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FÖRORD

Jag och mina vänner hade temafest i Malmö. Varje rum hade ett eget tema med anpassad musik och temaspecifika inredningsdetaljer. Sovrummet blev till körsbärsdalens vardagsrummet förvandlades till ”stora dans” och vad som egentligen hände i ”rum revolution” har jag fortfarande inte riktigt fått klarhet i. Köket gjordes om till ”salong spisdunk” och föga förvånande spelades där allt annat än mingelvänligt musik. På så vis kunde vi undvika ”köksfestscenariet”, vilket innebär att flertalet gäster flyr högtalarnas poackande på uppmärksamhet för att istället flockas och svettas i ett trångt och illaluktande kök. Kanske vill jag med detta förord just mana till dans, en förhoppning om att du som läsare emellanåt studsar ut från köket och in i körsbärsdalen eller var du nu önskar bege dig. De flesta kapitel kan läsas relativt självständigt från varandra och om du så önskar slipper du ta reda på vad som egentligen hände i ”rum revolution”.

Nu har vi klarat av momentet ”smålustig inledning” och säkert är några av er ivriga att finna just ert namn i den tackkavalkad som brukar finnas i dessa, avhandlingens mest lästa, sidor. Vi får väl se. Jag vill inleda med att uppmärksamma Krisberedskapsmyndigheten (KBM), Svenska nätverket för Europaforskning i Statsvetenskap, Crafoordska stiftelsen, Stiftelsen Lars Hiertas minnesfond, samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten och statsvetenskapliga institutionen vid Lunds Universitet. Tack vare finansiella förstärkningar från nämnda bidragsgivare har jag fått möjlighet att resa på konferenser, införska litteratur och andra faciliteter som underlättat tillvaron som doktorand. Ibland måste man jobba för sin lön. Tack till Gunilla Jarlbro och Ole Elgström för er förmåga att ordna extraknäck, och tack till Marja Åkerström som tillsammans med mig hetsade fram en ambitiös medierapport om Sveriges ordförandeskapsperiod i EU. En annan kategori som förtjänar ett kollektivt tack är de tidsskrifter (European Societies, European Legacy och Geografiska Annaler, series B) och antologiredaktörer som givit mig tillstånd att återanvända visst material i denna bok. Intellektuell stimulans och kloka kommentarer har jag fått på diverse konferenser i allt från Mexico City till Loka Brunn. Tack alla medverkande. Lorenza Sebesta ska ha ett särskilt tack för att hon tog emot mig som gästläsare vid Punto Europa i Forlì.


Vi går nu in i fasen ”särskilda omnämningar”. Catarina Kinnvall handledde mig hösten 1999 in i forskarutbildningen och Tove Dannestam är en lika begåvad läsare som god samtalskompis. Tillsammans var de
opponenter på mitt slutseminarium. Många förbättringar av manus som gjorts under våren är grundade i deras påpassliga påpekanden.


Det är inte riktigt slut än. Jag vill nu vända mig till mina föräldrar som, i snart trettio år, har trott på och stöttat mig genom livet. Syster Klara har utöver sina fantastiska syskongenskaper som supporter av sin lillebror och


Tre minuter efter midnatt den trettionde juli år 2000 föddes min son. De vackra ögonblicken lever och växer: det är till dig, Benjamin, som jag tillägnar denna bok.

Malmö i April 2006
till Benjamin
1. THE NEW EUROPE

a site of struggle
THE NEW EUROPE

This book deals with contemporary imaginings of the new Europe. It is not clear what ‘the new Europe’ refers to. Are we talking about the Europe of nation-states that saw the light of day in the aftermath of the peace in Westphalia 1648 (1)? Is ‘the new Europe’ the outcome of the French revolution and its enlightened thoughts about infinite progress and modernity (2)? Or is ‘the new Europe’ associated with the colonial enterprise that exported the European way of living to distant parts of the world (3)? Was it maybe when Peter the First decided to open ‘a window on the West’ (Neumann 1999: 76) that we saw the embryo of what we now refer to as Europe (4)? Perhaps we need to go even further back in Russian history, to Ivan the Third, and his ambitions - after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 – to transform Moscow into a third Rome (5)? Or was it that ‘the new Europe’ dawned when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met on Yalta 1945 to map out the post-World War II geography of Europe (6)? A popular representation of ‘the new Europe’ is associated with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. The wall had previously established an artificial border between the Western member-states of the European Union (EU) and the collective of nations from Eastern Europe that since 2004 are members of the EU (7). Yet another image of ‘the new Europe’ is today associated with the prospects of a citizen’s Europe and visions of a distinct European Community to which Europeans could commit themselves (8).

From different angles these narratives of a new Europe are used and told in various settings to propose a certain definition of Europe. The European Union consists of more or less well-established nation-states that continue to play an active part also in a more integrated Europe (1). Even if the French revolution is far away, ideas generally associated with the Enlightenment are reused in contemporary visions of a borderless cosmopolitan community of European nations and peoples (2). Against this view, however, it

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1 The peace in Westphalia has been a symbol for state-centric theories within ‘International Relations’ (IR). The numbers within brackets represent different narratives of what may constitute ‘the new Europe’.
can be argued that we cannot properly engage with the European integration process without taking into consideration post-colonial (re)-constellations between “us” and “them”(3). Some three hundred years ago, Peter the First wanted Russia to become part of Europe and its history of progress (4). Where Europe exactly ends and Asia begins has been a matter of dispute ever since. At the same time, the 1989 events have come to symbolise the end of the old ruptures between east and west; between communism and liberal democracy (7), and Athens and Rome continue to serve as points of reference for contemporary imaginations of a certain ‘European spirit’ that supposedly tie the 25 member-states together (5). In the articulations of ‘the new Europe’ as the fulfilment of the EU as a peace project, references are made to the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of the Union, predominantly Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, that some ten years after Yalta (6) decided to ‘lock in peace inside the borders’ so as to prevent future conflicts between France and Germany (e.g. Patten March 7, 2001). On the 15th of February 2003, millions of Europeans marched in the streets to demonstrate against the United States intervention in Iraq. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas saw in these events ‘the birth of a European public sphere’. In this case, the new Europe draws together European citizens against the militaristic ideology of the United States (8).

**A SITE OF STRUGGLE**

This short overview of narratives of what constitutes ‘the new Europe’ suggests that the question of what makes Europe “Europe” has no definite answer. The concept of Europe lacks

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2 The metaphor of the EU turning into a ‘fortress Europe’ is perhaps congruent with this image. See also Hansen (2000; 2004) who opposes the image of the EU as peace project, instead he brings to our attention the (civil) war between France and Algeria. See also Gerard Delanty (1995: 7) who argues that: ‘It was colonialism and conquest that unified Europe and not peace and solidarity’.

3 This reference connotes to a specific speech made by European Union Commissioner Chris Patten. As is the case with other references to speeches from the EU, I have located it at the search engine ‘Rapid’ (EUROPA – website).

4 Habermas initiated a joint statement with Jacques Derrida and other intellectuals, published in ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’ on 31 May 2003 (Habermas & Derrida 2003). See also discussion in (Borradori 2003) where Habermas and Derrida argue that the United States has recently begun to distort and betray the otherwise cherished ideals of modernity (cf. Delanty & Rumford 2004: 66).
essence. At the same time, these and other narratives of what constitutes ‘the new Europe’ give rise to different and sometimes contradicting definitions of Europe. According to Janelle Reinelt (2001: 365), the idea of Europe is a ‘liminal concept, fluid and indeterminate, and most importantly, a site of possible struggle’. The concept of Europe calls forth a struggle of definitions and, in this respect, Jan Ifversen (2002: 3) asserts that ‘[t]he use of the word ‘Europe’ has simply been taken as evidence for the manifestation of an idea of Europe’. What does it mean, Ifversen asks, to talk in the name of Europe and who may be entitled to do so (ibid: 4)? Ifversen hints at the close association between the political project of the EU and the concept of Europe. Indeed, contemporary political debates on the EU in relation to its member-states convey questions related to articulations of a certain European identity; of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. I believe that we are not able to engage with the ongoing integration of European nations and peoples without taking into consideration how the position of Europe is framed in relation to the positions of distinct nation-states. A point of departure of this study is that these identity positions define ‘the rules of the game’; i.e. categories that condition political debates around EU-related issues.

Let me give an example from a debate on ‘a future constitution for the EU’ in Lund, Sweden on November 11, 2003. There were four participants in the panel, myself included. We were given ten minutes each to introduce our main arguments. I was last to talk. The other three were, from different angles and perspectives (left-wing, liberal and juridical), clearly enthusiastic about the expected changes that would emerge from the implementation of a new constitutional treaty for the enlarged union. They described the further constitutionalization of the EU in terms of, for instance “a historical moment”, “better democracy”, “closer to the people”;

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5 See also E.E Schattschneider (1960) who argues: ‘Political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance of the definition of the issues. As a matter of fact, the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country.’ Thomas Diez (1999: 603) shares a similar perspective: ‘The contest about concepts is thus a central political struggle’. See also Deleuze & Guattarisis (1994) who emphasise the struggle of meaning as always latent in the defining of concepts.
“increased transparency”, and “a more coherent institutional framework”.

Eventually, I found myself in the position of acting as the devil’s advocate. Without controversies, there is no debate. I thus mentioned some problems connected with the integration process in general and the idea of the constitutional treaty in particular (most of which you will be familiar with, reading this book). During my talk, at the corner of my eye, I watched the others take notes. After my presentation, I was flooded with critical remarks. For instance, the liberal, a member of the European Parliament (MEP), said that I was not old enough to understand the significance of the EU as a peace project. There was, however, one question that united the three: why did I think of Sweden or the nation-state as so much better than the EU or Europe? What is interesting about these reactions is that I did not mention anything about Sweden in my speech nor did I explicitly refer to Europe as an idea: it was simply presupposed by the others in the panel that I somehow preferred Sweden to the EU; that I somehow preferred Sweden to Europe. It is not necessarily what you say that matters the most, but from which position you are articulating yourself. In some cases you are assigned a position rather than actually choosing the position from which you make your voice heard.

Maybe it was just a rhetorical game. They wanted to as effectively as possible advance an argument and downplay the relevance of mine. I believe, though, that there is more to it than that. During the past ten to fifteen years there have been a number of public referenda on EU-related topics in the EU member-states, ranging from membership, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to the ratification of constitutional treaties. Arguably, these campaigns have been framed around two distinct positions; that is the ‘Europeans’ versus the ‘nationals’.

The situation represents a case of identity politics. Identity politics indicates the contingent process during which “we” define ourselves as distinct from others that are not considered part of “us”. Practices of identity politics sustain greater in-group cohesion and the inherent logic entails a demarcation line between “us” and “them”. Identity politics is, on the one hand, about the making of

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6 I will explicitly deal with three of these domestic referenda in the fifth chapter of this thesis
similarities of what knits “us” together as a collective. On the other hand, it entails the making of differences; of ascribing to others a set of traits that together define “them” as a group as different from “us”. The employment of identity politics in the name of Europe indicates that “we Europeans” belong together and that “we” somehow are different from “them”, (“the not-Europeans”). The nation-state (“the nationals”) and ‘Europe’ (“the Europeans”) can in this respect be seen as two distinct identity positions from which we interpret what is said in the debate around EU-related issues. They feed off each other and are defined in relation to one another. This relation constrains the possibility of articulating alternative positions. The various attempts to fill the concept of Europe with meaning thus involve elements of power and repression in which alternative articulations are ruled out. This thesis emphasises the employment of identity politics in relation to the political project of the EU.

AIM OF THE STUDY

My ambition with this thesis is to analyse articulations of what makes Europe “Europe” in the context of the political project of the EU. This ambition is carried out in two interrelated steps. Firstly, I analyse how the concept of Europe is filled with meaning through articulations of a certain European identity. In particular, I look at the relation between the position of Europe and the positions of the nation-states. Secondly, I scrutinise the limits of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. In particular, I devote attention to contemporary labelling processes of what makes “us” (“the Europeans”) different from “them” (“the Not-Europeans”).

In the book, I focus on how articulations of a European identity partially fix the meaning of what makes Europe “Europe” and thereby attribute to the concept of Europe a tangible form. In relation to the intra-European integration process of nations and peoples, Europe is made the symbol for “us” coming together in a

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7 I use the label ‘Not-Europeans’ to signify not only those who are not citizens of a European nation-state, but also people or movements that in one way or another abstain from pro-union views of what makes Europe “Europe”.

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union. For that reason it is relevant to analyse articulations of what makes Europe “Europe” with a particular focus on the political project of the EU. In the political process of bringing the peoples and nations of Europe closer together, Europe is imagined as a distinct community with more or less clearly defined boundaries towards what Europe is not. Articulations of a certain European identity bring to the fore labelling processes that separate those who are knitted together more effectively from those increasingly left behind in the development towards greater intra-European cohesion. Bringing Europe down to earth, in this sense, means to highlight that there are no neutral definitions of Europe, which in turn encourage us to focus on the construction of borders between “us” (‘The Europeans’) and “them” (‘the not-Europeans’).

**BRINGING EUROPE DOWN TO EARTH**

In 1947 Max Horkheimer and Thedor Adorno, both members of the so called Frankfurt school of critical theory, firstly\(^8\) published their reputable book ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ in which they identified contradictions inherent in the heritage of the Enlightenment (2001: 3): ‘In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant’. While Horkheimer and Adorno wrote their book in a period of war, during which they had experienced totalitarian ideologies put into practice, I nevertheless believe that their approach is relevant for my ambition of bringing Europe down to earth as well. Central for critical theory is that ‘… a tension with itself, is built into social organization and culture. One cannot have grasped the sources of events and dynamism without grasping this underlying level of contradictions and differences’ (Calhoun 1999: 18; see also Morrow 1994: 7-8). In this perspective, any major political project (such as the EU) features inherent tensions and contradictions despite its integrative ambitions. The project of bringing Europe down to earth thus encourages us to focus on inconsistencies and possible paradoxes in

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\(^8\)The original German version was, however, published in 1944.
any attempt to partially fix the meaning of what makes Europe “Europe”. In this process of “demystification” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1992: 6-17; cf. Alvesson & Deetz 2000: 34), we come across how articulations of a certain European identity establish borders between what “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) are in relation to what is not considered part of “us” (as in “them”, ‘the not-Europeans’).9

In this thesis, I emphasise how the idea of Europe has been constructed from above (Delanty 1995; Haller 2001; Shore 2000; Waever 1996).10 However, it is not possible to completely dominate the site of struggle of what makes Europe “Europe”. Political articulations (hegemonic or not) are partial fixations of meaning, and thus open for redefinition and alteration (see further chapter 2 of this thesis). Bringing Europe down to earth means, on the one hand, to highlight that any articulation of a certain European identity is inherently inconsistent and filled with tensions and, on the other hand, to scrutinise how the contingent attempts, to partially fix the concept of Europe in relation to for instance ‘the nation’, constrain the possibility of articulating alternative positions. This tension, between the impossibility of ultimately defining what makes Europe “Europe” and the various attempts to partially fix the meaning of the concept of Europe, guides my analysis of articulations of a certain European identity in the context of the political project of the EU. In other words, I am not interested in shedding light on what the European identity really is nor do I intend to contribute to the discussion of what a more inclusive European identity ought to or could be.11 Rather, I focus on how

9 Whereas I refer to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School as a source of inspiration for my ambition of bringing Europe down to earth, I do not use this strand of critical theory as a theoretical framework for the actual analysis.

10 Delanty (1995: 6) says that ‘it is in their [the elite] language that the idea of Europe has been codified’. He argues further that (ibid): ‘The idea of Europe, by virtue of its own resonance, functions as a hegemon which operates to produce an induced consensus…’. In Delanty’s macro-oriented analysis, the idea of Europe crystallises in five ‘discourses’: Christendom, civilisation (based on the enlightenment), culture, the political discourse of post 1945 Europe and finally the discourse of ‘fortress Europe’ vis-à-vis a discourse of a ‘citizen’s Europe’ (ibid: 13-4). In this sense, different narratives of what constitute ‘the new Europe’ evolve in various ‘discourses’ of a certain ‘European idea’.

11 In conformity with the ambition of this thesis, Peo Hansen emphasises (2000: 21-2; cf. Hall 1997: 290) that the key question is not to what extent definitions of Europe or articulations of a European identity are true or not, but rather how definitions of Europe or articulations of a European identity are ‘made to be true’.

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articulations of a certain European identity set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.

The ‘new Europe’ that we face today rests on a conglomerate of historical paradoxes and myths. However, my analysis of articulations of a certain European identity is mainly restricted to contemporary times: I dedicate myself more to contemporary re-readings of a common European history than I engage with the question of ‘Europe’s genealogy’ (cf. Woolf 2003: 323).\(^\text{12}\) In this sense, we cannot deny the impact of post-war intra-European integration and the political project of the EU (Pagden 2002b: 33). Immediately, though, we confront some linguistic confusion following from the fact that the EU tends to be conflated with that of the whole of Europe. Basically, I conceive of the concept of Europe as the object of the identity-making enterprise that takes place within the EU. Europe becomes the symbol of “us” coming together in a union. Articulations of a certain European identity connect the political project of the EU to ideas of a distinct European community to which Europeans could associate themselves.

According to Thomas Diez (1999: 598), ‘In recent years, there have been many attempts at ‘exploring the nature of the beast’ /…/ in European Integration studies. In many of them, the European Union (EU) is dealt with as if it were our zoologist’s unknown animal’.\(^\text{13}\) In our ambition of ‘bringing Europe down to earth’, we

\(^{12}\) Like many other modern concepts, also the genesis of ‘Europe’ is traced to classical Antiquity. In this case, the mythological character of “Europa” comes from Asia. In the Greek mythology, Zeus transformed himself into a white bull and carried off a young woman called “Europa” on his back, from the west coast of Asia to Crete (Pagden 2002b: 34; Savin 2005: 14). Zeus seduced the young woman and according to the legend, “Europa” was left on the shore of the continent that today bears her name. In a more mundane version of this myth, Cretan merchants abducted “Europa” from her home in present day Lebanon and later let her marry their king. As argued by Delanty (1995: 19), however, the idea of Europe had little meaning for the Ancients. The main dualism was instead based on the division of Greeks versus Barbarians. If anything, most people that we today refer to as Europeans descended from the barbarian ‘others’ of the Ancient Greeks. Barbarians have also changed faces during the course of history (See e.g. Rufin 1991). While the Christian crusades picked the Muslim Orient as their foremost ‘other’, the colonial enterprise brought back the secular concept of ‘the savage’ to be applied to people living in the ‘non-European’ parts of the world (Delanty 1999: chapter 3). Yet today, we see again how Islam fundamentalists make up a dominant ‘other’ in contemporary European politics.

\(^{13}\) Indeed, the EU is unique in many ways. It is not a typical international organisation (any longer), since it features a supra-national level of decision making that has a direct effect on domestic politics. It is likewise hard to define the EU as a state, since it lacks many features normally associated with a Westphalian sovereign (nation-) state such as a monopoly on violence. The EU is a combination of intra-state agreements and supra-national forms of governance (Tallberg 2001: 12; Sjövik 2004: 120-2; Strömvik 2005: 3). Multi-faceted as it may seem, I resist
also need to demystify the political project of the EU and this for two immediate reasons.

Firstly, the EU institutional framework is possibly a ‘multi-layered governance’ (Kohler-Koch 1997) that involves a series of actors (interest-groups, state actors, networks and so forth), which sometimes makes the decision-making procedure very complex. But if we conceive of the EU as too complicated and too hard to grasp we are likely to be less prepared to critically engage with the politics of the European Union, and we may also be obstructed in our task of proceeding with an analysis of political aspects of the current intra-European integration process.

Secondly, the EU is sometimes described as a post-national order that, in a way, is a possible pilot case of a third democratic transformation responding to globalisation (e.g. Held 1999; Beck 2005; Habermas 2001: 80-3; Giddens 2000: 159-62; cf. Dahl 1989; Rumelili 2004). I believe there is reason to show some extra caution in this regard. In the third and fourth chapter of this thesis, I highlight the continuity between past attempts to imagine the nation-state (referred to as the ‘second’ democratic transformation) and current endeavours in the EU to foster a sense of belonging among European citizens to a certain European identity at a supranational level.

In the following section, I introduce key aspects of the relation between articulations of a certain European identity and the evolvement of the political project of the EU.

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the temptation of labelling the European Union (EU) as *sui generis* (a concept which is an instance of itself and nothing else).

14 According to Thomas Diez (1999. 604-5), the image of the EU as a system of multi-level governance has become a ‘self-fulfilling hypothesis’.

15 The first democratic transformation is normally associated with the organisation of city-states in the Antique Greece. This territorial limited system of governance is said to have generated a democratic culture of oral communication between all equal, and free men (Sjövik 2004: 67). Plato was one of the sharpest critics of the Athenian democracy, and anticipated that demagogues would dominate and rule the city by pure self-interest. This system would then, according, to Plato (1978) degenerate into Tyranny. The second democratic transformation is associated with the rise of the modern nation-state in the late 18th century (Sjövik 2004: 70-3). The nation-state acted within (larger) territorial limited realms and was dependent on enjoying support from a distinguishable [demos] residing within its power domain. The sovereignty of the individual state was based on a monopoly of violence and the rights to legislate. Its principle of governance was a liberal representative democracy as contrasted to the ‘direct democracy’ of the city-state. The third transformation, then, indicates something beyond ‘the nation-state’, a ‘post-national constellation’ in the words of Habermas (2001), based on (a more) global governance.
EU INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION

The EU has taken several different shapes since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) in the 1950s. Beginning with six member-states, the union now includes 25 member-states, and other countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Turkey and Croatia are knocking on its gates. The union has expanded vastly in both width (more member-states) and depth (more policy areas) and in 1973 the so-called Copenhagen Declaration united the then nine member-states in a common manifestation on a ‘Declaration on the European Identity (CEC 1973).

More recently, the Maastricht Treaty from 1991 outlined the contents of a union citizenship, which according to Licata & Klein (2002: 324; cf. CEC 1997) also was a means to promote European identification. Today, however, it is common wisdom to state that the EU has failed to ‘move its people’ (e.g. CEC 2001a) and a common identity is considered increasingly important to solve its ‘crisis of legitimacy’ (e.g. Laeken European Council 2001a; Prodi February 7, 2002).16 Others claim, though, that the EU should avoid a (too) strong focus on identity. In this respect, Delanty & Rumford (2004: 68) argue that: ‘… the challenge is less to anchor its constitutional order in an underlying identity or overarching collective identity than to create spaces for communication’. Licata & Klein (2002: 333) infer that strong ‘European identifiers’ tend to be more xenophobic than others less committed to the idea of Europe. I do not think we have to stretch the argument that far in order to emphasise that any identity construction revolves around the nexus of “us and them” (see further chapter 2).

As a concept, ‘European identity’ relates to the idea of Europe as a point of reference. Scholars differ on whether a European identity is at all possible and to what extent it could provide a basis for group loyalties beyond the nation-state paradigm. Some focus on individual perceptions of a European identity, as these are

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16 It has been argued that Europeans need to recognise themselves as Europeans, otherwise the EU institutions will not be considered legitimate among its peoples (e.g. Lundgren 1998).
indicated in, for instance, ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys\(^\text{17}\) (e.g. Kohli 2000; Licata & Klein 2002); yet others approach this matter from a more macro-oriented perspective and analyse, for instance, how articulations of a certain European identity are related to the construction of national identities (e.g. Smith 1997b; Habermas 2001; Delanty 1995; Delanty & Rumford 2004; Cederman 2001b; van Ham 2001; Ifversen 2002; Pagden 2002a).

Certainly, the concept of a European identity brings up many questions: does Europe really need an identity (cf. Kohli 2000: 118-9); to what kind of European community does a European identity refer (van Ham 2001: 229-231); does the coming to the fore of a European identity imply the existence of one or several ‘others’ (Neumann 1999: 207-9; cf. Waever 1996: 120-5)\(^\text{18}\); perhaps a strong identification with Europe may even sustain xenophobic attitudes (Licata & Klein 2002: 333)? I shall address these kinds of questions in order to analyse how articulation of a certain European identity partially fills the concept of Europe with meaning and scrutinise the limits of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in contemporary Europe.

**THE HORIZON OF EXPECTATIONS**

In this thesis, I restrict the analysis of articulations of what makes Europe “Europe” to the political project of the EU. My material is limited to what the historian Reinhard Kostelleck (2004) refers to as ‘the horizon of expectations’ that is analytically separated from the ‘space of experiences’ where we live our lives on a routine basis. There is, however, reason to believe that the visions and ideas of a different and better European society (the horizon of expectations) affect how we perceive ourselves as Europeans (the space of

\(^{17}\) The Eurobarometer conducts surveys on a routine basis to convey public opinions and attitudes towards the EU and Europe. For a critical examination of Eurobarometer surveys as regard underlying assumptions on ‘European identity’ vis-à-vis ‘the others’ see (Hansen 2000: 150).

\(^{18}\) Peo Hansen (2000) focuses, in his dissertation, on how the EU gives voice to a collective European identity amongst people residing in the union. This endeavour, he argues, has repercussions on the situation for ethnic minorities and immigrant communities in the EU. His dissertation comprises a series of essays that deal with the relation between the “ethno-culturalism” of Brussels up to 2000 and its relations to education policy, immigration policy, and in his view a neo-liberal economism.
experiences). In this case, we encounter how articulations of a certain European identity may partially fix the meaning of Europe as EUrope and thereby posit the political project of the EU as synonymous to that of Europe. However, the new Europe remains a site of struggle and there cannot be a final answer to the question of what makes Europe “Europe”. As regards the political project of the EU we encounter a plurality of opinions that reflect a diversity of wills and interests also within the Union.

In my thesis, I pay special attention to the supra-national body of the European Union Commission (EUC). While differing in perspectives and political views, all members of the EUC are committed to a certain ‘European interest’, and their “job” is to safeguard this interest so as to avoid fragmentation. Indeed, the EUC are the proclaimed ‘guardians of the treaties’ (e.g. CEC 2001a). It is not my intention here to find out what exactly is going on “behind the curtains”, who is really the architect behind a given statement or what compromises have preceded the decision. Instead, I conceive of the statements and speeches made by members of the Commission as individual articulations of decisions made in collegiality. Members of the EUC can be said to talk from

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19 Many of the text documents from the EUC (speeches, official communications, press information and so forth) that are used in the analysis are collected from the search engine ‘Rapide’ (EUROPA – website), which includes documents from a wide array of sources from the EU institutional framework. In order to find accurate documents, I use search terms such as “unity-in-diversity” (chapter 3), “Treaty of Nice” (chapter 5), “area of freedom, security and justice” (chapter 6) and “populism” (chapter 7) depending on the area of inquiry. The genre of public speeches allows for a more metaphorical and visionary use of language than for instance protocols from the Council of the European Union. However, I believe we must always put the study of political rhetoric in a wider context and also include complementary theoretical and empirical material from various genres to sustain or perhaps modify our conclusions based on speeches. Additional comments on the selected material will be made in relation to each and every chapter.

20 Of course, the actual situation is more complex than that. The members of the EUC are positioned at the top of an hierarchy of a large administration (more than 15000 employees) divided in sectors (so-called ‘directions généraux’ (DG)): Morten Egeberg (2006) suggests that the individual Commissioner is biased by his or her ‘sectoral portfolio’. Furthermore, the commissioners might be motivated by party loyalties and national self-interest (all member-states suggest one person to be member of the EUC); in turn, the EUC is sometimes described as a ‘fragmented organisation’ that lacks a cohesive will (see further discussion in Smith 2003, and in Egeberg 2006). It seems reasonable to believe that the EUC functions the same way as do many other political bodies in contemporary democracies: different opinions are compromised during the process so that any decision made in collegiality may be agreed by, or at least tolerated by all members of the assembly in question.

21 Andy Smith (2003: 139-42) puts forward the principle of ‘collegiality’ as fundamental for the daily work of the commissioners: they all share a collective responsibility for every collegial decision. In his anthropological study of the Commission, Cris Shore (2000: 130-2) detects a
the position of a ‘consensual elite’, thereby representing particular articulations of what makes Europe “Europe”. They talk from a position of an elite for the reason that they represent a top down perspective on European integration. They maintain a certain ‘agenda power’ (Hansen 2000: 31), which enable them to initiate new law proposals on policy issues that belong to the so-called ‘first pillar’. They talk from a position of a consensual elite for the reason that they make their fundamental statements in collegiality. When I refer to a consensual view among the Commissioners I refer, for instance, to a common awareness of the need for a certain European identity that could encourage Europeans to be more pro-active in relation to EU affairs. Also in relation to the integration process there is a strong incentive to avoid fragmentation and to achieve a smooth furthering of the integration process (cf. Waever 1996).

A new Commission is to be appointed every five years. In 1999 Romano Prodi replaced Jacques Santer as president of the EUC. Top EU priorities during this period were the eastern enlargement, the launch of the Euro, the European Future Convention and the new constitutional treaty and the further consolidation of a common EU politics on migration and asylum. All these issues involve aspects related to articulations of a certain European identity. The eastern enlargement has re-activated questions about Europe’s eastern borders and the launch of Euro has introduced a symbol from the realm of the nation-state and translated it onto a European context (see further chapter 5). After the double rejection of the constitutional treaty in France and Holland during the summer of 2005, these issues have provoked even more public

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22 In the Maastricht Treaty from 1993, the EU was divided in three pillars (see further Tallberg 2001: 63-80). The first (supra-national) pillar involves issues pertaining to the internal market, the common trade policy, regional policy, environmental policy, and the common agricultural policy (CAP). The second (intra-governmental) pillar comprises issues pertaining to the Common Foreign- and Security Policy (CFSP) whereas the third (also mainly inter-governmental) pillar deals with internal security (e.g. police co-operation). In the proposal for the new constitutional treaty - voted down in France and Holland in the early summer of 2005 - the pillar structure was to be abandoned.

23 Of course this does not mean that they agree on each and every issue. The question of a future union membership for Turkey and the related discussion about the status of Christendom as a common denominator in the enlarged union usually bring up many controversies, to mention but a few examples (see further e.g. Schlesinger & Forét 2006).
reactions. It is evident that contemporary articulations of a certain European identity from “Brussels” bring up controversies among the European people/s. This tension encourages me further to focus on the two most recent Commissions (Prodi 1999-2004 and Barroso 2004-) when the outlaid EU agenda is increasingly put in doubt at the same time as the expansion, both in width and in depth, is further intensified.

In the following, I outline the main contents of this book. Many of the chapters (3, 5-7) have, in different versions, been published before (or are about to be). It is my intention that they could be read independently from each other and yet relate to the general area of inquiry as outlined in this introducing chapter. In this respect, they can be seen as different examples and also sources of inspiration for how we may proceed with the task of bringing Europe down to earth so as to recognise that neither Europe nor the political project of the EU are that strange after all.

THE ART OF BRINGING EUROPE DOWN TO EARTH

The art of bringing Europe down to earth is about the correlation between articulations of a certain Europeans identity and the politics of European integration, of analysing how articulations of a certain European identity underlie the possibility of political action in relation to the current intra-European integration process. According to Michel Foucault (1984: 127), ‘there is no pre-discursive providence which disposes the world in our favour’. In other words, the way that we talk and use language does not mirror “reality”, rather we could say that we create the world through language (cf. Calhoun 1999; Mörkenstam 1999: 44; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 2000: 15-8; Hansen 2000: 15-6). In this perspective, we contingently reproduce knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” and in this ‘activity of knowing’ we also set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. In the words of Thomas Diez (1999: 600): ‘what we say may have an effect on other people; by saying something, we may

24 See further chapter five of this thesis.
not only act ourselves, but also force others do so’. The constitutive effects of language are related to the question of ‘who may speak for whom’ (Bourdieu 1999: 121); from what positions we are articulating ourselves.

What does it mean to speak in the name of Europe and who may be entitled to be in a position of doing so? What is it that makes Europe different from other entities? The second chapter of this dissertation discusses how we are to approach these kinds of questions so as to bring some conceptual clarification to my analysis of what makes Europe “Europe”. In this regard, I am inspired by the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe that, on the one hand, recognises the fluidity of any identity construction (i.e. the concept of Europe lacks finite essence), and on the other hand highlights how political articulations partially fix the meaning of any given concept (i.e. Europe) and thereby ascribe to it a certain essence. In this tension, we find a path through to analyse how definitions of Europe are made to be true and thus have political implications as regards the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. In the actual analysis, though, I refrain from making a rigid application of the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe for the reason that I do not find all of their theoretical concepts equally clarifying in relation to my ambition of bringing Europe down to earth.

Towards the end of the second chapter, I introduce the main analytical categories that will guide the reader through the subsequent chapters. In brief, I conceive of Europe as an ‘empty signifier’ that does not mean anything in itself, but receives its meaning through a series of constitutive splits (e.g. ‘Europe’ versus ‘the nation’). Certainly, these kinds of statements provoke methodological considerations and epistemological reservations that require further elaboration, and I will deal with these in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to say that articulations of a certain European identity knit together the empty signifier of Europe with a chain of so-called ‘floating signifiers’ (e.g. a cosmopolitan project; a family of nations) and thereby attribute the concept of Europe to a tangible form. In this process, “Europe” is demarcated from what it is depicted not to be. Conversely, diverging conceptualisations of what makes Europe “Europe” give rise to different sources of identification regarding what it means to be European in Europe.
EUROPE AND THE NATIONS

The third and fourth chapters of this thesis deal primarily with how the concept of Europe is partially filled with meaning as manifest in a constitutive split between the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’. The third chapter argues that the EU identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe (re-)invents many traits associated with the making of a nation-state, both ethnic and civic components centred on the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’. My main argument here is that the political project of integrating the nations and peoples in Europe is imbued with a kind of cosmopolitan nationalism that portray “our” nationalism as good and morally justifiable.25 Bringing Europe down to earth, in this respect, means to critically engage with and possibly “deconstruct” the (bi-) polar opposition between the positions of ‘Europe’ and that of distinct ‘nation-states’. I thereby emphasise the continuity with past attempts to imagine a nation-state with current endeavours to move the integration forward, spelling out a message that “we” Europeans are bound together by a shared commitment to a distinct European community.

If the third chapter challenges ideas of post-nationalism in relation to the political project of the EU, the fourth chapter illustrates how the logic of the nation-state has been reproduced throughout the course of post-war intra-European integration. Even if the ultimate goal with the European integration process, according to both federalists and neo-functionalists, is to prepare the ground for a European federation, we cannot grasp the content of this debate without taking into account how distinct nation-states continue to play a fundamental part in the process. In the fourth chapter, I present the argument that contemporary advocates of a more integrated Europe seek legitimacy in the legacy of the ‘founding fathers’ and the early days of intra-European integration back in the 50’s. Like any other collective identity-formation, the making of a certain European identity revolves around enacted differences that differentiate between “us” and “them”.

25 The EU strives, on the one hand, to define a distinct European people [demos]. On the other hand, for instance Romano Prodi (2000: 46) presents visions of an enlarged EU that acts as a ‘beacon for world civilisation’ [cosmos], see further chapter three of this thesis.
In the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, I emphasise how articulations of a certain European identity bring to the fore labelling processes that separate those who are knitted together more effectively from those increasingly left behind in the development towards greater intra-European cohesion. Bringing Europe down to earth, in this sense, means to scrutinise the politically enacted lines of demarcations (hence, constitutive splits) that differentiate between “Real Europeans” and those who are not considered to be part of “us”.

REAL EUROPEANS AND THE OTHERS

The argument in the fifth chapter is basically that domestic referenda campaigns about EU-related issues give rise to articulations of a certain European identity that also set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. I focus here on three domestic referenda campaigns on EU related issues that, potentially, bring to the fore contrasting political articulations of what makes Europe “Europe”. The first case deals with reactions to, and interpretations of the Irish “No” to the ratification of the Treaty of Nice in June 2001. Two years later, in a domestic referendum, the Swedish people decided not to introduce the common currency, the Euro. In the reactions (both in Brussels and among the national elites) to these two referenda, I identify a constitutive split between “yet-to-be-Europeans” and “Real Europeans”. The third case concerns the debate surrounding the French “No” to the new constitutional treaty in May 2005. The message from “Brussels” was that the destiny of France cannot be held separate from that of Europe as a whole. In this case, I instead suggest a constitutive split between “French Europeans” and “Real Europeans”.

In the sixth chapter, I discuss the transformation of the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) as it is manifest in text documents from meetings with the European Council from 1999 to 2004.26 In this context, I discuss how articulations of a

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26 The European Council brings together the heads of state or government of the European Union and the president of the Commission to discuss politically significant and sometimes sensible matters. The outcome of these meetings is summarised in particular documents (“Presidency Conclusions”). The European Council is the highest body in the EU-institutional
certain European identity knit together the floating signifiers of ‘immigration’ and ‘security’ into a conceptual chain attached with the concept of Europe as a point of reference. In this regard, I claim that an outside world perceived as threatening is linked to a presumed need of fostering identities on the inside. As indicated before, identity politics is about the imposing of labels that separate groups of people from each other. In this case, articulations of a certain European identity in the field of immigration sustain acts of differentiation between legal and illegal immigrants and thereby set the limits for who is welcome in Europe, and who is not.

The seventh chapter of this thesis deals with articulations of a certain European identity based on ideals of hospitality and solidarity in relation to the rise of Extreme Right Parties (ERP) – often labelled populists – in many European countries. The relation between Brussels and populism concerns the intertwined debates on the further integration of Europe and the issue of immigration from third countries. On the surface, the populists represent an antithesis to the politics of Brussels; they claim to represent the “true voice” of the people within the bounded territory of the nation (in this case Front National in France; Det Danske Folkeparti in Denmark and Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria). Also this relation is analysed as a case of identity politics: to be, act and think as European in Europe is, from the position of a consensual elite, also NOT to be a populist. However, if there are no foes, there is no politics and in this respect I suggest that the position of a ‘consensual elite’ and the position of the populists stand in a relationship of mutual dependency.

The eighth chapter summarises the main conclusions of this study and the various constitutive splits that sustain the articulations of a certain European identity. Towards the end of the book, I will discuss the possibilities of removing the question of what makes “Europe” Europe from the realm of historic necessity to the sphere framework and it formulates general guidelines and recommendations for the future development of the Union (see further Tallberg 2001: chapter 8). The European Council is primarily a political body that lacks legislative power and should not be confused with the “Council of the European Union” (sometimes referred to as the “Council of Ministers”) that together with the European Parliament codify new EU-laws. The European Council is presided over by the head of state or government of the member-state that currently holds the EU Presidency. The Presidency changes every six months according to a pre-decided rota.
of politics; from the idea of a certain European destiny to the recognition of the new Europe as a site of struggle.
2. WHAT WE ARE

the politics of identity
**SCENE I**

The main character in Dostoyevsky’s ‘Notes from underground’ (1961) is not a happy man. 40 years old and hampered by sickness, he gives voice to a generation that experiences alienation in a changing Russia. European civilisation preaches a sterile logic that aims at mathematical precision, creating lovely models that bring human sacrifice and despair. Throughout the monologue he returns, from different angles, to ‘this two times two makes four’ (1961: 117) as the purpose of life itself in the modern world. For the man in the mouse hole, though, it is rather ‘the beginning of death’. Therefore, he is afraid: left alone in a panoptical world and with nowhere to hide from a suffocating perfection (ibid: 118):

So, you believe in an indestructible crystal palace in which you won’t be able to stick out your tongue or blow raspberries even if you cover your mouth with your hand. But I am afraid of such a palace precisely because it is indestructible and because I won’t ever be allowed to stick my tongue out at it.

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SCENE II

Mister Big enters the restaurant, dressed in a suit as always. The tipsy friends (35+) lower their voices. The camera zooms in on the face of Carrie Bradshaw, the main character of the TV-series ‘Sex and the City’. She smiles nervously, takes a sip on her Cosmopolitan and pretends not to be aware that Mr Big moves towards their table.

Carrie quickly briefs the others, since they do not yet know that she and Mister Big have begun dating again. The first one to react is Charlotte who is happy to notice that they have decided to become a real couple. Maybe, she thinks, there is eternal love after all. Samantha does not really pay attention to what Charlotte is talking about, but instead asks quite bluntly whether ‘it was a good fuck’. Miranda, on the other hand, is worried about her friend and warns Carrie of what might happen if she does not stop seeing him.

Mister Big says hello and produces a gift to Carrie wrapped in a little black box. He kisses Carrie goodbye and leaves the table with a mysterious smile on his face.
WHAT WE ARE

What does it mean to speak in the name of Europe? What is it that makes Europe distinct from other entities? What is that makes “us”, Europeans, different from “them”, the not-Europeans? In this chapter, I focus on how we are to address the questions as such and thereby I approach associated methodological concerns. More precisely, I discuss the correlation between politics and identity in order to bring some conceptual clarification as regards the analysis of (1): how articulations of a certain European identity partially fix the concept of Europe with meaning and (2): the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.

This journey encourages us, to leave - for a moment - the political project of the EU and instead carry out a more general discussion on the politics of identity. After some introducing pages on the concept of identity, I then turn to a general discussion on the employment of identity politics and the question of what it means to speak from a certain position. In the second part of the chapter, I introduce the main analytical categories that will guide the reader through the subsequent chapters.

WHAT I AM

I am not like you. You are different from me. What is it, then, in more precise terms that makes me different from you? And why do certain differences appear to be more salient than others? In the celebrated sit-com, ‘Sex and the City’ (scene II) we are introduced to four women, most of the time single, with plenty of money to spend on drinking cocktails and buying shoes. The four friends share a habit of discussing sex, relationships and related topics. Their conversations, typically, take place at upscale bars in downtown Manhattan. After only a few minutes of watching the
show, it becomes obvious that they occupy four different ‘identity positions’ in relation to one another.27

Following their conversations, I as a viewer interpret what they say from these distinct positions; for instance, if Samantha (known as a notorious ‘man-eater’) says that ‘I had sex yesterday’, this means something quite different than if Charlotte (personifying an almost parodic picture of the girl who waits for the knight on his white horse to rescue her from single life) uses the very same words. Subtle body gestures and sharp comments help us understand the situation. It is not necessarily what you say that matters the most, but who you are and what identity position you are articulating yourself from.

Furthermore, why do I tend to identify myself more with the position of Carrie Bradshaw than that of Charlotte York? Is it the case that I have a vain desire to be like her? Or do I understand how this imaginary character thinks, somehow knowing her better than I do with the rest? Of course, the option is there to turn off the television set, switch channels or at least resist the temptation to identify with any of the characters. Certainly, I could also claim that the posh, inner-city middle age desperation of the show appears at odds with my own life. In this scenario, I would somehow know that ‘I’ am nothing like any of ‘them’; there is an unbridgeable gap between my life and theirs.

From this experience, I have two preliminary assumptions on how to deal with the politics of identity in scientific research. Firstly, questions of identity are part of everyday practices and thus far from limited to the realm of advanced scholars of sociology, psychology, political science or philosophy. In an interview with Glyn Daly, Slavoj Žižek (Žižek & Daly 2004: 25-7) answers the question of what it means to be a philosopher: ‘the point of philosophy is not ‘What is the structure of it all?’ but ‘What are the concepts the scientist has to presuppose in order to formulate the question?’ The position of Žižek suits the purposes of this thesis for several reasons.28 He emphasises the need to focus on everyday

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27 The notion of identity positions used here is much related to that of ‘subject positions’ introduced by Althusser (See e.g. Torfing 1999: 52). For the sake of consistency, though, I use the notion of ‘identity positions’ throughout the thesis.

28 Bent Flyvbjerg recommends (2001) - inspired by Aristoteles, Nietzsche and Foucault - social science to employ a phronetic mood of research beyond current rationalistic biases; that is to put
activities in order to grasp the concepts that we live by instead of
endeavouring to illuminate their essence in a pre-Kantian manner
(\textit{das Ding an sich})\textsuperscript{29}.

Identity happens to us every day in each and every situation
that concerns relations between selves and others. Identity is about
our fundamental conditions of existence. We may choose to
identify with Carry, Miranda or simply turn off the television in
disgust. In these and other usual everyday activities, we make –
inadvertently or deliberately – choices that say something about
how we picture ourselves as individuals. In other words, we come
to being as people through processes of identification involving
multiple forms of belonging.

Secondly, we make sense of the world around us through
different points of identification that accompany us from early
childhood, through adolescence to adult life.\textsuperscript{30} The question of how
we relate to others is associated with how we identify and position
ourselves in the social environment. Sometimes faces look familiar
to us. They might be friends, colleagues, antagonists or just
indifferent to us (See further Hellström 2005b). The common
denominator is that we somehow know of them either as
acquaintances, or perhaps as somebody we have seen on the
television. Furthermore, any process of identification (individual or
collective) relates to a multitude of points of identification – ranging
from gender and class, to everyday reflections on for example
which soap-opera character we like the most or the least.

Processes of identification might be about finding role models,
favourable activities or for that matter a certain kind of masculinity.
It is perhaps the case that Mahatma Gandhi or a famous rock-star

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\textsuperscript{29} See discussion in Torfing (1999: 84) on the notion of ‘classical transcendentalism’ (pre-
Heideggerian) that focus on the ‘conditions of possibility’ instead of concrete facts. Classic
transcendentalism re-appears in the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar (Laclau & Bhaskar 2005: 178-
92; Morrow 1994: 136-8). See also Critchley (1996: 27) for a discussion on the ‘non-Kantian
tradition of dialectical thinking’.

\textsuperscript{30} According to the so-called ‘object-relation theory’ the young child develops a personality in
relation to other objects in her immediate surroundings, such as “the mother” (Kinnvall 2003:
27-8).
personifies someone we would like to be more alike. Another option is that we feel more attached to certain people and/or situations: we may, for instance, feel sympathy for the film character Bridget Jones (2001) and view her as a mirror image of our mistake-prone selves. Or we might dislike, distrust or blatantly hate everything that Sex and the City, Gandhi or Bridget Jones stand for: we still make a statement related to our way of communicating ourselves to the world around us; that is to identify ourselves as individuals. Identity comes with existence.

The crucial part here is that these figures, fictive or real, tend to represent something more than themselves. They are not just individual persons, but might as well represent an ideal, an archetype or a personal trait. In this perspective, they also constitute positions from which we interpret their actions and words. What these positions are depicted to be in more precise terms shifts from one time to another, from person to person. For instance, the position of the tradition of Marxism is not synonymous with that of the actual person Karl Marx and the position of Freudian psychoanalysis is not the same as that of Sigmund Freud. Nevertheless, we make use of these distinct identity positions not only to comprehend the world, but also to find out who we “really” are in relation to what we are not: “We” Freudians are not like “Them”, the Marxists or “We the Derrideans” are not like “them, the Habermasians” and so forth.

To sum up: identities are not simply “out there” for us to reveal their inner essence. Identity comes with existence and corresponds to the question of what we are in relation to what we are not. The project of becoming what we are in relation to what we are not is never fully completed, since we continue to interact with other people, watch different TV-shows or in any other way relate to new experiences in our lives (cf. Winter-Jørgensen & Phillips 2000: 11-2). If using a Lacanian terminology, we may speak of a fundamental lack as a result of the failure to constitute a fully structured objectivity. According to Jacob Torfing (2003: 150), ‘[as a substitute for this loss] a single subject may identify with many

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31 See also (Featherstone 2000: 68) who says that: ‘For Nietzsche and, following him, for Weber and Simmel the genuine heroic person was characterized not by what they do, but what they are – the qualities are within the person and hence genuine personality is a matter of fate’.
different things and may thus occupy many different ‘subject positions’. A subjectivated individual is thus a masquerading void … After all, everybody is a little schizophrenic’. The fundamental lack is thus constitutive for processes of identification, of finding feasible substitutes for finding unambiguous answers to questions like “who are you?”.

As time goes by, we change the way we perceive the world, which means that we also alter our points of identification and how we relate to them. The position of Marxism, for instance, means something quite different today from only twenty years ago when the Soviet Union still was a key force in world politics. The content of the various points of identification are indeterminable. At the same time, we continue to actively or passively reproduce certain positions in social processes during which we make sense of the world. The position of Marxism may, for instance, be passed on from father to son: think of a situation when a child learn from an early age that Marxism is something good and interpret world events from that particular position. In a reverse move, the child could later protest against his father and become a liberal. The conflicting position of ‘liberalism’ thus confirms the existence of the position of the father (the position of ‘marxism’). Any identity position presupposes its opposite/s.

WHAT I AM NOT

If we change what we identify ourselves with throughout life, it seems accurate to suggest that we also change what we identify ourselves against. The question of what we are cannot be held separate from the question of what we are not. From a Freudian perspective, Julia Kristeva suggests (1991: 191; cf Hellström 2005b) that ‘the stranger’ crystallizes within us through a rejection of infantile desires and from the fear of others’. We are strangers to ourselves, which leads Kristeva to conclude that there are no strangers per se (ibid: 196). All people are strange in various degrees and in different situations and how we relate to ‘strangers’ is intertwined with how we picture ourselves as individuals and collectives.
This approach might, arguably, encourage us to challenge the idea of a homogenous self that clearly could be separated from what remains outside. According to Lemert (1998: 105), this image of the self bears primordialistic connotations and is sometimes referred to as the ‘Cartesian self’ (see also Laclau 1994; Derrida 2004: chapter 2; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 21). Furthermore, it reveals a permanent gap between the self and what remains outside and we can only perceive ‘the other’ as different kinds of distant shadow images, which we may tolerate, dispel or hate. In this respect, psychoanalysis seems to be a useful first step to ‘depathologise’ the other\(^{32}\): to acknowledge the immanence of strangeness in ourselves may provide us with an ethic of respect for the irreconcilable (Kearney 2003: 76).\(^{33}\)

Processes of identification simultaneously establish a sense of coherence on the inside and a distance towards what we are not. The question of “what we are” implies both preferences for sameness\(^{34}\) and acts of differentiation that separate “us” from “them”. In the language of this dissertation, the question of what makes us Europeans to be “Europeans” is intrinsically linked to the question of who are not considered part of “us”.

**INTERPELLATION AND IDENTIFICATION**

The Althusserian notion of ‘interpellation’ signifies the process in which a position is imposed on an individual (see further Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 2000: 22). Foucault (1988b: 36) talks, in this respect, of the ‘individual as an effect of power’. According to Bourdieu (1999: 120): ‘To institute, to give a social definition of an identity, is also to impose boundaries as sacred boundaries […], acting in keeping with one’s essence and nothing else’. It is not easy to choose the position from which you make your voice heard, something that was made obvious in the debate on ‘the future

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\(^{32}\) Sibley (1995: 7) says that psychoanalytical thinking needs to be incorporated in a broader cultural framework. See also Kearney (2003: 77) who asks: ‘… perhaps this psychoanalytical approach is too quick in its tendency to reduce alterity to a dialectic of the unconscious psyche?’.

\(^{33}\) From the assumption that the self is fragmented follows that also our images of others are heterogeneous. These images, thus, include friends, foes and everything in between.

\(^{34}\) Essed & Goldman (2002: 1071) argue that our preferences for sameness give rise to ‘cultural cloning’: ‘Sameness, repetition, predictability render social circumstance more manageable, more comfortable, more readily negotiable’.
constitution for the EU’ mentioned in the previous chapter. If we stretch this argument too far, though, we risk a deterministic fallacy and if there is no space for agency, we confront difficulties in explaining societal changes. In other words, we may fail to acknowledge the fact that processes of identification involve many forms of belonging and a diverse set of points of identification that also change character throughout life. On the other hand, if we remain confident with the assumption that identity is fluid and completely arbitrary we may fail to recognise the persuasiveness of certain identity positions; hence a kind of ‘voluntaristic fallacy’ (See further e.g. Flax 1990; Lemert 1998; Kinnvall 2003; Žižek 2001: chapter 3; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: chapter 1). In other words, we remain oblivious to the relation between mechanisms of power and processes of collective identification. We create the world through certain identity positions that separate “us” from “them” to the extent that the boundary appears natural, or ‘sacred’ to speak with Bourdieu. To deal further with these issues, though, we need to shift focus from individual experiences of identification to a discussion on the persuasiveness of certain identity positions.

**UNDER MY SKIN**

Some fifty years before we were able to watch ‘Sex and the City’, Franz Fanon (1925-1961) wrote about his experiences from working as a black lecturer and psychiatrist in France. His writings have been a source of inspiration for many post-colonial studies even today (Bhabha 1994: 112). His first book from 1952, ‘Black Skin, White Masks’ is a post-colonial classic. For Fanon, the question of identity shows through his skin colour and he claims (1995) “the black man” to be alienated from himself. His experiences both disgust and frustrate him (ibid: 107-10): if people like him, it is despite his skin colour and if people choose not to like

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35 Henk van Houtoum (2000) has identified three different approaches to the concept of borders in geographical studies after Second World War (see also Hellström 2003b). The third tradition, which is labeled ‘the People Approach’ is basically congruent with this analysis (Houtom 2000: 68), it ‘does not concern itself with the direct, manifest effects of a line in space, but rather with the dynamic processes of differentiations in perception and identity caused or stimulated by the social production and reproduction of that line’.
him, it is because of his skin colour. Blackness is never conceived of as a neutral category. Societal racist structures have deep psychological implications for the well-being of “the black man”: the frustration is already inside.

At one time, he was triggered by the ‘négritude movement’ (ibid: 117-32): to join forces with other “black people” and stress a certain pan-African attitude, to discover another mythical truth, unattainable for white people (e.g. white people cannot dance). He was, however, frustrated by this approach as well; was it not merely another vain effort to reproduce colonial stereotypes about the black man being closer to nature or having a natural sense of rhythm? On the other hand, if he did not fully comply with his blackness he would most certainly face discrimination and structural injustices on a daily basis without enjoying the support of other discriminated black people. In other words, his blackness goes deeper than his skin – there is no easy way out, nowhere to hide. I believe that we here find a parallel to why the man from the mouse hole (scene I) is so frustrated with his situation; it is not because he is mad or off-colour, rather that the world around him is declared sick. This diagnosis derives from his impression that society is perfectly ordered; hence, there is no space left for agency: two times two remains four as an ordering principle of the society, something we are never really allowed to question.

Fanon’s blackness is as a source of recognition, a given common denominator amongst blacks to occupy an underdog position. His ambivalence says something important about the study of identity politics. Firstly, in the writings of Fanon we are confronted with the crucial interplay between “I” and “We”; hence, we cannot simply hold macro- and micro processes of identity making separate from each other (Calhoun 1998b). The antagonistic relation between collective markers of identity, such as the relation between “black” and “white” also manifests itself in the personal experiences lived and reflected upon by Frantz Fanon. He cannot simply choose which category he wishes to belong to; he is not able to position himself outside the play of meaning that occurs at the macro level between black and white. Fanon’s personal experiences of being black are intrinsically linked to how the category of black is
constituted in the first place. In other words, collective identity markers (such as class, gender and skin colour) merge inside our skins. We cannot choose to live outside society and its implicit hierarchies of categories that continue to affect how we come to being as individuals in relation to others. Certainly, the more precise link between individual processes of identification and the contingent reproduction of collective identity markers shifts from one situation to another. Fanon gives voice to everyday experiences of working as a black psychiatrist in relation to how the category of “black” is contingently reproduced in relation to the category of “white”.

Conversely, the activity of reproducing knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” in relation to the position of ‘the nation’ does not bring repercussions of the same proportions of how we identify ourselves as Europeans. I believe that we do not spend much time, on a daily basis, to reflect upon what it means to be Europeans in Europe. However, a practical implication related to the theme of this thesis is that we are not able to make our voices heard in debates on EU related issues without somehow relating to the relation between the categories of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’ and how these are framed in relation to one another.

Secondly, we learn from Fanon that the relation between the categories of black and white is asymmetrical. The step from ‘I’ to ‘We’ is permeated by mechanisms of power that privilege one term over another. Indeed, it is not possible to think of modern history without considering the persistence of the divide between white and black, from colonialism to post-colonialism, from slavery to discussions on segregation, from race to essentialist accounts of culture. Again, the relation between the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’ does not match the asymmetry of the categories of “white” and “black”, but we can nevertheless assume that any collective identity formation has political connotations and is permeated by mechanisms of power.

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36 See also Danjoux 2002: 119 on the stereotype “exotic”. He [the exotic man] may choose to neglect his skin-colour, or he may choose to emphasise it: he cannot place himself outside.
IDENTITY POLITICS

In an interview (Wirtén 2003: 44-6), the French sociologist Alain Touraine explains that he hates identity. Somewhat paradoxically, Touraine makes a strong statement on who he is; what his points of identification are (or rather are not). What he probably refers to is not the fluidity of identification processes as discussed in the previous section, but essentialist uses of identity politics. In his book, ‘Can we live together’, Touraine (2000: 262-3) claims that the idea of a multi-cultural society is incompatible with the practices of identity politics. If certain groups of people act solely on behalf of their imagined essence to claim group-specific rights, this is likely to create alienation and hostility between different collectives in society, he argues.

Identity politics is about the making of differences, of constituting borders between what “we” are in relation to those who are not part of us. Politics is in this sense about the power of categorisation; of ascribing to others a set of essentialized traits that together define them as a group. At the same time practices of identity politics establish a sense of coherence on the inside; hence, the making of similarities that knit “us” together as a group. Iris Marion Young shares Touraine’s doubts as regards the employment of identity politics in modern societies. She (Young 2000a: 126) seeks to avoid the ‘logic of identity’ in her ambition to sketch the contours of a society in which we may live ‘together-in-difference’ (Young 2000b: 106): both universalistic accounts of citizenship and the employment of identity politics pose a threat to this vision, she thinks. Young acknowledges a ‘politics of difference’, which aims at recognising cultural and social differences among people that are living in the same region, but do not necessarily share the same basic ideals (ibid: 216-7; cf. Hellström 2003a: 184; Mörkenstam 1999: 32-7). She (2000a: 87-9) further argues that ‘Social difference

37 In his book ‘Critique of Modernity’, Touraine (1995: 6) confronts contemporary simplistic readings of modernity and proposes a dialogue between Reason and Subject: ‘Without Reason, the Subject is trapped in to an obsession with identity; without the Subject, Reason becomes an instrument of might’. He criticises and reconfigures narrow readings of modernity that construes a rationalist image of the world that integrates man into nature (ibid: 29) into an appraisal of pleasure and social imagination (ibid: 32).
is not Identity [...] the attempt to define a common group identity tends to normalize the experience and perspective of some of the group members while marginalizing others’.38

There is no easy way out and it is not my ambition to solve the dilemma of group-specific rights vis-à-vis ideals of neutrality and individual freedom. Crucial for my argument is, however, the process in which we establish differences between groups in society. Is it perhaps the case that multiculturalism presupposes identity politics? In order for a group to be recognised as such it must be attached with a distinct label (see further Mörkenstam 2005). Any process of identification revolves around a difference between what we are in relation to what is not part of us. We learn from the discussion about multiculturalism and group-specific rights that we ought to remain sceptical towards any attempt to make universalizable moral claims from particularistic positions. The alternative could, though, be to construct a universal position - behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ in the words of John Rawls (1973: 136-42) - from which we design the most just society without falling into the particularistic trap of identity politics.

**SPEAKING FROM POSITIONS**

Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative ‘was an injunction to act in the most completely universalizable way possible’ (Calhoun 1999: 163). The enlightened man can base universalizable moral claims only by seeing herself in the position of others. The limits of the ‘universal position’ were mentioned by Kant himself and further developed by Jean-Jacque Rousseau and later by Karl Marx among others (see further Calhoun 1999: 163-5). Rousseau criticised the contract-theorists Thomas Hobbes and John Locke for universalising their natural positions from the standpoint of their contemporary times, and Karl Marx thought that the rights of the proletariat were excluded from the so-called ‘universal’ individual rights of free men. However, all three share an ambition to

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38 Brian Barry (2001: 165; see also Hellström 2003a: 183) refutes the multi-cultural approach all together and claims that group-specific rights do not match the ideals of neutrality and impartiality that ought to characterise the liberal democratic state. Will Kymlicka defends, though, the fundamentals of multiculturalism and says (1998: 46) that group-specific rights may improve the situation for individual members of the minority group in question.
reconstitute the position of the authentic universal position (Kant with the categorical imperative, Rousseau with the general will and Marx with the authentic voice of the proletariat).

Certainly, the philosophical question of universalism versus particularism has no facile solution.39 Gayatri C. Spivak (1994: 104) concludes in her famous essay, ‘Can the subaltern speak’ that: ‘The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with ‘woman’ as a pious item’: there is no authentic voice of the oppressed. Returning to Fanon, the reverse position of the ‘négritude movement’ contributed to the reproduction of the asymmetrical relation between the categories of “white” and “black”. In this respect, there are no neutral positions from which we can let our voices be heard. As regards the employment of identity politics in multi-cultural societies, Young (2000a: 86) argues that: ‘Essentialist modes of asserting group identity can be found in the behaviour and discourse of some people speaking out of movements of women, Blacks, indigenous people, people with disabilities, migrants, and similar social movements’. However, when we confront the case of elite-articulations of what makes Europe “Europe”, we need to move from the periphery (where the multicultural debate usually takes place) to the centre (see also Hansen 2000: 52). It is not only among marginalised groups, we find examples of individuals (e.g. minority groups’ representatives) that speak on behalf of a larger collective.40

In relation to my object of analysis – the concept of Europe - I thus assume that there is no universalizable position from which we could unveil the most accurate image of what makes Europe “Europe”. There is no authentic voice of Europe. At the same time, different articulations of a certain European identity also give rise to different definitions of the concept of Europe. In other words, to talk in the name of Europe is also to define the position of ‘Europe’ in relation to for instance ‘the nation’. In doing so, we produce and reproduce knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe”. According

39 Pauline Stoltz (2000: 32) goes along with a feminist critique of a universalistic notion of citizenship based on the premise of an ‘individual without a body’). She does, however, also spot a certain ‘paradox of visibility’ that derives from likewise universalistic accounts of the category of woman.
40 Any act of ‘representation’ (to speak in the name of something larger than oneself) thus hints at the existence of identity politics (See further Laclau 1994).
to Michel Foucault (Hall 1998: 7; cf. Foucault 1988b; Dyhrberg 1997), knowledge implies ‘a power of definition and [is] therefore a most prominent power technique’. Foucault (1988b: 31-2) asserts that the power of knowledge is, coercive: ‘…we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order to function: we must speak the truth’. In order to “be Europeans”, we must know what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. In this sense, identity politics is much about the power of definition; of the production and reproduction of knowledge of what, for instance, makes Europe “Europe” (the making of similarities) in relation to what it is depicted not to be (the making of differences).

To sum up: it is not clear to me how we could distinguish between ‘social difference’ and ‘identity’ as suggested by Young above (cf. Calhoun 1999: 214). If identity comes with existence we could not simply choose to live without it. Furthermore, any collective identity-formation involves elements of power and repression. In the labelling of any group in a given society (e.g. the ‘immigrants’), we also construe a difference between “us” and “them” while at the same time downplaying internal difference between individuals who are positioned as members of that group (e.g. individuals born in the country of residence, whose parents have immigrated; immigrants who recently arrived from war and so forth). In order to deal further with the contingent reproduction of these enacted differences between “us” and “them”, we need to devote increased attention to the politics of identity.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

It is hard to see how we could communicate with the rest of the world if there were no common denominators from which we could make ourselves understood. When the former Swedish Prime Minister (1990-1994), Carl Bildt, proudly announced that he was not only Swedish, but also European and a “Hallänning”41, this was a way of communicating to the Swedish people that, for him, there was no contradiction between being Swedish and European at the

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41 Bildt here refers to a province in Sweden called “Halland”.

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same time. In order for him to get the message across to the public, though, people must somehow know what unites Europe, Sweden and Halland respectively. Another possibility would be to claim that it is impossible to be Hallänning, Swedish and European at the same time.42

Yet again we are confronted with the new Europe as a site of struggle: identities do not simply exist but are constantly shaped and re-shaped, evolving in an undecidable terrain. In this section of the chapter, I will introduce main theoretical tenets of the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe in order to provide the reader with some conceptual clarification as regards the further analysis. To begin with, we go to Jacques Derrida and the method of deconstruction, which has been a source of inspiration for many scholars interested in the relation between politics and language.

**THERE IS NO CENTRE, AND YET THERE IS**

Jacques Derrida (2004: 353) claims that the history of Western thought is characterised by a certain ‘metaphysics of presence’: ‘It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principals, or to the centre have always designated an invariable presence’. However, according to Derrida (ibid: 352) there is no centre or any undivided point of reference [logos], from which we may capture ‘the truth’ behind appearance. For him, ‘the centre’ is undecidable (ibid: 365):

> One cannot determine the centre and exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces the centre, which supplements it, taking the centre’s place in its absence – the sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a *supplement*. The movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always more…

Translated to the language of this dissertation, any new articulations of a certain European identity adds something more to the concept of Europe, and therefore there cannot be a finite answer to the question of what makes Europe “Europe”, but rather a series of supplements. The supplement can be added (e.g. articulation of a certain European identity) to the centre only if, in this case, the concept of Europe lacks a determinable essence (see further Culler

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42 I will return to the specific case of Sweden in the fifth chapter.
Derrida (ibid: 254) insists that we can never completely do away with the centre in the sense that we cannot escape metaphysics: ‘there is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax no lexicon – which is foreign to this history…’. In moving down the ladder of abstraction, we return to the assumption of that any process of identification is framed around distinct positions that condition ‘the rules of the game’. There cannot be a centre, and yet there is.43

Derrida claims that modern societies are built upon a series of ‘binary oppositions’ such as “death/life”, “essence/appearance”, “mind/body”, “inside/outside”, “orientalism/occidentalism” that frame our way of thinking and how we perceive the world. All of these terms relates to the primacy of one term in relation to another, something which Derrida (Culler 1994: 93) refers to as the logocentrism of Western thought: ‘Logocentrism thus assumes the priority of the first term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a complication, a negation, a manifestation, or a disruption of the first’. In a numbers of texts, Derrida has tried to think through these and other binary oppositions in order to disrupt or “shake” their oppositional logic.44

The method of “deconstruction” is much associated with Derrida and deals with the unfixing of certainty of binary oppositions, of bringing to the surface inherent contradictions at the centre. Again, in attempting to ‘bringing Europe down to earth’ we need to recognise that the concept of Europe is inherently contradictory and receives its meaning in relation to what it is depicted not to be. We should, however, be careful to note that the method of deconstruction has its critics. According to Richard Rorty, the ‘quasi-transcendentalism’ of Derrida relies on the myth of the philosopher who penetrates tangible institutions to discover another reality behind actual appearance. Rorty (1996: 46) infers

43 In ‘La verité en peinture’, Derrida (cited in Culler 1994: 197; cf. Derrida 1978) claims that: ‘There is framing, but the frame does not exist’. Translated to the language of this dissertation, this means that identities exist and do not exist at the same time and identity positions are simultaneously undecidable and decided.

44 In a basic introduction to Derrida, Jeff Collins & Bill Mayblin (2001: 21) illustrate how cinematic zombies appear as undecidables between life and death and thus ‘infect the oppositions grouped around them. These ought to establish stable, clear and permanent categories’. 

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that: ‘As somebody trained in philosophy, I get most of my romantic kicks out of metaphysics-bashing. As a citizen of a democratic state, I do not think that metaphysics-bashing is - except in the very long term – of much use’. In Rorty’s interpretation, Derrida ends up acting as an intelligent poet that does not contribute much to public utility, apart from stimulating people’s fantasies.\(^{45}\) In short, Derrida has little to offer our understanding of contemporary politics.

Clearly, Rorty has something significant to say about the danger of wandering astray in the labyrinth of metaphysics. However, Chantal Mouffe (1996b: 9; cf. 2000a: 136-7; cf. Critchley 1996) contends that:

Undecidability is not a moment to be traversed or overcome and conflicts of duty are interminable. I can never be completely satisfied that I have made a good choice since a decision in favour of one alternative is always to the detriment of another one. It is in that sense that deconstruction can be said to be ‘hyperpoliticizing’.

Regrettably never ceases because undecidability continues to inhabit the decision.

In the theoretical framework of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, we find an attempt to pursue the practical relevance of the philosophical method of deconstruction. In this regard, Lacalu (1996: 48) argues that we need to devote increased attention to ‘the field for a theory of the decision as taken in an undecidable terrain’.\(^{46}\)

I now turn to the theories of Laclau & Mouffe in order to identify the tools of analysis relevant for this thesis.

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\(^{45}\) Rortry places Derrida together with Nietzsche and Block in the category of ‘private ironists’ that have little or no significance for the improvement of modern liberal democracies (the public sphere). Chantal Mouffe (1996b; 2000a) claims, though, that Rorty embraces a (too) narrow definition of what politics is and therefore fails to see the potential of Derrida’s deconstructivism in the public sphere. It is as if social conflicts and disagreements may be relegated to the private sphere, whereas the public could be characterised by an overlapping, progressive consensus.

\(^{46}\) According to Jean Baudrillard: ‘Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible’ (1988: 177). We live in the age of simulation: we live in the ‘desert of the real’ (ibid: 167). He makes an allegory to a person who feigns an illness and later produces himself the same symptoms: is he ill or not? There is no answer, simulation is the norm; there is nothing behind the masks (ibid: 172): ‘It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle. The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false: it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real.’ When Baudrillard interprets the dramatic events of 9/11, he shows how the U.S managed to reabsorb these into a logic of simulation: the TV broadcasts showed that the fictional has become inherently blurred with our reality principle (Wilcox 2003: 29). From my point of view, Baudrillard stops at the level of the undecidable, of disrupting binary oppositions of what makes up the contemporary world (read: U.S) without reflecting upon the consequences and thereby fails to acknowledge the ‘political dimension’ of undecidability (See also Poster 1988: 8; Sim 1999: 24).
POLITICS AS THE PARTIAL FIXATION OF MEANING

Chantal Mouffe (2000b: 125-8) refers to politics as the endeavours to establish a certain order in the antagonistic field of ‘the political’, which is seen as a field of infinite antagonistic struggle. In this view, politics implies the partial fixation of meaning of a given concept (cf. Torfing 1999: 67). Translated to my discussion on identity, it means that the politics of identity is about the power of categorization; of the making and re-making of certain identity positions as partially fixed. Each and every constitutive decision entails the creation of a consensus for one option (A) before others (B, C, D and so forth) that are downplayed as a result: we cannot think of a decision that does not involve elements of repression and force (ibid: 68).

Let me take one illustration related to our area of research: if we decide that Morocco is not European enough to join the European Union, we have also established a frontier towards what Europe is not (cf. Hansen 2004). It may appear as natural, referring to the “fact” that Morocco is not situated in Europe (A). If we instead emphasise that Ceuta and Melilla already are part of the Union, then Morocco is as European as are the Caribbean Islands (B). However, Morocco cannot be European and not-European at the same time because the decision constructs a difference between the two alternatives. In other words, what makes Europe “Europe” manifests itself as a difference between what Europe is, and is not. Bahar Rumelili (2004: 28) claims that: ‘While the cases of Morocco, Turkey and Russia have supported claims of a modern mode of differentiation, the EU’s interaction with Central and Eastern European states have been used as empirical evidences that the EU is becoming (or has become) a postmodern collectivity’. Rumelili believes that scholars European integration have failed to critically engage with the question of how these modes of differentiation may co-exist. From the perspective of this thesis, any articulation of a certain European identity presupposes a ‘constitutive outside’ (see further Derrida 2004; Culler 1994; 47)

47 Returning to Derrida, the concept of ‘binary oppositions’ (there cannot be an idea of the mind without the concept of a body and so forth) may possibly be applicable in our case of the making of Europe as well.
In other words, there is no collectivity (post-modern or not) that can escape ‘the logic of difference’ to use Derrida’s terminology (2004). Any articulation of a certain European identity revolves around the nexus of “us” and “them”. The concept of Europe lacks finite essence and is at the same time contingently filled with meaning through political articulations of what makes Europe different from other points of identification.49

FROM A CONCEPTUAL LABYRINTH TO CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

In 1985, Laclau & Mouffe firstly published their book ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’. They aspired to outline a radical democratic politics that draws attention to the Marxist tradition as well as moving beyond it; i. e. ‘post-marxism’. Laclau & Mouffe presented a theory of politics that could not be reduced to class-essentialism, avant-garde romanticism, economic determinism or to rational dialectical certainty. According to them (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 88), the openness of any society conditions the possibility for ‘suturing’; that is to impose elements of closure into the realm of ‘the social’. Complete closure will, however, never be achieved since: ‘Society never manages fully to be society, because everything in it is penetrated by its limits, which prevent it from constituting itself as an objective reality’ (Ibid: 127) and ‘[I]t is only through negativity, division and antagonism that a formation can constitute itself as

48 In this respect, Jacques Derrida (see Culler 1994: 142-6) elaborates on Plato’s use of the term ‘pharmakos’ (scapegoat) in the dialogue ‘Critias’. The ‘pharmakos’ symbolises movement and the production of differences. In order to purify the city, the ‘pharmakos’ has to be cast off. This process requires that the scapegoat be chosen within the city and that the ‘pharmakos’ must be made known and heard of. Kearney (2003: 39) argues that strangers are scapegoated for the purpose of saving the city from sin. Hence, the act of scapegoating enables a differentiation between a pure inside (being) and a defiled outside (non-being).

49 As regards the construction of political identities, Pierre Bourdieu (1999: 221) asserts that: ‘What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of the social world through principles of di-vision which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish meaning and a consensus about meaning, and in particular about the identity and unity of the group, which creates the reality of the unity and the identity of the group.’
We again approach the idea that Europe lacks finite essence, but manifests itself in a series of oppositions in relation to what Europe is not.

The discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe introduces and elaborates on a multitude of concepts such as hegemony, discourse, antagonism, articulation, moments and elements just to mention a few. Considering the obvious risk of neologisms, we need to reduce the amount of conceptual tools in order not to get lost in this conceptual labyrinth. In the thesis, I focus on how the concept of Europe is continuously filled with meaning. In this respect, I am interested in the constitutive force of language as creating the categories and positions from which we make sense of the world. In the terminology of Laclau & Mouffe, any articulation takes place in a ‘field of discursivity’; hence, they reject the Foucauldian separation between discourse and non-discourse. There is nothing outside language, no logos behind actual appearance or any external force that may constitute society as a totality. However, Laclau & Mouffe make yet another analytical distinction between ‘moments’ (differential positions appearing within discourse) and ‘elements’ (any difference which is not yet fixed). In this sense, articulation is a practice that (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 105; see also Torfing 1999: 298) ‘establishes a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’. A political articulation thus transforms ‘elements’ into ‘moments’. The structured totality that comes as result is what Laclau & Mouffe

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50 Laclau & Mouffe (2001: 137) elaborates on Gramsci’s concept of ‘war of positions’, insisting that ‘[i]t introduces a radical ambiguity into the social which prevents it from being fixed in any transcendentalist signified’.

51 Important to note is, though, that the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is not relativistic in the sense that it makes social facts obsolete (Neumann 2001: 166; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 2000: 15), rather it emphasises how the meaning of these facts are interpreted and thus discursively constituted. See also Flyvbjerg (2001) who asserts that: ‘Despite more than two thousand years of attempts by rationalistic philosophers, no one has been able so far to live up to Plato’s injunction that to avoid relativism our thinking must be rationally and universally grounded. The reason may be that Plato was wrong’. I believe Flyvbjerg to be right on the spot. The solution to the pitfalls of relativism is not necessarily spelled rationalism. Craig Calhoun (1995: 18) argues in a similar vein that: ‘It is common to speak as though essentialism reigned throughout western history until a new Enlightenment freed us in the post-war era. Sometimes the contrast is narrower – essentialism is seen as modernist and postmodernism has saved us from it.’ Rather than representing two opposing logics, the invoked dichotomy between constructionism and essentialism offer ‘a field of possible strategies for confronting issues of identity’ (ibid: 17). And in her response to the ‘exclusionary practices’ of postmodernist discourses, bell hooks (1994: 421-6) seeks to replace essentialism with ‘the authority of experiences’.
refers to as ‘discourse’: a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done within a certain context. In this respect, I emphasise how the concept of Europe is discursively constituted through political articulations of a certain European identity that transforms ‘elements’ into ‘moments’.

In this thesis, I conceive of the concept of Europe as an ‘empty signifier’ (Torfing 1999: 301) that lacks essence, since it is so over-coded with meaning that it signifies everything and nothing at the same time. We may assume that Europe as an ‘empty signifier’ is inherently incoherent and fused by a ‘surplus of meanings’ that prevents its closure. In this sense, there is no finite answer to the question of what makes Europe “Europe”, but a contingent struggle of definitions.

To understand the process in which the concept of Europe – seen as an ‘empty signifier’ – is partially filled with meaning, I analyse how any articulations of a certain European identity knit together a number of ‘floating signifiers’ with the concept of Europe. These ‘floating signifiers’ have different connotations depending on which ‘articulatory practices’ they are associated with. To be less abstract, if we analyse the notion of ‘civilisation’ as a ‘floating signifier’ we may come to the result that civilisation means something quite different if it is associated with the rise and fall of the Roman Empire than if we do an analysis of 19th century colonialism. In the former example, civilisation could perhaps signify an era in modern history before the Roman Empire fell apart. In the later example, civilisation may possibly be described as a means to conquer, and to justify that “we” (as in “we”, the colonial states) have a moral right to colonise the parts of the world.

52 The use of the term discourse in social sciences and elsewhere has escalated in recent years and we should therefore be somewhat careful when we use it in actual research. Mats Alvesson & Dan Karreman (2000: 1127) have elaborated on the multifold meanings and uses of discourse in academic disciplinary practice, inferring that: ‘Discourse sometimes comes close to standing for everything, and thus nothing’.

53 I do not use the two concepts of ‘elements’ and ‘moments’ as analytical categories in my analysis of articulations of what makes Europe “Europe”. I introduce them here in order to highlight the tension involved in any political articulation of a concept such as “Europe”.

54 Torfing (1999: 301) suggests, for instance, that the notion of ‘democracy’ can be analysed as an empty signifier in this respect.

55 Any political activity of a partial fixation of meaning of a given concept leaves a surplus of meaning that may be re-activated as a result of another political articulation that alters the internal order and may thus privilege alternative definitions (see further Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 111). See also my discussion above on Morocco and Europe.
that are not considered as civilised as “we” (as in “we” who live in the civilised parts of the world, i.e the West) are. In relation to this thesis, political articulations of a certain European identity knit together the concept of Europe with ‘floating signifiers’ such as ‘civilisation’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’. There is struggle of definition also of what constitutes ‘floating signifiers’. We shall come across how, for instance, the concept of ‘populism’ – seen as a ‘floating signifier’ – connotes differently depending on which positions “we” articulate ourselves from. The question of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans corresponds, from a position of a ‘consensual elite’, to a partial fixation of meaning of ‘populism’ as something that “we” (as in “we”, “the Good Europeans”) refrain from (see further chapter 7).

A practical implication of the inherent incoherence of the concept of Europe is, as indicated before, that the question of what makes Europe “Europe” cannot be separated from what Europe is depicted not to be: the content of Europe is established through exclusionary practices that somehow “show” what Europe is not. I therefore assume that the concept of “Europe” receives its meaning through a series of ‘constitutive splits’ that distinguish between “us” Europeans and “them”, the not-Europeans. The concept of ‘constitutive split’ is used by Ernesto Laclau (Laclau 1995; see also Torfing 1999: 177-9) to account for the circumstance that any hegemonic agent is ‘constitutively split’ between the politics they advocate and their ability to fill the ‘empty place of the universal’ with meaning. In this thesis, I employ the concept of the ‘constitutive split’ in a less abstract way, namely as a set of enacted differences between what “we are” in relation to what is not considered part of “us”.

I thus assume that any identity formation is articulated though a series of ‘constitutive splits’ that demarcates an inside from an outside. In order for me to analyse how the concept of Europe – seen as an empty signifier - is partially filled with meaning through articulations of a certain European identity, I shall scrutinise chains of floating signifiers that are differentiated from what remains

56 In both examples, we see how the position of ‘the barbarians’ may be imposed on “them” who are not considered part of “our” civilised community.
The third chapter deals explicitly with the ambition within the EU to foster a sense of belonging among Europeans that somehow differs from “older” attempts to imagine the nation-state. From this perspective, we see how a number of ‘floating signifiers’ (e.g. universalism, liberalism) are arranged in a chain associated with the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ which, in turn, is separated from the concept of ‘nationalism’, which connotes a conflicting chain of ‘floating signifiers’ (e.g. particularism, democracy). In this sense, the empty signifier of Europe is filled with meaning through a conceptual scheme of floating signifiers that are arranged in relation to one another and tied to either “side” of the constitutive split of cosmopolitanism and nationalism.

If the concept of hegemony or ‘hegemonic intervention’ relates to the absence of struggle and the dissolution of antagonisms (see further discussion in Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 2001: 55), the mutually constitutive force of the ‘constitutive split’ between the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’ limits the possibility of articulating alternative positions from which we may let our voices be heard. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the relation between the positions of ‘Europe’ and the ‘nation-states’ in relation to the academic field of European integration studies. I emphasise how knowledge of the goals and means of European integration are contingently reproduced in this context. In chapter five, six and seven, I analyse how a series of constitutive splits (e.g. “Good versus Bad Europeans”) set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. With these analytical tools, I may now analyse both the relation between the positions of Europe vis-à-vis ‘the nation’ and the limits of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.

57 In this regard, Laclau & Mouffe (2001: 144) talk about ‘chains of equivalences’ as constructing what is beyond the limits of any given societal formation.

58 Returning to the debate referred to in the beginning of this book: a number of floating signifiers (e.g. better democracy, closer to the people) were ordered in a chain that maintained a difference between the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’.

59 Jacob Torfing (1999: 101) defines hegemony as: ‘the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces. Following the terminology of Laclau & Mouffe, to be hegemonic, a political force must occupy “the empty place of the universal” and thus lose its particularistic identity (Torfing 1999: 177). For pragmatic reason, though, I conceive of all articulations of a certain European identity as contingent articulations (hegemonic or not) that partially fix the meaning of what makes Europe “Europe” and yet fail to finally define the essence of Europe.
EPILOGUE

The question of what we are has no finite answer, nevertheless it crystallises among TV-watching friends, in the voice of the alienated man screaming in his mousehole or elsewhere. Identity comes with existence. However, in confronting actual processes of collective identification we soon approach the crucial link between identity and politics. To talk in the name of Europe is to speak on behalf of a larger collectivity that we claim to represent. In taking part of these activities, we contingently produce and reproduce knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe”. In articulating a certain European identity, we also present Europe as distinct from other entities, and thereby we construct a difference between what “we are” (‘the Europeans’) in relation to those who are not considered part of “us” (‘the not-Europeans’). The question of what makes “us” Europeans different from “them” is expressed as a series of ‘constitutive splits’ that taken together set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. The possibility of political action in relation to the European integration process is limited to which definitions of Europe we decide to hold true in relation to what remains outside.
3. THE NEW EUROPEAN NATIONALISM

between demos and cosmos
SCENE III

On the official interactive gateway to the European Union, the slogan reads: ‘united in diversity’. On the first of May 2004, the European Union (EU) expanded from 15 to 25 member-states, the greatest enlargement of the union so far. In Malta, Warsaw and Berlin, on the day before, gala concerts were held to celebrate the event. The singer of the Latvian band BrainStorm, Reynard Cowper, who performed in Warsaw, is interviewed. He is happy to celebrate the Latvian membership in the European Union, albeit he confirms that he will cheer for his national team in the World Championship in soccer taking place in Portugal later the same year.

In Berlin, the Slovakian opera singer Jenis Dalibor is enthusiastic about the free movement of people, which follows from the further integration of nations and peoples in Europe. He embraces the abolishment of boundaries and opening of new doors: ‘I like the idea of breaking these pseudo-borders between us through music /…/ it is a big honour for me to represent my country on such an occasion.’ In the same interview, Dalibor says that the enlarged EU brings with it increased opportunities for those people who are hardworking whereas those who are lazy will be left behind.

In July 1999, the European Commission recognised the cultural project, ‘The Organ as a Symbol of the European Vision-Safeguarding and Communicating a Common Heritage (ORSEV).’ ORSEV is a joint project to spread the organ as a symbol for a common European culture. The uniqueness of the organ as a European instrument is that it transforms the diversity of different national and regional music traditions into one common instrument. The organ stands as a symbol for unity-in-diversity. Music unifies. It transgresses borders. The allegory suggests that the same goes for the enlargement of the EU. Unity-in-diversity is communicated and pleaded for, displaying the distinctiveness of a common European heritage. Harmony.

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60 EUROPA – website.
61 ORSEV – website. (See also Hellström 2003a: 181-2).
SCENE IV

Once upon a time, Charlemagne (742-814 AD), king of the Franks, fought a war against Muslims who were raising arms in present day Spain. With his sword he defended Christianity against infidelity. As a protector of Western Christendom, he served a divine purpose and aimed at consolidating a Christian Europe. His worldly empire comprised a territory reaching from what today counts as France, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands to some parts of Germany and Italy.

In his book ‘Europe as I see it’ Romano Prodi claims the historical integration of the nations and peoples of Europe to be indebted to France (2000: 33): ‘France’s presence is a guarantee that our cultural tradition and our deeply held values will have the role they deserve in the creation of the new Europe’. The common Christian roots are pivotal for the (re)unification of Europe; a common denominator between the east and the west (ibid: 45). To safeguard the creation of an enlarged European Union, Christianity provides a means to instilling a soul into the European soil. The new Europe is not only a great political design or a ‘beacon for world civilization’ (ibid: 46); ultimately, it is, according to Prodi, the ‘reconciliation of man with nature’.

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62 From ‘Catholic Encyclopedia’ - website
This chapter introduces key aspects of the identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe. The main argument in this chapter is that the political project of integrating the nations and peoples of Europe is imbued with a kind of ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ that both reproduces “old” state-nationalisms in the name of Europe and yet strives at moving beyond them. Articulations of a certain European identity that knit together a certain demos (Europeans) with a distinct community (the ‘new Europe’) thus, potentially, give rise to a new European nationalism.

Even if it seems valid to suggest that the member-states of the European Union have given up aspects of their sovereignty to supra-national institutions of the European Union, this is not to say that the political project of the EU has moved away from nationalism per se. Articulations of nationalism in the name of Europe anticipate hopes for a European public arena, and is contrasted with nation-making processes based on ethno-cultural descent (Habermas 2001). In this chapter, though, I analyse how the EU identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe (re)-invents many traits associated with the making of nation-states, involving aspects associated with both ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ kinds of nationalisms.

Whereas proponents of a further integrated EU, on the one hand, aspire to attain a deeper sense of belonging among peoples and nations living in Europe, the EU on the other hand, also attributes to its own merits a political design that transgresses old borders, extending beyond the nation-state paradigm. The former project corresponds to an increased awareness of the need to establish a less vaguely defined European demos, to justify the coming to the fore of an expanded European democracy within the realms of the enlarged EU. In other words, it connotes an imagined European community and gives, potentially, rise to different kinds of nationalisms. The latter project, though, is about presenting

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63 A different version of this chapter was selected for publication in an anthology based on papers presented at the conference ‘Fortress Europe: cultural representations in media, culture and arts’ in London, April 2005. Yet another version was presented at the conference ‘Cuarta conferencia International de Geografíca Crítica’, Mexico City, January 2005.
visions of an enlarged EU that brings peace to the continent as a ‘beacon for world civilisation’ (scene IV). To speak in the name of Europe is, in this scenario, made equivalent of speaking on behalf of humanity or ‘world civilisation’ [cosmos]. In the text, I present the argument that the hybrid concept of cosmopolitan nationalism emerges between the seemingly irreconcilable logics of demos and cosmos.

I believe that the concept of cosmopolitan nationalism helps us to interpret how contemporary articulations of a certain European identity may work constitutively for the imagining of Europe as a distinct community. I have before discussed how members of the EUC (as part of their “job-description”) talk in the name of Europe, to safeguard a certain European interest and move the integration process further. Empirically, I mainly focus on how members of the Commission, in their speeches, give substance to the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’. It could be argued that the concept, if not associated with something tangible, is empty in itself (cf. Delanty & Rumford 2004: 65-6), since it may correspond to any political constellation or societal formation that seek to compromise between ambitions to achieve a common denominator among the included parts as to avoid fragmentation or dissolution (unity), and at the same time allow for a diversity of forms within this unity to avoid uniformity (diversity). To give but one example related to our case of a certain European identity, Vaclav Havel writes in a foreword to an academic anthology on “Europe’s soul” (2000: XV):

If Europe wants to, it has a chance to remember its best spiritual traditions and their roots; to search for the features that it shares with the roots of other cultures and civilisations; and to search together with the others for that common spiritual and moral minimum to be followed by all so that we are able to stand up to anything that threatens our common existence on this earth.

Havel thus recognises a ‘common spiritual and moral minimum’ for Europe (unity) that is combined with respect for separable ‘spiritual traditions and their roots’ (diversity). Or perhaps, we should interpret the quote as if the European civilisation is one distinguishable part (diversity) of ‘our common existence on this earth’ corresponds to a universalizable ‘spiritual and moral minimum’ (unity). Anyway, it could be argued that articulations of a certain European identity (as any process of identification) balance
the needs and interests of the many (unity) with the rights and claims of the few (diversity). The crucial part is, I believe, that some compromises must be made between the two notions of unity and diversity; returning to Havel, to achieve a ‘common spiritual and moral minimum’ we also need to exclude diversities that do not correspond well with this common denominator. 64

What we refer to as unity and diversity, respectively, is context-bound and the compromises we seek to achieve thus vary depending on what social- or political constellation we are referring to. As regards our example of articulations of a certain European identity, Gerard Delanty & Chris Rumford (2004: 57) provide us with an argument to pay attention to the notions of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’: ‘In fact each represents the hitherto dominant expressions of European identity, namely the Eurofederalist aspiration to a deep unity and the liberal respect of diversity within the limits of a broadly defined moral universalism’. In the next chapter, I will discuss the ‘Eurofederalist aspiration to a deep unity’ in greater detail, whereas this chapter addresses uses of the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ in relation to the concept of Europe and articulations of a new European nationalism.

THE EUROPEAN NATION

A first thing to notice is that the EU lacks many of the features considered necessary for the imagining of a nation-state. For instance, there is no pan-European school system that makes it mandatory for all its pupils to learn one, and only one European history. 65 Peter van Ham (2001) argues that the EU fails in its ambitions to move closer to the people due to a lack of ‘cultural affinity’. One may also wonder, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson (2001: 7), what makes people love and die for the sake of a European nation? From this perspective, the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ may indicate that “we” are yet to achieve the

64 In this balance act we also find a parallel to the debate on multiculturalism. While Iris Marion Young purports a principle of ‘Together-In-Difference’ that recognises social differences, Brian Barry gives priority to ‘unity-over-diversity’ (see further the previous chapter). Elsewhere (Hellström 2003a: 183-5) I have argued that the device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ is a democratic paradox that also manifests itself in the debate on multiculturalism.

65 See Patrik Hall (1998) for a discussion on the importance of a consolidated education-policy in the case of Swedish state-nationalism.
necessary unity to bring Europeans together in an imagined European community.

In the proposal for a new constitutional treaty issued by the so-called ‘European Future Convention’ in 2003, ‘United-in-Diversity’ is the declared motto of the enlarged union.\textsuperscript{66} One year after and the union had expanded from 15- to 25 member-states. And it is probably because of that event that ‘unity’ became ‘united: finally, nations from the eastern parts of Europe were (re)-united with their brothers and sisters in the West (cf. scene III). Regarding the analysis, though, I will pay little attention to this semantic manoeuvre: the project of achieving ‘unity-in-diversity’ does not necessarily end with the fulfilment of the eastern enlargement. In the words of Delanty & Rumford (ibid: 61-2):

\begin{quote}
In this sense unity derives from the overcoming of differences /…/ In the view of many EU policy makers unity – that is, a common European identity – can be created by cultural policies. In this version of the unity and diversity argument European identity is a project to be achieved rather than simply an identity that exists in some form'.
\end{quote}

Apparently, the political project of the EU is also about creating cultural policies that may sustain articulations of a common European identity (cf. Shore 2000; cf. Kohli 2000). Does this mean that we can talk about the coming to the fore of a European nation? Before further elaborating on that matter, we need to clarify what is meant by ‘nation’ and the related concept of ‘nationalism’ in the first place. If the nation, as formulated by Ernest Gellner (1983), presupposes the state as a protective shell we certainly need to balance our approach not to risk a ‘conceptual stretching’ (cf. Sartori 1970: 1034-6): in order to make sense, nationalism cannot correspond to everything that is related to processes of collective identification. I will thus begin this chapter with a discussion on how we are to understand articulations of nationalism in relation to the political project of the EU. I then discuss, in greater detail, the concept of cosmopolitan nationalism. After these general theoretical considerations, I change perspective and approach the identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe. In more precise terms, I elaborate on how uses of the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ sustain articulations of a certain

\textsuperscript{66} The debate on the new constitutional treaty will be analysed in the fifth chapter of this book.
European identity. Towards the end of the chapter, I will relate my analysis of EU-elite rhetoric to the concept of cosmopolitan nationalism.

**THE NEW EUROPEAN NATIONALISM**

The year before that he began his period in office, Romano Prodi (2000) firstly published his book ‘Europe as I see it’ in which he referred to the realm of Charlemagne as a common spiritual ground for the enlarged union (scene IV). Elsewhere, contemporary ideas of European cohesion are traced to ancient Greece or Rome (e.g. Viviane Reding May 8, 2003; cf. Smith 1997b: 330-5).67 The ‘flagging of Europe’68 and the invention of a particular ‘European history’69 correspond to common goods in the imagining of national communities. According to a well-known scholar of nationalism, Anthony D. Smith (1991: 14), a nation consists of: ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. In order to come into existence, he argues that a nation also should involve ‘ideas of a common culture’, ‘association with a specific homeland’ and ‘a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population’ (ibid).

From this definition of the nation we may raise some immediate concerns as regards the idea of a European nation. What in more precise terms are the historic memories and myths that could attach Europeans with a specific homeland? Is there really a public European culture solid enough to gather the masses (cf. Hoffman 2000)? Furthermore, since the EU does not involve all the nations and peoples of Europe, are we not again confronted with the common conflation between the political project of the EU and the whole of Europe? Apparently, the EU is not there, at least not

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67 For a discussion on myth-making processes concerning a common ancestry in the case of Europe, see Sonya Puntscher Riekmann (1997).
68 The notion of flagging nationalism is used by Michael Billig 1995 to stress the ‘banality’ of moulded national identities in established nation-states.
69 For a discussion on the invention of a history and national traditions in the case of the nation-state, see e.g. Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983).
yet.\textsuperscript{70} For Smith, nations are rooted in basic pre-modern ethnic cores (\textit{ethnie}).\textsuperscript{71} He insists on basic similarities between modern nationalisms and their predecessors even if these also need to be reproduced and remembered again (Hall 1998: 38-9): ‘[t]hey are both built up around what Smith calls a ‘mythomoteur’ – a framework of cultural meaning that consists of different myths and symbols which evolve around characteristics such as names, languages, myths of origin, territorial framework and solidarity’.\textsuperscript{72} We should be aware, however, that Smith’s conceptualisation of ‘the nation’ has been locus for major criticism. Smith and other so-called ‘ethno-symbolists’ have been criticised for overstressing the link between cultural ‘ethnic’ memories in the past and the formation of modern nationalisms (Özkirimli 2000: 198).\textsuperscript{73} If we conceive of the concept of Europe as an ‘empty signifier’ that lacks finite essence, then, there is no pre-existing \textit{ethnie} corresponding to the idea of Europe. In a reverse move, though, we may emphasise how articulations of nationalisms contingently invent or construct ‘the nation’ and what Smith refers to as the ‘mythomoteur’. In other words, we may find a path through to analyse how articulations of a certain European identity contingently construct a distinct European community that bond Europeans together.\textsuperscript{74}

However, even if we shift focus from the pre-existence of a certain “European nation” to articulations of European nationalisms we are confronted with some conceptual difficulties. According to Michael Billig (1995: 43): ‘Nationalism … is typically seen as the force which creates nation-states or which threatens the stability of existing states’. In the latter case, Billig argues, nationalism is projected to separatist- or extremist groups that aim

\textsuperscript{70} See also Lars-Erik Cederman (2001b) who has applied literature on national identity in order to scrutinise the possibility of constructing a ‘European Demos’, something that he finds rather unlikely at a present stage (cf. Hymans 2004: 23).

\textsuperscript{71} See also Armstrong (1982) on the concept of ‘ethnic consciousness’.

\textsuperscript{72} Smith (e.g. 1991; 1997b) is himself deeply sceptical to the possibility of imagining Europe as a nation-state. In his terminology, there is no pre-modern ethnie of Europe to rely on for contemporary entrepreneurs. For Smith, then, the project of creating Europe as a nation-state is likely to fail.

\textsuperscript{73} It could be mentioned that, according to e.g. Neumann 1999: 5-6, also Anderson and other so-called “modernist” scholars of nationalism fail to acknowledge how recent changes in communication and transportation affect imaginings of new kinds of communities.

\textsuperscript{74} It has been standard among scholars of nationalism to refer to Benedict Anderson’s view of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). In relation to this, I suggest that we may consider the new European nationalism as an attempt to imagine Europe as a distinct community.
for independence and/or territorial autonomy: it is “them”, not “us” who are the nationalists (See further Özkirimli 2000: 199-201). In this limited sense, nationalism has little to do with the identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe. It is not convincing to simply conceive of the EU as a ‘force that creates a new nation-state’. However, Billig (ibid: 199) encourages us to confront these ‘orthodox theorizations’ of nationalism and instead focus on everyday practices in which we all, more or less, reproduce banal signs of nationalism such as waving of the national flag during international sports events or when our daughters and sons sing the national hymn before leaving school for summer vacations. In participating in these and/or other mundane practices of ‘flagging nationalism’ we all contribute to the reproduction of nationalism. From this perspective, Billig (1995: 17) confronts both theories of nationalism that conceive of loyalties to nation-states as ‘endemic to the human condition’, and those theories (ibid) that tend to ‘project nationalism’ as a property of ‘others’ /…/ in doing so, they tend to overlook the nationalist aspects of ‘our’ common sense. Billig (ibid: 14) thus states that: ‘Nationalism is simultaneously obvious and obscure’. At the same time as “we” (as in “we” who live in Western societies) take the system of nation-states for granted and continue to reproduce its artificial borders, “we” also tend to project the existence of nationalistic ideologies everywhere but here. In brief, Billig encourages us to acknowledge nationalism as here and now and not just as before or elsewhere.

Again, we find a parallel to the notion of ‘identity politics’ in relation the debate on multiculturalism as discussed in the previous chapter: in order to critically engage with elite-articulations of what makes Europe different from other potential points of identification, we need to move from the periphery to the centre; from extremist expression of nationalisms to everyday activities of reproduction of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” (cf. Hall 1998: 41). While mainly focusing on US patriotism, Billig (1995: 141) also approaches my area of research, namely the European Union and the notion of nationhood:

75 In referring to endemic theories of nationalism, Billig explicitly refers to Anthony D. Smith (Billig 1995: 26-8). In discussing the tendency to restrict the study of nationalism to only “hot” or extremist kinds of nationalism, Billig explicitly mentions Anthony Giddens (ibid: 20-1).
The European Union is often seen as eroding statehood. However, it is not clear that, in the European Union, the ideal of nationhood is being replaced by a new image of community [...] The federalist vision transfers nationhood to a wider entity, as states combine to form a super-state. The non-federalist image defines membership of the community in terms of existing nationhood and national boundaries.

In Billig’s interpretation, both federalist accounts of a European community and more state-centric approaches perpetuate the notion of nationhood. A legitimate question would still be: what nationalism or nationalism/s are we referring to?

ETHNIC AND CIVIC NATIONALISM

More than one hundred years ago, Ernest Renan (1994: 17) defined the nation as follows:

The worship of ancestors is understandably justifiable, since our ancestors have made us what we are. A Heroic past, of great men, of glory (I mean the genuine kind), that is the social principle on which the national idea rests. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present, to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation.

Since then (and before) there have been numerous attempts to define ‘the nation’ and the related concept of nationalism. When scholars of nationalism distinguish between different kinds of nationalism, one common demarcation line is between ethnic and civic nationalism. Ethno-cultural nationalism normally refers to imaginings of a national community based on common ancestry, collective myths, a focus on heroes and/or ‘founding fathers’, selective memories and/or selective amnesias (Brown 2000: 51). This kind of nationalism is inward-looking and seeks its legitimacy in the past. It strives for authentic continuity. These features are linked to the ideal type of German nationalism that can be traced back to Herder’s romantic nationalism from the 19th century of a common destiny for the German Volks-nation. In citizenship terms, this nationalism is associated with the principle of ius sanguinis (the right of blood).

Civic nationalism connotes common principles for democratic decision-making. It offers a vision of a kinship community based on

76 In this respect, the French writer Albert Camus claims that German thinkers have ‘placed history on the throne of God’ (quoted in Duvall 2005: 139).
public loyalty and a commitment to a common political culture (Brown 2000: 127). It demands civil allegiance of its citizens, but instead of depending on common roots it is forward-looking. Instead of relying on common ethno-cultural roots, a civic community may include people from various backgrounds as long as these people integrate well and direct ‘their loyalty to the state’ (ibid: 128). Its principle of citizenship is *ius soli* (right of the territory). According to the author and columnist Michael Ignatieff (quoted in Billig 1995: 47), this kind of nationalism is a ‘political creed, which defines common citizenship and which emerged from the universalist philosophies of the Enlightenment. It is … the nationalism of established democracies at their best’.

Two scholars as diverse as Anthony D. Smith (1991) and Bhikhu Parekh (1995) use the analytical distinction between ethnic and civic to classify nationalisms in existing nation-states. Typically, this distinction follows a west-/east divide, between good (civic) and bad (ethnic) nationalisms. It could, though, be argued that all existing nationalisms include both civic and ethnic elements of community-making, of being both inward- and outward looking. David Brown (2000: 68-9) claims that:

> both forms of nationalism seek to tie the individual into communities of obligation which are depicted as persisting through time, and both have capacity to prioritise the collectivity over the individual /.../ Nationalism does have two ideological faces, civic and ethnocultural, but the political character of both is surely protean rather than Janus-faced

There is little reason to believe that the new European nationalism should be an exception to this rule. Rather than endeavouring to define the new European nationalism as either civic or ethnic, it might be a good idea to join forces with David Brown and question the value of the distinction as such. To be more precise, I do not believe, following Brown, that we are confronted with two different kinds of nationalism, rather with different aspects of the articulation of any nationalism. However, I will use the two categories of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ as ideal types in order to detect what aspects of nationalism that are manifest in the case of a new European

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77 When Camus talks about the French nationalism, he links it to the ‘Mediterranean mind’ with features such as virility, intelligence and courage (Duvall 2005).
78 See further discussion in Brown (2000: chapter 3).
nationalism that combines articulations of nationalisms with ideals of cosmopolitanism. In the following, I will discuss how we are to make sense of the concept of cosmopolitan nationalism in relation to the political project of the EU.

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM

In the post-1989 liberal democratic symbiosis, it could be argued that nationalism is an outdated phenomenon (cf. Billig 1995). Notions of human rights and cosmopolitan democracy [cosmos] do not, intuitively, fit well with articulations of nationalisms that stress the particularistic rights for a distinct people within the limited territory of a nation [demos].

This discussion is nothing new. Both ideals of cosmopolitanism and articulations of nationalisms within the limited territories of nation-states have roots back in history. Licata & Klein (2002: 323) observe that the idea of the European integration project is often said to be rooted in the Enlightenment tradition, which: ‘… promotes cosmopolitanism as opposed to particularism; universalism as opposed to cultural differentialism; reason opposed to instinct; and the respect of human rights’. They (ibid: 324) then turn to discussing the ‘reverse of this coin’; hence, exclusionary aspects of this ‘new identity’. Again, any political project involves inherent contradictions despite its integrative ambitions.

From his prison cell, Carl Schmitt (cited in Derrida 2000: 162) – the German anti-liberal law philosopher79 – claims that: ‘The other is my brother. The other is revealed as my brother, and the

79 Schmitt is a controversial figure in the history of science because of his ambiguous relation to the ideology of Nazism from which he never did distance himself from (See e.g. Strong in Schmitt 1996: xxiv-xxvii): he joined the Nazi party in May 1933 (the same month as did Heidegger). So, for what use should we engage with Schmitt today other than as a bad example? I let Chantal Mouffe (2005: 4) answer that question: ‘Many people will find it rather perverse if not outright outrageous. Yet, I believe that it is the intellectual force of theorists, not their moral qualities, that should be the decisive criteria in deciding whether we need to establish a dialogue with their work.’ Many of those engaged with Schmitt today are careful to somewhat distance themselves from Schmitt so as to ‘think with Schmitt against Schmitt’ (Mouffe 2005: 14). In particular, his obsession with the enemy as someone who needs to be physically killed has led scholars to modify his initial presuppositions. Derrida (2000: 138-48) observes a certain Hegelian teleological aspect of his reasoning on the political as if absolute hostility was the only solution to the fallacies of the liberal democratic hegemony.
brother reveals himself as my enemy'. The universal notion of brotherhood cannot escape the ‘friend-/enemy’ division that, according to Schmitt (1996: 25-7), is fundamental for any societal formation. He (ibid: 53) further argues that the world is a ‘pluriverse’ rather than a universe: ‘The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world’. The universal brotherhood of men cannot be for everyone (cf. Derrida 2000). The tension between universalism and particularism is - from this perspective – immanent in any society. Schmitt is, in particular, inclined to discuss inherent tensions in liberal democratic societies. Whereas liberalism asks for equal rights of every individual (rule-by-law), democracy requires a distinction between who belongs to the demos and who does not (Mouffe 1999b: 39). For Schmitt, the central concept of democracy is not humanity: ‘but the concept of the ‘people’ /…/ Democracy can only exist for a people’ (Mouffe 1999b: 41; see also Hirst 1999: 11).

Chantal Mouffe (1996b; 1999a; 1999b; 2000a; 2000b; 2005) has taken up on Schmitt’s idea of ‘the political’ as an ever-present possibility in each and every societal formation, including contemporary articulations of a ‘liberal-democratic hegemony’. She (2005: 10) returns to Schmitt for the explicit reason of questioning the liberal incapacity of ‘thinking politically’: contemporary articulations of a liberal democratic hegemony reduce ‘the political’ to mere interest conflicts (the aggregative model) or as issues of controversies that may be solved through dialogue and/or intellectual reasoning (the deliberative model) at the same time as alternatives to the dominant order are ruled out (Mouffe 2000a: chapter 1).

I recognise the philosophical reasoning of Carl Schmitt as a way to highlight the irreconcilability of the two dimensions of

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80 Derrida (2000: 158-9) recognises, rightly in my view, that Schmitt neglects ‘the sister’ in his philosophical reasoning on the notion of brotherhood, thereby placing Schmitt in a larger male-centred philosophical paradigm: ‘so many indications attest to it in all European cultures /…/ has always been virile virtue in its androcentric manifestation’.

81 Other scholars, e.g. Bauman (1999) and Žižek (2002), have also been engaged with articulations of liberalism as a ‘non-alternative credo’. Chantal Mouffe openly criticises the aggregative- and deliberative models of liberalism, whereas advocates of other liberal traditions (see e.g. Gray 1995) would possibly agree with her concerning the idea of that liberalism and democracy are inherently antagonistic.
demos and cosmos in the case of cosmopolitan nationalism. In the completely different context which is also ours, Romano Prodi refers to new Europe (here associated with the EU after the fulfilled eastern enlargement) as the ‘reconciliation of man with nature’ (scene IV). In his view, the EU should act as a ‘beacon for world civilization’ (Prodi 2000: 45-6). In this image, we have an example of a political unity that attributes to its own merits (at least if we listen to Prodi) the possibility to guide humanity to Cosmopolis. What Prodi refers to is, arguably, a kind of ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ that is allegedly attached with the political project of the EU.82

THE COSMOPOLITAN MAN

The cosmopolitan man is a citizen of the world. The cosmopolitan subject is disembodied, shares no obligations to anyone and knows of no sacred values (See e.g. Kristeva 1991: chapter 7). In the cosmopolitan vision there are no enemies. Its prime unit of concern is the individual rather than any larger unit of identification such as the family, the municipality or the nation (cf. Bowden 2003: 240-2): if anything, the cosmopolitan man identifies with ‘the world’. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism - as I understand it - acknowledges the equal rights and value of each and every individual paying little or no attention to class, gender, religion or any other categories that obstruct individual emancipation. Its scope is universal, including all humanity. As a consequence, mental barriers between peoples and territorial borders between nations are considered obsolete.

Gerard Delanty (2003) traces the EU slogan of ‘unity-in-diversity’ to both cosmopolitanism and nationalism. He bases this assumption on current undertakings within the EU community to attribute to the fact of diversity an inner unity that replaces older liberal notions of pure universality. Delanty (ibid: 28) believes this new device to be a post-liberal construction that is ‘heavily influenced by a kind of postmodern communitarianism’.83 In the

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82 For a discussion on different kinds of cosmopolitanism (see e.g. David Held 2003). See Patrik Hall (1998) for an example of how ideas of moral superiority have, historically, triggered Swedish nationalism.

83 See Chris Rumford (2002: 260-1) for a wider discussion on how romantic universalism in combination with enlightenment universalism played a vital part in modern state-formation projects. From this perspective, liberal notions of nation-hood have always been partly anti-liberal.
scholarly literature on cosmopolitanism, we soon approach similar attempts of combining “good” aspects of nationalism with “good” features of cosmopolitanism.

Immanuel Kant is a source of inspiration for advocates of cosmopolitan ideals even today (e.g. Bowden 2003: 241). According to Kant (1983b: 111-3), a cosmopolitan world order would bring about a state of perpetual peace, which could be established through republican principles. Following Kant (1983a: 41), the Enlightenment is ‘man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity’ and a state of perpetual peace is made possible through a cosmopolitan order that consists of free citizens residing in enlightened nations. All nations should, according to Kant, acknowledge the principle of universal hospitality, recognizing the right of each and everyone to be welcomed in another country as a visitor. The earth belongs to all men (1983b: 118): ‘In this way distant parts of the world can establish with one another peaceful relations that will eventually become matters of public law, and the human race can gradually be brought closer and closer to a cosmopolitan constitution’.

In Kant’s view, there was no contradiction between the universal principles of cosmopolitanism and a world system based on nation-states. A contemporary scholar of philosophy, Kai Nielsen (1999), recognises the possibility of combing nationalism and cosmopolitanism as a normative ideal:

We need national identities to make sense of ourselves and the world, but just not any nationalism: “I have argued not only for the compatibility of cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism, I have argued as well that liberal nationalism – as a social and political liberalism – more fully realises the ideals of cosmopolitanism…

Brett Bowden (2003: 245) shares a similar perspective stating that: ‘It should be spelled out that the possession of a global consciousness need not inhibit one from expressions of patriotic pride, or even a love of one’s own country.’ Both Nielsen and Bowden claim the feasibility of combining “good” features of nationalism (normally referred to as civic, civil or liberal whereas ethnic and illiberal varieties are set aside) and “good” aspects of cosmopolitanism.

84 Following Kant’s categorical imperative, the enlightened man may base universalizable moral claims only by seeing herself in the position of others.
cosmopolitanism (i.e. the embrace of universal hospitality and the avoidance of cultural relativism and Euro-centric biases).

Also Craig Calhoun (1998a: 325-9) regards open-ended forms of nationalism as feasible alternatives to a colour-blind cosmopolitan rationalism that 'loses touch with reality'. Calhoun (ibid: 325) argues that ‘nationalism’ - seen as an abstract category ‘is not intrinsically pernicious or antidemocratic’ and may serve as a mediator between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’. Following these lines of thought, to include ideals of cosmopolitanism in the continuous re-shaping of democratic societies, is not to do away with nationalism all-together. A first lesson to be drawn from Calhoun is that nationalism is not inherently bad. A second lesson to be drawn, however, is that nationalism is not inherently good either. From my point of view, references to a kind of moral cosmopolitanism may serve the purposes of portraying “our” nationalism as particularly good and morally justifiable (cf. Billig 1995; Hall 1998). Returning to Carl Schmitt, however, as long as the EU does not involve all humanity, the endeavours to reconcile demos with cosmos involve mechanisms of exclusion. Arguably, not everybody can be equally included in a European demos: each and every societal formation demarcates itself from what it is not. In the words of Chantal Mouffe (2005: 18): ‘Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities’.

In the next section, I will discuss how articulations of a certain European identity (summarised in the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’) involve aspects associated with both ethnic and civic nationalisms. Further on, I will also elaborate on how the compromise-making between unity and diversity in the case of the new European nationalism is related to the seemingly irreconcilable logics of demos and cosmos.

**UNITY-IN-DIVERSITY**

‘Unity-in-diversity’ (before and after the change over to united) captures the endeavours to consolidate a political entity (unity) labelled Europe at the same time as internal differences are to be
recognised (diversity).\textsuperscript{85} It is possible to cheer at the national team in the World Championship and still be part of a greater whole (Scene III). In this section, I will analyse speeches given by members of the Prodi-Commission (1999-2004) and other official documents emanating from the EU-institutional framework. I look at how articulations of a certain European identity give substance to the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ and, in the long run, partially fix the meaning of what makes Europe “Europe”.

\textbf{UNITY –THE DISTANT PAST}

A key to understanding the making of European Unity is, allegedly, the belief that the current integration process is not about creating a “new” unity, but to accentuate a common European heritage from the past (Prodi May 9, 2001; CEC 2001b). In Brussels on December 3, 2002, Prodi recognises that the iron curtain does no longer divide “us” and ‘the historical unity of Europe’s peoples has been restored. Our common destiny is once again to build a future for all of us’. Noteworthy is then that images of ‘the past’ are not only inherent in the present, but also prepare the ground for perceptions of a more united Europe in the future (e.g. Byrne May 25, 2001).

It is not always clear, though, what ‘a past unified Europe’ refers to. In his book, ‘Europe as I see it’, Romano Prodi (2000: 33) returns to the realm of the king of the Franks, Charlemagne (scene IV; Petersson & Hellström 2003) as the time period when Europe was united before\textsuperscript{86}. It could indeed be argued that the idea of a European unity is fictive (Puntscher-Riekman 1997: 60; cf. Smith 1997b). Nevertheless, my impression is that proponents of the EUC continue to put forward an idea of a European community of

\textsuperscript{85} Parts of this section are based on previous studies written or co-authored by me (Hellström 2003a; Petersson & Hellström 2003).

\textsuperscript{86} In a one-volume history of Europe (Duroselle 1990: 102) Charlemagne is described in laudatory terms: ‘As a leader in war he was skilful and indefatigable; as a diplomat he was imaginative and wise’. It should be pointed out, though, that (Petersson & Hellström 2003: 240; see also scene IV). Noteworthy is also that Charlemagne’s empire did only comprise some parts of what we today normally refers to as ‘Europe’. Another potential problem with invoking Charlemagne as a role model for contemporary attempts to ‘reunify’ Europe is that the king was a warlord (Winston 1969: 45): ‘attracted by the prospects of ridding the Christians in Spain from the Mohammedan yoke, for in his family it was an old tradition to fight the Saracens’. It is, however, not my ambition to verify or falsify certain images of a common European past, but to emphasise the role of myths in the imagining of any community distinct.
Europeans who belong together, united by references to a common past that yet has to be continuously invented to fit the agenda of today. At one point, Prodi (IP 2003b) committed a special ‘Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe’ to ‘identify the spiritual, religious and cultural dimensions that Europe will rely on for its future unity’. As part of their work, they arranged an exhibition based on the sculptor Nat Neujan, whose works should remind us of the brutalities of past century and also the ability of mankind to rise above them. Apparently, the creation of a common past is not only about remembering victorious was-heroes, but this process also involves aspects of memorisation that encourage us not to re-live the past.87

UNITY - THE NEAR PAST AND ON TO THE FUTURE

Before the ‘European Day’ May 9, 2003 (IP 2003a), president Prodi communicated ‘a message’ to his fellow-Europeans: ‘I believe Europe’s history shows us the way to the future’. This time, however, he did not think of Charlemagne or any other European war-hero, but of a much nearer past (ibid):

We are now at a crossroads. A difficult, delicate choice faces us. The lessons of fifty years of integration and recent international events must serve to guide us. To make the best choice for the peoples and the States of Europe. If Europe stops seeing the unity that can give it political substance, it will drift. Today we have a chance.

The early days of intra-European integration are thus invoked as the ‘golden age’ for contemporary appeals for a more integrated Europe (see further Petersson & Hellström 2003: 241-3). The message on this particular day was to honour the person and deeds of Robert Schuman who on May 9, 1950 launched the so-called ‘Schuman plan’. According to the European Commissioner David Byrne (May 25, 2001) the ‘founding fathers’ of the union (Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman): ‘managed to do what many great leaders – from as far back as the emperors of ancient Rome had

87 Neumann (1999: 219-20) refers to ‘Nietzsche’s point that it is not what they remember in common that makes them a people but, rather, what they decide to forget’. In this case, however, some memories of the past may be articulated as ‘bad examples’ of a past that “we” do not want to repeat.
tried to do without success, to lay the foundation of a united Europe’. Ultimately, the purpose of the European Union was here defined as a peace project that was given a tangible form in the European Coal and Steel Community between six European countries, including the former antagonists Germany and France. It was now time to show the world a ‘method for peace’ (e.g. Patten April 28, 2004; see also Patten 7 March, 2001; Prodi May 29, 2001).

Eric Hobsbawm (quoted in Özkirimli 2000: 120) anticipates the end of the nation-state era: ‘The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling around nations and nationalism.’ According to Hobsbawm, the ideology of nationalism has lost ground to processes of globalisation and is now ‘past its peak’. In the rhetoric of the EUC, however, there are many possible associations to aspects of nationalism. In the process of (re)-making European unity, references are made to common myths and memories in the past as well as to common feelings of belonging to a special homeland.88 If references to Charlemagne and the founding fathers are inward-looking, references to the much nearer past (the ECSC in the 50’s) lean towards a moral positioning of Europe as a peace-bringer. Although nationalism can be said to suffer from a bad reputation (Billig 1995) references to humanity or the good of all humankind (cosmos) may be used instrumentally to portray “our” nationalism as a morally justifiable alternative; a means to provide a certain people (demos) with a sense of belonging and a feeling of being at home in insecure times (Ibid: 55).89 To achieve peace, however, “we” need to stick together, as proposed by Prodi (March 7, 2003): ‘…united we will all win. United we can have real influence over international affairs and globalisation. But if we remain divided, no State, not even the biggest one, can muster the strength it takes to exert any influence on the world stage.’

Similar statements can be traced elsewhere within the EU: the then president of the European Committee of Regions (COR),

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88 For a discussion on the ‘golden age’ metaphor in this respect, see Smith 1997a. The founding of the ECSC made this metaphor feasible also in the context of the political project of the EU (see further the next chapter). For a discussion on the ‘original home’, see e.g. Paasi 1996.
89 Billig observes a similar phenomenon in the case of the U.S: “Our” nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien /…/ ‘Our’ nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’ – a beneficial, necessary and, often, American force.”
Albert Bort (COR 2003), acknowledges the necessity of building ‘more unity on the world stage’, which in turn is a confirmation of a call for unity of EU leaders initiated by Pat Cox, the then president of the European Parliament. These calls for unity tend to turn into a practical necessity, since Europe now is believed to need solid governance in order to tackle a world in movement. According to Commissioner Verheugen (December 9, 2004), ‘Europe is at its strongest when it acts in unison. It is this unity that we need when we are striving for more competitiveness, more growth and more employment’.

Romano Prodi (March 11, 2003; cf. CEC 2000: 3) stands before the European Parliament and gives further references to the need for unity:

After Maastricht, we are obliged by the treaty to give proof of loyalty and mutual solidarity /…/Today we have a chance to reforge our unity. Our fellow citizens are calling for this, and events leave us no choice'.

Ultimately, the very purpose of the EU is to put an end to conflicts in the ‘dark past’ (Prodi January 28, 2003; Prodi December 18, 2002; Prodi May 9, 2001). The fulfilment of the enlargement, in this respect, becomes a materialisation of a certain idea of Europe, since the EU belongs to all Europe. It is not a matter of choice, since ‘we need to reforge our unity. Our fellow citizens are calling for this, and events leave us no choice’ (Prodi March 11, 2003).

Prodi (November 9, 2001) labels the integration process ‘the first velvet revolution of the 20th century’, since ‘it sweeps away the old idea that citizenship and community rely on the nation and the state’. These appeals for unity in contemporary EU politics are, however, correlated with the appraisal and acknowledgment of diversity; hence, the various national and regional cultures that co-exist within the EU area. The common denominator of these diverse cultural traditions is – according to the rhetoric - what constitutes the diversified whole of what we today refer to as Europe. For example, the Irish Commissioner David Byrne (November 14, 2001) stated when visiting his home country in November 2001 that: ‘the building of Europe is actually a sort of hybrid community of peoples and states committed to diversity and identity of their nation’. Implied here is that the European integration process is not only about unity, it also involves
prospects for a common arena, which allows member-states and peoples of the EU to engage in the shaping of Europe’s common future. In this regard, Delanty & Rumford (2004: 62) remind us of another conceptualisation of the relation between the notions of unity and diversity that is currently gaining speed in the EU:

This is a more recent argument that moves the emphasis from unity to diversity. Hence, the emphasis is on a unity that consists of the fact of diversity. In this view the unity of Europe derives less from a historical cultural heritage than from the interaction of the different European traditions [...] With the official documents of the EU, it is the position that is becoming the more influential. It is also the broad stance of the Council of Europe.

Certainly, the more precise meaning of the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ is interpreted differently depending on the position from which it is being articulated. I now turn to discuss, more precisely, how the notion of ‘diversity’ is addressed within the EU.

DIVERSITY

At a meeting with the European Council in Brussels, December 2003, the delegates summarised the purpose of the eastern enlargement soon to be accomplished (Brussels European Council 2003: § 31): ‘Integrating the new Member-states into the European Family will fulfil the aspirations of European citizens throughout our continent’. The enlargement is presented, not as building a super-nation, but as a joint ‘coming together event’ that all Europeans will benefit from. European Commissioner Franz Fischler acknowledges, in a speech from the first of March 2004, that the enlargement is ‘opening up endless new windows of opportunity’.

In short, the concept of diversity is about bringing more peoples and states into the union, which is often metaphorically described as a family coming together (Prodi February 7, 2002): ‘Europe is not business: it is a family of nations and peoples who have come together to pursue common goals’. When visiting Warsaw in March 2001 and Budapest one month later, Prodi (March 8, 2001; Prodi April 4, 2001) uses the family metaphor to illustrate the diversity present in the building of the new Europe.
In spite of the relative homogeneity often attributed to the family metaphor, it is used in EU-elite politics to encourage diversity.90 Chatterjee (1993) brings to our attention that the family metaphor is a common characteristic in nationalistic ideologies. A family that lives together is often contrasted with a ‘threatening outside’. Moreover, ‘the family metaphor’ also indicates a certain cohesiveness among those included in the family, and when Prodi met politicians in Warsaw on the 8th of March 2001, he declared that: ‘Europe is a family of nations, and a family that cares and shares must have a common set of rules for living together’. Diversity demands unity. Simultaneously, the unity is based on a notion of cultural diversity where different collective identity constructions harmonise into one united whole. According to Commissioner Chris Patten (March 7, 2001; see also CEC 2001a; Prodi November 20, 2002; Prodi October 4, 2002), the ‘European family’ must learn to better ‘speak in one voice’:

The Member States, small and large, must be heard and accommodated. But we must turn this multiplicity into an advantage: We do not aspire to a single European voice, but we get more attention and better effect if we sing from the same song sheet. The European Union is not a state … Our several voices are learning to sing in harmony.

In this vision, there is room for several voices in the “chorus”, but they need to be harmonised. The integration process will be a success provided that the peoples, states and regions of Europe stick to common visions and policies, and thus act as part of the European community. Indeed, if there were no common denominators that could unite Europeans as a group, we would certainly confront severe difficulties in talking about “Europeans” and “Europe” in the first place. Furthermore, we should not conflate the ideal of diversity with division,91 and just as the organ needs an organist (scene III), the Commission has taken upon itself to supply distinct interpretations of how to invoke ‘unity-in-diversity’.

90 The metaphor may, for instance, suggest different layers of the family: not everybody can be the head of the family. In other words, there is an implied hierarchy in the use of this metaphor that also bring paternalistic associations (See further Petersson & Hellström 2003).

91 Both Barroso (26 October 2004) and Prodi (5 May 2004) confirm the need of counter-arguing different kinds of ‘Europsceptics’ who are triggered by apathy and aim for division and thus risk obstructing the European project (see also chapter 7 of this thesis).
UNITY-IN-DIVERSITY

In the EUC rhetoric, there is no immediate tension between unity and diversity. On the contrary, it is their intrinsic relationship that marks the very essence of what constitutes European identity (Prodi November 9, 2001):

But beyond good governance, and beyond Treaty revisions, there is the deepest question of all: what does it mean to be European? […] It is in finding unity within this diversity that we find Europe’s soul. I would say that what constitutes ‘the soul of Europe’ is our shared heritage of spiritual, expressed in our wonderful diversity of cultural forms.

As it seems, the history of European integration seems to be one of invoking unity in the diversity of cultural forms that together constitute the ‘the soul of Europe’. As it seems, the question of how to achieve ‘unity-in-diversity’ answers itself in the sense that the device ‘unity-in-diversity’ is also considered to be a description of what constitutes a common European identity.

In Zagreb on July 10, 200392, Romano Prodi welcomes the Croatian application for EU membership and insists that:

By submitting that application, Croatia has reaffirmed its European vocation. And by the same token it has declared that the long and trying period of war, division and nationalism is well and truly over /…/ Keep your eyes fixed firmly on your country’s interest and its aspiration join the great European family of nations /…/ Your country has already shown it can make tough choices in the name of the European idea. I am thinking of the International Criminal Court of Justice, where Croatia has decided to align itself /…/ This is the basis for building a future together in Europe: it means sharing the same vision and creating the tools to do it.

Apart from linking the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ to a certain European spirit that both preserves national identities and extends beyond them, it is also called upon as a political strategy to handle issues of European governance. The European Commissioner Poul Nielson (January 28, 2002) states that: ‘We have a recipe for achieving a unity of purpose which at the same time is respectful of national of both large and small countries: it’s

92 In visiting Slovenia one year before the country became a member of the EU, Prodi also returns to the notions of unity and diversity (7 March 2003; cf. 5 July 2003): ‘European integration and our recent history are the acknowledgment of our unity and diversity /…/ What safeguards our diversity and distinctive characteristics of each nation, community, region and local area within the union is not borders but the acceptance of certain common principles’.
called the Community Method’. Both pragmatically and philosophically, the EUC uses the device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ as a vehicle for greater intra-European cohesion.

The rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ is used in numerous settings, ranging from the organ in scene III, to the recognition of the important job of EU academics to recognise a certain European history (Prodi July 5, 2003) as well as a symbol for a certain European spirit. I believe that we can interpret this frequent use of the device as a means to bridge the potential clash between, on the one hand promoting a sense of community cohesion (unity) and on the other hand to allow for internal differences, such as distinct national traditions (diversity). I would argue that we can understand the use of the device as an indication of that the imagining of Europe as a distinct community is imbued with contemporary articulations of a cosmopolitan nationalism. In the last section of this chapter, I will bring the pieces together in a discussion on the relationship between, on the one hand, articulations of a certain European identity as it crystallises in the compromise between unity and diversity, and on the other hand, to aspects of nationalisms and ideals of cosmopolitanism.

COSMOS IS WHY OUR NATIONALISM IS GOOD

In contemporary imaginings of Europe as a separable political entity, references to ideals of cosmopolitanism serve endeavours to imagine a European community that is both strong and united, and at the same time respectful of national diversities. Apart from tangible signs (e.g. the European anthem, the European day, the common currency, the European instrument) of European togetherness, there are also efforts made to trace Europe’s soul. At the same time, the EU is considered a political instrument for transnational problem solving on a common European public arena. The

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93 Commissioner Viviane Reding (8 May 2003) acknowledges the value of common sports events in this regard: ‘Next year, the Games [The Olympic games, my remark] will leave Attica a new heritage. Clearly, it will not be a new acropolis, but rather an underground railway network. It will not be a temple, but new sports facilities that will link the glorious past of this country to a future of peace and prosperity in a more united Europe’.
motto ‘unity-in-diversity’ connotes a shared cultural heritage and a common past, but it may also function as a method to achieve common goals in the future. Whereas the first usage of the device expresses a focus on cultural symbols, history, values and so forth the latter usage implies the importance of joint procedures for democratic decision-making in a changing world. Rather than representing two opposing logics, the new European nationalism involves elements of both ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalisms.

However, combined with ideals of cosmopolitanism, the rhetorical use of the device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ implies the imagining of a distinct European demos that is attached with a certain European soil and yet contrasted with earlier endeavours to gain community cohesion through brutal force and/or other exclusionary practices. Any democratic regime draws legitimacy from a particular demos, but in the EUC rhetoric it is also emphasised that the EU should not limit its ambitions to the EU territory. If the EU before was depicted as a political dwarf; it should now according to Prodi (December 3, 2002) reassert its role as one harmonised voice in the world with a defined purpose of protecting universal values (i.e. peace, democracy, human rights). In the speech, Prodi stresses the necessity of sharing common interpretations of these and other fundamental principles.

The political basis for these endeavours is possibly associated with the ideology of liberal democracy that aims at combining universal rights of all human beings with a focus on democratic rights for a particular demos. The ambiguity resides in the fact that the category of the people (the prime reference of democracy) cannot be more than a limited fraction of humanity (the prime reference of liberalism). If demos refers to democracy, particularism, community (in this case a European community) and borders, then, simultaneously cosmos connotes liberalism, universalism, humanity and borderlessness. In this sense, cosmopolitan nationalism is both a contradiction in terms, and a possible means to imagine a distinct European community in a time when nationalism suffers from a somewhat bad reputation: Cosmos is why “our” nationalism is good and morally justifiable.

94 The European parliament, for instance, is a supra-national representative assembly for a 'European people'.
CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

The vision of an imagined European community beyond that of the nation-state paradigm has inspired Jürgen Habermas to put forward an ideal of ‘constitutional patriotism’ as a feasible alternative - not only for Germany - but also for a more integrated EU as well (1998: 500)95:

A liberal political culture is only the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism that heightens an awareness of both the diversity and the integrity of the different forms of life coexisting in a multicultural society. In a future Federal republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be interpreted from the perspectives of different national traditions and histories […] The original thesis stands: democratic citizenship need not to be rooted in the national identity of a people. However, regardless of the diversity of different cultural forms of life, it does require that every citizen be socialized into a common political culture.

For Jürgen Habermas, popular attachment to a legitimate European constitutional democracy is fundamental for the fostering of a political culture that enables intra-European cohesion in a more integrated Europe (cf. Fine & Smith 2003: 470-1). Constitutional patriotism differs from the “pure” cosmopolitan vision in the sense that it refers to distinctive interpretations of a common political culture within the limits of a certain people; the European demos.96 At the same time, it appeals to universalistic principles that are made manifest in a procedural consensus, an agreement on the forms for democratic law-making procedures.

Habermas thus decouples a European demos from a European Volk (see also Weiler 1997). However, he also stresses the need to compromise between unity and diversity in the case of the EU. In his case, the unity ought to be based on common interpretations of a certain political culture. We are, though, left in uncertainty about what this concept refers to. Is it the case that “we” Europeans are fated to work together in order to sustain the legitimacy of “our” common political institutions and thus reach “civil solidarity” on a common European public arena (cf. Habermas 2001)?

If Habermas’ ideas of a constitutional patriotism appear to be more “civic” in character; the EUC re-readings of a glorified past

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95 For a critical discussion on ‘constitutional patriotism’ in the case of the EU, see e.g. Fernandez 2005: 131-6.

96 Remember that the cosmopolitan man is a citizen of the world, whose prime unit of concern is the individual rather than for instance the family or the nation.
and focus on a common heritage, European heroes, golden ages, common Christian roots and shared memories may lean towards - what Peo Hansen (2004) refers to as - an ‘ethnification of Europe’. We should be careful not to jump into conclusions and remember Brown’s assumption that all nationalisms involve aspects of both civic and ethnic features of community-making. The difference between the two perspectives is not necessarily that obvious. Habermas radicalises Kant’s idea of moral cosmopolitanism in combination with enlightened nation-state formations and applies it to our times. He endeavours to establish a unity of thought among fellow Europeans beyond that of national self-interest. And when the EUC rhetoric highlights the near past (the founding fathers and the ECSC) this is at the same time a means to avoid the slightly more distant past to repeat itself (the blood-shaded history of Europe in general and WWII in particular). This ambition might be interpreted through a pragmatic lens: they wish to propose measures to achieve common goals in the future. We should also recognise current appeals for diversity and thus not conflate the idea of unity with more dogmatic references to, for instance, a uniform European (‘ethnic’) culture.

This chapter infers that nationalism is not on the wane; at least not in the case of the European Union. As formulated by Christian Fernandez (2003: 176) in his analysis of EU citizenship: ‘Union citizenship thus becomes a vehicle for the rescue, not the erosion, of national sovereignty and particularity.’ Nationalist rhetoric and thinking is (re)-articulated in the name of Europe in the midst of the European integration process to invoke unity in diversity; to install a sense of inner unity in the diversity of cultural expressions of what it means to be European in Europe. We may, or we may not, accept the notion of constitutional patriotism as a common denominator for the nations and peoples of the integrated Europe; any attempt to compromise between cosmopolitanism and nationalism reveals a political distinction between “what we are” and “what we are not”. Any appeal for a common European identification thus revolves around the nexus of “us/Them”. Not all diversities can be included in the ‘European family of nations and peoples’.

To talk in the name of Europe is to ascribe to the category of Europe – seen as an empty signifier - certain attributes that all
together define Europe as a distinct community. Learning from the analysis, we encounter how the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ is filled with a certain substance, and thus indicates a partial fixation of meaning as regards the concept of Europe. In other words, my analysis hints at the process in which Europe is discursively constituted. The rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ (defined as the essence of what constitutes a certain European identity) ties together a chain of floating signifiers (e.g. ‘a common history’ and ‘a family of nations’) to the empty signifier of Europe.

In stressing the necessity – in some cases the inevitability - of imposing a certain unity in the diversity of what constitutes a common European identity, the EUC rhetoric invokes distinct visions of what makes Europe “Europe” in relation to what it is depicted not to be. To claim the need for Europeans to be united in diversity is also to articulate a wish that Europeans somehow belong together today, in the past, and also in the future. The political project of integrating the nations and people of Europe is imbued with a kind of cosmopolitan nationalism that both reproduces “old” state-nationalisms in the name of Europe and yet strives at moving beyond them. It could even be argued that the new European nationalism is sustained by the making of a difference between older ‘ethnic’ nationalisms and the new ‘civic’ or cosmopolitan counterparts. In other words, the new European nationalism breeds the employment of identity politics in the sense that their nationalism is differentiated from that of ours. Returning to Billig, a precondition for articulating nationalisms in a time when nationalism is generally considered as outmoded is to speak of “our” nationalism as if it was not nationalism at all.

**EPILOGUE**

Finally, what does it take to become part of the European family to use a metaphor employed within the EU? Returning to the Slovakian opera singer in scene III, it is probably not enough to be “hardworking” in order to take full advantage of the alleged borderlessness of the enlarged union, one must also pay allegiance to ideals of cosmopolitanism. This and other banal signs of a new European nationalism also set the limits for what it means to be, act
and think as Europeans in Europe. In chapter 5, 6 and 7, I will deal more explicitly with these questions, but before that we move on to the field of European Integration studies in order to deal further with the continuity between the early days of intra-European integration to our days when the integration process has expanded both in width, and in depth. Again, we confront how the concept of Europe receives its meaning vis-à-vis the nation. And yet again, we come across that the relation between the two identity positions is not that dichotomical as it might seem at a first glance.
4. THE KING IS DEAD,  
LONG LIVE THE KING
SCENE V

King Richard II approaches the bed where John of Gaunt lies close to dying. Gaunt accuses the king of neglecting to serve his country properly. He believes that the King has failed to restore the former glory of England. The King is upset about the complaints and a few months later Gaunt is dead. Because of the war, Richard goes on route to Ireland. In his absence, the Duke of York manages the kingdom. He is afraid, though. From the north Bolingbroke (son of Gaunt) arises and summons noblemen, leading a rebellion. Simultaneously, omens indicate that King Richard is soon to fall and a new King is about to rise in the blossom magnificence of young Bolingbroke. Chance turns into destiny.

The captain of the bodyguard proclaimed loudly that Louis XIV was dead: “Le Roi est Mort. Vive le Roi”. The year is 1715 and with this wording the throne is eternalized; ‘time freezes to a standstill’. The physical appearance of the king is replaceable, whereas the magical enchantment of the throne is not.

97 The first part of this scene is from the play Richard II (act II) written by William Shakespeare.
98 This phrase was used by the heralds to proclaim the death of one French king and the accession of his successor. It is also commonly associated with the French Revolution, but the phrase has been used even back in the 15th centuries.
99 See also Žižek (2002: 8) who returns to this notion in his book ‘Welcome to the desert of the real’.
SCENE VI

A statue of Lenin nearly touches her.\textsuperscript{100} It is almost as if Lenin is saying goodbye. The illusion is about to crack. But it does not. The theatre continues. In October 1989, Alex’s mother fell into a coma. Before, she was an activist for social progress in East Germany and shared a strong belief in the socialist cause. She wakes up, but the doctor informs Alex that any direct shock could instantly kill her. Alex begins his work to create a pseudo-reality where everything has to be organized as if the wall has not fallen; as if Coca-Cola and other symbols of capitalism have not made their entry to Eastern Berlin; as if not thousands and thousands of East Germans have moved to the west to make a better life for themselves. The home is transformed into a socialist museum. Alex does his best to keep the illusion alive, everything from food habits and clothing are kept the way they were before the wall fell.

It gets increasingly difficult to maintain the illusion, though. One day, dressed in her robe, Alex’s mother leaves the bed to breathe fresh air. Eventually, Alex manages to capture her in the street. His mother is brought back to the beloved past, the family apartment. How is her perception of the outside world to be explained? Alex sets up a fake TV report. The parallel reality indicates that East German governmental officials have decided to help their brothers and sisters from the west to enter East Berlin. Now the time has arrived to let all Germans share a common socialist vision. In Alex’s alternative story, Lenin did win after all.

What about the statue? After a while, Alex’s mother is dead and we never find out whether she actually realised what had happened or not. For whom did the illusion continue? Is it that the son, the architect behind the parallel reality, needed his artefact to make sense of a world in upheaval? Something has happened, yet everything remains the same: the family home is protected against a turbulent outside. The past intervenes in the present and shapes alternative anticipations of the future to come. In this case, only thin curtains hanging from the window shows the division. They can easily be pulled back. They can easily be pulled in place again. Certainly, it is not always that easy.

\textsuperscript{100} From the screenplay ‘Goodbye Lenin’ (2003).
THE NATION IS DEAD: 
LONG LIVE EUROPE

How is it that the physical appearance of the King is replaceable whereas the throne as such is eternalised: how are we to understand that the King may be dead and alive at the same time? If we talk in less abstract terms and approach our area of research, then matters would perhaps get a bit less complicated. In this chapter, I emphasise the ‘constitutive split’ between the positions of ‘Europe’ versus ‘the nation’ as it was established during the relatively short period of intra-European integration after WWII. It is not necessarily the case that the integration process should be understood as a choice between Europe and ‘the nation’, instead I discuss how these two positions mutually reinforce each other throughout the process. I cling to the argument that the emergence of an institutional arrangement that combines (supra)-national elements with intra-state agreements has continued to reproduce the logic of the nation-state as a key point of reference. Alan Milward (1997) has argued that the European integration has rescued the European nation-state from dissolution. In this respect ‘the nation-state’ – here interpreted as the ‘the King’ - may be vitalised in its new EUropean environment. The Westphalian system of nation-states – here interpreted as ‘the throne’ – finds new paths to reproduce itself in mutual exchange with the position of Europe.

Likewise, Anthony Giddens (2000: 159-62) asserts that the European project protects the autonomy of the nation-state against the anarchy of globalisation. For him, the EU is a ‘pioneering response to globalisation’ and perhaps even ‘a platform for a global form of cosmopolitan democracy’ (ibid: 160-1)\textsuperscript{101}. From yet another perspective, Moravcsik (1993) explains the European integration in terms of strategic bargaining processes between states. The theory of ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ offers a state-centric solution to

\textsuperscript{101} It might be objected to this that Giddens perpetuates a principle of governance that appears contradictory: hitherto, we have not experienced a fully implemented cosmopolitan democracy. Returning to our discussion on Schmitt in the previous chapter, any democratic regime refers to a distinct ‘people’ as its prime unit of concern and it can therefore be no democracy of mankind.
the development of a community that sometimes has been accused of having neglected the interests of national democracies and identities. Thomas Diez (2004: 319) notes a return of geopolitics to the EU from the 1990s, something which is ‘undermining the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation-states’. What we witness in the case of European integration is, I believe, not a fundamental shift from one system of governance to another (from a Westphalian system of nation-states to a system of European governance), but instead a rather contingent development in which different principles of governance co-exist.

So, in relation to the question of how the King may be dead and alive at the same time, Michel Foucault (1998: 88-9) states that: ‘…despite the differences in epochs and objectivities, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.’ Foucault asserts that any representation of power is impeded by ‘the spell of monarchy’. In this way, he confronts an ’actor-centred’ approach to power, which according to him fails to acknowledge that power is not easily derivable from a single actor, or for that sake, a given structure. It is from this perspective that Foucault (ibid: 93) advances his ideas of the ‘omnipresence of power’ that comes from everywhere. For Foucault (ibid: 94), relations of power condition fundamental divisions in society and come into play in a ‘machinery of production’. From a Foucauldian perspective (Dyhrberg 1997: 87), then: ‘power and the political are viewed from the ‘inside’ and from ‘below’, and not from the ‘outside’ and from ‘above”: it is we who create our King/s. We are not able position ourselves outside the fundamental categories that define the ‘rules of the game”; i.e. the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’ in the case of European integration (see further chapter 2). We talk from positions, and in order to make our voices heard we have to relate to the fact that we have not ‘cut the head off the king’. Again, we cannot properly engage with the intra-European integration from the 1950’s on without bringing into consideration the relation between the positions of ‘Europe’ versus ‘the nation’.

It is in this perspective, I discuss the theories and practices of functionalism and federalism from the early days of intra-European integration and on. Indeed, my focus in this dissertation is on
contemporary articulations of a certain European identity. However, when members of the EUC today present their visions of an ever-closer union and thus articulate a certain European identity that bring unity in diversity, they tend to seek legitimacy for their political messages in the legacy of this precise context (see also the previous chapter). In other words, this chapter should not be read as an attempt to present the reader with an overview of “European integration studies”: the ambition is to relate my analysis of elite-articulations of what makes Europe “Europe” in contemporary times to a wider academic discussion on the means and goals of European integration. In doing so, we also encounter how the question of what makes Europe “Europe” is attached with a certain continuity in the relatively short history of post world-war intra-European integration and its ‘machinery of production’, to use Foucault’s terminology.

My argument in this chapter is basically that theories of European integration do not merely explain a certain development; they also contribute to produce knowledge of what prompts the integration process further. If politics is about the partial fixation of meaning, then, any attempt to define the purpose of European integration is profoundly political. Thomas Diez (1999: 599) thus means that: ‘...the various attempts to capture the Union’s nature are not mere descriptions of an unknown polity, but take part in the construction of the polity itself. To that extent, they are not politically innocent...’ In this sense, theories that seek to explain the process in which nations and peoples of Europe are knitted more closely together also produce and reproduce knowledge about what this particular development signifies.

THE SHOW MUST GO ON

The EU comprises a vast knowledge industry. Inspired by actual events (e.g. the signing of new treaties and introduction of new members), scholars from various disciplines predict, assume and produce “new” knowledge of and for this political experiment. The attraction is easy to understand: the coming to the fore of inter-state agreements on future political arrangements together with the emergence of supra-national institutions was a likely magnet for
pan-European visionaries tired of war, and also a thrilling task for more practically engaged political engineers. This was the time for both pragmatic solutions to prevent future conflicts, and for a reawakening of inter-war pan-European criticism of the Westphalian system of nation-states as a governing principle of organising modern societies.

FEDERALISM BUT NO FEDERATION

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded in Paris in 1951. Through the establishment of certain supra-national institutions like the ‘high authority’ (today referred to as the European Union Commission), the trade on steel and coal was put under joint control. This is where the image of the EU as a peace project has its most prominent point of reference: the former antagonists France and Germany were now to work together to attain economic growth. The practical experience of war encouraged decision-makers and intellectuals to seek new models of governance in Europe. Ideas of a federal Europe were initiated by, among others Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi who led the writings of a federalist document “Ventone Manifesto” in 1941 (See further Burgess 2004: 31-3). The federal movement was tantamount to an intellectual resistance to Hitler and involved a series of ideas related to the vision of a federal Europe based on popular sovereignty, political institutions and a popularly endorsed treaty. The federal idea was, in this strand, an anti-centralist idea that perpetuated a bottom-up approach to European integration and connoted ideals of pluralism, principles of subsidiarity and ideas of citizenship.

According to Burgess (2004: 30): ‘Federalism in the context of the EU is the application of federal principles to the process of European integration where the term ‘integration’ refers to the sense of a coming together of previously separate or independent parts to form a new whole’. Following this definition, we recognise a connection between the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ (see the previous chapter) and federalist ideas of combining unity in form with a respect for separate parts. Retrospectively, though, we also know that the federalist plan of a European Political
Community (EPC) and a European Defence Community (EDC) was never implemented (ibid: 32). Immediately after the war, the European nation-states re-grouped themselves and rejected the full implementation of a European federation. The embryo of what we today refer to as the EU was perhaps inspired by federalist visions of a Europe that was to be united in diversity, but it certainly did not start as a genuine political federation.

Instead, a less radical strategy gained resonance. In 1951, Jean Monnet became the first President of the “High Authority”. He worked for integration in small steps (the so-called ‘Monnet-Method’), starting with economical reforms on to a possible future culmination of a federal Europe (ibid: 32).\(^\text{102}\) Another key figure in the founding of the ECSC was the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman who in a famous speech of 9 May 1950\(^\text{103}\) presented his ideas – the so-called ‘Schuman plan’ - of a future united Europe:

> In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries /…/ It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe /…/ The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.

This speech is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it formulated the initial ambitions for the foundation for what we today refer to as the EU. The date (9\(^\text{th}\) of May) is now declared as the official ‘European day’ and thus made part of a symbolic repertoire associated with articulations of a European identity. Secondly, it distanced itself from the more radical federal ambitions to constitute a European federation from the start and indicated instead that: ‘Europe will not be made at once’.\(^\text{104}\) Even if the distant goal was a more fully developed co-operation among the

\(^{102}\) In this regard it could be pointed out that critics have insisted that the EU suffers from an intrinsic lack of democratic legitimacy for the reason that it was never designed to be a democratic project (e.g. Shore 2000; Hansen 2000; Smith 1991; Van Ham 2001).

\(^{103}\) The speech is available at EUROPA – website.

\(^{104}\) The same sentence also exemplifies the common conflation (deliberate or not) between the political project of the EU and the concept of Europe.
European peoples, it should begin with bi-lateral commitments. Thirdly, the speech signalled a strong attachment to specific nation-states, in particular Germany and France, the latter is even referred to as a ‘champion of a united Europe’. Again, we come across the crucial interplay between the positions of Europe and that of distinct ‘nation-states’.

Furthermore, it remains clear that the architects behind the ECSC, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, were both quite explicit in their preference of a ‘functionalist’ development of the integration process: ‘Consequently Monnet’s approach to a federal Europe rendered constitutionalism – the building of political Europe – contingent upon cumulative functional achievements’ (Burgess 2004: 36). In sum: what differentiated the different federal ambitions in the 50s from one another was not necessarily the ultimate aim of the European Integration process, i.e. to establish a political federation of Europe, the dispute was more concerned with the means with which “we” could achieve this goal (cf. ibid: 37). In this regard, the ‘founding fathers’ of the union represented a more moderate strategy, which suggested a focus on economics and “low politics” avoiding the more sensitive realm of “high politics”.

FEDERATION THROUGH FUNCTIONALIST MEANS

Even if the European integration process does not move beyond the logic of the nation-state, it may still challenge the idea that nation-states would do best on their own. In this, the federalist aspirations of a political community beyond the particularistic nation-state dovetail with the functionalist aspiration of securing welfare for the citizens in a broader European framework (cf. Mitrany 1975).

One important reservation is that the functionalists preferred a European integration process based on a functional rather than a territorial logic. Mitrany (see Rosamond 2000: 37), one of its main advocates, objected to the development of the EU in the 60s and the 70s: the ‘federal fallacy’, he argued, referred to the tendency to use the union for political purposes, to construct a centralized ‘United States of Europe’ in the guise of the European Community
The functionalism of Mitrany has been the locus of criticism: thin functionalist arrangements are, according to some commentators (see further Shore 2000), not solid enough to maintain public loyalty and identity.

As a contrast to “original” functionalist reasoning, which focused on general models for post-territorial governance, the school of neo-functionalism has been concerned with the question of how integration could occur within delimited territorial regions. The neo-functionalist agenda envisaged the supranational polity of the EC as a ‘facet of modernity’ (Rosamond 2000: 56) devoid of the dogmatic rules of power based state systems. Ernst B. Haas (1991; see also Rosamond 2000: 69-70), one of the more influential neo-functionalists, argued that the EC fulfilled the necessary background conditions for successful regional integration. The idea was that the deepening of integration in one sector (e.g. Coal and steel), subsequently, would accumulate a ‘spill-over’ effect onto adjacent sectors (e.g. Transport). In other words, the neo-functionalists anticipated a kind of ‘expansive logic’ (ibid 60) in the integrative web of different economical sectors.

The neo-functionalist model for regional integration in the EC consists of a few main tenets. Ontologically, it relies on assumptions of self-interest driven actors acting within purposeful institutions in order to achieve common goals. Firstly, the integration should proceed modestly in key economic sectors (“low politics”), avoiding politically sensitive realms. In more federal accounts of European governance, the integration should instead start with securing public loyalties from below. Secondly, the integration process would enjoy gradual progression through a perceived shift in loyalty amongst interest groups, from national to supra-national authority and these interests would be increasingly vested in a European supra-national system. As a contrast to the ‘federal strategy’, the neo-functionalist agenda indicates a top-down approach on European integration: transformation to a higher

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105 Functionalist assumptions on ‘pluralist social structures’, ‘strong economical development’ and ‘common ideological patterns among participating units’ were, according to Haas, fulfilled in the case of the EC.

106 Certainly, it could be argued that the ‘federal strategy’ is a top down approach as well, since it has formulated visions of a European federation without taking into account the wishes and interests of the peoples of Europe. In relation to the neo-functional approach, however,
stage of integration occurs almost automatically when the process has transcended its initial commitments (Schmitter 2004: 66). Thirdly, following the deepening of the economic integration, a need for greater institutionalized regulatory control emerges. Consequently, political integration is the immediate effect of the deepening of economic integration. Fourthly, progresses in the furthering of the integration of European nations and peoples will secure peace in the future. In this view, the finalisation of the integration process would, step by step, bring us closer to a federation of European nations and peoples.

THE STATE STRIKES BACK

All above-mentioned tenets have, indeed, been intensively debated and revised up to our times. A key factor in this debate has been the neo-functionalist relative diminishing of nation-state interests and the need for public loyalty from below. According to Perry Anderson (1997: 58), ‘At the centre of the process of European Integration has therefore always lain a specifically bi-national compact between the two leading states of the continent, France and Germany’. Anderson (ibid: 70) adds that, quite contrary to Monnet’s original plan, ‘the union developed into an inter-governmental consortium, where powerful statesmen like de Gaulle and Thatcher contributed to the maintenance of national self-interest also in a more integrated Europe’. Margaret Thatcher saw the federalist vision as the ‘other’ of her preferred ‘Europe of states’ (Wallace 1997: 21-2) and Charles de Gaulle saw the European project, from the beginning, as a project of nation-states (Delanty & Rumford 2004: 58). For some commentators, the correct conclusion to make is that nation-states are still the best vessels for enjoying durable public confidence and preservation of certain key values such as justice and liberty (See further Rosamond 2000: 73). This development has led Delanty & Rumford (2004: 58) to infer that: ‘There are not many adherents to the idea of European unit

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federalist strategies pay more attention, as I see it, to ideals of popular sovereignty, subsidiarity and so forth.
today. Diversity and radical hermeneutics is the order of the day, but more important for a time was the liberal idea of Europe.\textsuperscript{107}

Stanley Hoffman (2000: 198) pays attention to the dominant role of nation-states and national public spaces also in the emergence of a Common foreign and security policy (CFSP). He argues that ‘security policy requires a public consensus; but 50 years after the Schuman plan, there still is no ‘European public space’ – there is only a juxtaposition of national public spaces, capped by a jumble of intergovernmental and supranational bureaucracies.’ The message is that deeper integration in areas such as ‘security polity’ requires a larger degree of popular participation and thus public approval from the down top.

The neo-functionalist school has, since then, refined some of its initial presuppositions. If the so-called ‘spill-over’ hypothesis seemed to suggest that: ‘integration was a linear, progressive phenomenon; that once started, dynamics would be set in place to continue the momentum’ (Rosamond 2000: 63), new concepts were elaborated to explain backlashes on the domestic scenes. The idea of ‘spill-back’ was introduced to apply for retreats on level and scope of supra-national authority (see e.g. Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). To save the spill-over hypothesis, neo-functionalists claimed the need for elite-actors to give the integration process an extra push forward.

**TECHNOCRACY AS IDEOLOGY**

Yet another interesting feature of the neo-functionalist tradition is that the ideological aspiration to achieve material welfare and durable peace through political engineering was not considered to be ideological at all. In the words of Ernst B. Haas (cited in Rosamond 2000: 57): ‘Ideology, then, is still with us. But it manifests itself in religious, ethnic and educational policy confrontations rather than in the realm of the economy or the large issues of defence and foreign policy’. Instead of talking about ‘ideology’, Haas used the label ‘technocracy’ to describe the fact that

\textsuperscript{107} The authors use the term ‘liberal’ to describe a political project that conveys ideas of the limited state (‘watchman state’) that should not infringe on cultural and social issues. They also argue, however, that by the late 80s the EU (re)-turned to culture again (Delanty & Rumford 2004: 58-60). See further chapter 6 of this thesis.
EU politicians are not concerned with grand narratives any longer, but strictly managerial tasks to maximize material utility and welfare.

There are scholars who believe that the technocratic agenda of the neo-functionalists also has had significant political effects, though. According to Stanley Hoffman (2000: 189), already the ambitions with the Coal and Steel Union were ‘profoundly political’. Even if the French administration failed to establish a European Defence Community (EDC), the route towards an ever-closer union was laid. Cris Shore (2000: 147-53) argues, in his anthropological study of the daily work in the EU bureaucracy, that the legacy of neo-functionalism has contributed to a ‘psychological re-orientation towards a European consciousness.’ Hansen & Williams (1999) have for their part argued that the functionalist integration of the EU from the beginning has relied upon a certain set of myths and identities, which has worked constitutively for the consolidation of a distinct European community. Myth-making is a common element in the imagining of any community. We invent our own past in order to attain a sense of continuity and linearity from the past and on to the present (see further e.g. Baucom 1999; Cohen 1999; Petersson & Hellström 2003). In re-reading the past we also create expectations and predictions as regards where we are heading in the future. In other words, the debate about the ultimate aim of European integration and the possible means of achieving this goal may also sustain articulations of a certain European identity: the vision of a finalised intra-European integration process is deeply linked to the expectations of a distinct European community. Europe is the symbol for “us” coming together as the integrated parts of the European Union. Expectations of a more integrated EU also breed ideas of the larger entity of Europe as united in diversity.108

In the next section, I will discuss how the legacies of federalism and functionalism have been re-interpreted and used as sources of inspiration for contemporary European politicians who remain loyal to the ‘European idea’ and seek to move the integration process forward.

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108 We should, however, be prudent not to overstate the impact of neo-functionalism. There are today many other theories of European integration than neo-functionalism that seek to explain and define the integration process of which we have only dealt with a few (See further Diez & Wiener 2004: 6-20 for a broad overview).
THE FOUNDING FATHERS TODAY

Max Haller (2000: 534) infers that what was once a vivid dream of a peacefully integrated Europe among intellectuals such as Rousseau and Kant has still not come true: 'In view of the fact that the peaceful integration of Europe was a century old dream of intellectuals throughout Europe … it is somewhat surprising that intellectuals have been rather silent during the last decades, just when it is taking shape concretely for the first time in history'. Indeed, the federalist dream of a fully implemented European federation has not yet been fulfilled and the logic of the nation-state remains as solid as before. However, fifty years after Schuman having announced his famous declaration, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer made a speech on the 'finality of European Integration' at the Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000). He suggested that 'the transition from a union of states to full parlamentarization as a European Federation, something Robert Schuman demanded 50 years ago'. Like many of his predecessors, though, he did not conceive of the European Federation as a post nation-state order:

The existing concept of a federal European state replacing the old nation-states and their democracies as the new sovereign power shows itself to be an artificial construct which ignores the established realities in Europe. The completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state.

In this speech, he returns to France and Germany as the core of Europe; an 'alliance of interests' or a pan-European 'avant-garde'. In particular, the relation between Germany and the furthering of the European integration is conceived as a relation of mutual benefit: to be German is to be pro-European. In his vision of a European federation, Joschka Fisher at the same time recognises the value of the 'nation-state'. The message seems to be (especially in the German case) that the realisation of the national self-interest is best met in a common European framework. Intra-governmental agreements are reached to catalyse the deepening of the European integration also at the supra-national arena. Fischer claims, in his

109 Some parts of this section are based on an article that deals with temporality in the construction of an EU identity (Petersson & Hellström 2003).
speech, to sketch his ‘private ideas’ about the future of Europe. In this case, these private thoughts are quite rooted in the post-1945 political debate in Germany. Ulf Hedetoft (2002: 4) claims that:

German elite nationalism (interpreted through the prism of national interest perception) at this level is very largely identical with a pragmatic form of and discourse about a European supranationality, the two being economically, politically and morally coterminous: Germany serves its own interests and visions of itself and its future best by embedding its political actions, visions and discourses in the framework of Europe.

According to Hedetoft, the positions of ‘Europeans’ versus ‘the nationals’ in Germany differ from the rest of Europe: Europe becomes the framework for Germany to re-gain international confidence after WWII. In most other countries (Hedetoft explicitly mentions his own home country Denmark), the situation is rather different: Europe is ‘the other’ of the nation-state. The positions of ‘Europe’ and the ‘nation-state’ are defined and reproduced in relation to one another as the European integration continues on its way forward. The question of what makes Europe “Europe” is posed differently in different national contexts. When we discuss elite-articulations of a certain European identity, we have to take into account how these are related to the various positions of the nation-states.

Certainly, Fischer seeks justification for his lines of argumentation in the near past. The message given by Fischer on that day in Berlin was that the show must go on: ‘The consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU is therefore erosion or integration’. Both the Schuman vision of a European federation and the so-called “Monnet method” of communitarization are sources of inspiration to him.

It is in this context that members of the EUC now operate when they present their ideas of an even more integrated union. The past intervenes in the present and shapes alternative anticipations of the future to come (scene VI), mediated by those living today that are translating these memories and experiences from the past to our days. Romano Prodi (Prodi May 29, 2001; see also Prodi January 28, 2002; cf. Petersson & Hellström 2003: 241-2) tried to cast himself in the role of a present day equal to Monnet and Schuman: ‘The times of today are vastly different from the
50’s’, he argues, and ‘it is now up to men of equal stature to lead the EU into a qualitatively new stage of development’:

The genius of the founding fathers lay in translating high political ambitions, which were present from the beginning, into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible . . . My view is that this method, which reflected the constraints and objectives of the past, is now reaching its limits and must be modernized, for in the European Union the ‘pre-political’ era is over.

Elsewhere, the legitimizing ambition is equally clear. In a speech delivered in Florence on the fifty-first anniversary of Robert Schuman’s launching of the Coal and Steel Union plan, Prodi (May 9, 2001; see also Prodi June 13, 2001) remarked that the articulation of the plan had ‘changed the political landscape of the continent more than anything else’. In view of the pending enlargement, Europe was once more at the stage of ‘turning a page in history’ and ‘We are putting behind us, forever, our old divisions and the wars they generated’, Prodi said. The enlargement process and the institutional reform brought in its wake were justified by the need to ‘renew and reinvent’ ourselves, just like Robert Schuman did with his declaration in 1950.

The European Commissioner, Chris Patten (March 7, 2001), provides another example of how the heritage from Monnet and Schuman has been re-interpreted today: ‘The EU must use the Common Foreign and Security Policy outside its borders as those two visionaries, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, used coal and steel within its borders to “lock” in peace and stability, which allowed liberalization and democracy to flourish’. Even if the quest of Monnet and Schuman was to stay away from high politics, Chris Patten suggests that the time has come to expand their initial vision to comprise Foreign Policy as well. In other words, Patten has anticipated that the integration process needs an extra push to incorporate yet another policy sector.

DEAD AND ALIVE

To sum up: scholars differ in their opinions of what moves the integration process forward. Nevertheless, federalist visions of a pan-European community seek forms for co-operation beyond the limited territorial borders of the nation-states. It is also the case that
the (neo)-functionalists seek pragmatic solutions on supra-national policy issues. Both of these strands are recognizable in the rhetoric of the EUC today. My readings suggest the existence of elite-initiated expectations that the show must go on: if confronted with obstacles, the problem is rather too little integration than too much. The magic of nationalism, which ‘turns chance to destiny’ (Anderson 2003: 7; see also scene V), is now articulated also in the name of Europe and the relatively short history of European integration is ascribed a continuity that connects the past with the present. In Derrida’s reading of Hamlet (1994; cf. Petersson & Hellström 2003: 242-3), he concludes that after ‘the end of history’, the dead King returns as a ghost who repeats itself, again and again. Surely, we can imagine that we hear voices from the past predicting the future, but they resonate through the medium of those living today, invoking the spirits. It is from this perspective that we could understand how contemporary re-readings of the visions associated with for instance Schuman and Monnet also reproduce knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” and the question of a final telos of the European integration process. In ‘Goodbye Lenin’ (scene VI) we encounter the impossible venture of resisting history; time is frozen to a standstill inside the family apartment. However, we live with history and historical changes, and it is not always that easy to pull back the curtains and pretend that nothing is happening outdoors.

As in the case of the new European nationalism, my analysis suggests that the political project of the EU has not brought us to a post-national society. In the previous chapter we encountered how articulations of a certain European identity (from a position of a consensual elite) reproduced features associated with both ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ aspects of nationalism. In this chapter we have come across federalist and neo-functionalist ideas of European integration that nevertheless continue to reproduce the logic of the nation-state as a key point of reference. In other words, the political project of the EU is neither necessarily post-nationalist and nor is it essentially post-national. At the same time, articulations of a certain European identity and visions of a more fully integrated Europe indicate something different from the position of the nation. It is the construction and reproduction of this difference that will guide us further in the thesis.
5. TEACHING EUROPEANS HOW TO BE EUROPEANS
SCENE VII

Plato was no friend of democracy. All people are not meant to govern for the simple reason that they do not possess the necessary qualities to do so. Any democratic governance (rule by the people) was doomed to degenerate into demagoguery and despotism: a self-proclaimed friend of the people would eventually rise and betray them. Instead, the wise should rule. The ideal state was aristocratic (rule by the wise). All citizens of the Republic had their specific positions depending on their distinct nature. The main governing principle was, according to Plato, the virtue of arête (i.e. capability).110

In the dialogue of ‘Menon’, Socrates was asked the question whether arête and other virtues could be learnt. In the dialogue, Socrates develops the method of ‘maieutics’. In brief, knowledge is inside ourselves: it is already there. The teacher should not teach, but asking the right questions facilitating for the student to discover the inner truth (2001: 41). For Plato, then, knowledge is inherent and pre-existing before experience [apriori]. In the dialogue, Socrates talks with a slave boy to illustrate that the slave was able to solve advanced geometrical problems. Since nobody had ever taught the slave anything of the kind before Socrates infers that the slave already knew.

Further in the dialogue, Socrates concludes that a good nature can never transform into an evil one and vice versa. To govern, a person must possess either true opinions or true knowledge. Arête is a divine gift. Some people are born to rule wisely whereas others are not. The truth is out there. Inside ourselves.

110 See the dialogue ‘the Republic’, which deals explicitly with the virtue of arête in relation to the construction of Plato’s ideal state.
SCENE VIII

Pascal Fontaine is now active as professor at the ‘Institut d’Études politiques’ in Paris. He (2004) has written a teaching booklet on the EU that has been translated into 12 languages and can be ordered for free from the EU official website. It consists of 12 lessons starting out with explaining the main purpose behind the EU project. We learn that the EU is the solution to the request by Europeans to live together in peace and freedom. Europeans also recognize a common European identity as a valuable asset that needs to be safeguarded and nurtured. However, we are also told that Europeans feel frustrated about any attempts to conflate this identity with uniformity. Europeans reject that, the booklet informs us (2004: 6).

Second and third lessons (ibid: 10-11): we are told that the enlargement process is a victory for the European spirit, after 1989 the rupture between the free world and the communist one had disappeared. The seventh lesson is dedicated to the common currency, the Euro, which was successfully introduced in 12 member-states in 2002. In spite of the turbulent world situation, the launch of the Euro has ensured stability and predictability in the economy.111

During the eleventh lesson we get to know why it is so important that the member-states learn to act and speak with one voice in relation to the outer world. The last lesson is about the future of the EU. We understand from the booklet that the constitutional treaty is an important step forward in the project of making the nations and peoples of Europe work together. Is this the final step of the great peace project launched by the founding fathers in the 1950’s, Fontaine ends with asking.

111 In the fourth lesson, the European Convent is presented as a new form of governance that enables a more democratic, simple and citizen-friendly EU. The fifth lesson is about progresses being made in areas such as a sustainable development; joint efforts to sustain the social dimension; work with securing employment; the many research programs that are to secure Europe’s pole position in advanced technology. During the sixth lesson, we find out that the fulfillment of the internal market will create more jobs and strengthen the economy in the whole EU area. During the eight and ninth lessons, we learn about the different EU education exchange programs (e.g Socrates) and various efforts to sustain a citizen’s Europe. The area of freedom, security and justice is the object for the tenth lesson.
PRODUCING KNOWLEDGE OF EUROPE

In the philosophy of Plato, ‘pure knowledge is pre-existing before experiences’ (scene VII). Fundamental for Plato’s epistemology is a dualistic world-view that is divided into, on the one hand, ‘the perceptual world’ that consists of shadows and representations of “real objects”, and on the other hand, ‘the intelligible world’ that illuminates true knowledge of the order of things. If we are to attain true knowledge, in this perspective, we need to distinguish between changeable beliefs/opinions/perceptions (e.g. this horse is brown) and the ideas that lie behind our perceptions of things (e.g. the idea of the horse).

In this chapter, I emphasise how knowledge of Europe is contingently reproduced in ‘the perceptual world’, to put in the words of Plato. At the same time, we encounter how articulations of a certain European identity may partially fill the concept of Europe with meaning as if there was an observable ‘idea of Europe’ behind actual appearances. To understand the close relationship between knowledge and identity-construction, Iver B. Neumann stresses that (1999: 12): ‘the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world’. As discussed before, we make sense of the world through language and the categories with which we interpret our perceptions. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault (1988a: 7) says in an interview that: ‘Knowledge is for me that which must function as a protection of individual existence and as a comprehension of the exterior world’. We continue to create knowledge of the world around us in order to make it more comprehensible. For Foucault (2002: 13-6), then: ‘knowledge is an activity that lacks any reference to any finite essence’. Translated to the language of this dissertation, in order to realise ourselves as Europeans we must also know what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.
KNOWING EUROPE

In the union-wide teaching material on the EU (scene VIII) we are informed about what “Europeans” like and dislike. This teaching pamphlet thus provides us with an example of how knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” is communicated to a pan-European audience. Furthermore, it gives voice to a certain European identity that should not be conflated with ‘uniformity’ (scene VIII). If we by politics allude to a partial fixation of meaning of what, for instance, makes Europe “Europe”, then, this kind of teaching activity is not merely about communicating a message from the teacher to the student; it is also an activity that privileges certain definitions of Europe (or ‘the new Europe’), while downplaying others. In ‘knowing’ Europe we cannot simply hold true all possible interpretations of what makes Europe “Europe”.

The question is, though, what the ‘activity of knowing Europe’ implies in practice. The argument, in this chapter, is basically that domestic debates about EU-related issues give rise to articulations of a certain European identity that also set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. From one point of view, of course, national citizens of any EU member-state are simultaneously Europeans. The question is what it means to identify with Sweden and Europe at the same time: is it the case that the two points of identification nurture each other (as was the scenario implied by Carl Bildt in chapter 2) or do they contradict each other in the sense that we tend to privilege one term before the other?

THE QUESTION OF EUROPE ON DOMESTIC SCENES

My ambition in this chapter is to analyse how knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” is reproduced in the political debate that surrounded three domestic referenda on EU-related issues, ranging from Ireland in 2001, to Sweden in 2003, and finally France in 2005. In all three cases, the national populations voted against the will of a majority of their representatives, and chose not to follow
the defined EU agenda towards greater unification. Naturally, the
various explanations and interpretations of the outcome vary in the
different national context and also relate to nation-specific issues.
This chapter analyses how these debates may cling to notions of a
certain European identity and how the ‘activity of knowing Europe’
is expressed in the meetings between the EU and the three national
scenes. I thus analyse expectations about and reactions to the
referenda results so as to scrutinise further how these may partially
fill the concept of Europe – seen as an empty signifier – with
meaning.\textsuperscript{112}

Referenda campaigns on EU-related issues are particularly
interesting for analysing how the question of Europe is established
on the domestic scenes. Firstly, the debates form critical junctures
in the sense that the people actually had an opportunity to have a
say about the current development towards a more fully integrated
EU; a project that it is otherwise accused of being elite-driven (see
further the previous chapter). Back in 1992, the Irish electorate
voted yes (69 to 31) to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. However, the
Danes voted against it (48-52) and the French referendum was a
very close one (49-51). In 2003, the Swedes said ‘No’ to become a
full member of the EMU and by the summer of 2005 the new
constitutional treaty was turned down by referenda, both in France
(45-55) and in the Netherlands (38-62). Faced with these
expressions of popular discontent\textsuperscript{113}, a question is to what extent
the intra-European integration process may continue on its route
towards greater unification.

Secondly, these referenda campaigns also brought to the
surface potentially contrasting political articulations of what it

\textsuperscript{112} Certainly, it is possible to analyse the domestic referenda campaigns from many other
perspectives. If I had, for instance, chosen to analyse how ‘the nation’ – seen as an ‘empty
signifier’ – was tied to a set of ‘floating signifiers’ throughout the campaign and thereby ascribed
to a certain essence, I had definitely considered other explanations to why the Irish, the Swedes
or the French voted as they did. My selection of cases is restricted to the time from 1999 to 2005.
During this period of time, I have covered three out of five negative results in public referenda.
The Dutch ‘No’ to the constitutional Treaty in 2005 is indirectly dealt with when I analyse the
case of France and the Danish ‘No’ in 2000 to the currency union touches upon a similar
problematic that is dealt with in the section that emphasises the case of Sweden.

\textsuperscript{113} During this period of time, the election to the European Parliament in 2004 encouraged only
45, 4 per cent of the European electorate to go to the polls (in many of the new member-states
the figure was even below 30 per cent). Not surprisingly, the low outcome has been interpreted
as yet another expression of popular discontent and, possibly, also apathy (e.g. Bøe in ‘Dagens
means to be European in Europe; the question of Europe was put on to the political agenda. The chosen cases (enlargement, the Euro and the constitutionalisation of the union) all concern recent changes in the relation between the EU and its member-states. In one of his last speeches as President of the EUC, Romano Prodi (May 5, 2004) explicitly mentioned ‘the Euro’, ‘the eastern enlargement’ and the ‘convention and the emergence of a truly European public’ as three key achievements during his period in office. Even if the Treaty of Nice says little about whether the eastern enlargement was something “good” or “bad”, the debate on Ireland was nevertheless framed in that direction. In a similar vein, the debate on ‘the Euro’ in Sweden brought up a wider discussion of the relation between Sweden and the EU. And also in France, the referendum campaign involved issues that were not immediately related to what was in the actual treaty. In other words, the three referenda campaigns brought to the fore concerns for what it means to be, act and think as European in Europe.

In order to scrutinise the variety of reactions and explanations to the three referenda, I discuss both statements and speeches from the EU institutions (mainly the EUC and the European Council), and arguments used in the domestic debate as these are manifest in national news reporting one week before, and one week after election-day. Does the national news reporting, concerning the political debate surrounding the three domestic referenda, differ substantially from the reactions in “Brussels”? Even if this shows not to be the case, it is relevant to consider empirical material also from the three national arenas for the purpose of analysing how knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” is reproduced in the political debates that surrounded the domestic referenda campaigns in three EU member-states.

The genre of news report represents both an arena and an actor (Hellström & Åkesson 2001: 13-22). In the former sense, it opens up a space for dialogue and communication. In the latter sense, journalists do not only merely communicate true knowledge to the readers; in analysing or reporting from the referenda they also contribute to the ‘activity of knowing Europe’.114

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114 A word of precaution is related to the question of what voices are represented in the news reporting and we can already, at this stage, spot a difference between the selected cases. In his
In this chapter, I discuss how knowledge of Europe is reproduced outside “Brussels”. How do, then, elite-articulations of a certain European identity from “Brussels” correspond to elite perceptions\(^{115}\) of what makes Europe “Europe” on the three domestic arenas as these are manifest in the three referenda campaigns?

THE CASE OF IRELAND

Lunch-hour on 8 of June 2001, the outcome of the first Irish referendum about the ratification of the Treaty of Nice is not yet known.\(^{116}\) The Treaty of Nice was agreed on during the Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) in December 2000, and it incorporates technical adjustments into the EU constitutional framework so that the new member-states could later be admitted in. Göran Persson (Persson 2001a), Prime Minister in Sweden – at the time also presiding the European Council – notifies the Swedish press that the EU is heading towards a ‘mini-crisis’ if the Irish people decide to vote ‘No’.

Intuitively, the Prime Minister seems to be correct. All fifteen members had to ratify the treaty in order to make it valid. The then constitutional setting in the EU was adapted for six member-states and was generally not believed to handle the expansion of the EU

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\(^{115}\) Media play a fundamental role in the shaping of social cognition filters of the public at large, however, the analyses of the national news reporting should not take us to conclude that we have brought Europe down to earth in the sense that we thereby could grasp what the European people “really” think about Europe. We are still dealing with elite-perceptions of what makes Europe “Europe”. Nevertheless, the news material from the national arena provide us with yet another dimension of how the constitutive split of ‘Europe’ versus ‘the nation’ is manifest outside “Brussels”.

\(^{116}\) The reader may rightfully criticize me for sometimes writing Ireland, when I refer to the ‘Republic of Ireland’. The empirical material from the Irish case is collected from my previous analysis of the referendum on Ireland in relation to the notion of space (Hellström 2003b).
from fifteen – to twenty five member-states by 2004 (Sweeney in Irish Independent, June 9, 2001; cf. Prodi February 7, 2002). A ‘No’ to the Treaty of Nice on Ireland thus posed a threat to the accomplishment of the eastern enlargement and thereby also to the current integration process. At least that is the impression that Göran Persson gave the press before all of the votes were counted.

Six hours later, on the same day, the Irish people had decided not to ratify the Treaty. Prime Minister Persson (2001b) enters the press room again, only this time not mentioning the ‘mini-crisis’ he warned about earlier: instead, he declares that he knows that both the Irish Government and the Irish people are sincere proponents of an enlargement of the Union and he strongly hopes that it will be possible to convince the Irish people of the significance of the Treaty.

Persson’s ambivalence is symptomatic of the problematique in propagating a smooth fulfilment of the enlargement and at the same time allowing the people to have a say in this development. In its ‘White paper on governance’, the EUC (CEC 2001a; Prodi April 26, 2001) urges that ‘Brussels must come to mean all of us’. There is a growing awareness that the EU suffers from a lack of public support whereas political elites in Europe seem much more confident with a more integrated Europe (Haller 2001; Lindahl & Naurin 2005). Persson’s (later) reaction to the outcome of the referendum is indicative of a consensual view among leading politicians across Europe that the enlargement process is irrevocable and that the Irish people must be sent back to the polls (e.g. Sweeney in ‘Irish Independent' June 9). According to both Prodi and the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern, the Irish people are dedicated to the European project, but are yet to be better informed about the actual impact of the Treaty of Nice (Prodi June 22, 2001; Ahern in Brophy, in Irish Independent, June 9, 2001). The mini crisis is thus described in terms of a lack of information about the intrinsic good of both the Treaty of Nice and an enlarged Union.

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117 All cited articles in the Irish case are from 2001.
118 Elsewhere (Hellström 2003b), I have suggested that the reaction to the referendum result may be considered a means to bridge the potential clash of two parallel strategies, both of which aim to establish a more integrated Europe. The first consists of *widening* the EU through the realisation of the enlargement and further inclusion of additional member-states, building upon a
As it seems, the problem is not too much integration, rather too little. In this way, we encounter – in the case of Ireland – a constitutive split between, on the one hand “Real Europeans” who have understood the significance of the Treaty of Nice as a fundamental step towards the fulfilment of the eastern enlargement, and on the other hand “yet-to be Europeans” who are yet to be informed about the value of signing the EU treaties. The reactions thus emphasise the necessity of ‘knowing Europe’, of figuring out what it means to act, be and think as Europeans in Europe.

Otherwise, the Republic of Ireland has been referred to as a good example of how European integration has succeeded in improving peripheral EU countries in terms of economic progress (Gorg & Ruane 2000; Prodi June 22, 2001 on the Republic of Ireland as the “Celtic Tiger economy”). According to public opinion polls, Irish support for enlargement is at an average level among the fifteen member-states (e.g. EP 1999). In the next section, I will discuss how “Brussels” responded and reacted to the Irish ‘No’.

**DISAPPOINTMENT, BUT THERE IS NO TURNING BACK…**

The rather consistent response to the Irish ‘No’ was that even though the outcome sent waves of disappointment throughout Europe, it could not possibly be allowed to impinge on the enlargement process as such because it is seen to be irrevocable (e.g. Verheugen September 21, 2000). These were the conclusions drawn at the meeting at the General Affairs Council (GAC) between all the foreign ministers in EU (June 11, 2001), which the then European Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou (June 14, 2001) refers to in Geneva a few days later:

> The rejection of the Treaty of Nice by the Irish people was extremely disappointing for Europe as a whole … the European Union is committed to ensuring that the Irish referendum results last week do not hamper or delay the enlargement process. But as the EU foreign ministers made clear at their meeting on Monday, it’s

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view of the EU as a peace project, of extending the European family. The second aims to deepen the EU: to close the distance between the European people and the EU institutions through the inculcation of a deeper sense of belonging among the Europeans (See further Brabant 2000: 113).
business as usual as far as the accession process is concerned. In the meantime, the
Commission and member states will take all necessary steps to help the Irish
government find a way forward.

What, then, were the implications of the Irish rejection of the
Treaty of Nice? Approximately one week after the referendum,
Prodi stresses that the outcome indicates a need to proceed with the
efforts to set up a common convention. In a speech on the 13th of
June delivered at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Prodi
states that:

Enlargement is a historic and political necessity ... Every referendum has its
background story. The low turnout and other facts make it difficult to interpret the
result of this one ... in freely expressing their will, the Irish people have reminded
us that our present method for revising the treaties the method used at Nice is no
longer acceptable ... The only way acceptable to our citizens is to set up a
Convention, in which representatives of the member states and the elected
members of both national and European parliaments work together to revise the
treaties.

The message is clear; the result is a disappointment, but it cannot
hinder the ongoing enlargement process. Although difficult to
interpret, the result is an incentive for further and deeper co-
operation among the peoples and nation-states of Europe. The
Treaty of Nice is to be revised and implemented, no matter what
the referendum result says. As regards the Irish referendum, the
seemingly coherent reaction from the EUC and others\textsuperscript{119} were that
there was not an option to renegotiate the treaty (e.g. Sweeney &
McKenna in Irish Independent, June 12, 2001). If the method used
in Nice is not working, the EU has to find more efficient solutions
to facilitate the accession of the applicant countries to the EU.

THE TREATY OF NICE
AS MORAL OBLIGATION

Romano Prodi paid a visit to the republic of Ireland just two weeks
after the referendum. On June 21 he made a short speech at an
official dinner hosted by Taoiseach Bertie Ahern. Prodi (June 21,
2001) concludes in the speech that he is happy that the referendum
has launched a debate on the significance of the Treaty of Nice,
albeit he insists that this debate ‘on our common future is not a

\textsuperscript{119} This was also the dominant message in a debate in the European Parliament (EP 2001).
precondition for enlargement and it must not hold up the enlargement process’. He explains the statement in terms of the Union’s duty to unite the European family. The following day, he develops this point further (June 22, 2001):

The essential purpose of Nice is to enable us to welcome, within a few years, all twelve of the countries currently negotiating accession. Ten of the candidate countries have lived under dictatorship for forty-five years. These fellow Europeans were deprived of freedom, democracy and a decent standard of living through no fault of their own. Since the collapse of the Iron Curtain they have undertaken enormous changes in their economies and politics and have undergone enormous pain in the process … Can we now turn around to tell them we are unable to establish a renewed institutional framework, which can cope with the whole enlargement process? Or, even worse, basing ourselves on formalistic legal details, to say, ‘not all of you can join our club’?

According to Prodi, “they” (the peoples and nations from the candidate-countries) ought to be reunited with “us” who already are part of the European family. In the same speech, Prodi emphasises that the Republic of Ireland should be grateful for what they have accomplished in terms of political and cultural confidence and influence, since this is partly due to their entrance into the Union back in 1973. The ratification of the Treaty of Nice is above all considered to be a question of decency, something that the Western countries owe to their brothers and sisters in the former Eastern Bloc. The signing of the Treaty of Nice is considered a moral obligation, since it lays the ground for fulfilment of the enlargement process, which in turn is depicted as the realisation of the EU as a peace project.

The enlargement process has been advertised as a means to reunite all Europe into its ‘original state’ (e.g. Byrne May 25, 2001): it is considered to be the ‘historic opportunity to unify our continent’ (CEC: 2001b). Prodi (June 13, 2001) formulates his vision for the future EU:

There is a common future in a union that will stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea, from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean. But this is not all. I want us to think in terms of a continent-wide Community of peaceful nations, consisting of the enlarged European Union and all its new neighbours, increasingly sharing common values and objectives. This is not just a dream: the process has already begun.

Clearly the image of the ‘new Europe’ as a great peace project is frequently used in the EU-elite rhetoric on the enlargement: in order to secure peace and prosperity on the European continent,
we need to co-operate and face our common responsibility to include also the former communist states in the European family. From these reactions, we encounter how the case of Ireland makes a schoolbook example of how politics is enacted in the moral register; between those “Good Europeans” who are willing to share a common European vision with their brothers and sisters from the eastern parts of Europe and the “Bad Europeans” who are reluctant to do so.

In her analysis of legitimacy and justification in relation to the eastern enlargement, Helen Sjursen (2002: 505-7) observes that “The borders between east and west in Europe were often referred to as ‘artificial’”. She returns to the notion of the ‘Kidnapped West’ attributed to the author Milan Kundera as a slogan that was used to further stress the common destiny of a reunified Europe (cf. Neumann 1998). She (Sjursen 2002: 508-9) concludes that the driving force behind the eastern enlargement was not primarily based on national interest or any kind of utility aspects, but rather on a moral conviction that ‘We Europeans’ belong together.

Since the enlargement process is given the status of a historical necessity, it is logical to argue that a referendum result cannot violate that. However, it is likewise obvious that the people of Europe are not always equally convinced of the virtue of a more fully integrated Europe.

EUROPEAN PEOPLE WANT EUROPE

Some of the Commissioners underlined that the outcome of the referendum brought an important message to EU politicians: the people of Europe has to be listened to. Commissioner Günter Verheugen (September 4, 2001), who was then responsible for questions related to enlargement, acknowledges this in a speech in Strasbourg:

If we go by the motto ‘let’s close our eyes and press on’ the ship will soon founder on the rocks and we’ll miss a great and historic opportunity. Enlargement must not be the victim of growing alienation between Europe’s citizens and the European institutions and decision-making processes. The response to the warning signal from Ireland is also, but not only, a matter of getting the message across to the public.
The lesson to be drawn from Ireland is thus not that the Treaty of Nice as such should be questioned, but rather that something needs to be done about the alienation which some Europeans feel towards European institutions (cf. CEC 2001a). These remarks shed some light on why Prodi (June 22, 2001) had such difficulty understanding why the Irish people voted as they did, even though he ‘cannot believe they voted against the EU or against enlargement’. In the same speech he concedes that ‘I understand the people of Ireland need more time and opportunity to consider what is actually in the Treaty’. The Irish ‘No’ is here interpreted as a lack of information.

In mid-November 2001 the Irish Commissioner David Byrne visited Ireland in order to propagate a better understanding of the significance of the Treaty as a stepping stone for the enlargement process. Byrne (November 14, 2001) was somewhat worried about the outcome, but he also emphasised that he felt confident about the Irish people being sincere proponents of an enlarged union:

David Byrne bases his analysis on a survey initiated by the Commission, which shows that the Irish are more positive about the enlargement process than the average member state, but the same survey also reveals an information deficit about ‘the Treaty of Nice in particular, and the European project generally’.120

The ratification of the Treaty of Nice is depicted as a moral obligation for all Europeans. The potential clash between the ambition to promote the EU as a peace project and the endeavours to promote the people’s say in EU development is avoided assuming that ‘European people want Europe’. To be a “Real European” in this sense means to comply with the idea of Europe as a continent-wide community that transgresses the artificial border between east and west.

The reactions from “Brussels” concerning the outcome are marked by a seemingly consensual view of European Integration as

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120 See also Gilland (2002: 527) who argues that the Irish people have not suddenly become ‘Eurosceptic’, even though they are perhaps not as ‘good’ as they used to be.
a more or less linear process towards greater cohesion and cooperation in the enlarged EU.\textsuperscript{121} In this way, articulations of a certain European identity do not only partially fill the concept of Europe with meaning, they also provide knowledge of the \textit{telos} of European integration.\textsuperscript{122} Europe becomes the symbol for “us” coming together in a union. As it seems, when it comes to the eastern enlargement there seems to be a tacitly agreed upon logic that the process is irrevocable – the fulfilment of the fifth enlargement becomes a matter of historical necessity that derives from the idea that Europeans belong together in a continent-wide community of nations and peoples that all belong to the ‘European family’ (see further chapter 3).

I now turn to engage with the meeting between the EU arena and that of the national (Irish) arena as regards the link between the referendum on the Treaty of Nice and the concept of Europe.

\section*{BEFORE JUNE 7}

This section deals with the national debate on the Treaty of Nice in Ireland as manifest in the two newspapers ‘Irish Times’ (IT) and ‘Irish Independent’ (ID).\textsuperscript{123} The call for the referendum was made only twenty-one days before election-day. Four major parties (Fianna fail, The Progressive Democrats, Fine Gael and Labour), the media and the church were all advocating a ‘Yes’ in the referendum (Molony in ID, June 6). Against the ‘Irish establishment’ stood the Greens, Sinn Fein (IRA’s political wing, thus ultra nationalists), and the socialists.

\textsuperscript{121} See also Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2002: 503) who defines the eastern enlargement as ‘a \textit{gradual process} that begins before, and continues after, the admission of new members to the organization...’.

\textsuperscript{122} We confronted this view also in relation to, for instance, the neo-functionalist school of European Integration studies that envisaged a progressive development towards a more integrated Europe.

\textsuperscript{123} The ‘Irish Independent’ circulated 169,000 issues per day in 2001, making it the largest morning newspaper in Ireland – reaching approximately 19 per cent of the Irish population. According to the site ‘AJR News link’, the ‘Irish Times’ ranks very highly among the European newspapers, which makes it an important source for political debate. The ‘Irish Times’ circulated 120,000 issues per day 2001 and reached approximately 11 per cent of the Irish population. In sum, 47 per cent of the Irish people had access to morning newspapers of any kind in 2001 (National Newspapers of Ireland - website). I have analysed approximately 100 news items that have dealt with the referendum. The analysis covers the debate during the week before the referendum and also the reactions during the week following the referendum. All cited articles are from 2001.
The former leader for the Progressive Democrats (PD), Mr. Des O’Malley (in Mark Brennock, in IT, June 4), contends that:

... a No vote in the Treaty of Nice Referendum will be seen as a selfish spurning of the peoples of central and Eastern Europe /.../ that we are inward-looking, self-satisfied and complacent about our national interest and our role in Europe and the world. A Yes vote, on the other hand, will mean we are confident about sharing the opportunities for peace and prosperity in the European Union with new member states.

In the words of Mr O’Malley we have an example of a perceived demarcation line between those who dedicate themselves to the ‘national interest’ and those who are apt to share a common future with fellow Europeans. In this view, citizens of the Republic of Ireland share a moral responsibility to help the former satellite states (Ahern in Lucey, in IT, June 4; O’Malley in Brennock, in IT, June 4) to fulfil the prospects of the EU as a peace project, otherwise Ireland loses credibility in relation to the EU and the applicants (Ahern in Glennon, in IT, June 7). A ‘Yes’ to the Treaty of Nice is to reconcile with a historic logic, which follows from ‘the fact’ that the European family is about to be reunified (Editorial in IT, June 2). Jim O’Keefe (IT, June 7) is director of the Yes-campaign and develops this point, and suggests further that the opponents are ‘either anti-European or anti-enlargement’.

Not surprisingly, many representatives of the No-camp oppose this portrait of them being anti-European or anti-enlargement. The Independent member of the European Parliament (MEP), Dana Scallon (in O’Halloran in IT, June 2), emphasises that a rejection by no means implies ‘saying No to Europe’. According to an Editorial in the ‘Irish Times’ (June 2), an ambition throughout the No-campaign has been to show that ‘you can vote against the treaty and still feel good about yourself’. According to the same editorial, the campaign has highlighted that the citizens ‘have a right to get access to comprehensible information about what is being done in their name’. The debate indicates, however, that there are different opinions on what constitutes correct information on the Treaty of Nice. Michael Gallagher (IT, June 7), professor of political science, elaborated on the postulated ‘information deficit’:

Those who did not understand three months ago what problem the Treaty of Nice was supposed to be fixing are probably no wiser today. In fairness, though, that is the nature of the treaty, which simply does not contain any major and
Following Gallagher, the answer to why the voters have such difficulties understanding what they voted for (or against) does not necessarily have to do with a lack of information. As most voices from both camps agreed that the enlargement process was desirable, the preceding debate was mainly about framing the role of the Treaty of Nice in relation to both the EU and the republic of Ireland. The production of knowledge involves the power of definition that revolves around certain key concepts, arranging them in relation to each other. In this case, the Treaty of Nice brought to the fore conflicting articulations of what it means to be Irish in a European context.

**AFTER JUNE 7**

In June 2001, a mere 35 per cent of the electorate voted on the Treaty of Nice: 46 per cent were in favour of ratification, whereas a majority of 54 per cent preferred to reject the treaty. From the Yes-camp, Bishop Oaul Colton (in Glennon & Sweeney in ID, June 9) claims that the referendum was ‘an act of profound selfishness’.

The solution, according to Brendan McGahon (TD) from the Fine Gael Party, is that the Irish people ought to improve their knowledge on political matters through education. An editorial in ‘ID’ (June 9) says that some of the opponents of the Treaty ‘exploited xenophobic fears’ and often based their arguments on ‘dishonest and unscrupulous misrepresentations of what is involved in the Treaty of Nice’. Rather than acting rationally, the people had based their votes on ‘fear of the unknown’ (Walsh in ID, June 9). Conversely, Bertie Ahern claims that the people probably knew what the Treaty was about even though they were uncertain as to how it concerned the Republic of Ireland. Fintan O’Toole (IT, June 9) states that the opponents of the treaty are: ‘more cynical than apathetic /…./ haunted by a vague but powerful feeling that their Republic has been stolen from them, that the state is no longer theirs’. Whereas some of the advocates from the Yes-camp depict the outcome as a victory for apathy, the No-camp calls it a victory for empathy. The Green MEP, Patrick McKenna (in Glennon &
Sweeney, in ID, June 9), happily announced that the outcome was a victory for the people who had the courage to come out and ‘voted against what they were being told to. This is victory for people over greed and pretentious opportunism’.

LEARNING EUROPE

For some commentators across Europe, the Irish ‘No’ was a healthy sign, an incentive for governments all around Europe to tackle the problem of alienation which certain people feel towards the EU institutions. Is the dilemma solved then? The reactions from “Brussels” to the referendum on Ireland (O’Sullivan in Gallagher, in ID, June 11) indicated that the people were not yet adequately informed about the prospects of European Integration. If the presumed information deficit is solved, then, the European people will finally realise themselves as Europeans. The Treaty of Nice facilitates the enlargement process and since the Irish people were not really saying ‘No’ to the enlargement, they could – which they also did- vote differently in a second referendum (63 to 37). As indicated by my analysis of the EU-elite rhetoric, to be anti-Nice is to be anti-European: when the Irish people understand that to be the case they will also understand the merits of the EU as a peace project.

The message from “Brussels” was that “we” (as in “we”, the political leaders of the EU-countries and the members of the EUC) must work much harder on communicating the EU to the European public; “we” must teach Europeans how to be Europeans. In this way, the Irish ‘No’ was taken as an incentive to further the efforts to articulate a common European identity to which all Europeans could commit themselves. As it seems, the majority of Irish people who voted no to ratification are yet to learn what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe; hence, to understand that the Treaty of Nice is a stepping stone to the realisation of the fifth enlargement of the EU to which “Real Europeans” already commit themselves.

Moving to the national scene, however, proponents of the Yes-camp were not equally convinced that the Irish only had misunderstood the treaty: the rejection of the treaty was seen also as
a sign of national selfishness. In this sense, to vote pro-Europe is to show solidarity, to embrace the challenges and opportunities of the soon to be enlarged union, whereas a no-vote equals apathy and fear of the unknown. In other words, to vote in the affirmative of ratification is also to vote pro-European. Certainly, the No-camp contradicted this image in their rhetoric, instead invoking a dichotomy between that of an ignorant elite and a self-reflecting Irish people. Whereas the former position was associated with ‘pretentious opportunism’ the latter was about ‘showing courage’, of standing up for what you believed in rather than being anti-European. We are thus confronted with alternative interpretations about why the Irish voted as they did, other than the dominant EU response of the Irish people lacking sufficient information on what was going on. The question about the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe was posed somewhat differently in the genre of news reports than in the rather consensual responses from “Brussels”.

To sum up, the case of Ireland illustrates how knowledge of Europe is produced to warrant the necessity of an enlargement process depicted as irrevocable. The identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe is not merely about the making of spatial demarcations of where Europe ends (which countries are to become members, and which are not) or who is to become a European citizen and who is not. The production of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” (and ‘Europeans’ to be “Real Europeans”) is manifest also within the EU area and among EU citizens.

After the referendum the situation in Ireland was basically removed from the EU agenda. The Irish electorate voted yes to ratify the Treaty of Nice in October 2001. During the course of 2003, nine out of ten accession states voted yes to join the European Union. In Sweden on September 14 the same year, however, the national electorate voted no to abandoning their national currency (the Swedish Krona) for the newly introduced Euro. I now turn to the Swedish referendum as another example of how knowledge of Europe is reproduced on the national arena.

124 Cyprus ratified the treaty according to its domestic procedures and not through a public referendum.
THE CASE OF SWEDEN

Cris Shore (2000: 90) believes that ‘the Euro is the most important symbol of European integration and identity to date’. The introduction of the common currency was the realisation of the so-called ‘third step’ of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to which most member-states had committed themselves in the Maastricht Treaty (1992-3). In his study on elite attitudes towards public opinion, Shore infers that (2000: 103): ‘[for the Commission]: ‘destination euro’ represents the apotheosis of Europe’s federal destiny’. Even if Shore seems somewhat rash in his conclusions, it can be argued that ‘currency iconography’ has repercussions on the moulding of collective identities in general (Hymans 2004: 7).125

In December 2001, the Belgian presidency organised a summit in Laeken. The delegates were convinced that the launch of the common currency would foster an increased concern among Europeans to engage in the construction of Europe (Laeken European Council 2001: § 40):

The introduction of euro notes and coins on 1 January 2002 will be the culmination of a historic process of decisive importance for the construction of Europe /…/ The euro is also helping to bring the citizens of the Union closer together by giving visible, concrete expression to the European design.

The introduction of the Euro may thus help Europeans to realise themselves as Europeans in a more direct way than before. Shortly after the so-called Green day on the first of January 2002 when the Euro was introduced in twelve member-states, Romano Prodi (January 28, 2002) contended:

Ultimately, the launch of the euro was a life-size test (not a sample survey!) of the extent to which people are Europeans. The result of the test confirms that people want Europe […] there is a strong demand for a strong united Europe.

The Euro signifies a materialisation of the ‘European idea’, which is also an incentive for further integration since ‘people want Europe’. In the same speech, Prodi stresses that even though the Euro is a symbol of spiritual unity it is equally respectful towards national

125 Hymans traces (2004: 24-5) a certain commonality between European currencies even before the introduction of the Euro, which he conceives of as supportive for the construction of a European ‘demos’.
diversities: ‘It has even become a game for everyone to collect coins from various countries, building up collections that are a symbol of both European Unity and national diversity’ (ibid). Prodi here refers to the design of the Euro coin, which has one side with a common European symbol (unity), and yet on the other side there is a symbol related to a national theme (diversity). In the words of Prodi, we notice how ‘the Euro’ may sustain articulations of a certain European identity as manifest in the compromise between the two notions of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ (see further chapter 3).

EUROLAND

To date, ‘Euroland’ consists of twelve member-states and the “new” member-states have already approved changing from their national currencies to that of the Euro. The question is how we are to understand that the U.K, Denmark and Sweden remain outside ‘Euro-land’. Are the three Euro-outsiders less dedicated to the European idea than is the rest? Denmark has actually rejected EMU twice. Firstly, the Danish electorate decided not to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (that included the three steps of the EMU) in June 1992 (48 to 52). As was the case with the United Kingdom, the Danish Government acquired a certain opt-out clause that allowed them to stay outside Euro-land. Secondly, in a national referendum on the “currency-union” in September 2000, the Danes again chose to abstain from the Euro (47 to 53). However, Sweden never requested an opt-out clause in their accession agreement and is thereby legally forced to introduce the Euro (Hefeker 2003, Österdal in Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), September 10, 2003).

For this reason, it is understandable that some commentators thought it was deceptive to launch a referendum on something that was already decided on (Möller & Giljam in Dagens Nyheter (DN), September 9, 2003; Österdal in SvD, September 10, 2003). In 1997 (two years after Sweden’s accession to the EC), the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) decided to put the question of the third step up to public scrutiny in a national referendum. It was from the start evident that there was a cleavage between an EMU friendly elite

126 In a second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in May 1993 the Danish people voted in the affirmative of ratification (57 to 43).
and a federal-sceptic public opinion (Lindahl & Naurin 2005: 70; see also Oscarsson & Holmberg 2004). Since its entry in the EC/EU, Sweden has scored low on the ‘benefit-of-membership’ question in the “Eurobarometer”: there has been a lack of enthusiasm for a further deepening of the integration process, the ambition to become a euro-insider was clearly elite-driven.

In this section of the chapter, I will analyse the arguments used in the debate surrounding the referendum campaign on the domestic scene as manifest in two major newspapers, ‘Dagens Nyheter’ (DN) and ‘Svenska Dagbladet’ (SvD). In this section, I will analyse the arguments used in the debate surrounding the referendum campaign on the domestic scene as manifest in two major newspapers, ‘Dagens Nyheter’ (DN) and ‘Svenska Dagbladet’ (SvD).127

Before beginning the analysis, we should take into account one immediate difference between the Euro referendum in Sweden 2003 and that of the Treaty of Nice on Ireland two years before: the former does not hinder any other member-states and cannot directly impinge on the integration process. However, at a special Euro seminar in Brussels on May 26, 2004, European Commissioner Siim Kallas contends that the process of EMU is not completed till ‘the Euro zone coincides with the EU’. In Brussels the reaction to the Swedish referendum was crystal clear: no matter the outcome of the referendum, Sweden cannot remain outside Euro-land forever (e.g. European Commissioner Pedro Solbes in DN, September 16, 2003). In an official statement from the EUC on the 15th of September 2003 (IP 2003c) it is said that:

The Commission takes note of the decision of the Swedish people. We firmly believe that the euro, our currency, has brought and will continue to bring advantages to the euro area economy [...] Its full impact has still to work its way through to the euro area economy and that is what we are in the process of achieving together. Sweden could have influenced this effort by deciding to join the euro. We are confident that the Swedish Government will choose the way forward to keep the euro project alive in Sweden.

In other words, even if the Swedish people said ‘No’ to the introduction of the Euro it does not change the general impression that the launch of the Euro was a tremendous success (Prodi May 5, 2004). The Euro project is to be kept alive. At the time, the

127 Dagens Nyheter is the largest daily newspaper in Sweden, and reached 362500 readers per day in 2003 (see further Tidningsutgivarna 2003 – website). Svenska Dagbladet circulated 184900 issues during the same year and is the second largest newspaper with national coverage. Furthermore, these two newspapers are commonly used as objects of analysis in other studies of Swedish news reporting (e.g. Conrad 2006). For the purpose of this analysis, I have used approximately 150 articles related to the area of inquiry from September 8 to September 21. If not said otherwise, all news items from DN and SvD are from 2003.
Commission was troubled by more severe difficulties. The heavily disputed ‘Growth and Stability Pact’ (the second step of the EMU) obliged all member-states to keep domestic finances under control. At a meeting with ECOFIN\textsuperscript{128} 21 January 2003, France received an “early warning” to balance their budget. Faced with these challenges, Commissioner Kallas (May 26, 2004) turns to Belgium and Estonia as good examples where ‘People understand that debt is a burden for the future’.

Apparently, also the EMU is a matter of getting the message across to Europeans citizens (in this case, also national governments), of understanding the merits of an ever-closer union, of learning how to cooperate to minimise debts and maximise growth. It is not a matter of if, but when the EU will turn into a complete Euro-land. This process of transformation is, arguably, not only about the gradual improvement and harmonisation of the internal market: in adopting the Euro and showing solidarity to the growth and stability pact, Europeans have learnt well another lesson what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.

BEFORE SEPTEMBER 14

If it was up to \textit{Riksdagen} to decide whether or not to introduce the Euro, Sweden would most certainly become a member of the Euro-land rather soon. The governing party, the Social Democrats stood along with the Moderates (conservative/liberal), the Liberals and the Christian Democrats in the Yes-camp: together they represented approximately 80 per cent of the electorate. On the other side we found the Left, the Green and the Centre agrarian parties.

Within the Government, however, five ministers were taking sides with the ‘No-voters’, financial experts were divided in their opinions and so were different sections of the labour union. According to psychologist Henry Montgomery (in DN, September 11), the debate climate allowed people to express ambiguity in their voting preferences. In the end, Montgomery affirms, ‘it is a matter

\footnote{128 ECOFIN stands for ‘European Council meeting for Economic and Financial Affairs’.}
of identification’. The political editor in chief at ‘Dagens Nyheter’, Henrik Brors, (DN, September 9) contends that:

Det har formats ett nytt parti inför den här folkomröstningen – ett oorganiserat anti-etablissemangsparti utan ledning och ideologi som endast hålls samman av väljarnas misstro mot politikerlöften. /…/ Grundorsaken till nejsidans stora försprång får snarast sökas i den växande politikermisstron och skepsisen mot hela EU-projektet.129

According to Brors, there is a growing feeling amongst the Swedish people that they cannot trust their representatives. He infers that the people, in general, are sceptical towards any elite-driven campaigns and they have neglected to inform themselves sufficiently before the referendum (See also e.g. Rosander in SvD, September 9). Brors claims that the lack of enthusiasm for the European project in Sweden is partly due to the fact that the Swedish government itself has endorsed a critique against Brussels so as to avoid shrinking popular support.

The tension within the establishment, especially between leading social democrats, made for a constant source of debate throughout the campaign (e.g. Eriksson & Stenberg in DN, September 11). Finally Persson muzzled his no-camp minister colleagues, thereby forbidding them to actively participate in the campaign.130

MAIN TOPICS IN THE DEBATE

When Swedish Television, at the polls, asked more than 10000 people why they voted as they did in the referendum (europaportalen 2003), it stood clear that the feeling of being part of the EU community and the possibility of affecting EU politics was the foremost reason to vote yes. And “democracy” and “national independence” were the foremost reasons to say no. The debate was much about whether Sweden would do best alone or if it was considered more beneficial for Sweden to join forces with the

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129 Own translation: Before this referendum, there is a new party in the making – a disorganised anti-establishment party lacking both management and ideology, held together by voters sharing a lack of trust for promises given by politicians /…/. The main reason for the No-camp’s lead may be traced to a growing distrust of the political establishment; to a widespread scepticism of the whole EU project.

130 According to some commentators, this triggered anti-establishment forces already at work and gave the No-camp an extra push forward (e.g. Stenberg in DN, September 10).
other Euro countries to achieve economic growth and welfare. An editorial in DN (September 7) warns that Sweden risks being left in the cold:

Att rösta nej den 14 september vore att ställa Sverige vid sidan av den pågående debatten inom euroområdet. Visst kan vi även efter ett nej komma med synpunkter. Men det är inte troligt att de gör samma intryck när de kommer från någon som valt att inte delta i projektet. \(^{131}\)

In the rhetoric of the Yes-camp, to vote in the affirmative in the referendum is to vote for peace and solidarity and against national isolationism. In various articles, the ’national selfishness’ was debated and explained. In an editorial from Dagens Nyheter (September 3), the journalist claims that:

Den svenska linjen har, liksom de flesta andras, av tradition valts för att i första hand bevara Sveriges oberoende. Roten till detta står att finna i neutralitetspolitiken, i myten om att vi är speciella och om att den lilla minoriteten svenskar i Europa på något egendomligt sätt skulle klara sig bäst på egen hand. \(^{132}\)

This is perhaps the most frequently used reason to explain why the Swedes remain sceptical towards the EU project. For the late Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme (also social democrat) the Swedish neutrality was the main reason why Sweden should refrain from applying for membership in the 70s. However, Leif Lewin (2004: 127), professor of political science, states that after 1989 the social-democrats changed their view: the union suddenly came to visualise ‘the ultimate goal for the victorious, peaceful, liberal democracies and the political establishment in Sweden described ‘membership as the predetermined fate for Europe’. \(^{133}\) The assessment was that the risk of war in Europe had disappeared; therefore Sweden could now safely become a member of the EU. However, according to some commentators the national myth of the durable peace is still valid in the EMU elections, the journalist Maciej Zaremba (in DN, September 7) infers that the underlying myth discerns that ‘Sverige

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\(^{131}\) Own translation: To vote no on the 14th of September is to position Sweden outside the ongoing debate within the Euro area. Surely, Sweden may continue to deliver opinions even after a ‘No’. But it is not probable that these will make the same impression when they derive from someone who has decided not to be part of the project.

\(^{132}\) Own translation: The Swedish path has, like most others, traditionally been chosen to defend Swedish independence. The origin of this may be traced to the policy of neutrality, in a myth that we are special and that the small minority of Swedish people in Europe, curiously enough, could do best on their own.

\(^{133}\) Lewin bases his analysis on a dissertation written by Jacob Gustavsson (1998).
är ett land som inte står i skuld till någon eller något'.

According to Zaremba, the two camps approach EU-related issues from a state-centric perspective: 'Fråga inte vad Sverige kan göra för Europa, fråga vad Europa kan göra för Sverige.' A second prominent theme in the imagining of Sweden as a self-contained national entity is - according to many commentators - the idea of Sweden as a prosperous welfare state that is much better off than other industrialised countries. According to an editorial in DN (September 6):

Nästan varje dag framträder någon orolig väljare och frågar om den svenska välfärden – som är "bäst i världen" – kommer att försämras om det blir ett ja till euro.

In this perspective, the archetypical No-voter dislikes EU (and Europe) because he is so proud of the Swedish national welfare system that has enabled a decent standard of living. A deeper involvement with other EU member-states risks violating that system. The researcher and journalist, Stefan Jonsson, (in DN, September 13) elaborates on the Swedes as being rooted in the national:

I dagens Europa finns en utbredd känsla av övergivenhet som bereder marken för den stora populismen. I 2003 års Sverige yttrar sig misstron delvis gentemot EMU eller den ekonomiska globaliseringen. Om några år, i nästa valkampanj, kommer den antagligen att ledas in i grumligare kanaler och ta sig uttryck i direkt fientlighet mot främmande kulturer, invandrare, islam, terrorister och afrikaner […] det politiska ledarskapets entusiasm inför en högre europeisk idé uppfattas som ett underkännande av de människor vilkas världsbild är rotad i det nationella.

Following these lines of thought, we encounter a split between, on the one hand, an image of the No-voter as a victim of growing

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134 Own translation: Sweden is a country that is not indebted to anyone or anything.
135 Own translation: Do not ask what Sweden can do for Europe, ask what Europe can do for Sweden.
136 Own translation: Almost every day, some voter asks if the Swedish welfare system (which is "best in the world") would grow weaker because of the euro. Very few seem aware of how erroneous this image is, both in Sweden and amongst our European neighbour states.
137 A number of articles and letters to the editor were published on this subject: (e.g. DN September 3; DN September 13).
138 Own translation: In contemporary Europe there is a growing feeling of alienation that prepares the ground for great populism. In Sweden 2003, this is articulated in a lack of trust for the EMU or economic globalisation. In a few years, in the next election campaign, it will probably lead to even dirtier channels, articulating themselves in direct hostility towards unknown cultures, foreigners, Islam, terrorists and Africans […] the enthusiasm of the political leadership for a higher European idea is at the same time perceived as a failure for those rooted in the national.
alienation, afraid of the unknown and thus inclined to stick to the
national path and refrain from anything that threatens national
cohesion (ranging from terrorism to EMU), and on the other hand,
an image of the internationalist pro-voter who embraces a grander
European idea of uniting people over state borders.

Gustav Fridolin (interview in Danné, in SvD, September 10),
MEP of the Greens, is equally aware of the growing alienation that
certain people feel towards politics in general. For Fridolin,
however, the EMU represents an increased neo-liberalisation of the
EU, a move towards a federalist state further away from democratic
control. At the same time, Fridolin depicts himself as an
internationalist and he welcomes both Turkey and Russia to
become members of the union. Fridolin does not conceive himself
as anti-European, but criticises what he conceives of as a neo-liberal
political project that suffices from a democratic deficit. References
to democracy (or the lack thereof) are, in general, common themes
in the rhetoric of the No-camp. Leif Lewin (DN, September 6)
argues that the EU, and in particular the ECB, is: "vår tids främsta
uttryck för en samarbetsdemokrati utan ansvarsutkrävande." The
‘activity of knowing Europe’ is disputed in the debate preceding the
referendum, and we encounter different opinions of the connection
between the Euro and that of a further integrated Europe.

**AFTER SEPTEMBER 14**

On voting day, nearly 83 per cent of the Swedish electorate
exercised their right to vote. Only four days before, an assassin
killed the foreign minister Anna Lindh. The nation was in a state of
shock and many felt the democratic responsibility to go to the polls
to make their voices heard. The outcome of the election was that 56
per cent voted no to introduce the Euro as a new currency, whereas
only 42 per cent voted yes. 2 per cent were blank votes. On
television the day before, experts and TV-journalists were
identifying new cleavages in Sweden: women versus males; north

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139 Own translation: the most significant articulation of a cooperative democracy with no
accountability in our times.

140 According to Lindahl & Naurin, the Swedish people are no (longer) EU-sceptic, but feder-
sceptics. They argue that ‘a conscious outsidership’ is a possible path towards a reconciliation
versus south; left versus right; rural versus urban and so forth (editorial in DN, September 23). Lars Linder infers in the cultural section of DN (September 16): ‘Klass står åter mot klass’. 141

Disappointed intellectuals, sometimes, explained the outcome in terms of Swedish isolationism (e.g. Ahlmark in Göteborgsposten, 20 September). Yet others like the head of the No-camp, Sören Wibe, asserts that people felt annoyed by the arrogance showed by the Yes-camp (DN September 26; SvD September 16). 142 We recognise these reactions from the Irish case, but what did the Swedish ‘No’ mean in practice?

CONSEQUENCES

Gunnar Lund (2003: 19), Minister for International Economic Affairs and Financial Markets, is quick to announce that: ‘Swedish voters rejected the euro, but not the European co-operation’. Nevertheless, he also affirms that:

The door to the increasingly important group of euro area countries, which has been ajar for several years, is starting to close … The referendum campaigns reveals, and the result shows, that Sweden is not fully convinced about European co-operation.

In an interview in SvD (September 20), the minister is even more direct: ‘Our position is undermined /…/ In the area of economics, we are completely uninteresting’. As it seems, for Lund the Swedish people are at the same time in favour of European co-operation but have yet to learn to become even more co-operative, otherwise the Swedes will remain out in the cold. An editorial in DN (September 16) infers that: ‘Vi står utan karta och kompass i EUs historiska utvidgningsskede’. 143

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141 Own translation: Class again stands against class.
142 This view is also represented in some letters to the editor: ‘we do not need to excuse ourselves’, says one commentator (SvD, September 20) whereas others like the Swedish/Finnish singer, Arja Saijonmaa, was instead openly frustrated (SvD 16 September): ‘Resultater visar att svenskarne inte egentigen är intresserade av Europe’ (Own translation: The result proves that the Swedes are not really interested in Europe).
143 Own translation: We stand without a map and compass card at this historic moment of EU enlargement. (See also SvD September 15).
The critique against the government gained further fuel after election-day.\textsuperscript{144} Henrik Brors (DN, September 15) infers that ‘the losers’ are now to govern the country. According to political scientist Tommy Möller (DN, September 15), the combination of a no to EMU and the fact that the main government party cooperates with two EU-critical parties makes it difficult for “us” to influence the politics of the EU. Sweden is, in this perspective, likely to face fading credibility in relation to the EU.

These reactions are interesting when contrasted with the official EU reactions to the outcome: Tomas Lundin (SvD September 16; cf. SvD September 15) summarises the reactions from Brussels: ‘Sverige är redan glömt. Varken penningpolitiken eller eurons värde påverkas av folkomröstningen’.\textsuperscript{145} In an article written by the Brussels correspondent Barbro Hedvall (DN, September 15), though, it is said that when Brussels asked for help the Swedes hung up the phone. Hedvall infers that: ‘Ett svenskt nej till euron tolkas som ett svensk nej till ansträngningar för Europa’\textsuperscript{146}

COMMUNICATING EUROPE

Indeed, some surveys point in the direction that the Swedes were not sufficiently informed about what an introduction of the Euro would mean for the Swedish economy (e.g. SvD, September 9; see also Oscarsson 2004). Likewise prominent in the Swedish debate is a discussion about a rupture between an EMU-enthusiastic elite and a less devoted Swedish public. In this perspective, the referendum was much about a failure to getting across the message to the public. Europe needs to be better communicated. The alienation that some people feel needs to be dealt with.

\textsuperscript{144} The scapegoat of the day is the no-voting Minister for industry, Leif Pagrottsky: whereas some blame him for the result the minister himself claims that less than one per cent voted as they did because of him (SvD September 16).

\textsuperscript{145} Own translation: Sweden is already forgotten about /…/ Neither are the monetary policies nor the value of the euro affected by the referendum. A frequent observation is however also that the Swedish ‘No’ does affect the ambitions by the governments in the U.K and Denmark to enter the euro zone (SvD September 15). In the long run, the EU may face increased heterogeneity with different layers of member-states with different levels of integration.

\textsuperscript{146} Own translation: A Swedish no to the euro is interpreted as a Swedish no to efforts for Europe. Hedvall here refers to the ongoing debate on the growth- and stability pact where Sweden, according to her, could have altered the development in a positive direction.
A common explanation to the Swedish unwillingness to embrace the Euro was traced to the idea of Sweden as a self-contained entity that would do best on its own. In this respect the national myths of Sweden as a prosperous welfare state that has managed to secure welfare and peace for a long time was considered a main reason behind the negative outcome. To vote for or against the Euro is, in this sense, also a matter of identification. For some commentators in the Yes-camp, the EMU represents a post-nationalist order that allows peoples and states to cooperate beyond the realms of the nation-state. Some proponents from the No-camp oppose this interpretation, instead claiming the EMU to be a neo-liberal project that brings the EU further away from democratic control. In the Swedish referendum on the Euro we confronted divergent articulations of what it means to be Swedish in relation to a changing European environment. From the perspective of the Yes-camp, we also found indications of how knowledge of Europe is produced as congruent with the irrevocable project of turning the EU into a completed Euro-zone. The question is not if this will happen, but when and how. The No-voting majority of the Swedish electorate are considered, in this strand, as “yet-to-be-Europeans” in the sense that they have not yet realised that EU affairs matter for Sweden.

The limits of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe is related to how the constitutive split of ‘the nation’ versus ‘Europe’ is expressed in the various national contexts. If Ireland and Sweden can be seen as peripheral countries in the enlarged union, France surely cannot. We now turn to the summer of 2005, when the constitutional treaty was turned down both in France and in Holland.

THE CASE OF FRANCE

In Laeken in December 2001, the European Council decided to commission a convention to prepare constitutional changes in the institutional framework of the EU. The ambition was to sustain transparency and democratic accountability in the enlarged European Union. Especially after a turbulent meeting in Nice one year before, these reforms were considered extra salient (Jonsson &
Hegeland 2003; see also Moberg 2002: 281). The ‘European Future Convention’ was also a project that aimed at better communicating the EU to its citizens. It consisted of 207 representatives from all member-states under the leadership of the former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (VGE). On the first meeting, February 28, 2002, three phases were decided upon. The first step was about listening and receiving inputs from all around Europe. The second step was about discussing relevant topics for the constitutional shaping of the future EU. The third step was the finalisation of a new constitutional treaty to be ratified by all member-states.

In the end, 199 of the delegates agreed on the content of the final text. This document would replace all the other existing treaties that today make up the EU *aquis communautaire*. In some member-states, it was up to the national parliaments to decide whether to ratify the treaty or not. In Spain, a majority of 76 percent of the electorate voted ‘Yes’ to the new treaty in a public referendum.

Some weeks before the referenda in France and Holland, analysts started to worry about the outcome. Both Holland and France were among the six original members of the ECSC and a ‘No vote’ in either referendum marked a potential threat to the realisation of a coherent constitutional framework for the EU. Again, all member-states were to ratify the proposal made by the convention in order to make the treaty valid. In France, the ambition was to avoid the ‘Maastricht Treaty scenario’ when the support for ratification sank drastically during the last months before the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. Proponents from the different camps were beginning to dramatise the votes: Giscard D’Estaing warned for an “open crisis” in case of a rejection of the treaty (The Economist, March 26, 2005). The future of the Union was said to be in peril.

While differing in their complaints about the EU, Holland and France were both divided between a constitution-enthusiastic elite and a disappointed electorate (The Economist, May 21, 2005). Again we face the fact that the will of the people does not always correspond with what their political representatives believe (or want) it to be. We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the
French campaign before election-day on May 29 as manifest in the two newspapers of ‘Le Monde’ and ‘Le Figaro’147.

BEFORE MAY 29

On the 14th of July 2004, President Jacques Chirac announced a public referendum on the new constitutional treaty due on May 29 the following year. By then, backed by opinion polls, the President was rather convinced of a French ‘Yes’ in the referendum. In France, the major parties were in favour of ratification whereas the ultra-right parties (e.g. Front National and Mouvement pour la France) and ultra-left parties (e.g. Ligue Communiste révolutionnaire and Parti Communiste français) advocated a ‘No’. Important interest groups such as the peasant community (Le Figaro, May 23) and a majority of the French syndicates (Barroux, in Le Monde, May 25) were campaigning for a ‘Yes’ whereas some other social groupings (e.g. Attac) belonged to the No-camp.

The referendum gave rise to deviant opinions in the established parties. The socialist party (PS) was clearly marked by a split between two branches.148 The green party was equally divided, but in March a majority decided to vote ‘Yes’ and a no-voting minority was silenced (Dupont & Montalon in Le Monde, May 29).

Furthermore, an article in Le Monde (Chemin, May 27) notices that couples who have voted the same for ages (left or right) now express divergent voting behaviour.

EUROPE NEEDS FRANCE NEEDS EUROPE

The French referendum campaign generated a great deal of attention also outside France. In a series of articles in ‘Le Figaro’, prominent politicians were explaining their reasons to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum. The Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez

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147 Le Figaro (326 000 issues 2005) and Le Monde (324401 issues 2005) are the two largest French newspapers with national coverage, even if the circulation rate of both of them has decreased in recent years (Rosin in SvD, September 23, 2005). All cited articles are from 2005. For the purpose of the analysis, I have analysed approximately 100 articles related to the referendum from May 23 to June 6).
148 Laurent Fabius was actively engaged in the No-camp, whereas Francois Hollande (representing a majority) was taking the lead to suggest a ‘Yes-vote’ in the referendum.
Zapatero (Le Figaro, May 23), was turning to France as a role-model for Europe as a whole:

Mais la France a été, depuis le premier jour, à la tête d’un projet qui a évolué en rencontrant des difficultés, mais qui n’a jamais, jamais, cessé d’avancer vers son premier et ultime objectif: améliorer la vie des Européens et obtenir un espace de paix, de liberté et de cohabitation sociale et territoriale pour nos peuples.149

The idea that the European integration process is indebted to France is repeated also by Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg (Le Figaro, May 27), who insisted that all French citizens are deeply engaged with Europe. Juncker is glad to note that the debate in France shows that Europe is (no longer) a concern for the elite only. He continues to argue that ‘le peuple français donne un exemple à suivre’150: they demonstrate that it is possible to be patriotic about France at the same time as they are dedicated to the European project. Clearly, in the words of Zapatero and Juncker, a French ‘Yes-vote’ would benefit all Europe. The French electorate is extra pivotal in this regard, since its national destiny is intrinsically intertwined with that of post-war Europe.

VGE visits Germany on the 27th of May when the German Bundestag ratified the treaty (Bocev in Le Figaro, May 28). A double ratification of the treaty in Germany and France is of great historical significance, VGE says. For him, it is not an option to turn down the treaty: ‘Il n’y aura pas d’autre solutions que de revoter si le non l’emporte … On ne recommencera pas le travail, c’est trop lourd’.151 In other words, the ratification process is declared irrevocable.

On the day before election, John Bruton (Le Figaro, May 28) recognises the work done by the convention to obtain consensus; of reflecting a diversity of wills all around Europe. According to him, the people had several opportunities to have a say before the final version of the treaty was made official. There is no turning

149 Own translation: But France has been, from the beginning, at the head of a project that evolved while encountering difficulties, but which has never, never ceased from advancing towards its first and ultimate goal: to better the lives of Europeans and obtain a space for peace, liberty, and social and territorial cohesion for our people.

150 Own translation: The French people is an example to follow.

151 Own translation: The only solution will be to revolt if the No-camp wins /…/ we will not start this work again … it is too much
back now. For these reasons, he believes that a French ‘No’ to the final version would cause immediate danger to the European project.

Francois Bayrou (in Courtois, Eklief & Séguillon in Le Monde, May 24) is President of the party ‘Union pour la démocratie française’ (UDF) and is outspoken as regards the French responsibility to contribute to a further united Europe: ‘Je n’accepte pas l’idée que la France vote non à l’Europe’.152

Several proponents from the Yes-camp repeat the link between a ‘Yes-vote’ and a ‘Yes to Europe’, for instance Patric Chérau (Le Monde, May 27) declares that he feels European and for that reason he also recognises the great historical significance of giving the integration an extra boost forward:

*Dire oui, c’est donner à une utopie les moyens de devenir concrete, à un projet commun d’incarner l’avenir. C’est dire oui à ce qui est défini pour la première fois dans ce texte : la dignité humaine, la démocratie, l’égalité, le respect des droits de l’homme et des minorités, la tolérance, l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, l’égalité de salaire, entre autres, la justice, la solidarité.*153

In the rhetoric of the Yes-camp, expectations were associated with the new constitutional treaty and further associated with the dawning of a more integrated Europe. In Chérau’s case, the position of Europe is posed against that of a nationalistic nostalgia à la Le Pen (see also Bayrou in Courtois, Eklief & Séguillon in Le Monde, May 24). The question of what makes Europe “Europe” is made into a constant source of debate throughout the campaign. Indeed, some advocates from the Yes-camp equalised the fate of the new constitutional treaty with that of Europe: in the words of Edgar Morin (UDF): ‘Ce traité constitutionnel est le texte le plus européen que nous ayons jamais obtenu’.154 In the perspective of the No-camp, however, a common argument was that the new constitutional treaty was a step further away from the original (French) design of an integrated Europe. In other words, the

152 Own translation: I do not accept the idea that France should vote no to Europe.
153 Own translation: Saying “Yes” is to give to utopia the means of becoming concrete, a common project embodying the future. It is saying “Yes” to what has been defined for the first time in this text: dignity, humanity, democracy, and equality, respect for the rights of man and for minorities, tolerance, equality between man and woman, equality of salaries, amongst others, justice, solidarity.
154 Own translation: This constitutional treaty is the most European that we ever could have achieved.
concept of Europe was put against that of an ultra-liberalised European Union (See also Manners 2005).

**WE DO WANT EUROPE…**
**A DIFFERENT EUROPE**

The social dimension played an important role in the debate. Some Yes-camp advocates claim that the constitutional treaty advanced the social dimension in the Union. Juncker (Le Figaro, May 27) presents the argument that the treaty is neither right nor left, but an innovative solution to strengthen democratic accountability in the EU. Jacques Chirac (in Andreani & Ferenczi, in Le Monde, May 28) argues that: ‘la Constitution est le meilleur rempart contre l’ultralibéralisme’. Proponents from the No-camp argue against these opinions (e.g. ibid) that the constitution is Anglo-Saxon biased; favouring privatizations and bringing about increased social dumping. The new constitutional treaty threatens the French social model that acknowledges collective rights and social services. The argument is that France is losing influence in the EU. Conversely, Henri de Bresson (Le Monde, May 23) argues that among the No-voters, there is a strong wish for a more political European union. They want Europe, but a different Europe than is manifested in the treaty. Outside France, this is often neglected, he thinks.

Jaime Pastor (Le Monde, May 23), professor in political science in Madrid, means that: ‘Le débat n’est pas de savoir si on est pour ou contre l’Europe, mais quelle Europe nous voulons construire dans l’avenir’.155 He also thinks that the Spanish voted yes too quickly, without having had an opportunity to seriously discuss what was in the treaty. According to Pastor, the debate in France was much more informed than it was in Spain:

155 Own translation: The debate is not about being in favour or against the Europe, but what Europe we will construct in the future.'
Interestingly enough, the ‘lack-of-information thesis’ is, in this case, associated with a Yes-voting majority. Before in the chapter we have encountered how this argument was used to explain both the Swedish, and in particular the Irish ‘No’.

However, not all commentators are convinced of the quality of the debate. The former Prime Minister and Presidential candidate, Lionel Jospin, claims the No-camp to be both unrealistic in their ideas and internally incompatible with one another (Jospin in Barotte, in Le Figaro, May 25). He concludes that: ‘une telle attitude non seulement va isoler France mais même va nous laisser incompris des autres Européens’.

Another explanation of the French scepticism is that the French are uncertain about what a constitutionalisation of the EU would imply in practice. Even if France, in general, is considered to be more closely attached with the European spirit than are most other member-states, they are still not keen on the idea of a European super state (e.g. de Bresson in Le Monde, May 23).

People are worried about the EU becoming too centralised and of political decisions being made further away from the citizens and democratic control (ibid). Members of the Yes-camp criticised their opponents of exploiting nationalistic sentiments ranging from the protection of the ‘French social model’ to xenophobic slurs about Islam in general, and Turkey in particular (See e.g. Chérau, in Le Monde, May 27). Also in the French debate, advocates of the ‘Yes-camp’ played the ‘nationalist card’ against their opponents.

In other ways, too, the French campaign showed similarities with Ireland and Sweden. The debate invoked concerns for a whole range of political issues that is not immediately related to what is actually written about in the treaty (Andreani & Firenzi in Le Monde, May 28). The Iraq war, the role of civil society and the discussion on Turkey’s possible future entry in the union appealed

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156 Own translation: It is not the xenophobic extreme right or the ‘sovereignists’ [the term has a special meaning in French, my remark] that brings together the no vote, it is a pluralist left. If we compare the debate in France with what is happening in Spain, I have seen a higher level of information and a higher knowledge of constitutional texts in France than here. Therefore, I think that in France we are speaking about more things than just the government or Turkey.

157 Own translation: such an attitude will not only isolate France, but will also make us appear incomprehensible to other Europeans.
to passionate feelings among the French people.\footnote{See e.g. Chérau in Le Monde, 27 May. VGE himself has said that: ‘it would be the end of the EU if Turkey were ever actually to get in’ (The Economist November 14, 2002).} A difference is, though, that in the case of France, we encounter from the two camps – although not internally coherent – more clearly defined visions of Europe. Compared with both Ireland and Sweden, it was seemingly more legitimate in France to argue against a ratification of the treaty and still remain trustworthy in articulating a somewhat different European vision.

To sum up: rather than talking about a constitutive split between “yet-to-be Europeans” and “Real Europeans”, I instead suggest a constitutive split between “French Europeans” and “Real Europeans”. To be more precise, a common opinion is that there exists a certain ‘European idea/spirit’, which is at least partly derived from France. At the same time, in the vision of an enlarged family of nations and peoples that live together in peace and harmony, the EU project cannot be limited to the national interests of the Republic of France. Consequently, those who have realised that France shares a common responsibility for their fellow Europeans may be positioned in the latter, whereas those who are unwilling to do so may be positioned in the former. In this constitutive split, production of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” is reproduced so as to warrant the necessity of nurturing a certain ‘European idea’ that both incorporates the different nations, and yet extends beyond them.

\section*{AFTER MAY 29}

During the campaign period, each household in France received a copy of the constitution. It is doubtful that everybody had read it; nevertheless almost 70 percent of the French electorate went to the polls on May 29, 2005 to make their voice heard. A majority of 55 per cent voted ‘No’ to ratification whereas 45 per cent were in favour. Only three days after, the Dutch people turned it down with more than 60 per cent voting against ratification. This was a message from people living in one of the founding states of the ECSC: are we then to expect other reactions from Brussels than
was the case with Ireland and Sweden? Not necessarily. In an article from ‘The Economist’ (May 21, 2005), the journalist suggests what he thinks would be the reaction of a double rejection:

The French, it will be said, were really voting about high unemployment and their dislike of Jacques Chirac. As for the Dutch, they are still in the grip of the national angst unleashed by Fortuyn. A double rejection, however, would rise a more disquieting thought: that the problem was not the French or Dutch electorates, but the constitution itself.

I now turn to discuss interpretations and explanations as manifest in Le Monde and Le Figaro after May 29.

**THE HEART VOTING AGAINST THE BODY**

Alexis Lacroix, journalist at the Le Figaro, summaries his thoughts on the negative result (June 3):

> Le texte qui vient d'être rejeté est considéré par l'Europe comme un produit “made in France”. Notre pays en fut le principal inspirateur, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, le rédacteur en chef. Cette Constitution européenne est la plus française qui se puisse concevoir.159

Lacroix believes that France misses the opportunity to remain in front position for the furthering of the integration process. Jean-Pierre Robin (Le Figaro, June 2) is equally annoyed and finds it ironic that the French electorate could be fiercely critical against ‘the system’ at the same time as they explained their voting preferences in terms of defending the ‘French model’. He infers that people, in general, have difficulties understanding how any major changes could make things better; he refers to this phenomenon as ‘the tyranny of status quo’.

Certainly, also in France there were commentators who, in different ways, believed that the electorate voted wrong and for wrongly reasons. Yves Mény (Le Monde, June 1) sees the preceding debate as a ‘véritable regression’160, since it was dominated by populists and conservatives who exploited a public fear of the unknown. He also indicates that xenophobic arguments are not

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159 Own translation: The test that has been rejected will be considered by Europe as a ‘product made in France’. Our country has been the main source of inspiration, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing its editor in chief. This European constitution is the most French that we could have achieved.

160 Own translation: ‘a real regression’
limited to the extreme right, but is likewise present in the rhetoric of the left who are accused of contributing to the ‘paranoïa française’.

Is Paris afraid of Brussels? In an interview, Gérard Courtois (Le Monde, May 30) confirms that: ‘depuis l’origine, on dit que le couple franco-allemand est le moteur de l’Europe. Il est clair que ce moteur est aujourd’hui en panne’.\(^{161}\) Courtois is, however, sceptical to label the voting behaviour of the French electorate as populist. Furthermore, he finds it improbable that Europe will leave France behind on its march forward. Rather than changing the role of France (or Holland) the double rejection simply suggests that the constitutional treaty is more or less buried. The message is that the destiny of France cannot be separated from that of Europe: a comment from Timothy Garton Ash (quoted in Le Monde, May 30) is symptomatic: ‘Les Français qui disent non à Europe, c’est comme si les Anglais disaient non au boeuf, ou les Russes non à la vodka. Ou peut-être même comme si le cœur disait non au corps’.\(^{162}\) Following these lines of thought, to vote against ratification of a new constitutional treaty for Europe in a referendum in France is a contradiction in terms.

Anyhow, the French did say no to ratification of the treaty and has thus brought Europe (or ‘the body’, to paraphrase Ash) into a major crisis. In an article in Le Figaro (May 31), Vianney Aubert contends that the international press has unequivocally decided who is to blame: ‘Jacques Chirac et, avec vous, dans le box, toute la classe politique, levez vous: tous coupables! Coupables d’avoir tué la Constitution européenne’.\(^{163}\) If ‘the elite’ (French and EU) are depicted as the perpetrators of crime, it is the whole of Europe that makes up the victim. From this interpretation it is not obvious that the French electorate has failed to recognise themselves as Europeans (they already are), rather the outcome implies that they are disappointed with the way politics has been performed in France under President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin. In

\(^{161}\) Own translation: It is said that from the beginning, the French/German axis has been the engine of Europe. It is evident that this engine is now broken.

\(^{162}\) Own translation: The French saying no to Europe, that is like the British should say no to steak or the Russians should say no to vodka. Perhaps, it is as if the heart should say no to the body.

\(^{163}\) Own translation: Jacques Chirac, and you, the political class who are in the same corner, stand up! You are all guilty. Guilty of having killed the European constitution!
particular, it is the high unemployment rate in France that upsets people and made them less willing to sign a new constitutional treaty for Europe (Philippe le Coeur in Le Monde, May 31; cf. The Economist, May 21, 2005).

In an article in Le Figaro (June 1), André Grejebine contends that: ‘les Francais n’ont pas vote contre l’Europe /…/ les Francais ont avant tout vote contre l’engrenage du chômage et de la crise don’t ils sont prisonniers depuis plus de vingt ans’. The French people were not convinced by the argument that unemployment had anything to do with the treaty (Dolez in Le Figaro, May 31). There were, however, also other explanations to why the French voted as they did. According to Michel Erman (Le Figaro, June 2), professor in linguistics, the referendum discerns ‘Un échec de parole’ (Le Figaro, June 2):

En un mot, l’ Europe s’y trouve représentée comme un espace économique et juridique obscur, mais non comme un espace public ouvert. Le citoyens français ont eu le sentiment que ce traité constitutionnel descendait de l’Acropole bruxellois au lieu de venir prendre sa place dans l’ agora nationale et européenne.

Erman thus claims that the French rejection of the treaty should be seen as a reaction to the democratic deficit, to the lack of platforms for democratic conversation-making outside Brussels. For others, like Giulo Tremonti (Le Monde, June 3), the referendum result confirms that the ‘golden age’ of Europe has reached its limit and now people are uncertain about the role of the EU as a competent actor on the global market.

The debate was much about figuring out the role of the new constitutional treaty in the shaping of what Europe for whom. Professor Pacal Salin (Le Figaro, June 6) asserts that the referendum highlights some major ambiguities inherent in the integration process. He identifies two rival visions; free competition versus harmonisation. Up to date the vision of ‘free competition’ has lost ground because of the centralisation of decisions to Brussels: the

164 Own translation: The French have not voted against Europe /…/ The French have foremost voted against the blockage caused by unemployment and the crisis that has kept them as prisoners for the last twenty years.

165 Own translation: ‘A stalemate of words’ /…/ In one word: Europe finds itself represented as an obscure economic and judicial space, and not as an open public space. French citizens feel that the constitutional treaty descended from the Acropolis of Brussels rather taking its place in the national and European Agora.
referendum result may, according to Salin, change the direction towards increased free competition again.

According to others, the French referendum articulated different conceptions of society. In an interview in Le Figaro (June 6), philosopher Michel Serres – also member of the French Academy – conceives of the referendum as a possibility for the French citizenry to express different views on the modern project. He talks about the radical transformation of the societal condition from that of rural France up to contemporary times. The rejection of the new constitutional treaty should be seen from this perspective; a popular reaction to radical changes in society that are difficult to comprehend (See also Ysmal in Le Figaro, May 31).

Taken together, this set of explanations of the outcome derives from the circumstance that the new constitutional treaty divided the French and their Europeans neighbours in distinct visions of what makes Europe “Europe”. The French referendum brought repercussions to the rest of Europe in a way that was not apparent in the case of Ireland and Sweden.

**THERE IS NO PLAN B**

It was clear from the start that there was no plan B (e.g. editorial in Le Monde, May 30). VGE had before indicated that the only way forward after a rejection of the treaty was that the French should have to re-vote. After the result had become official, however, there was really never an option to send the French back to the polls. According to Courtois (Le Monde, May 30), the figures (55 to 45) were too massive. We should not forget, though, that the result on Ireland was equally obvious (54 to 46), but by then a second referendum was seen as inevitable. What were, then, the consequences of the ‘French No’?

The No-camp, of course, celebrated the result: the former President of the farmer confederation, José Bové, was talking about a popular revolt and the Attac movement recognised the historical significance of saying no to neo-liberalism (Le Monde, May 29). Most European leaders were both worried and confused. In a joint statement on the day after election, Chirac and Zapatero estimated
that Europe ‘surmonterait cette période de crise’ (Le Monde, May 29). On the first of June also Holland voted no to ratification, and the crisis grew worse (T. Firenzi & J.P Langellier, in Le Monde, June 3). Initially, a majority of the EU leaders wanted the ratification process to proceed (Le Monde, June 2), but quite soon the treaty was put on hold for an unforeseeable future and Jacques Chirac called for ‘le temp de la réflexion sur la Constitution’. In an editorial from Le Monde on May 30, it was predicted that:

L’hypothèse la plus probable est une renationalisation des diverse politiques aujourd’hui intégrées, donc un renforcement d’une tendance qui s’était fait jour ces dernières années et que la Constitution visait précisément à inverser /…) ce serait un triste retournement de l’Histoire.

Apparently, without the involvement of France (and also Holland) the further constitutionalisation of the EU is simply not doable. Euroland survives without Sweden and when the Irish people decided not to ratify the Treaty of Nice (or when the Danes rejected the Maastricht) it was possible to launch a second referendum. In the case of France, though, the negative outcome resulted in an uncertain future for the political project of the EU whole and thus a constitutional treaty more or less buried.

According to the sitting President of the European Union Commission, José Manuel Barroso (e.g. IP 2005a), Europe needs a clear vision that manages to attract its peoples. In relation to this, Thomas Ferenczi (Le Monde, June 3) identifies four distinct visions of the future Europe that are all present in the French referendum on the new constitutional treaty. The first one assumes the preservation of national independence and is present amongst the French Gaullist and the conservatives in Great Britain. The second vision is the liberal vision of a highly competitive union that will help France to adjust to processes of globalisation. The third vision is a vague social-democratic one that mediates between ‘the French social model’ and the liberal vision of a more liberal union. The fourth vision is anti-capitalist and aims at protecting national

166 Own translation: should overcome this period of crisis.
167 Own translation: the period of reflection on the constitution.
168 Own translation: The most probable hypothesis is a re-nationalization of today’s diverse, integrated politics, therefore a re-enforcement of tendencies that have come to light in recent years and which the constitution set out precisely to inverse … that would be a sad reversal of history.
monopolies against free competition. These visions all tell different stories of what makes Europe “Europe” in relation to the political project of the EU. Again, the referendum campaign in France brought up concerns related to what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe in a way that was not apparent in Ireland and Sweden.

EXPLAINING EUROPE

On the 29th of May 2005 (IP 2005b), the heads of three major institutions of the EU gathered around a joint statement:

We regret this choice, coming as it does from a Member State that has been for the last 50 years one of the essential motors of the building of our common future. The tenor of the debate in France, and the results of the referendum also reinforce our conviction that the relevant national and European politicians must do more to explain the true scale of what is at stake, and the nature of the answers that only Europe can offer. We must ask ourselves how each among us … can contribute to a better understanding of this project, which cannot have its own legitimacy without listening to its citizens.

Again, it is striking that France is recognised as an ‘essential motor’ of the making of a more integrated European Union. Compared with Sweden 2003 and Ireland 2001, this reaction is more direct in emphasising the common European responsibility and joint interest to help Europe forward. French domestic affairs are deeply intertwined with the future destiny of both the EU and that of all of Europe. A second aspect to note is that the EU citizenry needs to be listened to, and at the same time Europe needs to be better explained. Peter Straub (COR 2005), President of the Committee of the Regions) stresses that ‘Europe has to be built at the grassroots’.

According to Straub this is the main lesson to be drawn from the referendum:

Elected representatives of regions and towns must provide the link between the Union and public opinion. They will have to work even harder to explain Europe more clearly to people. No one can ignore this any longer.

The same kind of message is repeated by other prominent figures within the EU institutional machinery: Anne-Marie Sigmund is
President of the EECS\textsuperscript{169} (CES 2005) and she is equally convinced of the virtue of ‘communicating Europe better’, since ‘it is not enough to believe that what we do is in the interests of our citizens. We must explain why.’ This further implies, I would say, that the Europeans need to learn better what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.\textsuperscript{170}

On a round-table discussion at Residence Palace in Brussels some days before election-day (Wallström May 24, 2005), Commissioner Margot Wallström (responsible for institutional relations and communication) calls for accountability, transparency and openness. The endeavours to explain the benefits of the European Union to the member-states must be made so in a much more effective way, she says, and: ‘[I]t is not merely a communication issue, it is a raison d’être of the European project. Effective communication by the EU should therefore be seen primarily as a public-service duty.’ In Brussels, the EUC has launched both a plan “C” (as in citizen) and a plan “D” (as in dialogue). In a recent ‘Action plan’ (CEC 2005), the EUC emphasises that: ‘Communication is more than information: it establishes a relationship and initiates a dialogue with European citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people’.

The task of communicating and explaining Europe better to the Europeans is considered extra salient after the double rejection in France and Holland. Deputy foreign minister of Luxembourg, Nicolas Schmit contends in a debate at the European Parliament (EP 2005) that:

\begin{quote}
The European Union had helped build peace and prosperity for decades /…/ Many of those voting ‘no’ were keen on the European idea, but wanted Europe to act in a different way /…/ The only way to achieve results is to build a real European democracy.
\end{quote}

According to Schmit, it is not the ‘European idea’ that is distrusted by the Europeans, rather the way that the EU acts and behaves in practice. From the same debate a member of the socialist party, Schuls (socialist) asserts that: ‘No-one read the treaties in the 1950s

\textsuperscript{169} EESC stands for ‘European Economic and Social Committee’ and functions as a bridge between the EU and civil society actors.

\textsuperscript{170} Reading between the lines, we are also prompted to ask the question how Europe is to be built from the grassroots as it is simultaneously being explained from the top down.
either, but they trusted Europe and its promise of peace and democracy, which was fulfilled’. According to many of the participants in this parliamentary debate (ibid); the shaping of a more vital European and, for the EU citizens, more recognisable democracy was seen as the solution to the lack of legitimacy for the EU institutions.

Following this logic, ‘the European idea’ must be better implemented in the EU institutional arrangements in order to bring the union closer to its peoples. As a consequence, the integration process must gain further speed. From different perspectives, representatives of EU institutions tend to justify intensified integration with a perceived wish by people around Europe to create a more coherent Europe. So, in Washington on the first of June 2005, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy) confirms that ‘There is no meltdown in Europe’. She is also convinced that: ‘EU public opinion is firmly behind strengthening Europe’s role as a global actor.’ She takes this as an incentive to continue the efforts to consolidate a common EU foreign policy. On the same day in Brussels, Viviane Reding (European Commissioner responsible for Information, Society and Media) presents her vision of a European Information Society in 2010 (i2010): ‘The i2010 initiative shows that Europe has to move forward. Our citizens will only believe in the European idea if we can assure prosperity and jobs for Europeans’. In other words, Europeans may only perceive themselves as “Real Europeans” if they understand what makes Europe “Europe” and what Europe an do for them.

This task is understandable; it is hard to see how the EU institutions may be considered legitimate if the EU citizens do not recognise them as theirs. To ‘explain Europe’ is also to produce and reproduce knowledge of what Europe or ‘the European idea’ really is. In the case of the three referenda, though, it is evident that it is not the perception of the elites that has gained resonance in the wider European public. The analysis also shows, however, that the referenda results have encouraged various political elites to further the efforts to consolidate a certain European identity to which Europeans could commit themselves. In the final section of this chapter, I will further elaborate on these efforts.
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

This chapter has addressed how the question of what makes Europe “Europe” was expressed in three public referenda on EU related issues. The analysis focused on three domestic campaigns ranging from Ireland 2001, to Sweden 2003 and finally France 2005. In all three cases, the proposed EU agenda about greater unification was put to test and the people had an opportunity to express their opinions on fundamental aspects of the integration process. In Ireland, the ratification of the Treaty of Nice that included institutional adjustments of the eastern enlargement was campaigned and argued for and against. In Sweden, the introduction of the common currency, ‘the Euro’, was disputed in public debate. In France, the new constitutional treaty that strove at replacing existing treaties with a single coherent one was put to test. These three referenda constitute critical junctures that, potentially, give rise to different articulations of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. It is in this perspective, I have analysed expectations and explanations to why the Irish, the Swedes and finally the French people voted as they did.

The immediate reaction from “Brussels” as regard the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice was that a majority of the Irish people had misunderstood it. The conclusion was that the Irish people had not yet realised the merits of the Treaty of Nice as a stepping stone towards the accomplishment of the enlargement, which in turn was seen as part of a greater endeavour to guarantee peace in Europe. The enlargement process was thus given the status of historic necessity rather than a question open for public controversies. Consequently, an ‘information-campaign’ was launched to guarantee that Ireland voted differently in a second referendum later on the same year.

The case of Ireland displays how knowledge is produced to warrant the necessity of the irrevocable enlargement process. This political controversy (i.e. for or against the accomplishment of the enlargement) was enacted in the moral register and thus considered to be a matter of decency; of sharing a common European vision with “our” brothers and sisters from the eastern parts of the soon
to be enlarged union. The debate revealed a constitutive split between “yet-to-be-Europeans” (the No-voting Majority) and “Real Europeans” (the Yes-voting minority) that further emphasised what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe, in this case translated as realising the virtue of signing the Treaty of Nice so as to allow more member-states in the EU. At the same time, some proponents of the No-camp put forward the argument that it was possible to vote against ratification and yet feel good about themselves as committed Europeans.

When the Swedish people decided not to introduce ‘the Euro’, this was taken to imply that the Swedes were not completely prepared to embrace EU-co-operation so as to realise that they belonged to Europe. Even if Brussels had little to say about the Swedish ‘No’ (in signing the Maastricht Treaty Sweden had already agreed to eventually becoming a member of the Euro zone), the national debate – in the perspective of the Yes-camp - revealed images of the Swedes as being hopelessly rooted in the national. The No-voting Swedish majority was, in this strand, depicted as “yet-to-be-Europeans” in the sense they had to leave their national nostalgia behind in order to become “Real Europeans”. For some proponents in the No-camp, though, the question was not so much about whether one was positive or negative to a ‘the European idea’ rather the emphasis was more specifically on the democratic implications of the Euro. In Sweden, the debate was much about to what extent Sweden should and/or could engage with the furthering of the political integration of the EU.

The case of France differs from Ireland and Sweden, which is related to the idea of Europe as a product ‘made in France’ (e.g. Lacroix in Le Figaro, June 3). The destiny of Europe was intrinsically linked to the national destiny of France. Some proponents of the No-camp declared that the new constitutional treaty was a step further away from ‘the original’ French model of Europe, while yet others used their votes to protest against Chirac and the ever high employment rates. From the Yes-camp, however, the new constitutional treaty was sometimes described as a symbol of European unity of which France is one of its main architects. In sum, the question of what makes Europe “Europe” was expressed
in a constitutive split between “French Europeans” and “Real Europeans”. Different visions of Europe were debated during the campaign and gave rise to distinct articulations of a certain European identity. The reaction in “Brussels” was that the French rejection of the constitutional treaty provoked an immediate crisis for the European project as a whole. The general impression was that Europe could not move on without France marching in the front (together with Germany).

After the double rejection in both France and Holland, “Brussels” again emphasised the need to better explain Europe to its citizens; hence, to gain further acceptance for distinct notions of what makes Europe “Europe”. Arguably the three referenda campaigns have in different ways enforced borders between those Europeans who are seemingly dedicated to the European idea and those who remain (too) committed to a national self-interest. In this sense, the concept of Europe receives its meaning versus the position of ‘the nation’. In the Irish case, this was manifested by a ‘lack-of-information’ thesis; the archetypical No-voter has not taken the time to really engage with Europe, to understand in what ways it concerned Ireland. In Sweden, several commentators returned to a certain attachment to a national mythology of Sweden as an explanation to why the Swedes voted as they did. Also in France, the national selfishness was seen as an explanation to the outcome. Since ‘the people’ failed to recognise that the treaty was actually a ‘product made in France’, they instead defended the so-called ‘French social model’.

To talk in the name of Europe is also to distance ourselves from what “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) are not. In this sense, some proponents of the Yes-camp - in all three cases - put forward the argument that a Yes-vote was synonymous to a vote for Europe. Certainly, there were those who refuted further European integration for the sake of national independency. However, yet others tried to make the argument that it was possible to endorse European co-operation and yet vote no to a ratification of the

171 This conclusion echoes the long dispute between a de Gaulle inspired intergovernmentalist idea of a Europe of states and a more federalist vision (see further chapter 4).
172 It should be noted that my ambition was not to shed light on how the state-nationalisms of Ireland, Sweden and France were reproduced in relation to the EU throughout the campaigns, even if I believe this to be the case as well.
Treaty of Nice, the introduction of the Euro or to the implementation of a new constitutional treaty.

‘The activity of knowing Europe’ dovetails with articulations of a certain European identity as manifest in a series of constitutive splits that taken together set the limits for what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. My analysis suggests that the reproduction of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” may sustain particular definitions of a new Europe at its dawning, as linked to the image of the EU as a peace project (Ireland), a welfare provider (Sweden) or a union closer-to-its citizens (the case of France). It is a bit odd that the important lesson to be drawn from the different referenda, from the position of the consensual elites, is that the people need to be better involved in the European project at the same time as Europe needs to be better explained to them. My analysis infers that the three No votes were all interpreted as incentives to further the integration process, spelling out a message of that Europeans want Europe, even if some people (i.e. the No-voting majorities) are yet to learn what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. Again, the problem is not considered to be about too much integration, rather too little.
6. EUROPE IN PERIL
SCENE IX

In July 2005, bombs exploded in the London tube system. This act of terrorism caused fear and discomfort among Londoners, elsewhere tourists decided to cancel their vacation trips to the British capital. During the fall, the UK government presided over the European Council of Ministers. Charles Clarke, UK Home Secretary, gives a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. He (September 7, 2005) begins by stressing that the European Union ‘has been a massive source for good’. He is, however, aware of the scepticism many Europeans feel towards EU co-operation recently manifested in the double rejection of the new constitutional treaty. The reason, he thinks, is that the EU does not seem to offer practical solutions to acute problems such as terrorism and trafficking.

For Clarke, the EU must prove worthy of its citizens’ approval and safeguard their demand of security and protection against organised crime-activities. He anticipates that ‘no state can tackle these problems alone, even in their own country’: the only way forward lies in deeper integration on issues pertaining to internal security. He suggests collecting biometric data on visas, passports and driving licenses so as to facilitate a pan-European intelligence system to sort out criminals on the run from regular travellers. He also suggests the bugging of telephone calls with ‘appropriate safeguards’. Finally, Clarke opens up for changing the European Convention of Human Rights that protects individuals against various ill-treatments. Since the times look vastly different today from when the Convention was founded, Clarke argues that individual rights now need to be balanced by the protection of collective democratic values such as safety and security. He infers that the No-votes (in Holland, and in France) ‘should be taken as a wake up call to those who believe and support the value of the European project to focus on what matters’.
Political representatives from the EU member-states met in Helsinki, December 11-12, 1999 (Helsinki European Council 1999a). The summit decided upon a number of measures to promote the eastern enlargement. The delegates requested the accession-states to settle their border disputes as a prerequisite for membership negotiations according to criteria laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993.

In Helsinki, the ambition was also to strengthen a common security and defence policy. Attached with its Presidency Conclusions is the so-called “Millennium Declaration” (Helsinki European Council 1999b). This document recognises the prospects of the European integration process to guarantee peace on the European continent. Bound together by shared values and common policies, the countries of the EU are believed to be well suited to face tomorrow’s challenges associated with processes of globalisation. Above all, the peoples of Europe demand the EU to guarantee their security. The declaration concludes that: ‘People expect to be protected against crime and to be able to exercise their legal rights everywhere in the Union. We shall make the Union a genuine area of freedom, security and justice’ (Helsinki European Council 1999b).

Only together can the nation-states and peoples of Europe achieve mutual goals. Only together can the nation-states and peoples of Europe take control over the pressures provoked by mechanisms of globalisation.
WHAT WE ARE AFRAID OF

Freedom is always desirable. Freedom needs to be protected. But against whom, and for what reasons? Who are the people who ‘expect to be protected against crime’ (cf. scene X)? This emphasis on freedom and other fundamental values is, arguably, a component of a larger enterprise to imagine and safeguard Europe. The construction of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ) is part of the ambitions to consolidate a common policy on migration and asylum within the EU. The freedom to move regardless of national borders for citizens and businesses is made possible only if “we” work together to combat trans-national crime-activities. This is made evident in a number of official statements like the Millennium Declaration (scene X) and also in speeches made by statesmen across Europe (scene IX). The underlying assumption seems to be that Europeans want the EU to consolidate efforts to sustain security for its citizens. Talking to a less EU-enthusiastic British audience, Mr Clarke interprets the double rejection of the new constitutional treaty as an incentive to better implement EU decisions on these matters (scene IX). Again, the problem is not considered to be too much integration, rather too little.

FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER

In this chapter I will discuss articulations of a certain European identity in relation to the transformation of the EU into an area of ‘freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). The construction of Europe goes hand in hand with the perception of threats at its borders. In the words of Stephen Legomsky (quoted in Gowlland-Debbas 2001: 227): ‘Immigration laws are about as central to a nation’s mission as anything can be. They are central because they literally shape who we are as a people’ (cf. Hansen 2000: 19). In contrast to

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173 In the summer of 2004, earlier drafts of this chapter were presented and discussed at the ISPP Twenty-Seventh Annual Scientific Meeting in Lund, the 9th ISSEI conference in Pamplona and finally at the fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference in the Hague. Another version of the chapter will later appear in (eds. Petersson & Tyler 2007, forthcoming).
international conventions, immigration laws are normally restricted to the domain of the sovereign nation-state: current EU ambitions to harmonise asylum politics also at a supra-national level are for that reason particularly interesting. It is not only that the territory of distinct member-states of the EU needs protection, now also Europe is recognised as a separable entity that is to be safe-guarded in relation to an outside world perceived as threatening. In our context, then, the question of what makes Europe “Europe” cannot be separated from what it is depicted not to be, and how “we” (‘Europeans’) relate to others (‘Not-Europeans’) is intertwined with how we perceive ourselves.

Mr. Clarke (scene IX) asserts that Europeans want the EU to work even harder at finding appropriate measures to offer protection for EU-citizens that reside in the area. My analysis identifies a ‘language of security’ attached with processes of intra-European migration and extra-European immigration. Jef Huysmans (2000; 2001) has analysed how the notion of ‘migration’ increasingly has been linked to that of ‘security’ in the EU area. Huysmans (2001: 197) looks at how migration as a signifier has ‘a capacity to connect the internal security logic to questions of cultural and racial identity and to challenges to the welfare state…’ This is where this chapter has its point of departure; hence, I discuss how articulations of a certain European identity – as these are manifest in the process of transforming the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice – knit together the floating signifiers of ‘migration’ and ‘immigration’\textsuperscript{174} with the floating signifier of ‘security’ into a conceptual chain attached with the concept of Europe as a point of reference.

In various official EU-documents, the embrace of open borders is juxtaposed with the need to boost security within the union. On the one hand, the political project of the EU indicates that all Europeans benefit from further integration in terms of greater cultural interchange, economic growth and more opportunities to move around freely within the EU area, on the other hand, it also emphasises that “we” need to protect ourselves much better against trans-national crime-activities that transgress

\textsuperscript{174} Gowlland-Debbas (2001: 214) argues, though, that ‘asylum rather than immigration has constituted the important challenge to the pillars on which Europe has built its identity’.
state borders as was evident both in Madrid 2004, and in London 2005. An outside world perceived as threatening is linked to a presumed need of fostering collective identities on the inside. What “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) are afraid of works constitutively for a sense of commitment to a distinguishable inside; hence, an imagined community of Europe.

The transformation of the EU into ASFJ involves intra-state-agreements, supra-national initiatives and domestic politics that concern the relation between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Not-Europeans’; between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’; between legal and illegal immigrants. Empirically, the analysis starts when the European Council met in Tampere, Finland in October 1999 to set a blueprint for a common policy on immigration and asylum (e.g. Moraes 2003: 120).175 I then proceed with an analysis of the subsequent summits up to 2004 when the construction of a genuine area of freedom, security and justice was anticipated to be at least partly accomplished (Geddes 2003: 199-201).176

A GENUINE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

The Amsterdam Treaty laid the foundation for a common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) that made aspects of immigration, migration and asylum closer attached to existing EU decision-making procedures.177 The fusion of the two parallel ambitions to, on the one hand, facilitating free movement of people within the union, and on the other hand, to enforce border

175 Moraes (2003: 120) provides us with a good argument to begin with Tampere: ‘Tampere was important because it was the first time the Council had been explicit both in calling for the EU to work formally towards a binding common EU policy and in setting out a blueprint for a common policy which could be described as comprehensive’.

176 The Amsterdam Treaty brought the Schengen Accords into the European Union through the intra-governmental Pillar of Justice and Home affairs; it committed the European Council with developing the necessary means to deal with the management of external border controls. New frontiers were implemented around the supposedly frontier-free Europe (e.g. Geddes 2003; Uçarer 2003: 27). It was even anticipated an exclusive right of initiative for the EUC on these matters by 2004. Besides analysing “Presidency Conclusions”, I take into account other relevant EU-documents that concern the AFSJ. Not claiming to grasp the totality of this massive development, I believe that the variety of material has provided me with a fairly comprehensive view of the link between the floating signifiers of ‘security’ and ‘immigration/migration’ during this period of time.

177 See Geddes (2001) for a comprehensive overview of the development of the EU migration policy from 1993 to 1997.
management control, is made explicit in the presentation of the AFSJ on its homepage:

The Treaty of Amsterdam on the European Union (EU) which came into force on 1 May 1999 states that the EU: must be maintained and developed as an area of freedom, security and justice; (an area) in which the free movement of persons is assured; in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and prevention and combating of crime.

Apparently, the AFSJ is rooted in a shared commitment to common values in terms of freedom, security and justice for all. This project also covers those people living outside the AFSJ. It is proclaimed to contradict ‘European traditions to deny [them] such freedom’. In relation to this (ibid), a common policy on immigration and asylum has to incorporate principles that allows for a ‘consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes’. As a result, concerns for extra-European immigration are made part of the joint ambition to ensure free movement of persons inside the Union.

SECURITY AND CULTURE

A starting point for this part of the study is that efforts to protect the freedom of legal residents to move within the enlarged European Union has led to, what Jef Huysmans (2000) refers to as a ‘securitization of migration’. It has become standard to believe that, in the wake of globalisation, the withering away of borders presupposes increased flows of various forms of trans-national crime-activities. In their quest to respond to the challenges of “globalisation”, the European Council suggests various measures to manage migratory flows within, and from outside the current borders of the Union. To understand this way of thinking, we need to scrutinise what is being conceived of as being under threat and for what reasons. According to the terminology adopted by the Copenhagen School178, a ‘securitization move’ needs to address a

178 Many scholars in post cold-war Europe draw attention to the significance of the security dimension in foreign affairs to challenge the Westphalian model of state sovereignty and also to question a narrow conceptualisation of security restricted to the military sector. The Copenhagen school (featuring for instance Ole Waever and Barry Buzan) has been a prominent voice in this
certain ‘referent object’ that is perceived of as being existentially threatened. Ole Waever (1996: 106) writes:

Security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security discourse is characterized by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an existential threat: if we do not tackle this, everything else will be irrelevant … And by labelling this a security issue, the actor has claimed the right to deal with it by extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game.

In this tradition, security is understood as a speech act that concerns survival. Rather than dealing with “objective threats”, the process of securitization entails the construction of a shared understanding of what is to be considered a threat in the first place (e.g. Buzan et al. 1998: 26). In referring to immigration and migration as security issues, the EU may undertake ‘extraordinary means’ to deal with them. However, the referent object has to be recognised as existentially threatened, otherwise the securitization move fails to gain acceptance by the public. We are not likely to understand the increased demands to boost security within the EU accurately, if we do not pay attention to what object is being referred to, and how it is constructed within a distinct context.

Security is traditionally associated with the category of the (nation)-state. In this analysis, I focus on the concept of Europe as a referent object for acts of securitization. In order to be recognised as existentially threatened; “we” (as in “we”, the Europeans) need to know what makes Europe “Europe” in the first place. Already in the Treaty of Rome it was acknowledged that only European states could apply for membership in the European Union. In other words, the concept of Europe is to be (re)-invented before it can be decided whether a country can come into question for membership in the European Union. In his study of cultural politics in the re-thinking of security. They study security from a speech-act perspective and pay attention to how certain ‘securitization actors’ endeavour to ‘securitize’ certain issues through language in front of a ‘relevant audience’, which either can accept or reject the ‘securitization move’. See Wagnsson (2000: chapter 2) for a throughout and critical introduction to the main theoretical tenets of the Copenhagen School.

Wagnsson (2000: 18) suggests that it is important also to clarify which particular audience that may conceive of an issue as being securitized: ‘For example, it may turn out that an issue is securitised in the eyes of a nationalist party, but not in the eyes of the government’. Peo Hansen (2004: 56) recognises ambiguities in this process: ‘…if Moroccans, according to the EU, so clearly fail to pass for Europeans, why is it that Melilla and Ceuta on the North African coast form part of the European Union? Why, in other words, is the European flag flying in the very region that the EU itself has dismissed as non-European?’ We have already encountered the vagueness of the concept of Europe. Lars-Erik Cederman (2001a: 2) infers that...
EU, Cris Shore (2000: 58) argues that the current political integration of the EU member-states and peoples ‘reifies an outdated idea of cultures as fixed, unitary and bounded wholes…’. He (ibid: 27) also suggests that: ‘[this] process has a long way to go before European institutions become as ‘naturalised’ and as uncritically accepted as those of the nation-state’.

The referent object of Europe is by no means given beforehand, but is constantly shaped and reshaped in the process of consolidating a more coherent inside that is demarcated from an outside world perceived as threatening. Again, a furthering of the integration process into areas traditionally restricted to the realm of the nation-states (such as security and immigration) dovetails with the ambitions to commit Europeans to a certain European identity.

WE WOULD START WITH CULTURE

Jean Monnet is said to once have uttered that181: ‘if we were to do it all again we would start with culture’. According to Shore (2000: 42), the emphasis on culture as an integrative mechanism corresponds to a major shift within the EU. The idea of a ‘people’s Europe’ is linked to an ambition within the EU to move from technocracy to culture and thereby help solving the lack of interest among the European citizens for the ‘European project’ (Hansen 2000: 59-62). This project of making the European citizens aware of a certain common culture was articulated already in the 70s (Shore 2000: chapter 2; Hansen: essay 1) and the ambition to shore up a certain European identity182 has since then escalated and also been increasingly linked to actual policy-making procedures. The synchronisation of different policy areas was made obvious already in the realisation of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The ambition with this document was to advance the development of a

‘Given the absence of an explicit legal definition and the plethora of competing identities, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Europe is an essentially contested concept’.

181 Quoted in Shore (2000: 44). Shore is, though, sceptical about whether Monnet actually has coined the phrase or if it has been attributed to him posthumously.

182 See further chapter 3 of this book in which I introduced some basic components of this endeavour in relation to the rhetorical device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ that recognises cultural diversities and yet strives at consolidating these into one harmonised whole. It should further be acknowledged that the concept of ‘culture’ does not necessarily imply a common ethnic origin, but can as well be expressed in terms of a common ‘public’ or ‘civic’ culture (cf. the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ that was discussed in the third chapter of this thesis).
fully integrated internal market within the EU so as to facilitate the free movement of people, services, goods and capital. This form of ‘negative’ integration was also correlated to a ‘positive’ integration in the form of common policies on, for instance, immigration and asylum. The ‘spill-over’ effect was, however, by no means fated to occur. For instance, Andrew Geddes (2001: 24) claims that:

There was willingness to cede some sovereignty in the pursuit of economic integration and market making because it was seen as beneficial, but this does not mean that states would be so willing to cede responsibility for areas as sensitive as immigration and asylum.

According to Huysmans (2000: 758-62), common restrictions on intra-European migration flows and joint efforts to combat illegal immigration were considered necessary to accomplish a smooth realisation of the internal market. He (2001: 196) notices the production of a certain ‘internal security knowledge’ after the realisation of the Single European Act in 1987:

the issue was no longer, on the one hand terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.

Issues of migration and immigration have since then been increasingly internalised into the EU-political structure through for instance the Schengen Accords, the Dublin Convention and the introduction of a third pillar on Justice and Home affairs (Moraes 2003: 117, Sassen 1999: 153-4, Stalker 2002: 166; Huysmans 2001: 192-3). Avtar Brah (2003: 172-4) argues that the increased freedom brought about by the SEA was by no means the privilege of all groups of people: ‘Economic processes are simultaneously political and cultural’, she says. The SEA brought effects for the labour market and it accentuated the gap between citizens, denizens\textsuperscript{183} and migrants in terms of an uneven distribution of civic rights. Brah (ibid: 172) claims that citizenship rights in contemporary Europe are ‘underpinned by a racial division’. From her point of view, the making of ‘the new Europe’ institutionalises a wide array of measures to keep out immigrants from the third world. According

\textsuperscript{183} Denizens are defined by Brah (2003: 172): as ‘people with established residential and civic rights in one of the member states but with ‘Third Country’ nationality’.
to her, ‘the ‘new Europe’ is racially divided’. Peo Hansen (2004) asserts that structures of colonialism has continued to underpin the direction of the integration process, something which is made obvious also in the consolidation of a more rigid asylum politics at a supra-national level.

According to some members of the EUC, however, the transformation of the EU into AFSJ is considered to be a means to respond to globalisation (e.g. Fischler March 1, 2004; Verheugen July 11, 2002). The ‘new Europe’ is fundamentally about the disappearance of the old east-west divide and is, in general, conceived of as a successful border-transgressing venture. It should be noted, though, that the EU does not embrace what is depicted as the fact of globalisation without reservations. On the one hand, the enlargement rhetoric gives the impression that we are all linked to a common European destiny. Only together, we can take advantages of the great promises made by the disappearance of national borders. On the other hand, immigration is perceived as a threat to internal security and European cohesion. Furthermore, migration is to be managed and unwanted migrants are seen as potential exploiters of domestic welfare systems.

It is in this respect that we should understand the linkage between security and culture: the fostering of a sense of commitment among Europeans to a certain ‘European culture’ corresponds to a collective perception that “we” need to stay together and protect ourselves from threats from the outside. The construction of what we refer to as “Europe” cannot be isolated from the borders that demarcate its extension.

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184 Geddes (2003: 196) interprets this harsh domestic reaction to (un)-wanted immigration and migration as a ‘reassertion of territority’. The restriction of movement constitutes, according to Cederman (2001a: 3), a possible trade-off between exclusion and identity-formation.
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTITUTIVE THREATS

On July 15, 2002, Romano Prodi presents his ideas on security and fears at “Fondazione Caripoli” in Milan:

... we must ensure the security and peaceful coexistence of all those who live in Europe in full observance of the principle of freedom. Recently the issue of security has been increasingly linked to immigration. I am not convinced that the two should be linked, but it would be dangerous to ignore people's real fears. No country can hope to tackle these issues effectively on its own: We must coordinate border controls at EU level; We need a common approach to asylum and control of migratory flows; We must concentrate on the external dimension of these policies.

Prodi here observes that there is a linkage between immigration as a phenomenon and the issue of security. Even though he is sceptical about the actuality of such a connection, he nevertheless feels obliged to suggest measures to coordinate more effective border control towards migration flows. He bases his reasoning on that 'people’s real fears' have to be acknowledged. It is the people of Europe who, according to Prodi, ask for supra national cooperation on asylum and immigration. Hence, an assumed fear amongst the people of Europe provide a source of legitimacy for promoting measures to challenge, not the fear as such, but what it is assumed to be based upon (see also scene X).  

We recognise this kind of rhetoric from the EU-response to the referendum in France and Ireland (see the previous chapter). The alienation that certain Europeans feel towards the EU-institutions needs to be dealt with. Again, the solution seems to be to enhance the integration process even more, now also 'spilling over' to the realm of asylum politics. According to Prodi (ibid): 'No country can hope to tackle these issues effectively on its own' (cf. scene IX). A shared commitment to consolidated EU-policies on immigration is considered necessary to tackle challenges and threats.

185 The link between immigration as an abstract phenomenon and pending problems is consistently repeated amongst those who oppose any attempts to underpin integration and multiculturalism (cf. Van Dijk 1993: 223-4). It is, though, somewhat peculiar that Prodi – an advocate for a multi-cultural Europe that challenges destructive ‘us-/them’ polarizations – makes the same connection. In doing so, Prodi risks – in all probability, against his own intent - reinforcing a division between residents and strangers that, according to van Dijk (ibid), may be subsequently exploited by Extreme Right Parties to justify measures to protect 'the people' from “uncontrollable levels of immigration” (see further chapter 7 of this thesis).
to intra-European cohesion. Later in his speech, Prodi declares his ambitions to shore up the democratic credibility of the EU project through the introduction of an EU citizenship that comprises rights and obligations equal for all legal residents and migrants within the EU territory. This way of reasoning dovetails with current ambitions to involve “the people” better in the European project through the establishment of common rules and an increasing awareness of being part of the same project; of sharing a commitment to a certain European identity (e.g. CEC 2001a). In his study on U.S foreign policy, David Campbell (1998: 36) makes the link between citizenship, identity and security explicit: “The passage from difference to identity as marked by the rites of citizenship is concerned with the elimination of that which is alien, foreign and perceived as a threat to a secure state’. Campbell (ibid: 48-9) means that any state in the so-called post-Westphalian system continues to produce truths about who “we are”, as well as what “we have to fear”.

Fundamental for the purpose of this study is that ‘danger is not an objective condition’ (Campbell 1998: 1). Rather, it has to be invented and chosen from a plethora of potential fears that may jeopardise the well-being of any community. At the same time, some kind of perception of threats and fears from the outside is what makes an inside possible in the first place. The logic of the ‘constitutive outside’ (see chapter 2) entails that there are no homogenous societies: there cannot be a “we” without the presence of a “them” that, somehow, displays what is not part of “us”. What is depicted as posing a threat (imagined or not) works constitutively for the formation of a European identity. In the words of Jef Huysmans (2001: 203): ‘Turning migrants into an existential threat is then a particular political strategy seeking social integration and political legitimacy by reifying an inimical force that endangers the survival of the political community’. I now turn to discuss the link between security and identity in the context of European Council meetings between 1999 and 2004.
FROM TAMPERE TO LAEKEN

When the Finnish EU Presidency presents the programme for its period in office (fall 1999), it is evident that security is a key concept:

The Kosovo crisis has posed a threat to the security of the whole Europe and a challenge to the defence of fundamental European values /…/ The crisis in Western Balkans have greatly strengthened solidarity between the peoples of Europe and awareness of their common responsibility. Citizens expect the Union to show a new effectiveness in crises prevention and management, a task for which the Treaty of Amsterdam provides new potential and instruments.

Apparently, it is not only that Europeans may risk their lives in military interventions outside Europe, also ‘fundamental European values’ are at stake when these crises occur. Moreover, the Presidency assumes that ‘citizens expect’ the union to further the endeavours to develop an integrated common foreign and security policy (CFSP). David Campbell (1998: 50) seems to be correct in his observation that: ‘The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers’. According to Campbell the state project of security replicates the church project of salvation. If the outside world is depicted as dangerous in the context of the political project of the EU, then, a ‘strengthened solidarity between the peoples of Europe’ may arise. In turn, securitization acts may be enforced. When referring to the disappearance of internal borders, the Finnish Presidency suggests that:

The internal market and Treaty of Amsterdam have created a European Union without internal borders /…/ Freedom of movement poses a challenge for external frontier policy, action to combat crime and coordination of legal systems.

The ambition was to sustain a comprehensive approach for better external border control. For serving this purpose, the EU had to harmonise the legislative procedures between the member-states. I now turn to examine how this was done and argued for.

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186 For a comprehensive overview and analysis of the evolvement of CFSP from 1970 and on, (see Maria Strömvik 2005).
THE TAMPERE MILESTONES

In Tampere 1999, the delegates shared a commitment to ‘freedom, based on human rights, democratic institutions and rule of law’ (Tampere European Council 1999: §1). They also emphasised the ‘absolute respect of the right to seek asylum’ (ibid: § 13) following the Geneva Convention that assures that nobody is to be sent back to persecution.

Particular measures to enable better co-operation with third countries in order to ‘manage migration flows’ (ibid: § 22-27) were decided on and the European Council called for closer police co-operation between the member-states so as to set up a ‘Unionwide fight against crime’ (ibid: § 40-58). The delegates also inferred that a more ‘vigorous integration policy’ was needed to tackle pressures on the domestic scenes (ibid. § 18). We here encounter how issues pertaining to migration and immigration are dealt with on a combined trans-national and supra-national level of governance.

In Helsinki, two months later, the delegates confirmed the CFSP as an integral part of the management of intra-European migration flows (Helsinki European Council 1999a: § 27). The summit in Helsinki (Helsinki European Council 1999c) also emphasised the co-operation between the EU and so-called border areas, such as Ukraine. These efforts comprised a series of proposals directed at decreasing the number of illegal immigrants (ibid: § 34).

Johannes van der Klauuw (2003: 41) means that the aspirations agreed upon at the Tampere Summit not only led to the field of external action being internalised in the EU decision-making structure. He also asserts that common policies on these issues may ‘contribute to the strengthening of the values, liberties, and control mechanisms within the Union’:

The key parameter justifying EU external action in this field [Justice and Home Affairs] must be its relevance in terms of developing the “Area of Freedom,

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187 § 22-27. This section juxtaposes concerns for intra-european migration and enforced measures to deal with extra [illegal] immigration.
188 § 40-58. This section includes a variety of crime-activities, ranging from money laundering, trafficking in drugs to terrorism.
189 § 27. The Summit decided that the EU should be capable of conducting military operations as to respond to international crises, which ‘does not imply the creation of a European army’.
Security and Justice internal to the EU, that is, where the EU has common policies to defend and where such action can contribute to the strengthening of the values, liberties, and control mechanisms within the Union.

Securitization acts may occur when ‘security’ is considered more important than other issues and therefore should take absolute priority (Buzan et al 1998: 24). In the case of AFSJ, acts of securitization are considered necessary for two immediate reasons. Firstly, they aspire to ensure people’s freedom towards a threatening outside. Secondly, they enable the people to realise that they belong to a distinct imagined community with certain values and liberties. In this perspective, more people may realise themselves as “Real Europeans” if they believe that the EU can offer them security and protection (cf. scene IX).

During the Portuguese presidency, spring 2000, the focus shifted to comprise ‘employment, economic reform and social cohesion’ (Santa Maria da Feira European Council 2000). At the Lisbon Summit in March 2000, the delegates affirmed that (§ 1):

The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy … The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society.

The Union has to properly adjust to changed living conditions ‘in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society’. In December 2000, European leaders met in Nice to decide on a number of issues, including the signing of a new treaty to promote constitutional reforms necessary for allowing some ten new member-states in the Union by the 1st of May 2004. The European Council ‘reaffirms the historic significance of the European Union enlargement process and the political priority which it attaches to the success of that process’ (Nice European

190 In the terminology of the Copenhagen school, an act of securitization should be understood as a ‘securitizing move’, and as such it must gain the acceptance of the audience in order to succeed in securitizing an issue. In this analysis, I do not extend the analysis to scrutinise whether the audience (‘the Europeans’) recognise the referent object (‘Europe’) as existentially threatened or not, though.

191 In many official EU documents and speeches, before and after the meeting in Nice, the eastern enlargement was referred to as a historic necessity that reunites a continent allegedly hampered by 50 years of communist oppression (e.g. Prodi June 22, 2001; Fontaine June 26, 2001; Gothenburg European Council 2001: § 4). (See further the previous chapter).
Council 2000a: § 6). Now it was up to the Europeans to realise their common European heritage (Nice European Council 2000b):

Convinced that the construction of a genuine European area of knowledge is a priority for the European Community and that it is through education that Europeans will acquire the shared cultural references that are the basis of European citizenship and of a political Europe [...] Convinced that it is therefore essential to target intelligible action, shared by all of the Member States [...] that it is by building the Europe of intelligence that we will bring about a true feeling of being part of Europe.

Indeed, the shoring up of a ‘genuine European area of knowledge’ is not irrelevant to the development of an area of freedom, security and justice. Whereas the former emphasises that a sense of Europeaness can be taught, the latter protects this ‘Europe of intelligence’ by linking freedom to security. Freedom cannot be for everyone.

THE MISSING LINK

Before the meeting in Laeken, the European Commission proposed a common policy on illegal immigration as the henceforth ‘missing link’ of a Common Policy on immigration and asylum (CEC 2001b). In this document, a certain action plan was made to ensure that all parts involved in the ASFJ (the member-states, border land areas, and third countries) were adjusted and adhered to common rules.

This plan included the development of a European Visa Identification system, enhanced information exchange through the creation of a European Migration Observatory, ‘awareness raising campaigns in third countries’; the development of a special police unit labelled ‘European Border Guard’, the imposing of sanctions towards carriers that bring with them ‘irregular migrants’ and common readmissions policies. Indeed, the Commission proposes a comprehensive strategy to fight those engaged in human trafficking and illegal immigration. An immense control system is built up, from random passport-controls inside the EU area to airports located far away from the EU territory. In the conclusions (ibid: 25), though, the Commission underlines that all these measures are ‘in line with Europe’s tradition of hospitality and solidarity’.
It is also crucial in building up the necessary confidence and support of public opinions for a much needed common asylum regime based on the highest humanitarian standards, as well as a genuine immigration policy, in line with Europe’s tradition of hospitality and solidarity, taking into account the new dimensions of the migration phenomenon world-wide and ensuring a proper integration in our societies of legal migrants.

This figure of speech is, according to the discourse analyst Teun Van Dijk (1993), commonly used in elite-discourses on “anti-racism”; hence, it connotes ambitions to promote a positive self-image of what makes Europe “Europe”. In the cosmopolitan vision of the reunified European family of nations and peoples (see further chapter 3), the ideal of ‘hospitality’ entails being welcoming to strangers. To act hospitably is, however, also a way to separate the ‘hosts’ (Europeans) from the newcomers (Hellström 2005b) and put into practice, the ideals of ‘hospitality’ and ‘solidarity’ are correlated with a demarcation line between legal and illegal immigrants. Vera Gowlland Debbas (2001: 219) refers to the EU policy on illegal immigration as an ‘adoption of policies of exclusion /…/ [that] has meant presenting the debate as one between real refugees and fake ones’. Saskia Sassen (1999: 143) asserts that: ‘illegal immigration has emerged as a generalized fact in all Western economies in the post-World War II era’. However, she estimates that the number of illegal residents is heavily exaggerated. Moreover, she assumes that most of the actual so-called illegal immigrants have no aspiration to become permanent residents, but working a few months in the country of destination to supply household income in their countries of origin. Identity politics is about the power of categorisation; of imposing labels that separate groups of people from each other. In this case, articulations of a certain European identity in the field of immigration sustain acts of

192 Intuitively, a person in need of immediate protection from regime advocates in his state of origin, it seems understandable if she/he fails to collect the documents necessary for being acknowledged the status of a “legal immigrant” when escaping to another country. According to some commentators, the emphasis on “illegal immigrants/migrants” is highly problematic. Mitsilegas (2002: 679) argues that the “problem” as such is very loosely defined and have provoked a number of difficulties for the new member-states of the EU: “The demanding task of achieving respect and understanding of human rights with a repressive approach to the movement of people from ‘unwanted’ countries becomes even more complicated in Central and Eastern Europe bearing in mind that these ‘unwanted’ countries are linked with the candidate countries by well-established economic, social and political ties”. According to Jef Huysmans (2001), most ‘illegal immigrants’ gain their illegality status after that their visas have expired; hence, the number of illegal immigrants that try to pass the external border controls tend to be overestimated.
differentiation between legal and illegal immigrants and thereby set the limits for who is welcome in the EU territory, and who is not.

Shortly after 9/11 and the ensuing “war on terrorism”, the ‘European Council on refugees and exiles’ (ECRE 2001: 22) evaluated the ‘Progress towards a European Asylum Policy Tampere’:

Little progress has been made since Tampere towards addressing root causes and adopting a holistic approach to countries of origin. EU asylum and immigration policies have great export value, particularly those that restrict access to protection.

Consequently, the solidarity and hospitality referred to in the Communication from the European Commission do not neatly correspond with what the legislative arrangements on immigration-related issues have implied in practice. The ECRE mentions the poor co-ordination in the legislative process between the national level and the harmonisation of asylum polices at the EU level. As it seems, member-states have rushed into major changes in their legislations on asylum without waiting for European arrangements. According to their report, the member-states are afraid of being conceived of as “more attractive” than their neighbours (ibid: 24-5). The ECRE appeals for greater consolidation and consistency before the Summit in Laeken in order to live up to the promise of protection for asylum seekers.

Up to date, the member-states of the EU are key security referents in Europe. Even if Europe as a whole may ‘fail to trigger the levels of mass identity necessary for securitization’ (Buzan et al 1999: 37)193, many nation-states of Europe recognise themselves as existentially threatened in the process towards a more integrated Europe. In other words, the outside world constitutes a common threat to both the preservation of national cohesion and to the intra-European integration process as a whole. It could be argued that the member-states of the EU have triggered each other to further the efforts to boost security within the territorial limits of Europe: the coming to the fore of some supra-national policies on asylum and immigration is clearly driven by intra-governmental agreements between the member-states. We encounter again how

193 See (Buzan et al 1998: 36-7) who argue that large-scale security referents are often too ‘subtle and indirect’ for securitization. They argue that ‘the middle-scale of limited collectives has proved the most amenable to securitization as durable referent objects’.
the logic of the nation-state reappears in the name of Europe. However, the intra-European integration process gains further speed through a conceptualisation of the outer world (‘Not-Europe’) as increasingly threatening, indicating that “we” have to cooperate, among the member-states, to handle these challenges.

FROM LAEKEN TO BRUSSELS

In December 2001, the Belgian presidency organised a meeting in Laeken. During the Summit, the delegates agreed to speed up the implementation of the Tampere Mile Stones and the AFSJ as outlined in the Amsterdam Treaty: ‘progress has been slower and less substantial than expected’ (Laeken European Council 2001: § 37).194 Migratory flows were to be controlled much more coherently than before and in a new action plan on illegal immigration, the Council decided to advance the implementation on common standards for visa policies, reception and family reunification (ibid: § 40).

The EUC answers this request by the Laeken European council to promote: ‘Better management of the Union’s external border controls’ (CEC 2002a: § 42. They interpret the decision as follows (ibid: §1. 1):

This conclusion of the European Council reminds us that coherent, effective common management of the external borders of the Member States of the Union will boost security and the citizen’s sense of belonging to a shared area and destiny. It also serves to secure continuity in the action undertaken to combat terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.

The construction of Europe goes hand in hand with the ambitions to ‘boost security’ within the EU. The link between security and identity is unmistakeable in this excerpt: it is even anticipated that the ‘citizen’s sense of belonging to a shared area and destiny’ will be boosted as a consequence of management of the external borders. Europe is conceived to be under threat, therefore the EUC urges

194 According to Brinkmann (2004: 197): ‘[T]he proposals of the Commission in line with the Tampere ‘Milestones’ have been watered down in the negotiations. Harmonisation of immigration, allowed by the Treaty in case of migration, has not been achieved’. Nevertheless, he infers that ‘A common immigration and asylum policy /…/ has been realised at an astonishing speed’.
the EU to safeguard the interest of the European people. In the same document (ibid: § 1. 4), the citizens of Europe are referred to:

The security of the external borders of the European Union is an essential subject for European citizens [...] Furthermore, in the context of expansion, citizens recall the necessity to maintain, and even improve, the level of internal security of an enlarged European Union /.../ The new challenges to internal security force a European Union in the process of expansion to regard external borders as a priority question.

The increased concern for ‘internal security’ is, thus, considered pivotal for the citizens of the enlarged European Union. The management of external border is depicted as a ‘priority question’ and the people’s sense of belonging is intrinsically linked with the levels of internal security. Again, it is assumed that the citizens demand of the EU to sustain more effective external border control. During the following Spanish Presidency in the European Council (spring 2002), various prominent politicians discussed perceived security threats and also suggested measures to deal with these. At a press conference before the summit in Seville, Romano Prodi (June 18, 2002) emphasises the need to deal with the ‘flow [my emphasis] of illegal immigrants’ 195. The then prime minister of Spain, José Maria Aznar and the British prime minister, Tony Blair, suggested to reduce financial aid to those countries that refuse to obey EU demands in the combat against “illegal immigration” (Yarnoz, in El País, June 22, 2002). In other words, Aznar and Blair proposed to impose economic sanctions on countries that – according to them – do not live up to the EU plans on illegal immigration. Due to major criticism from other nation-state representatives in the European Council, they were forced to withdraw the proposal. In the final document from Seville, however, restrictions towards third countries remain (Seville European Council 2002: § 36):

The Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration flows. In that event the Council may, in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaties, adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Police and other European Union policies, while honouring the Union’s contractual commitments and not jeopardising development cooperation objectives.

195 According to for instance Riesigl & Wodak 2001: 76) this is a metaphor commonly used to portray a phenomenon (e.g. immigration) as an overwhelming threat.
The Seville summit accentuated the ambitions to incorporate also third countries in the controlling of external borders. Whereas some key figures (e.g. Aznar and Blair) represent a more coercive strategy, others entrust third countries with showing mutual responsibility. The latter approach can be found in the Communication on migration issued by the EUC shortly after the Summit in Seville (CEC 2002b). In this document, the Commission encourages a ‘clear policy line’ (ibid: 4) for all parts involved in the implementation of a common policy on immigration and asylum. Third countries should, however, never be punished for their lack of cooperation:

The dialogue and actions with third countries in the field of migration must be part of a comprehensive approach at EU level, which must be fundamentally incitative by encouraging those countries that accept new disciplines, but not penalising those who are not willing or not capable to do so.

Of course, the EU is not a homogenous political body. There are divergent opinions on how to implement a common migration policy, both between and within the EU institutions. The above cited document focuses, for instance, less on a common cultural heritage than dealing with ‘the root causes of migration’ (ibid). While differing in perspective, there seems to be a greater convergence when it comes to conceptualise globalisation as an indisputable fact, which in turn allegedly brings about increased migration flows. In the above cited Communication from the European Commission (ibid: 15), it is said that:

Globalisation invites migration /…/ In those cases where comprehensive immigration policies are not yet in place – which is also for the EU – workers will find their own (illegal) way to enter the globalised labour market. Hence it is necessary to – as agreed on the European Council in Tampere – to develop a harmonised admission policy with a view to regulating the legal access of migrant workers into the EU.

A ‘harmonised admission policy’ is depicted as fundamental for controlling the flux of migrant workers on a globalised labour market. These issues have been discussed intensively in relation to

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196 In the foreword of the document it is said that migration ‘can be a positive factor for growth and success of both the Union and the countries concerned’ (ibid: 4), and it also acknowledges the importance of not only perceiving migration as a problem, but also as an ‘essentially positive phenomenon’ (ibid: 7). In this chapter, I have predominantly focused on the link between ‘migration’ and ‘security’, but it stands clear that the migration policy of the EU conveys many other aspects not dealt with here (e.g. economy).
the fulfilment of the eastern enlargement. Denmark hosted the succeeding summit in Copenhague in December 2002. Much attention was devoted to the process towards enlargement and progresses being made so far (Copenhagen European Council 2002: §3):

[This achievement] testifies to the common determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and prosperity on our continent. As fully fledged members of a Union based on solidarity, these States will play a full role in shaping the further development of the European project.

The message is that the ‘European project’ will continue to ensure peace on the European continent guided by principles of solidarity mutually agreed upon by all European member-states and peoples. However, there are also fears associated with this development, therefore (ibid: §5): ‘Safeguard clauses provide for measures to deal with unforeseen developments that may arise during the first three years after accession’. Indicative of this is that the “old” member-states have implemented a seven-year long moratorium for the “new” members-states, meaning that the free movement is restricted to the EU-15 during a certain period of time (Geddes 2003: 204). Indeed, European welfare regimes are acting as if labour migrants pose an imminent threat to their capacity to distribute scarce resources evenly, which also cling on perceived threats to borders of identity in Western European societies (see further Pijpers 2006).

The construction of threats is pivotal for the justification of an enhanced pre-occupation with ‘security’. This is made manifest during the European Council meeting in Brussels (Brussels European Council 2003: §85), when the Italian Government concludes its period in office in December 2003:

The European security strategy reaffirms our common determination to face our responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world. It will enable the European Union to deal better with the threats and global challenges and realise the opportunities facing us. An active, capable and more coherent European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world

This emphasis on security is not only directed at the management of fears, but is also about framing opportunities awaiting us at the horizon if “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) succeed on “our”
common European project to create ‘an active, capable and more coherent European Union’. Even if various political actors talking from different positions may express divergent opinions on the content, it is not a matter of if the EU is about to institutionalise a common immigration. Everything equal, integration is seen as something intrinsically good and fragmentation is depicted as highly undesirable.

**WE HAVE TO STAY TOGETHER**

I have in this chapter elaborated on how a language of security has sustained elite-articulations of a certain European identity. The emphasis on security has anticipated an increased popular commitment to a certain European community. It has been argued that feelings of ‘ontological insecurity’ (Kinnvall 2004; cf. Giddens 1991) may trigger people to increasingly identify themselves with ethno-national and/or religious movements. This study suggests that the same kind of mechanism is present in the case of the EU: a collective perception of the outside world as ultimately dangerous may in turn justify acts of securitization also at a supra-national level. Because of globalisation, “we” have to stay together. In this sense, processes that are said to be associated with globalisation (e.g. increased migration flows and trans-national communication) have worked constitutively for the endeavours to further the integration process.

Doreen Massey (1999: 20) presents the argument that globalisation ‘provide[s] a legitimation of things’. She refers to dominant conceptualisations of globalisation as a repeated ‘mantra’ of a ‘free unbounded space’ and infinite possibilities (ibid: 15-21). She exemplifies with the curious acceptance of the stories told by ‘financial experts’ that everybody, sooner or later, will become like “us” (see also Hirst & Thompson 1998; Cameron & Palan 2003: 166; cf. Dannestam 2005). According to Massey, this story is congruent with the modernist story of infinite progress. As was the case with modernity, though, also stories about globalisation display divergent patterns (ibid: 19):

the very term ‘free’ immediately implies something good, something to be aimed-at. Yet, come a debate on immigration /…/ It is a vision of the world which is equally
powerful, equally – apparently – incontrovertible. 

This second imagination is the imagination of defensible places, of the rights of ‘local people’ to their own ‘local places’, of a world divided by difference and the smack of firm boundaries, a geographical imagination of nationalism. ‘So here we have two apparently self-evident truths, two completely different geographical imaginations, which are called upon in turn. No matter that they contradict each other, because it works.

If the first imagination of progress refers to a language of hopes associated with processes of globalisation, the second imagination connotes a language of fears and a reassertion of territoriality. Both of these imaginations somehow indicate that “we” must work together in order to tackle a world in upheaval. If modernity was a concept that worked instrumentally to invoke a feeling that “we” need to stick together in distinct ‘nation-states’, recent conceptualisations of ‘globalisation’ hint at a perceived need for “us” (as in “we”, the nation-states of Europe) to work together across state-borders to respond to an increasingly globalised world.

Bringing these pieces together, it is evident that mechanisms of globalisation are taken to imply both fears and hopes. As regards the political project of the EU, these conceptualisations of globalisation are expressed in different settings serving differing political purposes. For instance, when referring to the eastern enlargement as a peace project it is above all an imagination of hopes and expectations that is articulated (see further the previous chapter). When the EU, on the other hand, asks for increased efforts to combat illegal immigration as well as measures to limit migratory flows within the union, it is fundamentally a language of fears that is being used. In relation to the intra-European integration process, both of these imaginations may be used to justify increased efforts to boost the process further. Because of globalisation, “we” have to stay together.197

Peter Marcuse (see Mukhtar-Landgren 2006: 83) argues that the ideology of ‘globalism’ is the ‘lens’ (or discourse) that underlies new policies in many governments.198 In this respect, the political

197 Scholte (2000) suggests a ‘non-territorialist cartography of social life’ that acknowledges both processes of de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation as emanating from the time-space compression provoked by mechanisms of globalisation. In the language of this dissertation, collective perceptions of the outside world as increasingly globalised may legitimate both measures to limit the role of the single nation-state in relation to the EU, although it might simultaneously encourage nations to enforce the management of external border controls around the individual nation-state.

198 Both Jan Aart Scholte (2000) and Doreen Massey (1999) criticise current – in their view – ‘neo-liberal’ conceptualisations of globalisation as essentially (non)-ideological stipulations. This
project of the EU is no exception. In the transformation of the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice, globalisation has worked as a floating signifier\textsuperscript{199} that ties together seemingly remote policy fields such as the combating of terrorism, police cooperation, intra-cultural communication, migration management and asylum politics. I believe that we cannot properly engage with the intra-European integration process without taking into account how distinct conceptualisations of globalisation - as manifest in a language of hopes and a language of fears - have triggered the integration process forward.

NEITHER GOD NOR GLOBALISATION

This chapter has addressed issues pertaining to processes of securitization in the making of a genuine area of freedom, security and justice within the European Union. In the construction of the ASFJ, the idea of Europe is recognised as existentially threatened. The securitization of migration-related issues are depicted as fundamental for the preservation of freedom and justice for European citizens in this area. Furthermore, it enables the people of Europe to realise their common cultural heritage and it encourages them to realise themselves as “Real Europeans” sharing a distinct spatial locality labelled Europe. The construction of Europe goes hand in hand with a pre-occupation of threats at its borders.

This all suggests a demarcation line between a clearly defined inside [Europe] and a likewise distinguishable outside [Not-Europe]. There is, however, reason not to jump to conclusions. The borders of the EU have been described as ‘fuzzy’ (Christiansen et al 2000) and it is not clear what threatens Europe in more precise

\textsuperscript{199} The important question, in this regard, is not whether globalisation actually takes place, to what extent it is happening, and for what reasons; rather I emphasise how globalisation is perceived and reproduced in practice (See further Hellström 2005b). Possibly, we could refer to the concept of globalisation as a ‘master signifier’, defined by Slavoj Žižek (2001: 108-11, see also Neumann 1999: 220-2) as ‘a name [that] refers to an object because this object is called that’. In this perspective, globalisation becomes a ‘tautological fact’ that constitutes itself through processes of naming objects after itself. However, I resist the temptation of making yet another analytical distinction (i.e. between floating and master signifiers).
terms. After the cold war the border between the east and the west has at least been modified. Ole Waever (1996) addresses an ‘unfortunate habit’ among scholars to instinctively look around to find ‘Europe’s other’ outside its territorial borders. These endeavours are chiefly in vain, he thinks, since there are no single enemies out there that fit neatly into the category of Europe’s Other. According to Waever it is Europe’s own past that constitutes a threat to its existence, if anything (Waever 1996: 122; cf. Sjursen 2002):

If some Other is at play, it can be distinguished in time, rather than space: not Russia, but Europe’s past must be negated. This is reflected in the rhetoric that Europe has to be integrated, otherwise we will fall back into the power balancing and rivalry of former Europe.

To some extent I concur with this reasoning, there are perhaps no evident enemies threatening Europe from the outside. It is not obvious that the demarcation line should be interpreted between Europe and non-Europe primarily in spatial terms or even between inside and outside. In its place, however, certain threat images (e.g. terrorism, internationalised military conflicts; illegal immigration) nurture a representation of Europe as extensively vulnerable. Waever further infers that it is not any notion of a ‘European state’ that has to be defended, but rather a certain ‘European idea’. This may, in turn, legitimize security actions, since: ‘…integration gains urgency, because its alternative is “fragmentation”, a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy ‘Europe’ as a project’. As it seems, the “enemy” (who or whatever that is) is with us even today and thus not limited to narratives of a deplorable past that “we” (as in “We”, ‘the Europeans’ who live in Europe today) do not want to repeat.

See also Neumann (1999), Lundgren (1998) and Rumford (2004) for a throughout discussion on these matters, in relation to for instance Turkey and Russia.

Cf. Campbell (1998: 61) who rethinks foreign policy in a way that: ‘shifts from a concern of relations between states that take across ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the “state” and “the international system”’. See also Steve Smith (2004) for a discussion on the role of IR in this respect.

Recent terrorist attacks in larger European cities indicate that these images are already inside (cf. scene IX; see also Sassen 2005).

There are, however, several indications of how the EU creates its past in order to make it fit the agenda of the present; history is not just ‘out there’ waiting for us to unveil its inner truth (cf. Petersson & Hellström 2003). In other words, it may be a certain narrative of the past that ‘constitutes a threat to its [Europe’s] existence, not history as such.
WELCOME IN EUROPE

The transformation of the EU into AFSJ is everything but an all-inclusive project. However, the EU borders appear as less fuzzy for people from non-OECD countries (e.g. Huysmans 2001: 198). There is a practical difference between those who need a visa to enter a member-state of the EU, and those who do not. In controlling the in- and outflux of people to the EU area, the EU stands as the ‘last bastion of the nation-state’ (Huysmans 2001: 194). Vera Gowland-Debbas (2001: 222) asserts that:

...by the development of what has been termed a two-tier human rights system – that is, one that grants citizens the most sophisticated protection from human rights abuse yet excludes from full human rights protection unwanted aliens, branded as “illegal” or those in an “irregular” situation – Europe faces the risk of undermining this very identity.

According to Gowland-Debbas, current developments in EU member-states undermine the very idea of human rights, since it ceases to be universally applicable (cf. scene IX). Freedom cannot be for everyone. The articulation of a certain European identity crystallises, in the case of the AFSJ, in a constitutive split between people who enjoy more opportunities (and protection) to move freely around Europe and those who are increasingly isolated at their localities (see further Bauman 1998: 18). This split responds to the question of which groups of people we are ready to include in the ‘European family of nations and peoples’.

The production of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” entails the imposing of labels that separates “us” from “them”. This is evident in the distinction of legal and illegal immigrants. Those people who are positioned in the former category may claim legitimate rights for asylum and thus be allowed entrance in the EU area, whereas illegal immigrants are

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204 Vera Gowlland-Debbas (2001: 220) illustrates how this distinction manifests itself in artificially created air-ports areas, creating a ‘no-man’s land’. I remember myself taking the boat from northern Morocco to the southern Spanish coastline in the late 90’s (diary notes). My impression was of a divided ship, passengers with passports from any EU country travelled safely at front deck whereas the rest were sent down to overcrowded areas. There was, however, one thing that united the ship: frequently during the pass-over, the loudspeakers played the song: ‘We are the world’ very loud and clear.

205 Following the Dublin Convention from 1997, the asylum seeker has to hit the right asylum state, because if rejected in one state there is no second chance in another member state (Huysmans 2001: 193). Gowlland Debbas (2001: 220) likens this procedure with playing ‘playing Russian roulette’.
posed as a collective threat to intra-European cohesion. And within the enlarged EU area, migration is increasingly being controlled and not all migrants are equally wanted even if they can produce the right documents. Typically, people from the Eastern “new” member-states are depicted as a threat to the welfare regimes of the Western “old” member states (See further Pijpers 2006).

These kinds of polarisations clearly extend the tangible, yet fuzzy spatial borders of Europe. In this context, they also challenge Waever’s notion of that it is Europe’s own past that constitutes its other (if anything). Illegal immigrants, illegitimate asylum seekers and “unwanted” migrants are all known categories from a world system based on the territorial logic of distinguishable nation-states. However, my analysis suggests that these are now also applied to the broader category of Europe; hence, groups of people are separated from common European residents, and in various degrees excluded from the system of rights privileged to EU citizens (see further Gubbay 1999: 49). It is neither God nor globalisation that draws the lines or establishes the categories. It is a matter of politics: any political articulation revolves around a set of definitions of certain key concepts that are arranged in relation to one another. The political construct of the “illegal immigrant” (as a kind of ‘internal other’) is distinguished from the category of the “legal immigrant” and so forth.

The production of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe” is established through exclusionary practices that somehow “show” what Europe is not. Articulations of a certain Europeans identity do not only convey what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe (see further the previous chapter), but is also about who is welcome in Europe and who is not. As

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206 The EU has during a relatively short period of time promoted measures to harmonise the asylum policies between the different member-states. If refused in one state, the asylum seeker is automatically rejected asylum in the whole EU area. In co-operation with so-called third countries, so-called illegitimate asylum seekers may be sorted out long before they even enter the European continent. In November 2004, a new European Commission was to begin its period in office. It did not. Roccio Buttiglioni was nominated to be Commissioner with special responsibility for freedom, security and justice. Apart from expressing conservative, not to say, old fashioned opinions on moral issues, he suggested that asylum seekers should be gathered on the North African coast, facilitating the deportation of illegal ones. After major criticism from the European Parliament, Buttiglioni was excluded from the final EUC constellation. It seems clear that there is no consensus among Europeans leaders concerning the means on how to tackle illegal immigration.
argued before, the question of what “we are” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) cannot be separated from what is not considered part of us (as in “them”, ‘the not-Europeans’). In the contingent imagining and safeguarding of Europe, the categories of ‘the Europeans’ and also ‘the not-Europeans’ are given a tangible form and separated from one another.

In this analysis, we have seen how various politicians in Europe have claimed to talk in the name of the people: Europeans demand of “us” (as in “we”, ‘the elite’) to undertake actions to safeguard the security of the European people. This chapter has indicated how a collective perception of the outside world as threatening has triggered efforts to boost security at national, trans-national and supra-national levels of policy-making. Current undertakings within the EU legislative framework to boost security in order to protect the freedom to move for people legally residing at the EU territory would not have occurred without the active consent of its member-states. If there is a ‘fortress Europe’\(^{207}\), it sure is multilayered. And it is not necessarily the case that the Europeans believe that it is Europe that needs protection, but rather above all the more limited category of the nation-state.

The ambition to better control perceived higher levels of migration flows and trans-national crime-activities is, however, also linked to ‘Europe’s tradition of hospitality and solidarity’. Correspondingly, the archetypical “Good European” acts as a “Good Host” who welcomes “Good Immigrants” to the European territory. The ambition of controlling migration, in this respect, should not be conflated with the politics of the populists who are said to be exploiting people’s fear of the unknown in order to justify their nationalistic (“anti-European”) agendas. In the next chapter, I will further elaborate on issues pertaining to migration and immigration in relation to identity and security, although this time I focus on the relation between the positions of ‘the consensual elite’ versus that of ‘the populists’.

\(^{207}\) As indicated before, the metaphor of ‘Fortress Europe’ is partly deceptive. Firstly, fortress Europe consists of many integrated fortresses [the member-states]. This multidimensionality, I think, is too easily neglected in the public debate on asylum politics where national politicians tend to blame “Brussels” for what is going on. Secondly, the metaphor risks reducing the complexity of ‘inside/outside relations’ to a pure spatial dimension.
7. BRUSSELS AND POPULISM
SCENE XI

Captain Euro208 is the super hero of Europe. He is ‘the new ambassador for global peace’ and bears with him the European message wherever he goes. ‘He's friendly and he appeals to all Europeans because he's totally multicultural and non-political’: Captain Euro is a true European. Together with his team, he fights for freedom and justice all over the world. In the shadows, though, the vicious criminal ‘Dr. D. Vider’ plans to divide Europe and create his own empire. Luckily enough, Captain Euro is not alone. Perhaps closer to him than any other member of his team is the gorgeous ‘Europa’. She enjoys athletic activities, but is also a committed and well-educated environmentalist. Wherever they go, they fight evil and unite Europeans. Captain Euro and ‘Europa’ make Europeans feel proud of themselves as Europeans.

208 Captain Euro is an international label shaped and established by ‘Twelve Stars Communications’ (Captain Euro – website). The co-founder of the corporation, Nicholas de Santis, has before worked as an advisor for the EU-institutions on issues pertaining to the introduction of the EURO and the European identity (see further Twelve Stars Communications – website).
SCENE XII

Marti Ahtisaari (former president of Finland), Jochen Frowein (Former Vice President of the European Commission of Human Rights) and Marcelino Oreja (Former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs): together they are the three wise men. Their task was to deliver a report on (1): The Austrian Government’s commitment to the common European Values, in particular concerning the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants and (2): the evolution of the political nature of the FPÖ (Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs). Their report (Ahtisaari et al 2002) recommended the EU-14 to lift the sanctions against Austria. Mission was accomplished.
WE ARE NOT LIKE THEM

On the 14th of June 2002, Frits Bolkestein, the then European Commissioner in charge of the Internal Market and Taxation, argued in a speech at the Societeit de Witte in the Hague that:

The more ‘Brussels’ grows the more people look for their own identity, their roots. One day we may even come to the conclusion that European integration generated a measure of alienation. Fear of the future would be an ill chosen guide. The future harbours challenges and there are policy options we ought to consider in order to cope with mounting problems [...] The levels of immigration and the lack of integration tend to stretch the absorption capacity of a number of urbanised areas [...] As a result both popular discontent and populism have become rampant.

Bolkestein’s view is that the deepening of European integration may inspire Europeans to re-evaluate their identity. In turn, this might be expected to lead to some backlashes. He infers that populism may grow stronger in this context, especially so in urbanised areas. Bolkestein further argues that the current rise of populism can be understood as a result of increased immigration.

We are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, processes of European integration are said to entail the withering away of old territorial borders, the embracing of increased migration flows and the fostering of post-national identity constellations. On the other hand, as suggested by Bolkestein above, extra-EU immigration is conceived of as preparing the ground for populists to exploit popular discontent with the furthering of the very same processes. Consequently, the intra-European issue of the integration of the states and peoples of Europe into a multi-level governmental system centred in Brussels gets conflated with the extra-European concern with immigration to the EU area. It is evident that the so-called Extreme Right Parties (ERP) have grasped the opportunity to take advantage of this fusion. The relation between Brussels and populism concerns the intertwined debates on further integration of Europe and the issue of immigration from third countries.

209 This chapter has been published twice before, most recently in European Legacy (2005, 10:2, pp. 217-32). An earlier version of that article was translated into Swedish and published in ‘Fronesis 2003: no.13’.
The anthropologist Cris Shore (2000) asserts that the building of a new European identity posits nationalism as ‘the other’ of the ideals of cosmopolitanism represented by Brussels (see further chapter 3). The rise of the ERP parties (often labelled populist) in contemporary European politics distorts this image of the ‘new Europe’ (e.g. Prodi May 9, 2001) as intrinsically border-transgressing. These parties claim to represent the voice of the people within the bounded territory of a nation. On the surface, the populist parties mark an antithesis to the politics of “Brussels”, spelling out a message that ‘We are not like them’.

A common denominator in the otherwise diverse movements of populism is that they refer to the people [populus] as a point of reference. Thus, the recent European populist movements²¹⁰ aspire to protect, and represent the true voice of the people. Dennis Westlind (1996: 31-2) suggests that ‘populism can only be defined by its articulation of a discourse of “the people”’. In the previous chapter, I indicated how efforts to boost security within the EU were presented as an answer to the request by Europeans to live together in harmony and freedom. The ambition to safeguard the people against an outside world perceived as threatening is not limited to the populists. At the same time, however, we also experienced how processes of securitization were taken to be in line with a distinct European tradition of ‘hospitality and solidarity’. I now turn to discuss how the ERP, in their loyalty to ‘the nation’, tend to be positioned outside this particular (European) tradition. As it seems, to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe excludes the possibility of ‘being a populist’.

**RACISM DISCLAIMED**

Bolkestein maintains that an alienated and oppositional popular political identity may be the result of high levels of immigration and lack of integration. According to this logic, the strategy to deal with the rise of populist movements would be to initiate policies that

²¹⁰ According to Dennis Westlind (ibid, 27-30), ‘The Far-Right and Socialist Populism’ is the major populist movement in contemporary Europe. He (1996: 13-32) also mentions three other important populisms in modern time; ‘Frontier Populism’ that appeared in the U.S in the 1890s; ‘Intellectual Populism’ that encouraged growth of peasant socialism in pre-Revolutionary Russia; ‘Urban Populism’ that grew between 1940 and 1965 in Latin America to gather the urban masses.
promote strict measures on immigration to Europe. Immigration is associated with social danger. Migration flows are portrayed as threats to domestic welfare systems and internal cohesion.

Of course, the current trend towards amplified suspicion against third country nationals who seek asylum in the EU area does not conform to the fierce racism of the 1930’s and its successors today. Recently the EUC has launched campaigns to combat racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia within the EU area (e.g. Prodi February 19, 2004). There is, however, reason to believe that a too narrow conceptualisation of “racism” risks overlooking current signs of a “racism without races” (Balibar 1991: 21; cf. Hansen 2000: 92; Gilroy 2001: 14-8).

Étienne Balibar suggests that (1991: 20) the category of ‘immigration’ has substituted notions of ‘race’ in the contemporary movement of ‘neo-racism’ in Europe. Instead of relying on theories of biological heredity or the referring to the supremacy of certain groups of peoples, this movement claims the incommensurability of cultural differences and the danger with open borders and the blending of cultures in general. To understand the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes in contemporary Europe, the analysis needs to extend beyond the monitoring of blatant racism and xenophobia. Teun van Dijk (1993: 8) even claims that: ‘their [the elites] denial of racism presupposes a definition of racism that conveniently excludes them as part of the problem’. Following this line of reasoning, a ‘positive self-representation’ (ibid: 73) of what makes Europe “Europe” may facilitate the justification of a more rigid immigration policy: efforts to boost security within the union are said to be done in line with ‘hospitality and solidarity’. In referring to the boycott of Austria in 2000 (cf. scene XII), Chantal Mouffe (2005: 74) sees a ‘particularly perverse mechanism in those moralistic reactions. This mechanism consists in securing one’s goodness, through the condemnation of the evil in others’.

The argument underlying this chapter is basically that the populist movement in the shape of the ERP represents what we (as in “we”, the “Good Europeans”) are not. At the same time, though, the recent emphasis on security in the political project of the EU (see further chapter 6) corresponds to the ambitions of the populists to protect ‘the people’ against an outer world perceived as
threatening, while racism is generally considered to be outdated. This chapter, then, seeks to scrutinise the relation between “Brussels” and populism in order to detect (a) how the notion of populism is conceptualised from the position of a consensual elite and (b) how parties labelled as populists articulate a popular identity in relation to the position of a consensual elite.

ELITE CONSENSUS

When Francis Fukuyama (1992) declared the end of history, this was a triumphalist account that celebrated the death of communism and the emergence of a widespread consensus on the supremacy of liberal democracy throughout the world. In fact, Fukuyama suggested that ‘liberal democracy might well be the final form of human governance’ (Sim 1999: 18). His concern was, however, a fear of being too satisfied; of being too secure and satisfied with material plenty. He was worried that we perhaps also are facing the ‘end of man’ and thereby risk being ‘dragged back in history again’ (Fukyama 1992: 312). After that Fukuyama published his book, we have confronted many severe conflicts around the world (including a “war on terror”-discourse) that make Fukuyama’s fear of being ‘too secure’ already seem partly outdated: if we ever left history, we have been ‘dragged back’ rather quickly. At the same time, the series of events that took place in 1989 and after the fall of the wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire, have continued to serve a view that we are better off today than ever before.

Tony Blair is a leading proponent of the so-called third-way social democracy and he articulates his pragmatic view on democracy through rhetorical figures (Callinicos 1999: 80; Fairclough 2001: chapter 1) such as ‘the democratic family’, ‘the state without enemies’ and ‘the cosmopolitan nation’. In his books (1998; 2000) about ‘The third way’, Anthony Giddens supplies this

\(^{211}\) Fukuyama follows a historicist tradition from among others Hegel and Marx, arguing that we, by the end of the 1980s, witness the end of a certain concept of history. Fukuyama is certainly not only in this regard; there are several other examples of so-called ‘endist-thinking’; i.e. ‘the end of ideology’ (Bell 1967); ‘the end of nationalism’ (Hobsbawm 1990). See also (Mosco 2004) on the myths of the ‘digital age’ and a discussion on the ‘end of geography’ thesis.

\(^{212}\) Returning to the previous chapter, a language of hopes and a language of fears associated with processes of ‘globalisation’ co-exist in contemporary Europe.
politics with an academic stance. Also in ‘Consequences of Modernity’, he argues (1996: 114) that in the era of reflexive modernity: ‘the former dualism friend/enemy has been replaced by a relation between colleagues’. Jürgen Habermas claims (2001:103) for his part that:

These successful forms of social integration have shaped the normative self-understanding of European modernity into an egalitarian universalism that can ease the transition to postnational democracy’s demanding contexts of mutual recognition for all of us – we, the sons, daughters and grandchildren of a barbaric nationalism.

As opposed to previous stages of modernity, involving introvert nationalism and a hostile attitude towards foreigners, current development in Europe points in the direction of a “new modernity” where multiculturalism and tolerance flourish. From this perspective, the ERP are nothing but anomalies in the progressive development towards a new modernity.

A point of departure of the analysis is that the current rise of the ERP is conceived of as an anomaly in an age supposedly characterised by a natural order of third way consensus (Mouffe 2005: chapter 4). Chantal Mouffe (2000a: 113-6) claims that ‘[this] sacralization of consensus’ veils the inherent dynamic of pluralistic democracy itself and thus marks a democratic deficit, ‘which allows populist parties challenging the dominant consensus to appear as the only anti-Establishment forces representing the will of the people’.213 The image of the new Europe as a peace project that puts an end to conflicts in the past has, according to Mouffe (2005), served a consensus view of politics that is more concerned with deliberation and discussion than with conflicts and antagonisms. According to her, the relation between left and right has been replaced by a distinction between right and wrong. This does not mean that we, following Mouffe (ibid: 75), actually have entered any post-political era rather that political controversies are increasingly being enacted in the moral register according to the categories of “good versus evil”.

213 In her most recent book, Chantal Mouffe (2005: 68) uses the term of ‘consensus elites’ to discuss the situation in Austria, which is indeed very similar to the notion of ‘consensual elite’ which I adopted in a previously published version of this chapter (Hellström 2005a).
I now turn to analyse how members of the European Union Commission have dealt with the notion of ‘populism’ in some of their speeches from the early days of Prodi to the debate following the double rejection of the new constitutional treaty under the chairmanship of Barroso. As mentioned before; while differing in perspectives and political views all members of the EU Commission are committed to the ‘European interest’ and their “job” is to safeguard this interest and thus avoid fragmentation. For this reason, I am interested in how the EUC responds to the rise of ERP in contemporary European politics.

INSECURITY AND INDIFFERENCE

The young people of Europe are anxious about what is going on around them. This is, at least, what Romano Prodi (July 23, 2002) suggests:

We have a duty to raise our sights, especially with our young people in mind. The original sense of urgency and need for reconciliation have faded. Today you sense a sort of indifference, the worst feeding-ground for populism.

Populism is here described as a result of extended indifference. Later in the speech, Prodi mentions the ‘European Future Convention’ as a means to combat these tendencies, since it launches a public debate on the common future of the European people. The political prospects of promoting constructive changes in existing institutional arrangements are contrasted with the indifference and cynicism that are said to sustain populism (cf. Lamy February 3, 2003). Prodi visits the Hague on the 1st of July 2004 to celebrate the start of the Dutch Presidency:

Even worse than euro-scepticism, perhaps, is euro-indifference. You can argue with someone with different – even opposing – views. You cannot easily engage with someone who is indifferent. And a lack of debate creates the conditions for the false assumptions that breed populism and prejudice – the very things that democracy and the European Union are there to counter.

In the quote, we notice a division between, on the one hand, euro-indifference that breeds ‘populism and prejudice’ and, on the other hand, ‘democracy and the European Union’. In this vein, the political project of the EU stands in opposition to, and actively
counters, the kind of euro-indifference that underpins populism. In similar wording, Commissioner Günter Verheugen (July 11, 2002), then responsible for issues related to the enlargement, likens the indifferent character of populism, in its response to EU eastern enlargement, to national backwardness:

Where uncertainty prevails, where fear of the future is widespread and where many people’s living conditions have not yet improved after so many years, radicals find fertile soil for agitation with their nationalism, populism and finger-pointing […] the Polish populists want Poland to go its own way. They want to convince Poles that their country can do something no other nation in Europe believes it can do: go it alone, single-handed in a globalised, highly competitive world. So what would be Poland’s alternative to European Integration? Join forces with its eastern neighbours, the biggest of which, Russia, is economically no stronger than little Belgium?

According to Verheugen, to choose the national path is to oppose the logic of globalisation that demands co-operation rather than isolation. To think naively highly of oneself is here described as a key characteristic of the populist politician. The European integration process balances the fears that populist politicians address when they ‘finger-point’ at the people to show loyalty to the nation. Returning to the double rejection of the new constitutional treaty, Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson (June 28, 2005; see also Barroso, September 22, 2005) of the Barroso Commision refers to a popular fear of globalisation:

In the public’s growing negative mood, they are answering ‘no’ to everything before they have even heard the question /…/ At this juncture, Europe is faced with a fairly fundamental choice of directions. One way we sink into protectionism, and the sort of populism that defeated the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda. The other way is to make our economies more dynamic and flexible, receptive to competition in Europe and from outside…

In the words of Mandelson, we notice how the position of ‘the populists’ equals fear of changes and saying no to everything. In a speech in London (June 13), some weeks before he stated that: ‘The European project is today under sharp attack from a Populism of the Right that blames foreigners for every woe, and a populism of the Left that feeds on fear of globalisation’. Apparently, the meaning of the word ‘populism’ has expanded to include also those ‘Euro-sceptics’ on the Left who resist globalisation and liberal

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214 As will be discussed later in this chapter, this relation is turned upside down in the rhetoric of the populists.
demands of a less regulated internal market. Interesting is also that the populists are taken to threaten ‘the European Project’. As it seems, to be a populist is to be anti-European. Mandelson argues further that it was this kind of populism that led to the No votes in Holland and France during the summer of 2005 (see further chapter 5). To a certain degree, then, to be a populist also means saying ‘No’ to replacing existing EU treaties with a new constitutional treaty for the European Union. A feasible way out is, according to Mandelson, to prepare ‘our economies’ for ‘competition in Europe and from outside’.

**ANTI-EUROPE**

A common theme in the EUC-rhetoric is that the EU needs to work harder on reaching consensual agreements on important political matters (see further chapter 3). The rise of populism supposedly indicates (cf. Lamy May 6, 2002) that these efforts have not yet been accomplished. Antonio Vitorino (June 14, 2001), the then European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, formulates the political significance of coherence:

This political renewal of the legitimacy of the European project will clarify, in a way that is more appropriate to the challenges of a globalised world, where the dividing line is between Euro scepticism and anti-European populism of various ideological hues /.../ and what the body of values, principles and policies is that constitutes the meeting point between the European currents of thought and political parties that consider the deepening of the integration process to be of central importance.

In the words of Vitorino, there is a certain European tradition with a ‘body of values and principles’ that is separated from ‘Euro scepticism and anti-European populism’. Some political parties realise that ‘We Europeans’ benefit from a deepening of the European integration, whereas others do not. The message is clear: to oppose “our” common European project is to decline into anti-European populism. Commissioner Michael Barnier (April 3, 2000), then responsible for regional development, confronts the same ‘enemy’ in a speech delivered in Paris where it is said that ‘The concept of Europe’ needs to be protected from the threat posed by

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215 It should be mentioned, however, that Mandelson also believes that many French voters voted as they did because they wanted more ‘Europe’, and not less.
the populists in Europe, otherwise the implementation of a sustainable development agenda is put at risk.

Commissioner Chris Patten (responsible for External Relations) talks about the problem of reducing politics to managerialism in a speech in London on 30 April 2002:

the battle of ideas must be constantly refought. If politics is reduced to mere managerialism, then xenophobic populism will reassert itself. Politicians on the Left and Right must reconnect politics with ideas and principles.

Instead of engaging in real issues, many Britons prefer to indulge in fantasy arguments … Even some who are keen to co-operate in Europe seem to want to do so on an imaginary basis purporting to be pro-Europe, but anti-EU. It is time to get real.

In the first quotation, Patten suggests a link between politics as managerialism and the rise of xenophobic populism. He goes on to stress the importance of bringing in ideas and principles in politics. In the second, he differentiates between fantasy arguments and real politics. Whereas the populist politicians may use fantasy arguments, real politicians should deal with real politics. Moreover, he claims that it is impossible (but in fantasy) to be pro-Europe and anti-EU at the same time, predicting that the EU-development marks unreservedly the future for all Europe.

Patten (October 15, 2001) talks in laudatory terms about ideas that must be refought, but in analysing the past century’s two world wars he insists that:

...the Great War destroyed the political and intellectual consensus that sustained this first wave of globalisation, and the world was sucked into populism, protectionism and fanaticism which led to World War II, and from which we spent most of the rest of the 20th century recovering.

According to Patten, we must continue to recover from the disastrous position of World War II into a politics that deals with ideas and principles. Ideas must be refought. The struggle of ideas has to continue. At the same time, there is a need for a ‘political and intellectual consensus’. Otherwise, ‘populism, protectionism and fanaticism’ may grow stronger again. I have before argued that any societal formation relies on a compromise between the two notions of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ (see further chapter 3). In this case, Patten emphasises a ‘battle of ideas’ (diversity) at the same time as he indicates that “we” need to sustain a certain ‘political and
intellectual consensus’ (unity). This is nothing strange. Crucial for my argument is, though, that the threat to both of these principles is associated with the rise of ‘populism’. In this sense, ‘populism’ is disqualified from the battle of ideas that ought to take place between left and right.

Slavoj Žižek (2000: 37-39) claims that the ‘populists’ sustain an invisible antagonistic split in contemporary politics. He believes that populism fills a void in today’s political climate, since there is nothing else out there to challenge the dominant socio-political order. Chantal Mouffe (1996a: 498) asserts that the ‘end of politics thesis’ has generated a crisis of representation that holds a terrain for extreme-right populism to exploit the presumed disappearance of the political and the blurring of the right/left-dualism. In this respect, I argue that the labelling of certain politics and certain political movements as ‘populist’ serves the endeavours to justify and rationalise the current agenda of the political project of the EU. By excluding the populists from the realm of ‘real politics’, members of the EUC portray populism as ‘the other’. Repeated among members of the Barroso Commission, the fundamental choice in Europe today is between a pro-European integration perspective that welcomes changes and a populist route towards increased isolationism and national nostalgia. In the figure below (figure 1) I have identified some aspects of the dichotomisation being made between ‘real politics’ and populism as these are articulated by leading proponents of the European Union Commission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Real Politics’</th>
<th>Populism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Making a difference</td>
<td>Based on indifference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facing Globalisation/</td>
<td>Exploiting fears of globalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surmounting Problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro European integration</td>
<td>Anti-EU/Euroscepticism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro Europe</td>
<td>Anti-Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality based argumentation</td>
<td>Fantasy based argumentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 1 – aspects of the dichotomisation of ‘real politics’ and populism in the rhetoric of the EUC.
We here encounter how the concept of Europe is filled with meaning through a semantic chain of what makes up ‘real politics’ as opposed the position held by the populists in the rhetoric of the EUC. As argued before, articulations of a certain European identity is manifest in a series of constitutive splits that differentiate between “us” and “them”. Interestingly enough, we can basically apply the same kind of conceptual scheme with similar kinds of attributes to the constitutive split of “Real Europeans” versus “yet-to-be-Europeans” (see further chapter 5).

In the next section, I will illustrate how the dichotomisation of ‘real politics’ versus ‘populism’ gives the ERP the opportunity, from a subordinate position, to turn the relation upside down. They aspire to challenge the dominant order and present themselves as the real voice of ‘the people’ in contrast to ‘the other’, which in their case is portrayed as an ignorant elite that has failed to recognise the needs of the people they claim to represent.

**POPULAR CONSENSUS**

In my discussion of how parties labelled as populists articulate a popular identity in relation to the position of a consensual elite, I focus on three settings: ‘Front National’ (FN) in France, Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria and ‘Det Danske Folkeparti’ (DF) in Denmark. The sociologist Jens Rydgren (2002: 2) has argued that Front National is the prototypic ERP party and thus the most representative case of ERP in contemporary Europe. After its internal split, the party lost a considerable amount of members and voters. In the 2002 presidential election, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the final round after having defeated the socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, in the first. In the parliamentary elections that took place some months later, Front National received 11.3 per cent of the vote.

In February 2000, FPÖ took seat in the national Austrian government with approximately 27 per cent of the electorate behind them. This provoked immediate reactions among the other EU countries. They decided to expel Austria from bilateral negotiations. The boycott ended after approximately seven months
when the ‘Three wise men’ had published their report (Ahtisaari et al. 2000) on the ‘Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common European Values’ (scene XII). The third case, Det Danske Folkeparti, concerns one of the more recently developed ERP. It has had a significant impact on official politics in Denmark after having had profitable negotiations with the conservative and liberal national government. In the national elections in November 2001 they gained support from approximately 12 per cent of the electorate. All three parties enjoy rather strong support for their politics at home and they have also, in various degrees, affected governmental politics. I here intend to discuss how they, in their party programs, exploit the category of “the people” to articulate a popular identity.216

**IMMIGRATION IS DANGEROUS**

A paragraph in the FPÖ-programme from 1997 (excerpt 8, chapter. IX: article 3) responds to Bolkenstein’s description of the problems involved in uncontrolled immigration:

> To counter the flood of illegal immigrants and those engaged in smuggling refugees, an efficient border control should be established. This also serves as a means of crime prevention since experience shows that illegal immigration is connected with an import of crime.

The use of the flood metaphor is indicative of the conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to its residents, by ‘whipping up a sense of moral panic’ (Shore 2000: 63). Implicit in the excerpt is also the technique of ‘blaming the victim’ (van Dijk 1993: 89), the smuggling of refugees is causally linked with a presumably higher crime-rate among the immigrant group. This link is justified due to ‘experience’, it is what ‘everybody knows’. Interestingly enough, FPÖ shares with Bolkestein the assumption that more efficient border-controls are needed in order to protect the residents from ‘the problems’ related to high immigration levels.217

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216 The party-programmes are the ones advertised by the parties on their homepages.
217 In the previous chapter, though, we noticed how Prodi expressed doubts concerning the accuracy of this connection and the validity of ‘the experience argument’. Instead he justified more efficient border controls for the reason that “people’s real fears” had to be acknowledged.
THE PATRIA IS SET UNDER THREAT

Above all, the nation-state is said to be endangered:

La nation est, pour tous les Français, le cadre naturel de leurs libertés et de leur souveraineté… Le monde reste dangereux … Il faut libérer les Français de la peur et restaurer la paix civile.218

Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society. Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of Danish culture.

Both passages juxtapose a supposedly threatening outer world with the need to protect the natural order that connects national residents (Danish/French people) with the national territory (Denmark and France). The sovereignty and the rights of the people must be safeguarded in an otherwise frightening world. It is not natural for the Danes to share their territory with (too many) non-Danes, since that will jeopardise the protective shell that connects the nation and the national culture. The category of “the people” is conceived of as given and unproblematic. The popular identity expressed here is primordial and presupposes “the people” as an isolated entity. Everything strange, then, put to risk this restricted domain of popular consciousness. The FPÖ makes the link between immigration and a primordial culture identity explicit (excerpt 11; chapter IV, article 4: 2):

Unlimited immigration would demand too much of the resident population as far as an active capacity for integration is concerned. It would endanger the right to preservation and protection of cultural identity [Heimat]. We reject multi-cultural experiments that bear social conflicts in them.

While the previous chapter focused on a demarcation line between illegal and legal immigration in the transformation of the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice, the FPÖ insists that any kind of immigration to Austria poses a potential threat to the residents and their right to a fixed cultural identity. None of the parties do, however, explicitly announce that they prefer some cultures to others; only that Austria belongs to the Austrians first

218 My own translation: The nation is for all the French people the natural frame of their rights and of their sovereignty … The world remains dangerous … We must release the French people from the fear and restore civil peace. The pamphlet, advertised on the party homepage, is signed by its chairman, Jean-Marie Le Pen.
(chapter III, article 2); that Denmark belongs to the Danes and that France belongs to the French people. The Patria is in peril and the nation has to be rescued in order to liberate its people.

**FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE**

The ERP parties say to care for the little man in a complex world. Front National has been very explicit in blaming the political establishment for not protecting their people. They mean that we live under the pressures of totalitarianism:

> nous vivons sous un joug totalitaire à masque démocratique […] Une fois de plus, nous avons eu raison de dire que l'Europe de Bruxelles est une prison pour ses peuples.²¹⁹

Front National claims to be the democratic voice of the people. In the populist conception of democracy it is the political establishment that fails a democracy test, not the populists (Rydgren 2002: 265). This anti-elitist attribute is also illustrative of the FPÖ in their criticism of the Proporz system.²²⁰ In an interview (Purvis & Leuker 2000) in TIME-magazine from the 14th of February 2000, Jörg Haider explicitly criticises the two dominant Austrian parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) for having, deliberately, avoided to confront Austria’s past:

> For a long period after the end of World War II the two predominant political parties – the Socialist Party and the People’s party – tried to reduce responsibility of the past. They played a role, saying Austria was the first victim and not responsible at all. But, clearly, we have victims and perpetrators. We were sitting on both sides. We have to have an open discussion on all of these questions because the new generation, the young people, are open to discussing the past because they don’t feel personally responsible for it.

Haider positions himself and his party as the voice of the new generation of Austrians who dares to ‘speak the truth’ (Wodak 2002). The old elite is considered closely attached to nationalistic thinking. The FPÖ represents, on the other hand, the new young

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²¹⁹ My own translation: We live under a totalitarian yoke, which presents itself as democratic. Again, we have reason to claim that the Europe of Brussels is a prison for its people.
²²⁰ Proporz is a term used to describe the corporal structure of post WWII’s Austrian domestic politics. This system allowed the two major parties, the Socialdemocratic (SPÖ) and the Conservative People’s party (ÖVP), to assign posts in the national bureaucracy (Marchart 2001).
generation. It is ‘them’, not ‘us’, who are more likely to decline into xenophobic ideas. In this way, Haider presents an image of his party that appears at odds with features normally associated with the ERP-label.

The FN metaphorically describes contemporary France as a prison and thus attributes to their own movement the ambition to emancipate the people to speak freely about issues concerning, for instance, multiculturalism. ‘The elite’ neglects the ‘true problems’ involved with migration flows and the blending of cultures in general.

The DF is, at least in their principal program, less hostile against the political elite, but is nevertheless explicit in their ambition to extend democracy to the people.

According to Rydgren (2002: 269) it is important for the ERP to present themselves as the true democrats. In the quoted passage above, the DF has taken upon itself to preserve the traditional national order. This is a pre-condition for the Danish people to develop and secure a democratic governance. The sovereignty of the nation-state is sacred and for that reason the DF opposes the European project. The link between the national citizenry and the national democracy is made explicit also in the FPÖ-programme (chapter III, article 2):

This dedication to Austria underlines a permanent task to preserve and develop democracy as a basis for Austrian patriotism. Beyond that it means an obligation to stand up for Austria’s independence and to preserve its constitutional principles. According to the Freedomite understanding of an Austrian self-image [Österreichischer Patriotismus] related to a democratic society there is an ongoing commitment to develop and preserve democracy for the people. This commitment includes the preservation of federal, social and liberal constitutional principles.

The FPÖ portrays itself as a party fighting for peoples’ democratic rights, which forms a basis for Austrian patriotism [Österreichischer Patriotismus]. The category of ‘the people’ does not, however, include all people but specifically ‘the Austrian people’. This idea approaches a concept of democracy that advocates a national democracy for the people who naturally belong inside the borders of a nation. Whereas ‘the elite’ has failed in their political
commitment to protect the national democracy in a time when the patria is set under threat, the ERP articulate the ‘true voice’ of the people. Front National states that:

Nous n’avons jamais trompé nos compatriots pour garder nos gamelles au chaud. Nous avons toujours préféré l’inconfort de la vérité aux prébends du mensonge. Nous, nous avons toujours été du côté de la Vérité et de la Liberté.\textsuperscript{221}

It has often been said that the ERP need to articulate themselves against ‘the elite’ in order to gain votes (e.g. Rydgren 2002: 265-6). This is, indeed, a case of identity politics and the label ‘the elite’ connotes a vague spectrum of different political environments, e.g. ‘Brussels’, ‘Washington’, ‘Vienna’, ‘Copenhagen’ or ‘Paris’\textsuperscript{222}. A common denominator for the three parties, FN, FPÖ and DF, is that they consider themselves to be the (only) representatives of the [national] people and also [national] democracy, something that is contrasted with the hypocrisy attributed to ‘the elite’. They thereby endeavour to evoke a dichotomy between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ as separable given categories. A popular consensus is presupposed, since they claim to know what the people want and think. The category of ‘the people’ is ambiguous and excludes whole groups of individuals (Rydgren 2002: 270). It involves an ethnic categorisation of who belongs to ‘the people’ and who does not. The idea of a popular consensus, then, sustains a hierarchical view on already immigrated groups of citizens.\textsuperscript{223}

In this study, we notice how the ERP tend to occupy a conflicting position to that of the position of the consensual elite/s. There is, however, reason not to jump to conclusions. Recent

\textsuperscript{221} My own translation: We have never let our compatriots down just to mind our own business. We have always preferred the inconvenience of truth to the prebends of lies. We have always stood on the side of truth and freedom.

\textsuperscript{222} Influential politicians representing the blurred mid range of the political spectrum can in this respect be said to occupy the position of a ‘consensual elite’ that collectively rejects ‘anti-establishment’ forces that do not engage in ‘real politics’ (see further chapter 1). Furthermore, it is evident that the ‘populists’ have imposed the “elite-label” to various prominent political actors or parties that, according to them, do not represent the voice of the people adequately.

\textsuperscript{223} Apart from proposing strict measures on immigration, the ERP also apply these categories within the nation. According to their rhetoric, also the resident population seems to be layered. A related trend is that international conflicts, such as the Gulf-war or the Israeli-Palestinians conflicts, have been domesticated and further utilized by the ERP in their political rhetoric (Virchow 2004). Sandra Dungaciu (2003) discusses the notion of new anti-Semitism as based on the daily flow of global media filtered through traditional anti-Semitic lenses. According to her, September 11 gave rise - not only to islamophobic sentiments and activities - but also to a wide spread belief that the attack could be directly attributed to Jews and Israel.
changes in contemporary European politics (some ERP actually have made their way through to national governments) might challenge us to alter that conclusion.

**THE FOURTH WAY**

On July 18, 2000, three wise men paid a visit to Vienna just a few weeks after they were appointed their mandate by the President of the European Court of Human Rights (scene XII). Marchart (2001) comments on the event:

> By describing the FPÖ as 'right-wing populist with radical elements' – a description applauded even by the FPÖ itself which accepted the qualifier populism as a name of honour for a party siding with 'the people' – the radical nature of the FPÖ was effectively played down by the report and reduced to certain 'elements'. One day this report might be considered a historically unique document in being the first official clearance certificate for what might emerge in the future as the 'fourth Way': an alliance between conservative parties and ultra-right populism.

According to Marchart, the FPÖ ‘applauded’ the description formulated by the three wise men. It enabled them to dictate a policy that concerned people’s needs, without being accused of orchestrating popular racism. After all, the sanctions were lifted. To pursue ‘some radical elements’ may even sound promising for potential voters who distrust conventional politics.

In this chapter, I have discussed a double functioning of the notion of populism in contemporary European politics. Firstly, from a position of a consensual elite the EUC locates populist rhetorics elsewhere, which implies that populism symbolises something different from what is associated with the ‘real politics’ performed in Brussels. However, if the ‘fourth way’ becomes a reality, we may have to alter that conclusion. At least, we may witness how the term populism will be used differently and/or signify other movements than today (i.e. recent emphasis on so-called ‘left-wing populism’). Secondly, the ERP parties can

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224 In the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004, the FPÖ scored only 6.7 per cent of the domestic votes. According to Chantal Mouffe (2005: 68), the reason to this decline is ‘not the appeal to supposed Nazi nostalgia which accounts for the dramatic rise of the FPÖ but the ability of Haider to construct a powerful pole of collective identification around the opposition between ‘the people’ and the ‘consensus elite’. In a governing position, the party was unable to maintain this exact opposition. In the case of Denmark, while remaining outside the government DF continues to affect governmental politics. During the summer of 2005, the Danish governmental party has, together with the DF, suggested additional measures to make it even
applaud their imposed label, since it enables them to suppose a distinction between (a) protecting “the people” from pending high immigration levels and (b) promoting blatant racism.

**MUTUAL DEPENDENCY**

A main difference between the politics of the EU and populism is, according to some members of the EUC, that whereas the populists are exploiting people’s fears, “Brussels” is handling contemporary problems. However, the current migration situation is described in a similar way. The popular identity articulated by the populists is expected to grow stronger due to ‘high immigration rates’ and a turbulent world situation in general. Both the populists and advocates of the EUC aspire to protect the well-being of ‘the people’ against an outside world perceived as threatening. They both endeavour to be the ‘good democrats’.

Both camps portray each other in a negative manner. Members of the EUC accuses ‘the populists’ of using fantasy arguments and being naively stubborn about the possibility for a single nation-state to deal with global problems; in other words, they are not involved in ‘real politics’. Simultaneously, the populists claim to represent the true democratic voice of the people that fights for the well-being of the resident population, something that ‘the elite’ has neglected because their cosmopolitan dreams make it impossible for them to ‘speak the truth’. Politicians articulating themselves from a position of a consensual elite can thereby gain support for their politics as pragmatic and non-populist, focusing on reaching consensual agreements on complicated political issues, something which, from a reverse position, enable the populists to represent an alternative to the dominant order.

The main inference to be drawn from this analysis is not that the political project of the EU deliberately promotes increased populism. Rather, I would say that the position of a ‘consensual

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harder to gain Danish citizenship. In a recent proposal, all foreigners in Denmark have to sign a special contract in which they promise to integrate well in the Danish culture, to find a proper job and not ‘hit their children’ (Söderberg in ‘Sydvenska Dagbladet, November 28, 2005). Possibly, the situation in Denmark is an example of the fourth way at work. See also Kofoed & Hansen (2005) for a discussion on contemporary articulations of nationalism in Denmark all over the political spectrum.
elite’ and the position of the populists stand in a relationship of mutual dependency. Politics is about the power of categorisation and both camps posit each other as essentially different from each other. Identity politics is at work in both directions as expressed in acts of differentiation that separate “them” from “us”. In the EU-elite rhetoric, “we” (as in “we”, “the Good Europeans”) are portrayed as morally superior to the populists, who are said to exploit people’s fear of the unknown. At the same time, the populists present the national residents as sacredly attached to a “Heimat”. In this perspective, the consensual elites (in e.g. Brussels, Wien, Paris or Copenhague) are conceived of as morally inferior, since they have lost contact with the people it claims to represent. Conversely, the populist movements are said to mobilize anti-political movements. We are confronted with another new constitutive split in the political landscape of Europe. If there are no foes, there is no politics.

In the fantasy world, Captain Euro and his colleagues could unite Europeans in their struggle for global peace and world justice. In the comics, the good forces always defeat Dr D. Divider (cf. scene XI). The task ahead for the EU Commission is, arguably, a much more delicate one: that is to bring Europeans together in the European project towards greater unification without risking even more popular discontent (division). The EUC does not lack ideas of how to boost the integration process forward and yet enjoy popular support. The current Commission requests a new consensus on where the EU is heading. Barroso (September 22, 2005) says that “our” citizens require accurate leadership that may guide them into the future’. In a statement to celebrate the first anniversary of the eastern enlargement on the 1st of May 2005, Barroso (IP 2005a) ends with saying: ‘…united Europe is also a response to the fears bound up with populism, chauvinism, xenophobia, terrorism and, at the heart of it all, with poverty’.

My analysis suggests that populism is a label that corresponds to the question of what “we are not” (as in “them”, ‘the not-Europeans’). Different movements and political parties may be

225 Dr D. Divide fits neatly into the category of Europe’s other not only because of his actions and ‘evil plans’ to bring fragmentation to Europe, but also in his racialized face traits that stand in sharp contrast to the pure appearance of ‘Captain Euro’ (Captain Euro – website).
positioned in this category and the analysis of this chapter has indicated a tendency to attach the populist label not only to the ERP, but also to left-wing groups that say no to everything, including globalisation and the furthering of the integration process. In this sense, the label of populism works as a floating signifier that knits together a variety of characteristics (e.g. ‘anti-globalisation’; ‘euro-indifferent’; ‘nationalistic’) of what it means NOT to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. The populists are also the “Bad Europeans” that, potentially, enable “us” to feel good about ourselves as dedicated Europeans.

The possible blurrification of the right-/left distinction does not necessarily lead us to a post-political society; rather we may assume that the lines of demarcation are articulated differently. To remain (too) loyal to the nation is to oppose the logic of globalisation that demands cooperation rather than isolation. Neither Dr D. Divider nor the populists seem to understand that to be the case. In the statement cited above, Barroso (IP 2005a) declares that: ‘We must strive for an open Europe, a Europe of dialogue. In each of the 25 countries work has begun on explaining and educating [my emphasis] the public’. This study indicates, however, that in order to take part in this dialogue you first must learn to show loyalty to Europe; to be, act and think as a “Good European” and thus refrain from populism.
8. CONSENSUS IS DANGEROUS
WE DO NOT KNOW AND YET WE DO

We do not know what makes Europe “Europe”. Yet there are many dreams, expectations and fears of what Europe is or ought to be. This book has analysed how the concept of Europe is filled with meaning through contemporary articulations of a certain European identity. In the political process of bringing the nations and peoples of Europe closer to each other, Europe is imagined as a distinct community with more or less clearly defined borders towards what Europe is not. I have, in particular, focused on contemporary articulations of what makes Europe “Europe” in relation to the political project of the EU. Europe is the symbol for “us” coming together in a (the) union.

Any political articulation revolves around a set of definitions of certain key concepts that are arranged in relation to one another. In the case of the EU, it is evident that we are not able to engage with the current integration of nations and peoples in Europe without taking into account how the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’ are constituted in relation to one another. Articulations of a certain European identity and visions of a more fully integrated Europe indicate that “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) have to co-operate across state-borders (and possibly in the long run to dissolve them) so as to achieve “our” common European goals. In this sense, the position of Europe indicates something different in relation to the position of the nation. At the same time, my analysis suggests that the political project of the EU is neither necessarily post-nationalist (chapter 3) nor is it necessarily post-national (chapter 4). Instead we see how current endeavours to articulate a certain European identity that commit Europeans to a distinguishable European community tend to reproduce features associated with civic and ethnic kinds of nationalisms (chapter 3) and how visions of a more federal Europe rely on the logic of the nation-state as a key point of reference (chapter 4). Knowledge of Europe is thus contingently reproduced in a ‘constitutive split’ between ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’. My analysis shows that the two positions together work constitutively for the consolidation of a certain European identity. This relationship of mutual dependency further constrains the
possibility of articulating alternative positions. Bringing Europe down to earth in this sense means to highlight the continuity between past attempts to imagine nation-states and current endeavours to articulate a certain European identity that knits together Europeans with a distinct notion of a European community. We still live in a world of nations.

In the third chapter, I discussed the fusion of ideals of cosmopolitanism with articulations of nationalism in the EU-elite rhetoric. I inferred that the political project of integrating the nations and peoples of Europe is imbued with a kind of ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ that both reproduces “old” state-nationalisms and yet strives to move beyond them. The rhetorical use of the device of ‘unity-in-diversity’ implies the imagining of a distinct European demos attached to a certain European soil while distanced from earlier endeavours to gain community cohesion through brutal force. If demos refers to democracy, particularism, community (in this case a European community) and borders, then simultaneously references to cosmos connotes liberalism, universalism, humanity and borderlessness. In this way, the new European nationalism compromises between unity and diversity; between cosmos and demos. This cosmopolitan nationalism is both a contradiction in terms and a means to imagine a distinct European community in a time when nationalism suffers from a somewhat bad reputation: cosmos is why “our” nationalism is good and morally justifiable.

I believe that we here have an example of how the concept of Europe – seen as an ‘empty signifier’ - is filled with meaning through a constitutive split between the positions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’. In this vein, the question of what makes Europe “Europe” is manifest in enacted differences of what floating signifiers (e.g. a cosmopolitan project versus ethnic nationalisms) are tied to the categories of Europe and the nation respectively. In order to be, act and think as European in Europe, then, we cannot at the same time remain too loyal to the nation.

In this perspective, we need to presuppose the existence of a radical otherness – a ‘constitutive outside’ – that is both the limit and the condition for Europe as an imaginable entity. The concept of Europe is inherently incoherent in the sense that it is established through exclusionary practices that somehow “show” what Europe
is not. Any collective identity formation involves elements of power and repression. The ‘constitutive outside’ prevents the full presence of a coherent inside.

In reproducing knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe”, we thereby set the limits for the “sayability” and “doability” of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe. In the second part of this book (chapter 5 to 7), I analysed contemporary articulations of a certain European identity as manifest in a series of constitutive splits that presents “us” (‘the Europeans’) as different from “them”, ‘the not-Europeans’. We realise ourselves as Europeans in relation to what is not considered part of us.

In order to grasp this process in which the concept of Europe (including the category of ‘the Europeans’) contingently comes into existence in the relation to what it is depicted not to be, I have combined theories and perspectives of identity construction with theories that deal more explicitly with mechanisms of power as immanent in any societal formation. From Fanon we picked up the intrinsic link between individual perceptions of belonging and the persuasiveness of collective identity markers such as black/white at a macro-level: we cannot simply choose to live without identity and it is not necessarily what you say that matter the most, but the position you are articulating yourself from. There is no authentic position of Europe from which we may be able to make our voices heard. Identity politics is about the making of similarities of what knits “us” together and it is also about the making differences and the constructions of borders between what “we are” in relation to what is not considered part of “us”. However, the employment of identity politics tends to be projected to minority groups (see further chapter 2). For a group to claim group-specific rights, in any society, it must first be recognised as such. This process of labelling brings elements of repression to the extent that we may suppose that not all individuals positioned in a certain category of people (e.g. ‘the black community’ or ‘the elite’) feel equally comfortable about their imposed label.

In this thesis, I have shown how similar practices are at work also when we talk in the name of Europe: the identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe fixes a set of traits that together define what Europe is, in relation to what it is not. In the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe, we find an approach that
attempts to reconcile the relation between the fluidity of identity constructions with the partial fixity of certain identity positions. On the one hand, Europe (like any collective identity constellation) lacks finite essence and is inherently inconsistent and yet, on the other hand, knowledge of Europe is contingently reproduced in various articulations of a certain European identity that partially fill the concept of Europe with meaning. In this study, I have sought to synthesise and develop these approaches in order to analyse the correlation between articulations of a certain European identity and the politics of European integration.

This dissertation has not tried to illuminate whether the ambitions within the EU to imagine Europe as a distinct community is good or bad from a moral point of view; or whether or not it will succeed, rather I have emphasised that the way we talk about Europe also underlie the possibility of political action in this context. My ambition of bringing Europe down to earth encourages us, in this sense, to critically examine enacted demarcation lines between “us” and “them” as these are manifest in practice. By way of conclusion, it is not evident that we need to go outside Europe to find ‘the others’: the limits of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe also crystallise inside its borders, between “Good and Bad Europeans”.

GOOD AND BAD EUROPEANS

In order to realise ourselves as “real Europeans”, we must know what makes Europe “Europe” in the first place: ‘we must speak the truth’ to use words of Michel Foucault. In the fifth chapter, I analysed how the ‘activity of knowing Europe’ was expressed in the meetings between the EU and three of its member-states. I hinted at a constitutive split between the “Good European” who realises the merits of an ever-closer union as contrasted to the “Bad European” who is likewise an EU-citizen, but is yet to realise the merits of ‘the European idea’. The referendum on Ireland in 2001 on the ratification of the Treaty of Nice displayed how knowledge of Europe was reproduced so as to warrant the necessity of the irrevocable enlargement process. The debate revealed a constitutive split between “yet-to-be-Europeans” (the No-voting Majority) and
“Real Europeans” (the Yes-voting minority) that further emphasised what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe, in this case translated as realising the virtue of signing the Treaty of Nice. In the second case, the Swedish people decided not to introduce the common currency (the Euro) in a referendum in 2003. The national debate, in the perspective of the Yes-camp, revealed images of the Swedes as being hopelessly rooted in the national. The message given was that the Swedish people had to leave their national nostalgia behind in order to become “Real Europeans”.

The referendum campaign in France 2005 was about the new constitutional treaty. The French referendum brought repercussions to the rest of the Europe in a way that was not apparent in the case of Ireland and certainly not in the case of Sweden. The destiny of France was intrinsically linked with that of the whole Europe and the category of “yet-to-be-Europeans” does not quite make sense in the French case. At the same time, in the vision of an enlarged family of nations and peoples that live together in peace and harmony, the EU project cannot be limited to the national interests of the republic of France. Consequently, those who have realised that France shares a common responsibility with their fellow Europeans were positioned in a category of “Real Europeans”, whereas those who are unwilling to do so may be positioned in the category of “French Europeans”.

Bringing the pieces together, the three debates indicate how politics is being enacted in the moral register between “Good and Bad Europeans”. In my analysis, I have come across definitions of the ‘new Europe’ linked to the image of the EU as a peace project (Ireland); the EU as a welfare provider (Sweden) and the EU as a union closer to its citizens (the case of France). The political questions of the eastern enlargement, the euro and the new constitutional treaty were transformed from the field of political controversy to a moral distinction between “Good and Bad Europeans”.

226 From another perspective, of course, it could be argued that the position of the “French Europeans” may be ascribed to those Yes voters who felt that the Treaty served the French interests and voted Yes for that particular reason. In a similar vein, No voters could argue that the Treaty was too focused on the national interests of France and voted No for that particular reason; i.e. they wanted “more Europe”, not less.
Europeans”; between those who are willing to embrace the ‘European project’ and those who are not.

The negative results in the three referenda made EU politicians realise, more than before, that the alienation felt among Europeans towards the European project had to be dealt with. The solution was for the Union to integrate even more. In other words, the No votes were interpreted as incentives to consolidate efforts to further the integration process. However, Sweden has to date not yet entered the euro-zone completely and the constitutional treaty voted down in France and Holland is still considered more or less buried. In Sweden, national elites articulated a need to better involve the Swedes in the European project so as to make them realise that they belong to Europe. After the double rejection in both France and Holland, voices from “Brussels” and elsewhere articulated a need to explain Europe better to its citizens. At one level, this was about consolidating efforts to sustain a European identity which Europeans could commit themselves to and realise the merits of an ever-closer union. At another level, it was about communicating to the Europeans what the European project already has accomplished and where a joint path would take “us” to in the future in terms of joint solutions to common challenges. It is of course quite logical for political representatives who receive an affirmative vote in a public referendum to decide to continue on the route laid out. It is noteworthy that a No vote may provoke similar reactions. I do not propose that this is the only inference to be drawn from the EU reactions to the domestic referenda, but it did play a crucial part in sustaining the feasibility of the integration process to continue its march forward despite the obvious lack of popular support.

In the referenda campaigns both camps posited the other as essentially different from itself. In this respect, we can analyse the campaigns as cases of identity politics; of the making of differences and categorisations between “us” and “them”. In the French case, I noticed that the No-voting majority was described as being closer to the populist agenda. The seventh chapter of this thesis indicated that the label of populism corresponds to the question of what “we” (as in “we”, “the Good Europeans”) are not. Political movements labelled as populists continue to distort the vision of a new Europe that welcomes change and the abolishment of borders.
Members of the EUC portray themselves as morally superior to the populists who are said to exploit people’s fear of the unknown and to be naively stubborn about the possibility for the single nation-state to deal with global problems. The ERP are excluded from the making of the realm of ‘real politics’ that deals with pragmatic problem-solving in the name of Europe, since they are said to live in a fantasy world and are unable to expand their loyalties to outside the limited borders of the nation-states. At the same time, the populists claim to represent the ‘true voice’ of the people, something which ‘the elite’ has neglected. Both camps portray each other in a negative manner and they both endeavour to position themselves as the ‘good democrats’. If there are no foes, there is no politics.

In this regard, I hinted at the tendency to attach the populist label not only to the ERP, but also to members of left-wing movements that are inclined to say ‘No’ to everything from further European integration to globalisation. Political movements or groups labelled as populists tend to incarnate the image of the “Bad Europeans” and it is striking that the no-voting majority in Ireland, Sweden and France were ascribed the same kind of attributes as was the case with the ERP (figure II):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good Europeans</th>
<th>Bad Europeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitans</td>
<td>Nationalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border-Transgressing</td>
<td>Border-Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facing Globalisation</td>
<td>Exploiting fears of globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Integration</td>
<td>Cause fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess knowledge of Europe</td>
<td>Euro-indifferent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus-Driven</td>
<td>Conflict-Driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Europe</td>
<td>Anti-European Populists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 2 - A constitutive split between “Good and Bad Europeans”](image)

Any political articulation revolves around a set of definitions of certain key concepts, and simultaneously produces and reproduces knowledge of what for instance makes Europe “Europe” in relation to what it is depicted not to be (i.e. ‘the nation’). In the conceptual scheme above (figure II) I have illustrated how a set of traits is ascribed to each side of the constitutive split of “Good Europeans” and “Bad Europeans”, which in turn enables acts of differentiation
between the two categories. My analysis thus suggests that the question of what makes Europe “Europe” is expressed as a constitutive split between “Good and Bad Europeans”. The empty signifier of Europe is filled with meaning through a conceptual scheme of floating signifiers that are arranged in relation to one another and tied to each of these categories respectively.

To be “Good Europeans”, then, it is not possible to remain too loyal to the nation. It is not the case that the cosmopolitan vision of a more integrated Europe excludes the possibility of also identifying with ‘the nation’. However, in order for us to talk about Europe as a feasible point of identification, Europeans need to recognise themselves as Europeans and thus expand their loyalties to include Europe also. Certainly, it is wrong to state that the integration process is leaving nationalism behind. The political project of the EU combines articulations of nationalisms with ideals of a kind of moral cosmopolitanism that is distinguished from the nationalist agenda of the “Bad Europeans”, be it the FPÖ in Austria or the No-voting majority in Sweden. As a contrast to the “Bad Europeans” who tend to remain loyal to the ethnic mythology of ‘the nation’, the “Good Europeans” share a commitment to joint forms of governance and democratic deliberation on a civic European public space where the European dialogue is supposed to take place.

Furthermore, the “Good Europeans” venerate the abolition of borders between member-states whereas the “Bad Europeans” remains loyal to the restricted domain of the nation-state. Ultimately, the EU is considered a great border-transgressing venture that nurtures cultural inter-change across old state-lines. The “Good Europeans” consider the EU (and the integration process as a whole) an answer to globalisation: “we” have to stay together in order to tackle a world in movement. On the other hand, the “Bad Europeans” exploit a public fear of societal changes associated with mechanisms of globalisation. The “Good Europeans” also understand the merits of even further integration, whereas the “Bad Europeans” strive to move backwards and seek fragmentation rather than co-operation.

The “Good Europeans” know what it means to be, act and think as European in Europe, something which the “Bad Europeans” have yet to realise, since they lack sufficient
information of what for instance the signing of the Treaty of Nice entails in practice. In this vein, however, the position of the “Bad European” does not automatically imply that the No-voting majority of the Irish people are inherently bad from a moral point of view, rather that they are yet to learn how to act as “Good Europeans” and realise that the Treaty of Nice symbolises a common dream of a reunified European family of nations and peoples. A furthering of the integration process, potentially, challenges spillbacks of euro-indifference.

The “Good Europeans” seek to solve common European dilemmas in common European dialogues: they are dedicated to seek compromises to facilitate for the Union to ‘speak in one voice’ whereas the “Bad Europeans” distort this ambition, allegedly blinded by national self-interest (e.g. the No-voting majority in France). All this suggest that the “Good Europeans” are anti-populist and acknowledge the ‘European idea’ of “us” coming together in a union.

These analytical constructs indicate that in order to fully participate in the debate on the future of Europe we must first learn how to be, act and think as “Good Europeans”. The European dialogue, like any act of communication, has its rules. A ticket to be accepted as a participant in this particular dialogue, my analysis suggests, is that “we” (as in “we” who aspire to be, act and think as “Real Europeans” in Europe) reconcile with the features associated with the archetypical “Good Europeans”.

**WANTED IN EUROPE**

The question of what makes Europe “Europe” is not only expressed as a constitutive split between “Good and Bad Europeans”, but it is also about who is wanted in Europe in the first place. The fostering of a sense of commitment among Europeans to a certain European culture corresponds to a collective perception that “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) need to stay together and protect ourselves from threats from the outside. What we refer to as ‘Europe’ cannot be isolated from the borders that demarcate its extension. On the one hand, the enlargement rhetoric gives the impression that “we” (as in “we”, ‘the Europeans’) are all
linked to a common European destiny. Only together can the peoples and nation-states and peoples take advantage of the promises made by the transgression of borders. On the other hand, immigration is perceived as a threat to internal security and European cohesion. Furthermore, migration is to be managed, and unwanted migrants risk being perceived as potential exploiters of domestic welfare systems of Western member-states. The joint message is that “we” have to stay together in order to both tackle fears and accommodate hopes associated with processes of globalisation. The image of the EU as a peace project responds to a language of hopes that indicate that “we”, by virtue of our achievements, have reached a higher stage of development and is now able to co-operate in a union of former antagonists. The Union is the symbol for “us” Europeans coming together to achieve mutual goals. On the other hand, when the EU asks for increased efforts to combat illegal immigration and others kinds of trans-national criminal activities, it is fundamentally a language of fears that is being used. My analysis indicates that these two ways of conceptualising globalisation have triggered the integration process further, spelling out a message that the furthering of the integration process will, eventually, make Europeans aware that they ought to unite in order to handle pressures provoked by the mythical globalisation.

In the sixth chapter, I pinpointed the relation between identity and security as manifest in the transformation of the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice. Noteworthy is, though, that the spill-over of European integration into the realms of internal security would not have occurred without the active consent of the member-states. My analysis suggests that efforts to maintain security within the EU are triggered both at a supranational, trans-national level and also at state-national level of policy-making. Current undertakings within the EU legislative framework to boost security to protect the freedom to move for legal citizens within the EU area do not contradict that the various national communities remain key security referents. However, in the construction of AFSJ the idea of Europe is also recognised as existentially threatened and “we” (as in “we”, the member-states of the EU) need to combine the efforts to sustain mobility within the EU with increased efforts to protect the freedom of Europeans against those engaged with
crime-related activities that take advantage of the abolishment of borders.

In my analysis of the ‘Presidency conclusions’ from the meetings with the European Council between 1999 and 2004, I inferred that acts of securitization were considered necessary for two immediate reasons. Firstly, they aspire to ensure peoples’ freedom towards an outside world perceived as threatening. Secondly, they enable people to realise that they belong to a distinct imagined community labelled Europe with certain values and principles. In this perspective, more people may realise themselves as “Good Europeans” if they believe that the EU can offer them security and protection.

Of course, we do not know whether this is a feasible strategy to attract popular commitment to the political project of the EU, and since we continue to live in a world of nations it seems relevant to suggest that the distinct nation-states also remain the key referent objects for acts of securitization in a more integrated Europe. However, Europe is increasingly being recognised as a security referent of its own and articulations of a certain European identity are sustained by acts of differentiations between those people who are welcome in Europe and those who are not.

We have before discussed how both ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’ serve as points of identification; of something to rely on when the outside world is perceived as increasingly insecure. In the production of knowledge of what makes Europe “Europe”, the imagined community of Europe - sometimes described as a ‘family’ - is ascribed a set of values that defines ‘the rules of the house’ to which ‘the guest’ has to adjust in order to prove herself worthy of the acceptance of ‘the hosts’. More abstract, the transformation of the EU into ‘an area of freedom, security and justice’ – as outlined in the Millennium Declaration from 1999 - indicates the sharpening of a constitutive split between those who are welcome to move freely around Europe and enjoy the protection of ‘human rights’ and those who are not.

Cris Shore argues that (2000: 63): ‘the most effective way to promote a sense of European identity is to manipulate fears of Europe being invaded by enemy aliens’. This is, arguably, what the ERP do when they associate immigration with pending flood-waves. Shore does, however, also claim that the EU-elite uses a
more sophisticated strategy, which is to assert the existence of a common European culture emanating from the Greco-Roman tradition. The fostering of a sense of commitment among Europeans to a certain European culture also corresponds to a collective perception that “we” need to stay together and protect ourselves against an outside world perceived as threatening.

Essed & Goldberg (2003: 1074) argue that: ‘a growing sense of ‘We Europeans’ goes hand in hand with increased respectability of ultra-nationalist parties, and the more and more openly expressed assertion that immigrants are a threat to the cultural heritage of established residents’. The way that we talk about Europe frame the politics that is being employed in the name of Europe. If we, for instance, define Europe as existentially threatened by forces of globalisation we have also prepared the ground for a politics that suggest measures to deal with these threats. The mutual dependency relation, discussed in the seventh chapter, of the position of consensual elite and the position of the populists corresponds to a trend towards a Europe that fears its newcomers. The construction of Europe goes hand in hand with a preoccupation of threats at its borders. The popular identity articulated by the populists is expected to grow stronger due to ‘high immigration rates’ and a turbulent world situation in general. The question is how “we” as “Good Europeans” may continue to act hospitable, in relation to strangers.

Certainly, how we relate to strangers reveals something important about how we picture ourselves. Guided by the (family) principles of hospitality and solidarity the archetypical “Good Europeans” are welcoming to strangers. In being indifferent to these principles, the “Bad Europeans” are likely to meet the stranger and the strange with less respect than the “Good Europeans”. However, not all strangers are equally wanted in the imagined community of Europe. Freedom cannot be for everyone. The stranger straddles the border between what we are in relation to what is not considered part of us (see further Hellström 2005b: 80). In this sense, the stranger challenges established categories and does, potentially, pose a challenge to existing hierarchies (See further Kearney 2003; Bauman 1991). Returning to the split between “Good and Bad Europeans”, we may add to this picture a split between Good (i.e “stranger as a guest”) and Bad strangers (i.e
“stranger as an intruder”). The stranger as a guest is related to an image of the cosmopolitan traveller who refuses to settle down anywhere. This ‘stranger’ is potentially welcome everywhere and nowhere at the same time. The second image – ‘the stranger as an intruder’ - may be the criminalised immigrant trying to find his or her way to a new home inside the borders of the European Union. The constitutive split between “Good and Bad strangers” contribute to the partial fixation of meaning of what makes Europe “Europe” in the sense that it defines who is wanted in Europe and who is not. The power of definition is expressed in the (re)production of knowledge of what, for instance, makes an illegal immigrant different from a tourist.

This all suggests a demarcation line between a clearly defined inside [Europe] and a likewise distinguishable outside [Not-Europe]. The borders of Europe may appear fuzzy in spatial terms, but the constitutive split between “Good and Bad strangers” provides yet another example of how the question of what makes Europe “Europe” is manifest inside the territorial borders of the enlarged union. The identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe is not merely about the making of spatial demarcations of where Europe ends; who is to become a European citizen or not. The production and reproduction of what makes Europe “Europe” evolves in the EU area and among EU citizens also. Consequently, the idea that ‘the new Europe’ makes a borderless community where everybody is equally estranged in relation to one and another is questionable. When whole groups of people are depicted as strange we are not talking about universal estrangement in a Beckian sense (Beck 1998: 133; see also Hellström 2005b: 82), but selective estrangement; hence, some people are knitted more closely together whereas others are increasingly left behind in the process towards a more integrated Europe (cf. scene III).

In the final section of this chapter (and book) I return to my ambition of bringing Europe down to earth and to what extent this study has contributed to this endeavour.
EXPERIENCES AND EXPECTATIONS

The question of how to define Europe has no finite answer; it is debated in an undecidable terrain of conflicting and sometimes contradicting wills and visions. At the same time, the identity-making enterprise that takes place in the name of Europe partially fixes the meaning of what it means to be, act and think as European in Europe. The ambition of bringing Europe down to earth, in this sense, encourage us to highlight tensions and contradictions that are inherent in our perceptions of what makes Europe “Europe”.

An immediate concern is, though, that the visions and expectations of the EUC seem rather remote from the daily lives of Europeans in contemporary European societies. Who reads the treaties referred to in this dissertation, and who actually listens and pays attention to what members of the EUC say in their speeches? In what ways do these articulations of a new Europe concern Europeans? This thesis has certainly not gone all the way as regards the ambition of bringing Europe down to earth. As indicated in the beginning of this book, the historian Reinhart Kostelleck (2004) separates a space of experiences from a horizon of expectations. The ‘space of experiences’ is where people actually live and it is characterised by routine practices, continuities and repetitive behaviour. On the ‘horizon of expectations’, on the other hand, we find visions and ideas of a different (better) society in the future (cf. Hall & Löfgren 2006: chapter 4). This dissertation has, in particular, emphasised the employment of identity politics from the position of a ‘consensual elite’. The material has, in other words, been limited to the level of expectations in the context of the political project of the EU. The question of what makes Europe “Europe” is expressed on both arenas, but I would argue that expectations of Europe influence how Europeans view themselves as Europeans also on a daily basis. Expectations of what makes Europe “Europe” define and condition the rules of the game in the context of the political project of the EU.

We cannot easily separate macro- and micro levels of identity construction from each other. As was the case with Frantz Fanon (see further my discussion in chapter 2), we cannot simply choose
what positions we want to identify with. The two levels of history-making meet in a discursive formation of what it means to be, act and think as European in Europe. In the terminology of Kostelleck, any revolutionary settlement evolves as a struggle of meaning of certain key concepts. In the case of the French revolution, Kostelleck claims that the meaning of the concept of ‘state’ was a fundamental source of conflict. Interestingly enough, the actual revolutionary struggle was about reducing the complexity of the concept of ‘state’ in to a singular, hegemonic entity. These struggles shape the conditions for our moods of existence in the space of experiences: our perception of the world is affected by how certain key concepts are defined in the first place. The struggle of what makes Europe “Europe” crystallises in an undecidable terrain of antagonistic knowledge-producers that taken together condition our perceptual horizon of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe.

The question is to what extent we may challenge these fundamental premises and so alter the rules of the game. The main character of the novel ‘The Man without Destiny’ written by Imre Kertész (1998) returns home to Cracow after having survived several years in concentration camps such as Auschwitz and Birkenau. The young man is annoyed with questions about the ‘horror’ he had lived through. In particular, he was frustrated about the advice to forget in order to start a “new life”. For him, there is no ultimate destiny only little steps that takes us from the past to the future. Before Auschwitz, he had endless conversations with his older sister during which he tried to explain that for him the concept of “the Jew” does not mean anything at all. There is no grande-route to follow, apart from making sacrifices to stay alive.

What do we learn from this story? The young man from Kertész’s novel lives in the space of experience but is likewise forced to relate to the fact that he is a Jew and has survived the holocaust. In communicating with relatives and others, he felt limited by the fact that he had to relate to an idea of a collective destiny of the Jewish people. Before he even opened his mouth, many of his conversation-partners had already decided what he was going to say and as a consequence they did not pay attention to his experiences and what he was saying, or they felt annoyed with his stories and concluded that he probably “needed to rest” before he
could ultimately realise what it means to be, act and think as a “Real Jew”. The young man in the novel refused to admit that he was simply a loser or an innocent victim, since that would deprive him of any individual sense of existence. And according to him: ‘if there is destiny, freedom is not possible’ (ibid: 205).

It is not necessarily what you say that matters the most, but the position you are articulating yourself from. The people that the young man in Kétesz’s novel met on his return to Cracow had already decided what his individual experiences from the concentration camps were like. Sometimes, the answers even precede the questions: he had ‘to speak the truth’ and there were certain acceptable ways of answering their queries. By his way of responding, though, it was clear that he did not concur enough with the collective perception of the big horror and he was also, more or less, ostracised from the Jewish Community.

Identity comes with existence and we cannot simply choose to live outside the fundamental categories (e.g. male/female; black/white) that continue to have a more or less noticeable effect on how we identify ourselves as individuals and collectives. Even so, picking up from the novel, there is no intelligible principle or divine force that finally decides what it means to be a “Jew” or a “European”. These and other identity positions are contingently reproduced and reshaped in human interaction, it is “we” who create the Kings (see further chapter 4). In other words, there is no destiny of Europe, but a series of supplements and political articulations of a certain European identity that partially fill the concept of Europe with meaning. However, this thesis has suggested that debates on EU politics revolve around certain categories that define ‘the rules of the game’. In the debate recounted in the beginning of this book, I experienced difficulties in approaching EU specific issues without relating to the distinct categories of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’. Together these positions constituted the perceptual horizon from which we (as in “we” who were debating and the audience) were to make sense of what was said in the debate. These positions provide a ticket to enter any debate on EU-related issues and thereby they also constrain the possibility of articulating alternative positions. It was due to my perception of a lack of space in this regard that I felt a need to proceed with the task of bringing Europe down to earth in the first
place, of removing the question of Europe from the realm of historic necessity to the sphere of politics, from the idea of a certain European destiny to a recognition of the new Europe as a site of struggle.

FROM CHANCE TO DESTINY TO POLITICS

Benedict Anderson defines the magic of nationalism as the transformation of chance to destiny (Anderson 1991: 7; see also scene V). My analysis indicates that this magic is now manifest in a ‘logic of irrevocability’ attached with the current European integration process. In my analysis, we have come across notions that “we” Europeans belong together in the past, in the present and in the future, when “we” must cooperate even more in order to tackle challenges of globalisation (see further chapter 3, 4 and 6). And in the fifth chapter, I analysed how three No votes in domestic referenda on EU-related issues encouraged EU politicians to further the efforts to communicate Europe better to its citizens, to establish a new Europe from the grass roots so as to commit the European citizens to a distinct European Community. The problem with the democratic deficit and lack of popular commitment was thus not necessarily considered to be about too much integration, rather too little, and therefore the process must continue.

On the one hand, the logic of irrevocability enables a partial fixation of meaning of what it means to be, act and think as Europeans in Europe, on the other hand, the citizens of Europe are left with few alternatives to imagine Europe in any way different from what it is implied by this logic. It is in this perspective that a consensual view of what makes Europe “Europe” is dangerous: the crucial part is not that we in various situations seek consensus, but how this is done and what is being discarded on the way; what we choose to remember and what we choose to forget.

We can hardly think of any social formation or political community that does not rely on a consensual view on at least some fundamental aspects: we are not able to imagine Europe as a distinct community if we do not share any kind of mutual understanding of what makes Europe “Europe” in the first place. Nevertheless, if consensus is made the overarching aim of the
political project of the EU, we are ill-suited to recognise the plurality of voices that are downplayed or ignored in, for instance, the ambitions to enable the EU to speak with ‘one voice’ in relation to the outside world (see further chapter 3). There are no politically innocent consensus formations: there will always be some elements of power and repression. We continue to live with political confrontations between groups of people (or individuals) who claim divergent opinions of how we are to organise everything from grander societies to minor institutional arrangements. The post-political illusion (see further chapter 7) is dangerous in the sense that it neglects political distinctions between “us” and “them” as immanent in any attempt to imagine a community as distinct from other entities; in any endeavour to compromise between unity and diversity (see further chapter 3) or in the logic of irrevocability attached with the intra-European integration process.

Of course, we can pretend that everything is equally strange (or not) to us, that we treat everyone with equal respect and hold no principles to be more true than are others, but the supremacy of the better argument. Beside the fact that our loved ones may feel rather frustrated of not being treated exclusively and separated from others, we can – moving up to a collective level of identification – return to our premise that any collective identity-formation presupposes its own opposite: there are no homogenous societies and any political project involves inherent tensions and contradictions.

**WE ARE THE GOOD GUYS**

The constitutive split between “Good and Bad Europeans” implies that ‘we want to be good’ and make the right choices, however, we do not always have that much of a choice. The case is, I believe, that political antagonisms tend to be enacted in the moral register according to the categories of “good and bad/evil” (cf. Mouffe 2005; Žižek 2000; Žižek 2001). In his book, “Welcome to the desert of the real”, Slavoj Žižek makes the following provocative allegory (2002: 3):

In a classical line from a Hollywood screwball comedy, the girl asks her boyfriend: ‘Do you want to marry me?’ ‘No!’ ‘Stop dodging the issue! Give me a straight
answer! In a way, the underlying logic is correct: the only acceptable straight answer for the girl is ‘Yes’, so anything else counts as evasion /…/ And is it not the same today with the choice ‘democracy or fundamentalism’? Is it not that, within the terms of this choice, it is simply not possible to choose ‘fundamentalism’?

Žižek here refers more specifically to the “war on terror”-discourse emerging after September 11. But I believe that we can apply the same metaphor to our case of the making of Europe. The post-political illusion leaves us with few tools to confront actual ruptures in contemporary European societies. If we are left but with two options, either to get on the train and reconcile with the irrevocable European project, or to turn our faith to the promises of nationalism we face a new Europe that is as poor as it is ugly. However, the new Europe remains a site of struggle and in this perspective it is only our imagination that limits the possibility of imagining ‘the pluriverse’ (see further chapter 3) of Europe in any different way. To ‘bringing Europe down to earth’ means to critically engage with contemporary articulations of what makes Europe “Europe” and to highlight that there are no politically neutral definitions of the concept of Europe. Inspired by the man without destiny, we may continue to refuse the answers that we feel that others are imposing on us and instead think through the categories that condition our moods of existence (i.e. the perceptual horizon of ‘Europe’ and ‘the nation’). We do not have to dodge the question of Europe even if we aspire to alter the terms of choice and thus refrain from marriage.
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