In memoriam - Jordan Howard Sobel (1929 – 2010)

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Published in:
Theoria

2010

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):

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Obituary

In memoriam: Jordan Howard Sobel (1929–2010)

by

WLODEK RABINOWICZ

A FINE PHILOSOPHER AND a good friend, Howard Sobel, died on March 26 this year. His death was a loss to many Swedish philosophers who both loved and admired him. While he lived in Toronto in Canada, Uppsala was his intellectual “home away from home.” In recent years, Sobel was a regular visitor to the philosophy department in Uppsala where he gave courses and attended research seminars every Spring term from 1999 onwards. In recognition of his contributions, he was awarded an honorary doctorate by Uppsala University in 2003.

His first visit to Uppsala, by the way, took place as early as May 1986. On that occasion, he delivered a series of advanced lectures on decision theory, as well as being an opponent at Jan Österberg’s defence of a doctoral dissertation on ethical egoism. Many of us who were present at the defence still vividly recall this event. Sobel was unyielding in his criticisms, despite (or perhaps because of) his great

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Sobel returned to Uppsala to spend the whole academic year 1997–1998 and the Spring of 1999 as a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of Advanced Study. Needless to say, on several occasions he also was invited to lecture at other Swedish universities, in Lund, Stockholm, and not least in Umeå, where he delivered the Burman lectures in 1998.

Sobel’s first contacts with Sweden go as far back as the end of the 1960s; at that time, he read Lars Bergström’s groundbreaking dissertation *The Alternatives and Consequences of Actions* (1966) and the two of them engaged in a lively correspondence. Even earlier, in 1965, *Theoria* published his paper on “Generalization Arguments”, in which he criticized some of the claims made by Marcus Singer in *Generalization in Ethics* (1961). This was in fact his first ever publication in a philosophical journal.

Generalization arguments in ethics were the subject of Sobel’s doctoral dissertation *What If Everyone Did That?*, done under the supervision of Richard Cartwright and William Frankena, which he defended at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in 1961, the same year as Singer’s book came out. After the defence and a short stay as an instructor at Princeton, he went on to UCLA as an assistant professor and then to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. In 1969, he moved to the University of Toronto, first as an associate professor and then, from 1976, as a full professor. There he remained until his retirement in 1995.

*Theoria* was fortunate enough to be one of the outlets for his philosophical work throughout the years. As late as 2008, it published one of his very last papers, on the paradox of the liar. For the complete list of his *Theoria* publications, see below.

On a personal note, my own contacts with Sobel date back to the early 1980s. They began with an extensive correspondence on causal decision theory and in time led to a life-long friendship, after I visited him and his wife Willa during their stay in Cambridge in 1985. Sobel’s seminal work on decision theory and game theory and his subtle discussions of the conceptual framework of utilitarian and contractarian theories in ethics were a major source of inspiration for my own work in these areas. His version of causal decision theory still seems to me unsurpassed, on a par with the classical contributions by Allan Gibbard and William Harper, David Lewis and Brian Skyrms and the more recent work by James Joyce. His early papers on decisions and games are collected in the volume *Taking Chances* (CUP, 1994), which in my view is indispensable reading for anyone who is interested in the problems of rational choice. There is also a difficult and challenging book manuscript *Probability, Chance and Choice – A Theory of Rational Agency* (1978, revised 1980), which unfortunately has never been published. It is available on Sobel’s website, www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~sobel/. The manuscript deserves close
study: it contains an astonishing wealth of insights into the foundations of decision theory.

Sobel continued to work on rational choice in the 1990s, even after his intimate engagement with causal decision theory came to an end. From that later period one might especially mention his work on the assumptions needed to justify backward induction as a method of solving choice problems in games and decisions. The presuppositions of this influential approach require philosophical analysis. Sobel was one of the first researchers who had undertaken this task in a serious way. His work on cyclical preferences and money pumps also deserves to be mentioned in this context.

Connections between issues in rational choice and the problem of free will are at the forefront of his fascinating book *Puzzles for the Will – Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience* from 1998 (University of Toronto Press).

As for Sobel’s study of utilitarianism and contractualism, one has to go to a series of papers published in the 1970s, 80s and early 90s, in such journals as *Inquiry, Nous, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Theoria, Dialogue* and *Philosophical Studies*. Unfortunately, his contributions in this area have never been collected in book form, but their influence on the philosophical debates of that period was important. They were widely read by moral philosophers with consequentialist leanings, not least in Sweden, and much discussed. An issue that I especially come to think of in this context concerns our predictable deviations from an optimal course of actions and the normative relevance of such deviations for our current decisions – a problem that Bergström already had taken up in his dissertation. To give an example that comes from a later paper by Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter:1 should I undertake an important task that I am well equipped to perform (say, to write a review of a new book), if I am convinced that I am not going to deliver? Or should I rather decline the assignment from the beginning? Many of us unfortunately recognize this predicament from our own experience! Sobel’s treatment of the issue can be found in “Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes” (*Noûs*, 1976).

Sobel was always deeply interested in logical methods. One of his special interests concerned logical paradoxes. Another was the application of logic to philosophy of religion. In 2004, Cambridge University Press published his *Logic and Theism – Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God*. Since the subject is one I am not very familiar with, let me refer to a review by Nicholas Everitt: “This is an outstanding work in the philosophy of religion. It is immensely scholarly, meticulous in its attention to detail, both textual and philosophical, hugely well-informed in the relevant literature, bold where it needs to be bold, yet carefully

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I have just added the following text in the document:

nuanced where qualification is required” (Philosophical Books, 47, pp. 380–3).
Everitt is the author of The Non-existence of God which appeared the same year as Sobel’s volume.

The book on logic and theism was recently followed by another treatise, Walls and Vaults – A Natural Science of Morals. Virtue Ethics According to David Hume (Wiley, 2009). Hume had long been one of Sobel’s pet projects, along with three other main figures in the history of western moral philosophy: Plato, Aristotle and Kant. On Sobel’s website there are book-length drafts on each of these three philosophers: No Light Matter – Socrates and Plato on Justice; Ends and Means – Aristotle on Happiness and Virtue; and The Mystery and the Glory – Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy of Morals. There is also an extended draft dealing with the history of twentieth-century metaethics: Good and Gold – A Judgmental History of Metaethics from G. E. Moore through J. L. Mackie. It is to be hoped that all this material will eventually find a publisher. Sobel’s approach to the great stars of moral philosophy is consistently stimulating and subtle in its attention to the argumentative structure of their work: “bold where it needs to be bold, yet carefully nuanced where qualification is required”.

The sheer amount of unpublished material gives some indication as to how active Sobel was as a philosopher up until the time of his death. He will be missed by his readers, colleagues and friends.

Sobel’s Publications in Theoria

“Generalization Arguments.” Theoria (1965), 32–60.

His Publications in Swedish Philosophical Festschrifts


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