,” the term mahalla is used in Uzbekistan to mean a neighborhood or local community, which is mostly characterized, by common traditions, language, customs, moral values, and reciprocal exchange of money, material goods, and services. Most Uzbekis identify themselves through their mahalla. For example, if a native is asked where he or she lives, the answer will be, “I live in mahalla X.” There are about 12,000 mahallas in Uzbekistan, and each mahalla might contain 150 to 1,500 households. Mahallas are led by an *oqsoqol* (leader) elected by residents. As the state in contemporary Uzbekistan is no longer able to secure the basic needs of its population, mahallas have become a key welfare structure that provide alternative access to public goods, services, and social protection. Seiple describes mahallas as the place where group members look out for each other, collectively parenting their children, connecting friends and family to jobs, distributing funds to those in need, and submitting to the judgment of elders. Typically, mahalla-level mutual aid practices include monetary and labor exchanges, rotating savings and credit initiatives, non-compensated labor during life-cycle rituals, housing construction, and contributions to charity. A *hashar* (non-compensated community project) is the most common mahalla practice, where local residents cooperate with one another through the reciprocal exchange of labor, money, material goods, and services. *Guzar* (mahalla meeting space), *masjid* (mosque), *choyxona* (teahouse), *gaps* (regular get-togethers) and life-cycle events are places where such mutual aid activities are discussed and initiated. The cooperative behavior among mahalla residents is ensured by social norms that create order and increase group solidarity. The failure to comply with mahalla-level social norms might lead to informal sanctions, such as gossip, ridicule, humiliation, or even exclusion. Therefore, every resident tries to conform to social norms established within the mahalla.

These mahalla-based norms, identities, reciprocal relations, and social sanctions will continue to shape Shabboda residents’ livelihoods even when they are not physically present in the village. When talking with people in the village it becomes evident that the decision to migrate to Moscow not only stems from economic considerations, but it is also connected with kinship relations between migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants (i.e., people’s translocal social capital). Villagers believe that going to Moscow will mean joining mahalla and village acquaintances there. They imagine their future migrant life as integrating into their mahalla and village networks that already extend into Moscow. As Shabboda migrants come from the same village, often the same mahalla, and thus their families know one another, there is a high probability that they will continue to help one another when they move to Russia. The fact that families are from the same place and regularly
interact at social events acts as a further guarantee that social pressure can be applied onto a family if their member in Moscow is not acting fairly or not helping his mahalla member. This is also a way to make up for formal protection mechanisms by relying on mahalla connections. So, money is not everything in Shabboda and “alternative currencies” such as respect, prestige, and reputation also count in everyday mahalla life and social relations. Villagers probably attend the same social events and have a relationship of mutual dependence. It is possible that some of the villagers have helped one another in the past. Subsequently, these interactions lead to the emergence of networks of reciprocity, expectations, affections, and obligations among residents. These mahalla-level networks of reciprocity are crucial to the survival of migrants and serve as an alternative social safety net. Hence, the give-and-take rituals constitute an integral part of everyday transnational interactions between Shabboda and Moscow.

Accordingly, the state is absent not only in Shabboda, where villagers use mahalla-driven solidarity to create alternative public goods and services, but also in Moscow, where solidarity and support from mahalla networks make up for the total lack of security from state institutions. Many migrants I encountered were totally unaware of the existence of Uzbek diaspora organizations that could provide some form of redress for their grievances. Also, they received little or no support from the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow when they experienced human rights abuses. As most Shabboda migrants worked in the shadow economy, they were reluctant to approach Russian state institutions because doing so would only invite punishment by the state. Under these circumstances, the only feasible source of help is their village and mahalla networks. Hence, Shabboda migrants usually stick together, in case someone gets sick, needs to send something home, or desperately needs money. Even the terminology they use clearly reflects their precarious livelihood in Russia. Shabboda migrants rarely used the terms such as “migrant” to refer to their status in Russia. Instead they use the term musofir, which provides more context-sensitive definition of what it means to be a migrant worker in Russia. Unlike the more neutral “migrant worker,” musofir refers to a person who works in a foreign country and experiences risks, hardships, and challenges on a daily basis. This is especially evident in the words of one of my informants who stated that “we are not living in Moscow, but we are struggling to survive here” (“Biz bu yerda yashamayapmiz, vizhivat qilishga harakat qilyamiz”).

Smartphones and social media serve as the social glue connecting migrants and their distant mahalla on a daily basis. A growing body of literature on migrant transnationalism and new communication technologies suggests that mobile phones do not “fracture” localities but actually extend and reproduce
them in migrant-receiving societies. Similar patterns can also be observed among Shabboda migrants. Although most Shabboda migrants do not share common accommodations and/or work in different places in Moscow, they are engaged in intertwined relationships that are mediated by smartphones and social media. They regularly use social media apps like Viber, Telegram, and Odnoklassniki to stay in touch with one another in Moscow as well as with their left-behind families and mahalla. Owing to these everyday technologies of transnationalism, news of events that take place in Moscow quickly travel to migrants’ sending village and become the subject of daily discussion. Hence, smartphones allow migrants to remain within the daily life of Shabboda village. Left-behind families and mahalla also take part in migrants’ everyday life in Moscow by sharing mahalla news and giving advice on important matters. Accordingly, smartphones and social media serve as the everyday technologies of transnationalism, reproducing and maintaining mahalla-level identities, social norms, and relations (e.g., reciprocity, affections, trust, obligations, gossips, hierarchies) across distance.

TYPES OF TRANSNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

This section presents two case studies that focus on everyday transnational exchanges between Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their left-behind families and mahalla in Fergana, Uzbekistan. These case studies resulted from my research stays in both in Moscow and the Fergana region. Both cases demonstrate the existence of (telephone-based) transnational mahalla that emerged as an alternative to state migration regulations and have identifiable impacts on the livelihoods of Uzbek migrants and their left-behind community. My goal is to provide a “thick description” of the transnational mahalla that shapes the livelihoods and behavior of its residents “here” (Uzbekistan) and “there” (Russia).

Transnational Mahalla

“Misha” leads a construction brigade (brigada) comprised of his co-villagers and mahalla acquaintances. He employs some of his fellow villagers from Shabboda, and they are all in a mutually dependent relationship. Misha needs trusted workers, and his workers need him to protect and help them, given that they do not speak Russian and have no resources to get official work permits. Even more important, their families are intertwined transnationally. When all goes well in Moscow, Misha’s family back home is well respected and praised for providing economic opportunities to the mahalla. However,
when things go bad and Misha cannot pay wages, his family’s position weakens and they come under attack. If the brigada fails to find a solution with Misha, they can turn to Shabboda to put pressure on Misha in Moscow. Mahalla pressure put Misha’s family in an awkward position. Declining status and dwindling respect eventually lead Misha to find a new arrangement that, although less financially lucrative, saves his and his family’s reputation.

Misha is an early migrant from Shabboda village who brought around 200 of his co-villagers and acquaintances to Moscow. He arrived in 2002 when labor migration was still a new phenomenon in the village. He currently works as a *posrednik* (middleman) in the construction sector, connecting migrant workers and Russian employers. This is the highest rung on the career ladder that many migrant workers strive to reach. Misha is fluent in Russian and Uzbek and well trusted by Russian middleman who approach him with many *zakaz* (jobs). Misha’s main role is to find well-skilled migrant construction workers, take full responsibility for the quality of the construction work, and address migrants’ daily concerns (e.g., accommodation, food) and legal problems (e.g., police problems). It is not so easy to find skilled, reliable migrant construction workers who will perform their tasks in accordance with state standards and not steal construction materials. Kinship is more important than reputation in this case, but workers’ reputation is also key factor when Misha selects workers for his brigade. When Misha approaches someone who is not from his village, or at least his district, they rarely agree to work under him. Coming from the same village creates not only a social bond but also social responsibility in the workers’ mind. Both the family of the middleman and the workers share a territory and interact daily to the point that non-compliance with the agreed obligations from either side would trigger a chain reaction with the workers’ families putting direct pressure on the middleman’s family in the village, a thing that might not happen if the two men’s families lived far from one another.

Thanks to this mechanism, Misha’s *erkakcha gap* (literally “man’s word”) is enough for his workers, and he allows migrants to work without any documents. The work of a middleman in the Russian construction sector is largely informal. An amount is agreed upon and paid gradually as the construction project progresses. There is no written agreement between Misha and his co-villagers, and they rely on *ko’cha qonunlari* (laws of the street) and *erkachilik* (“manliness”) rules to get things done. Misha receives payment from Russian middlemen and then distributes the money to his workers, taking a *dolya* (share) of between 10–15 percent of each workers’ salary. As other studies have demonstrated, the embeddedness of work and social relationships generate mutual dependence and a long-term reciprocity relationship that all parties are happy to continue. This relationship exists on two levels,
the local and the transnational, reinforcing the relations not only between actors but also their families in their home village.  

At the time of fieldwork, Misha’s brigada consisted of 12 migrant workers, and their main job was installing new windows in mid-rise and high-rise buildings. On average, the brigada worked 10–12 hours per day, without taking any days off. They endured harsh conditions, working on the 17th floor despite the freezing cold weather (the outdoor temperature was –25°C). They only took a day off in exceptional circumstances, such as when supplies were delayed or in case of an emergency. Misha usually purchased food, and the brigada cooked meals for themselves. This means every day one migrant, on a rotating basis, could be assigned to prepare lunch and dinner for everyone. In this kind of relationship, there is no clear boundary between work and non-work activities in the brigada’s daily life.

Furthermore, there is no clear boundary between workers and supervisors. Misha takes care of his dependents under the assumption that happy workers are better workers. He may do small favors for some of his workers, such as buying cigarettes or sending money home on someone’s behalf, even if Misha has to advance the sum from his own pocket. Eventually, this combined position of older brother and line manager allowed him to have more leverage. His workers knew that they can count on him but he also knew that, should he need extra help, they would be available to provide it. Likewise, the brigada members were at the center of a complex matrix of relationships. In Moscow they operated under Misha, respected his authority, and called him elder brother, regardless of their age difference. While they have little choice but to trust that he will deliver their salaries, take care of them if they face difficulties, and help them with documents, this trust is based on the understanding that, given their family connections, it would be too costly for him to cheat on them. Any monetary advantage would bring only short-term benefits and would be countered by retaliation at the village level.

Almost all brigada members had smartphones and regularly used Odnoklassniki and Telegram Messenger to check the latest news, view photos of Russian girls, and send instant messages to their families and mahalla networks. New technologies allowed them to remain in touch with their families in a quasi-real time exchange of information between the village and the workers in Moscow. The brigada’s Moscow adventures were the most popular subject of “village talk.” Misha’s capacity to provide for his countrymen not only put him in a higher position in Moscow; it also enhanced the prestige and reputation he and his family enjoyed in Shabboda village. Given that Misha provided many village residents with jobs in Moscow, his family members enjoyed high social status and prestige in the village. When invited to weddings, Misha’s father was always offered a premium table and served
more quickly than others. Misha was especially praised by the parents of his brigada for employing and taking care of their sons.

Despite his high social status, Misha’s prestige is surprisingly tenuous. As long as he is perceived as bringing more benefits than troubles, he will be supported by his brigada and mahalla. However, when this comes into question, or the benefits are not tangible, any kind of allegations might be used to attack him. In April 2014 tensions within the brigada emerged. The brigada had completed half of a window installation job in Moscow but had not been paid since January. Two workers left and others were considering it. The issue was both local, they need money to eat and survive in Moscow, and transnational, since all their families were expecting remittances money. Misha took a clear stand, insisting that he, too, was a victim of circumstances, blaming Russian middleman and the construction firm’s representative.

As the brigada was in daily contact with their families and mahalla, the problems in Moscow quickly travelled to Shabboda village. Relatives of Misha’s workers started putting pressure on Misha’s family, by spreading gossip at guzar, choyxona, and weddings where people gather and talk. This raised rumors in the village about Misha’s exploitative behavior and emboldened many fellow villagers to confront him through his family. Misha, in the villagers’ view, was supposed to secure the brigada’s salary irrespective of the circumstances. After all, the brigada trusted him and worked hard during the cold winter. This was based on an understanding that a person must never assume posrednik role if he cannot keep his word. Tempers flared and some villagers went as far as to accuse Misha of human trafficking. He was held responsible for the brigada’s undocumented status in Russia and the possibility that, if caught, they would be banned from re-entering Russia for five years.

Religion was also invoked. Misha was portrayed as a bad Muslim who earns money through harom (sinful) means. The brigada’s families regularly visited Misha’s house and told neighbors about the situation. Moreover, the oqsoqol (mahalla leader) and imom (leader of the mosque) interfered and warned Misha’s parents that the details of the dispute would be made public during Friday prayers if Misha refused to pay his fellow villagers’ salaries. Misha’s family was under siege, facing daily barb on the village streets. Misha’s father’s situation was particularly bad since he could no longer attend guzar, choyxona, and other social events. Eventually, mahalla pressure forced Misha to make a decision and prioritize the well-being of his family over his personal situation. He borrowed money to pay the brigada’s salaries. Thus, the extension of mahalla-level affective regimes of guilt, shame, and gossip across borders proved to be an enforcement mechanism that determined the outcome of a dispute.
This case study shows that transnational social capital not only provides privileged access to resources but also limits individual freedoms. As Vertovec notes, social capital is based on collective expectations affecting an individual’s behavior, including general shared values, normative reciprocity, and enforceable trust that can be monitored and safeguarded within a social network. Shabboda migrants, despite being physically located in Russia, continue to be influenced by collective expectations and norms of their mahalla and village. On the other hand, villagers are “socially located” in Russia due to their increased engagement in migrants’ everyday life and socioeconomic relations. Due to the inability of the Russian and Uzbek authorities to adequately regulate the migrant-labor market, the mahalla emerged as a transnational governance mechanism resolving the dispute that occurred in the territory of Russia. Thus, everyday lives of Uzbeks are becoming increasingly transnational in light of migratory processes, while the role of the mahalla is becoming increasingly important in the lives of both those who migrate and those who stay behind. The case study also highlights the need to move away from methodological nationalism and broaden our analytical lens to include transnationalism perspective when analyzing social change processes in migrant sending and receiving contexts.

Telephone-based Mahalla in Moscow

The next case study is organized around three empirically interwoven moments including: (1) obligations stemming from shared mahalla origin—mahalladoshlik obligations, (2) solidarity and reciprocity among migrants, and (3) repatriation of a body from Russia to Uzbekistan. All three examples illustrate the role of transnational exchanges and mahalla networks in organizing the precarious livelihoods of Uzbek migrants in Russia.

Mahalladoshlik Obligations

Wednesday afternoon, July 30, 2014, “Zaur” and I were in the car heading toward a construction site in Balashikha, a small city in Podmoskovye (Moscow province) where the majority of Shabboda migrants work. Unlike his co-villagers who work in the construction sector, Zaur works as a clerk at the grocery store in Moscow city, a status that made him known as Russkiy (Russian) among his co-villagers, given the fact that he receives a higher salary and not obliged to do chornaia rabota (black work). As Zaur is considered to be more successful and better connected than other migrants, people from Shabboda village often contact him with requests.

As we neared the construction site, Zaur received a phone call from Uzbekistan. He usually picks up calls if they come from Uzbekistan and im-
Immediately answered. It was Zaur’s neighbor, “Ozoda,” who had an urgent request. From their phone conversation I learned that Ozoda’s husband, “Ulugbek,” who works on greenhouse farm in Vologda city, recently had appendectomy surgery and was on a train to Moscow. Ozoda was very worried about her husband as he was physically unable to work and had no money to purchase train ticket back to Uzbekistan. It was obvious that Ozoda asked Zaur to help her husband return to Uzbekistan. After finishing the conversation, Zaur said that we needed to return to Moscow city and meet Ulugbek at Kazanskaya railway station when he arrived from Vologda. On our way to the station, I asked Zaur to tell more about the details of the phone conversation, and he provided the following account:

Ulugbek and I come from the same mahalla. He is in a critical situation now, as he has neither good health nor money to return to Uzbekistan. There is no train from Vologda to Tashkent for the next 10 days, so he must go to Moscow first and then take another train to Tashkent. Actually, Ulugbek could have taken direct train from Vologda to Tashkent if he stayed there 10 more days.

He knows that he would be taken care by his mahalla networks if he comes to Moscow. Therefore, he is now coming to Moscow. Ulugbek is very clever. He didn’t contact me directly. Instead he contacted me through his wife since he knew that I wouldn’t refuse if someone contacts me directly from Fergana.

Of course, I have no any other choice but to cover Ulugbek’s expenses from my own pocket. First, I am now driving from Balashikha to Kazanskaya railway station and burning gasoline. If you take taxi, you will spend at least 3,000 rubles for this trip.

Second, Ulugbek wants to return home as soon as possible, but train tickets to Uzbekistan are usually sold out. One needs to buy a ticket at least three days before traveling. This means I have to bribe the train provodnik [conductor] and arrange a place [without valid ticket] for him. In addition, there are many thieves and racketeers in Kazanskaya railway station that extort money from migrants. I have connections there and I can make sure that Ulugbek safely boards the train and reaches home without any problems.

Third, Ulugbek does not have any money to pay for train expenses. This means I have to bribe the provodnik from my own pocket, and I know that Ulugbek will not return this money to me. This would be treated as my “mahalladoshlik obligation.”

But I hope he would appreciate my help and tell our mahalla about my odamgarchilik [good deeds]. This is enough for me. You see how much trouble and expenses I have and the time I loose just to keep my face in the mahalla.
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If I refuse to help Ulugbek and other mahalla acquaintances, mahalla people will spread gossip about me saying that I have no odamgarchilik. Of course, I am in Moscow now and could just ignore the gossip, but I have to consider my family members’ situation, as they are the ones who bear the consequences of my decision.

We arrived at Kazanskaia station at 4 pm. Ulugbek’s train arrived one hour later. Events unfolded exactly how Zaur had described. After meeting Ulugbek at the station, we all headed toward a small fast food cafe where migrants can get fake work permits and residence registrations. There we met one Uzbek woman who was well-connected with train provodniks. Zaur paid her 7,500 rubles and she then guided us toward the station and quickly arranged a special seat for Ulugbek on a Moscow–Tashkent train. After a short conversation with the conductor, she assured us that Ulugbek was now in safe hands and would be in Uzbekistan in five days. Zaur gave an additional 1,000 rubles to Ulugbek and told him that he can use it for his food expenses during the long trip. We shook hands with Ulugbek, and watched as the train departed for Uzbekistan.

Solidarity and Reciprocity among Migrants

In April 14, 2014, I spent a day together with “Baha,” a migrant construction worker from Shabboda village. Baha does not have a stable job, but he usually receives various short-term offers from private clients, for example, to install windows or fix apartment doors. After we had dinner, we took a taxi to the parking garage in Moscow’s Babushkinskaya district, where “Horin,” another migrant from Shabboda, works. Baha did not tell me why we were going to visit him, but I assumed that he was going to introduce me to him. Horin and his boss “Kolya” welcomed us at the garage entrance and we all shook hands. After a brief chat, Baha told me that we would need to join Horin and Kolya and go to Medvedkovo district where Kolya’s apartment is located. I did not know why were going there but I quickly learned that Horin had asked Baha to repair his boss’ broken door. I concluded that Baha had received a job offer and that he was going to earn some money now. It took Baha nearly two hours to repair the door. Based on my knowledge of pay rates in the construction sector, I was confident that he would get at least 1,500 rubles payment for his work. Surprisingly, Baha did not receive any payment for his work, except the fact that Horin promised that he would invite us for dinner next week. Although I had a good understanding of the migrant labor market in Moscow, this situation was puzzling for me. In my view, Horin had clearly abused Baha’s kindness by just expressing his gratitude and not translating it into some cash. When I asked about it, Baha explained:
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Our musofirchilik [migrant] life in Moscow can be compared to how we live in our mahalla in Shabboda village in Fergana. You know, in our mahalla people help one another during weddings, funerals, house construction, irrigation infrastructure building, road asphaltling, et cetera. This is a hashar—collective effort of the mahalla to solve day-to-day problems. Without hashar it is very hard to get the things done. As we are all musofir in Russia, it is very important that we continue this tradition and support one another. We are nobody in Russia, the lowest-class of workers, without any rights. Russians treat us lower than dogs, simply we are all churka [dumb] to them. Therefore, we need to stick to one another and live like one mahalla.

As you see, I helped Horin and did not ask any payment. Horin enhanced his status (plyus bo’ldi), as he fulfilled his boss Kolya’s request without any cost. I know that Horin appreciates my help and he would also do some favor for me if I ask him for help. I helped him today, and he will help me tomorrow. If you ask money for everything, you would be alone tomorrow when you get into trouble. You don’t die from hunger if you have good relationship with your mahalla and village networks. We are all musofir here, so you must be kind and generous to your mahalla networks, otherwise you cannot survive in Russia.

Repatriating a Body from Russia to Uzbekistan

Uzbek migrants, like other Central Asian migrants, experience difficult living and working conditions in Russia, including discrimination, hazardous working conditions, and physical violence. Hence, the threat of death looms over migrants’ daily life in Russia. As one of the Shabboda migrants said, “Death can be the fate of any musofir in Russia as we are working in a bespredel [limitlessness, lawless] country where anything can happen.” Aware of their own precarious livelihoods, migrants voluntarily contribute to repatriation expenses if someone from their mahalla or village dies from work-related accidents, disease, or from neo-Nazi skinhead attacks.

When someone is killed, this news spreads swiftly because migrants immediately contact their mahalla networks via smartphones and social media. There is no standard contribution amount, and migrants determine how much to contribute based on their financial situation and income level. As the threat of death is constantly present in the lives of migrants, news of a death affects everyone deeply, and many migrants step forward to help with repatriation expenses. The following statement by “Nodir,” a migrant from Shabboda, indicates that migrants see their contribution to the body repatriation process as a form of insurance in case of their own death:

I always make contribution to body repatriation because I know my co-villagers would do the same favor for me were I to suddenly die from a work accident or disease. Body repatriation is a hashar—a collective mahalla project where
everyone is expected to contribute. If you are greedy and don’t contribute, there is a high likelihood that your body will not be taken care of in case you die. Nobody wants his body to remain in Russia, we all want to be buried in our homeland.

Due to these risks, Uzbek migrants tend to capitalize on their mahalla traditions (norms of reciprocity and solidarity, good neighborliness) as a means to cope with the challenges of musofirchilik in Russia. However, this practice is spread only within village and mahalla networks; it is rare to see someone from Uzbekistan’s Kashkadarya region contributing to the repatriation of a deceased Fergana migrant, for example. This indicates that bonds of mahaliychilik (localism) and mahalla-bound identities are stronger than national or ethnic belonging among Uzbek migrants.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter explored the everyday transnational lives of Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their left-behind families and communities in rural Fergana. I argued that rapid improvements in communication technologies (e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled Uzbek migrants to stay in touch with their origin societies as well as to create telephone-based, transnational mahallas in Moscow, which attract migrants from the same village in Uzbekistan. It was empirically shown that the mahalla-based identities, solidarity, reciprocity and social sanctions are reproduced and maintained across the distance and have a significant impact on the livelihood strategies of Uzbek migrants and their left-behind families.

One important finding of my study is that mahalla institutions are undergoing significant changes due to migratory processes. They are becoming involved in shaping the livelihoods of their residents both locally and transnationally. This means not only Uzbek people but also their mahallas are becoming nomadic. My findings in this sense do not provide support for previous research that claims that the mahallas’ capacity to enforce social norms is weakening because migrant remittances reduce the need for mutual aid activities and creating economic inequality among mahalla people. As my findings indicate, migration further strengthens the mahallas’ role in the everyday life of Uzbeks, as a mahalla-based moral economy (e.g., traditional modes of trust, obligation, shame, and neighborliness) and mahalla-bound identities have been extended across borders and have considerable impact on the livelihoods of Uzbek migrants in Russia. It is actually the existence of everyday transnational interactions and pressures between migrants and their left-behind mahalla that create strong moral bonds and serve as a main
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social safety net and risk-sharing institution for Uzbek migrants whose rights and needs are not addressed by the Russian or Uzbek governments. Thus, the intrinsic message of this chapter is that the study of migration and social change cannot be confined to the political and geographical boundaries of a particular nation-state and that we also need to focus on the intersection among the practices, exchanges, and experiences of those who have migrated and those who have stayed in place.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Throughout the chapter, Russian and Uzbek words are spelled according the standard literary form. They are used based on the following two criteria: (1) whether a Russian/Uzbek word or phenomenon is central to the study; (2) if an English translation does not fully capture the meaning of the Russian/Uzbek word or phenomenon. Russian and Uzbek words are presented in italics. The principal exceptions are mahalla, musofir, musofirchilik, hashar, brigada, posrednik, mahalliychilik, since these words are frequently used or have a central place in the chapter.

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NOTES


4. Ruziev, Ghosh, and Dow, “The Uzbek Puzzle Revisited.”


13. Laruelle, “Central Asian Labor Migrants in Russia.”


19. Ilkhamov “Labour Migration and the Ritual Economy of the Uzbek Extended Family.”

20. Abashin “Migration from Central Asia to Russia in the New Model of World Order.”


38. According to *RFE Uzbek Service*, 7 million citizens of Uzbekistan are registered on *Odnoklassniki*—the most popular social networking site in the post-Soviet space. At least 1.5 million Uzbeks visit *Odnoklassniki* on a daily basis. Some 92% of these visitors use mobile version of the site, which means visitors mainly use smartphones to access the site. “Bir iarim million uzbekistonlik khar kuni,” *RFE Uzbek Service*, 2013, accessed October 1, 2016, http://www.ozodlikorg/a/25120527.html.


43. Abashin, “Migration from Central Asia to Russia in the New Model of World Order.”

44. Abashin, “Central Asian Migration.”


46. Round and Kuznetsova, “Necropolitics and the Migrant as a Political Subject of Disgust.”


51. Bobylov, “Glava FMS.”


55. Abashin, “Migration Policies in Russia.”


59. Markku Kangaspuro and Anna-Liisa Heusala, “Russian Foreign Policy and Migrant Workers,” in Migrant Workers in Russia, 35–50.

60. Sahadeo argues that negative attitudes towards Central Asian workers existed even during the Soviet times in spite of družba narodov (people’s friendship) discourse. Central Asians who worked on construction sites (limitchiki) in Moscow and Leningrad were perceived as chernye (black) and faced discrimination. See J. Sahadeo, “Družba Narodov or second-class citizenship? Soviet Asian Migrants in a Post-colonial World,” Central Asian Survey 26, no. 4 (2007): 559–79.


64. Round and Kuznetsova, “Necropolitics and the Migrant as a Political Subject of Disgust.”


67. Laruelle “Central Asian Labor Migrants in Russia.”

68. Uzbekistan’s official policy with regard to Uzbek labor migrants in Russia is changing under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The government has finally acknowledged the scale and economic importance of these migratory processes.

70. Abashin, “Migration from Central Asia to Russia in the New Model of World Order.”


75. Etzold, “Migration, Informal Labour, and (Trans) Local Productions of Urban Space.”

76. Velayutham and Wise, “Moral Economies of a Translocal Village.”

77. Etzold, “Migration, Informal Labour, and (Trans) Local Productions of Urban Space.”

78. Chikadze and Brednikova, Migrants from Uzbekistan in Russia.


87. Raul Pertierra et al., Txt-ing Selves: Cellphones and Philippine Modernity (Manila: De La Salle University Press, 2002); Nicole Constable, Romance on a Global Stage: Pen Pals, Virtual Ethnography, and “Mail Order” Marriages (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); McKay, “Translocal Circulation.”
88. All names used in case studies are pseudonyms.
91. S. Vertovec, “Migration and other Modes of Transnationalism.”
93. Round and Kuznetsova, “Necropolitics and the Migrant as a Political Subject of Disgust.”
94. Kikuta, “Remittances, Rituals, and Reconsidering Women’s Norms in Mahallas.”