Poor Relief and Internal Migration: Lessons From the Nineteenth Century

Sara Kalm and Johannes Lindvall
STANCE is a six-year research program at the Department of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. The program, consisting of several separate but connected research projects, aims to answer the question of how state-making and the international system co-evolved in the long 19th century (1789-1914) and beyond. The program is constructed around three research themes: (1) How did the different dimensions of state-making evolve? What actors and organized interests supported or put up resistance to these processes? (2) How were these dimensions of state-making affected by geopolitical competition, warfare and the diffusion of novel political technologies?; and (3) What were the consequences for the international system, both with respect to the type of state that emerged and what entities were granted membership in the state system? The program aims to bridge the gaps between comparative politics and IR, as well as those between the study of political thought and positive empirical political science. The research has been made possible by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (Riksbankens Jubileumsfond). Visit the research program’s website at www.stanceatlund.org

Please address comments and/or queries for information to:

*Email address*: info@stanceatlund.org

*Mailing address*: STANCE
Department of Political Science
Lund University
Box 52, SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden

In Series 2016:
1. “STATE CAPACITY AS POWER: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK”, Johannes Lindvall and Jan Teorell
3. “STEPPE STATE MAKING”, Martin Hall
4. “WAR, PERFORMANCE AND THE SURVIVAL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS”, Hanna Bäck, Jan Teorell, and Alexander von Hagen-Jamar
5. “THE NATION-STATE AS FAILURE: NATIONALISM AND MOBILITY, IN INDIA AND ELSEWHERE”, Erik Ringmar
6. “CABINETS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND CORRUPTION. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS”, Hanna Bäck, Staffan Lindberg, and Jan Teorell
7. “SOCIAL POLICY AND MIGRATION POLICY IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY”, Sara Kalm and Johannes Lindvall
8. “FROM AN INCLUSIVE TO AN EXCLUSIVE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS FROM THE 19TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY”, Ellen Ravndal
10. “REPUBLICA SRPSKA – THE BECOMING OF A STATE”, Annika Björkdahl

In Series 2017
1. “THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF STATE CAPACITY: ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND LATE DEVELOPMENT”, Agustín Goenaga Orrego
2. “TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS: A RESEARCH AGENDA”, Johannes Lindvall
3. “RULES OF RECOGNITION: EXPLAINING DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY”, Jan Teorell
5. “INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, AUTHORITY AND THE FIRST PERMANENT SECRETARIATS IN THE 19TH CENTURY”, Ellen Ravndal
7. “STATE MAKING AND SWEDISH POLITICS IN THE NORTH”, Martin Hall

In Series 2018
2. “EMPIRE AND STATE IN EARLY MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT”, Jens Bartelson
3. “THE AMBIGUOUS EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY ON BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY”, David Andersen and Agnes Cornell
4. “NOT BECOMING A STATE: THE ICELANDIC COMMONWEALTH FROM COLONIZATION TO NORWEGIAN SUZERAINITY”, Martin Hall
5. “POOR RELIEF AND INTERNAL MIGRATION: LESSONS FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY”, Sara Kalm and Johannes Lindvall

STANCE working papers are available in electronic format at www.stanceatlund.org
COPYRIGHT © 2018 by authors. All rights reserved.
Poor Relief and Internal Migration: Lessons From the Nineteenth Century

Sara Kalm
Associate Professor in Political Science
Lund University

Johannes Lindvall
Professor in Political Science
Lund University
Through social policies – such as income transfers to the poor, the sick, the old, and the unemployed – governments provide for the welfare of members of society. Through immigration policies – such as the rules that govern the admission of foreigners and define the rights of resident migrants – governments decide who becomes a member of society in the first place. The nature of the relationship between social policies and immigration policies is one of the main political questions of our time. Many scholars and politicians argue that generous social policies are incompatible with openness to immigration. Many others disagree.

We put these contemporary debates in historical perspective by examining the relationship between social policy and internal migration controls in the beginning and middle of the nineteenth century, before the modern welfare state emerged. Our analysis relies on a case-by-case discussion of four countries: the Austrian Empire, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find a relationship between social policies and immigration policies in the United States, which experienced large flows of immigration early on. By contrast, in Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which experienced much less immigration in the nineteenth century, we find a stronger relationship between social policy and the regulation of internal migration. This suggests that the latent conflict between social policy and migration policy, broadly defined, existed long before the modern welfare state – but for a long time, it was primarily a local conflict, not a national one.

These findings are important since they remind us that governments do not only decide how generous social policies should be, or how open countries should be to immigration; they also decide where social policies and immigration policies should be made. To be more precise, they decide at which level of government social benefits should be provided, and they decide which types of immigration should be regulated.

In a companion piece, Kalm and Lindvall (2018), we have studied social policies and immigration policies in Western Europe in the forty-year period between 1880 and 1920, seeking to determine if international immigration policies became more restrictive when the world’s first social insurances were introduced from the 1880s onward. We found the following: (1) When the German Empire introduced the world’s first national social insurances in the 1880s, Germany already had more restrictive immigration policies than all other countries in Western Europe. Denmark, another early social-policy adopter, also pursued restrictive immigration policies early on. (2) Almost all other countries in Western Europe started out with more liberal immigration policies than Germany’s and Denmark’s, but then adopted more restrictive immigration policies and more generous social policies concurrently. (3) There are two exceptions: Italy and Belgium, which did not adopt more restrictive immigration policies and more generous social policies concurrently before 1920.¹ When national social rights were first defined, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most Western European states thus either made it more difficult for

¹ The Italian exception has a straightforward explanation: emigration, not immigration, was the main concern in Italy in the early twentieth century. The Belgian case is more puzzling, but it should be noted that Belgium introduced much more restrictive immigration policies in the early to mid-1920s, just after the period we investigate.
immigrants to enter their territories, or restricted the rights of resident migrants, or both.

We now wish to move further back in time, investigating the relationship between social policy and migration policy before the introduction of the world’s first social insurances. Meanwhile, in a third paper with Frida Böräng, we are investigating the relationship between social policy and migration policy from the inter-war period until the present.

Social Policy and Migration

Anticipating the accession of ten Eastern European countries as members of the European Union, in 2004, Sweden’s prime minister Göran Persson, a social democrat, proposed temporary movement restrictions for citizens of the new member states. Persson suspected that Sweden’s generous welfare provisions would otherwise attract poor Eastern Europeans to Sweden as “benefit tourists.”

This argument is in no way unique. The principle of free internal movement of workers – as laid down in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – has always been subject to the suspicion that poor foreigners will misuse mobility to claim welfare benefits illegitimately. The most recent example is the debate about the Romanian Roma, who have recently and suddenly appeared in large numbers in cities across Europe, and whose poverty is visible in their begging, and their lack of housing. Similarly, voting in the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom was influenced by concerns that immigrants were exploiting Britain’s welfare system, and during 2015 and 2016, following large inflows of mostly Syrian refugees, the suspicion of “benefit tourism” resurfaced once more. In Denmark, for instance, social benefits were lowered in order to decrease the number of asylum seekers (Hartacollis 2015). And Europe is not alone. The Trump administration is currently preparing a rule which would castigate documented immigrants who use food stamps, Obamacare, and other social programs.²

These debates about the relationship between migration and welfare seem to recur in all contemporary states that count themselves as welfare states, although welfare states are in fact very different in many respects (Esping-Andersen 1990). The populist radical right parties are among the most insistent (Mudde 2006), but the same kinds of arguments are voiced on the mainstream left and the mainstream right. The exact arguments that politicians use vary. More radical politicians depict immigrants as free-riders who take advantage of their host country by committing welfare fraud. Less radical politicians describe the perceived problem in more neutral and less sensationalist ways: it is argued large numbers of immigrants cannot be absorbed by the labor market, either because of general economic downturns, or because their skill

² The draft of the rule reads as follows (quoted in Jones, 2018): “Non-citizens who receive public benefits are not self-sufficient and are relying on the U.S. government and state and local entities for resources instead of their families, sponsors or private organizations. An alien’s receipt of public benefits comes as taxpayer expense and availability of public benefits may provide an incentive for aliens to immigrate to the United States.”
levels are not much in demand. Their resulting need for social support makes them costly to the country that hosts them, which in the long run threatens to erode the financial basis of the welfare state, to the disadvantage of all, including the poor. This argument often relies on the ethical position that states should first and foremost provide benefits for “their own” (Huysmans 2000: 768–9).

We wish to historicize these perceived dilemmas regarding immigration and welfare. Current day-discussions understandably focus on current-day concerns, but we want to demonstrate that the worries – even the structure of the arguments – have deep historical roots. In other words, we wish to question the “presentism” that defines debates on immigration and welfare. The tension in the past was between the domestically itinerant poor and locally organized poor relief – not, like today, between the internationally itinerant poor and the nationally organized welfare state. But the logic was similar.

We also wish to question the boundary between the domestic and the international that characterizes many contemporary studies of migration policy. These two realms are typically seen as sharply differentiated and governed by different concerns and interests, and immigration policy is typically seen as something that is closely associated with state sovereignty and the political and conceptual universe of the modern state system. More precisely, immigration policy is typically said to originate with the First World War, when modern passports and border controls were established, and when the foreigner became the defining Other in evolving national projects. We question this conceptualization by highlighting continuities over time. Throughout modern history, the excluded “alien” has been both domestic and international, and defined both economically and culturally.

The reason that taking on more public social responsibilities sometimes leads governments at different levels to adopt more selective immigration policies is, quite simply, that when localities and nations take on greater social responsibilities, they have a strong incentive to avoid those who are likely to become financial liabilities. Georges Midré (1990) summarises social policy over several hundred years, with a particular focus on understanding “delimiting institutions.” When public authorities take on the responsibility of providing for parts of the population, delimiting, or definitional, institutions are set up to distinguish between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor (cf. Panican and Ulmestig 2017). Our main point is that this is true for both localities and states, both today and in the past.

Within the field of immigration policy research, most studies in political science are concerned with the post-Second-World-War period (in fact, most cover an even shorter time span, concentrating on post-1980 or post-Cold War policy). The period preceding World War II has mainly been the preserve for historians, economic historians and historical sociologists, who have usually focused on only one country, or locality, and who have often zoomed in on one particular aspect of immigration policy (such as passport requirements) (see, for instance, Groebner 2004, Torpey 2000, Caplan and Torpey 2001, Hatton and Williamson 1994, Robertson 2010, Fahrmeir et al 2003, Noiriel 1996, Enflo and Ramón Rosés 2015, Green 2010, Lövgren 2000, Rosental 2011, Winter and Lambrecht 2013, Caestecker 2003, Fahrmeir 2000, Hirota
2013, Law 2014, Lloyd 2005, Lucassen et al. 2006, Ruedin et al. 2014, and Sánchez Alonso 2013; for an overview of historical approaches, see Gabaccia 2014). Lately, however, political scientists and political sociologists have begun to engage with earlier historical periods. For example, Scott FitzGerald and David Cook-Martín (2014) have investigated the connection between democratization and racist immigration policy in six countries in North and South America, and Margaret E. Peters (2015) has explored the relationship between openness to trade and to immigration by studying nineteen countries from the late eighteenth century today. We wish to contribute to this branch of politico-historical analysis by focusing on the relation between immigration and early social policies with their roots in the early-modern period.

Forms of Exclusion

In the literature on migration and the welfare state, the “welfare chauvinism hypothesis” is the expectation that states become more likely to exclude immigrants as their social policies become more generous. Welfare chauvinism is a result of the competition for scarce resources. It thus depends on material conflict – as opposed to racism and nativism, which are grounded in ethnic, racial, religious, and other non-material factors (Boräng 2015: 217). There are two main versions of the welfare chauvinism hypothesis, for welfare states can restrict access to social policies either by curbing the admission of immigrants or by restricting the rights of resident migrants. The welfare chauvinism hypothesis is not uncontested in the literature. According to some scholars that have investigated its accuracy in present-day political settings, welfare states come with institutions that counteract the exclusions that the welfare chauvinist hypothesis countenances. Frida Boräng, for example, has found that generous welfare states actually admit more forced migrants than other states. She argues that welfare states tend to widen solidarity, strengthen generalised trust, and foster the view that the state should protect individuals – a view that can be extended also to non-citizens (Boräng 2015). Mau and Burkhardt have similarly pointed out that welfare state institutions mediate distributional conflicts, which allows policies to become more inclusive (2009). When it comes to rights, Sainsbury has argued that generous welfare states have actually been more prone to extend rights to immigrants than others (Sainsbury 2012). Other scholars have observed that the more generous the welfare state, the more tolerant its citizens are toward outsiders (Crepaz and Damron 2009; Crepaz 2008). Guiraudon also argues that welfare-state institutions have improved the social integration of immigrants due to their “inclusionary” and “non-discriminatory” logics (see also Banting and Kymlicka 2006).

But there are strong reasons to believe, in our view, that the welfare chauvinism hypothesis offers an accurate description of politics during the first few decades after the introduction of modern social insurances in the 1880s (Kalm and Lindvall 2018). The explanation, in our view, is the “newness” of ambitious social policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The norm changes that the scholars we cited
in the previous paragraph describe are only likely to occur after some time, as solidarity, inclusion and trust are gradually extended to immigrants.

What interests us now is whether we can find welfare chauvinist exclusions at the domestic level in the beginning and the middle of the nineteenth century. We now proceed to identify two different categories of exclusions, which, in combination with a differentiation between policy levels (national and local), gives us a total of four forms of exclusions directed at migrants. Recognizing that such exclusions may be established for different reasons, we wish to emphasize once more that we are interested in exclusions that are caused by economic concerns, arising, more precisely, from the way that the “boundaries of welfare” are drawn, to borrow Maurizio Ferrera’s term (Ferrera 2005).

We do not assume that these forms of exclusion are necessarily connected to a certain ideology. In fact, we expect that they can be practiced by either rightwing or leftwing governing authorities.

The first of our two main categories is external exclusions, which are directed at the geographical presence of immigrants. Such exclusions may be implemented at the country’s border, in which case the person in question is prohibited from entering. But importantly, they may also be enacted from within the receiving jurisdiction’s territory. They then take the form of deportations. The difference between these two kinds is not only that they are carried out at different geographical locations. There is also a temporal difference in that the former occurs before immigration is accomplished, prohibiting immigration from being realized, whereas the latter take place after the fact of immigration. 3 Externale exclusions may be directed at foreigners or at nationals. In the former case, we will speak of “international external exclusions”; in the latter, we will speak of “domestic external exclusions.”

The second main category is internal exclusions, which aim to prevent the immigrant’s access to benefits, or at least severely restrict it. Here, what is under attack is not geographical presence, but what we with modern vocabulary will call “rights.” What interest us the most is the exclusion of migrants from receiving poor relief or other kinds of economic benefits. But in general terms, the benefits from which immigrants are excluded may comprise suffrage or other benefits of political, legal or cultural character. In either case, the objective is to prevent or undermine the equality between immigrants and native subjects. There are two different types of internal exclusions. The first denies immigrants’ access to benefits altogether and has no intention of ever changing that state of affairs. The second allows immigrants to gain the benefits of natives gradually and over time. The former amounts to legal discrimination and is generally not seen as legitimate in democratic regimes – in contrast with the second, which is practiced widely: for the most part, excluding immigrants from some benefits is seen as democratically legitimate, as long as this is meant to be a temporary phase in his/her life, and as long as access to citizenship

---

3 There is a third general type of external exclusions in which the political authorities of the jurisdiction of origin seek to evade re-entry by unwanted subjects. In so far as such a policy is official, it is carried out in cooperation with the authorities in the area of destination, which often receive cash payments or other kinds of compensation.
through some process of naturalization is open. This allows the immigrant to gain formally equal status with citizens – to legally and effectively become one of them – after a determined period of settlement. Just as in the case of external exclusions, internal exclusions may be directed either at foreigners (“international internal exclusions”) or at nationals (“domestic internal exclusions”).

External and internal exclusions are easier to distinguish in theory than in practice. For instance, if a law promises to deport immigrants that apply for poor relief, and if that law results in that immigrants abstaining from applying and hence becoming even poorer in comparison to others – how can we tell whether what is at work are external or internal exclusions? The way we handle this complicated matter here is by restricting our investigation to direct policy only, disregarding the varied indirect consequences that may arise (the example we just mentioned would therefore be counted as a case of external exclusion).

To end this section, we will briefly consider what economic theory has to say about the interrelationship between the local and the national level regarding social policy and migration. Brown and Oates (1987) have demonstrated that the mobility of the poor is a source of “inefficiency” in a system of locally organized poor relief. When there is mobility, there will therefore be pressure to centralize poor relief. This is because unequal levels of assistance will lead the poor to migrate to high-support localities. A migrant destination area will then lower its levels of assistance, because politicians take into account that higher levels will lead to more inflow of poor people. Centralization is more efficient under the condition of mobility, because it equalizes the assistance levels between localities and ends migration that is induced by inequality in assistance (cf. Panican and Ulmestig 2017).

An alternative “solution” to the centralization of poor relief, Brown and Oates argue, is to prohibit immigration – or, in other words, what we call external exclusion. As we will see, this is how the problem was handled under the Poor Laws before the centralization of social policy, when deportations and other forms of domestic external exclusions were common.

But Brown and Oates disregard another possible mechanism for “solving” the issue without resorting to centralization of poor relief. This would be the equivalent to internal exclusion, see above, and more specifically what we in this context refer to as “domestic internal exclusion”: the exclusion of migrants from social rights, including poor relief, although his or her physical presence is accepted.

---

4 It should be underlined that we are only discussing exclusions of unwanted migrants, and not unwanted people in general. Should we cover treatments of unwanted national minorities too, other forms of exclusions would have to be included, among them genocide, sterilization, de-nationalisation and expulsion. One might also then have to take into account that “social policy” may also be directed at getting rid of these groups socially albeit not physically. This may involve forced assimilation of future generations through state seizure of and upbringing of minority children (Ericsson 2016: 97; cf. Hoerder 2001).

5 For critique of this assumption from a contemporary perspective, see De Jong et al (2005).
The Context

In the pre-social insurance era (before 1880), the citizen-foreigner distinction was not yet very significant – at least not in Europe – but the local organization of pre-welfare-state poor relief made domestic exclusions and deportations of paupers and other “undesired” migrants follow a similar logic to the one that we later find with respect to international immigrants (Caestecker 2003: 131–132; Lucassen 2003: 188). In fact, the reason that the citizen-foreigner distinction later became so consequential partly has to do with the centralisation of welfare, as Torpey notes: “In part as a result of the nationalisation of welfare provisions and the increasing assumption by political leaders of responsibility for economic well-being, the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘foreigner’ – a distinction implemented and made knowable by documents – was growing sharper” (Torpey 2003: 83). This is in line with the assumption guiding this paper; that exclusions do not only stem from racism and xenophobia, but also from the organization of social policy.

Before we proceed to analyse the experiences of individual countries in the poor-relief era, we will present the general context of the pre-welfare state period.

Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, poor relief in Europe took broadly comparable forms (Johansson 2001: 38–39). One of the distinctive traits was its local organization. Local governments, mainly parishes, were responsible, and their work was financed locally. To cross a parish boundary was therefore to pass from one social-policy jurisdiction to another. The question of where a poor person belonged was paramount, since it determined what parish that was responsible for him or her, and many parishes did what they could to avoid financial liabilities for the poor, which often led to conflicts among localities (Åman 1976: 127). Poor relief was governed less through legal instruments and more through local, decentralised negotiations: “actual policies towards paupers and migrants were determined mainly by local concerns … and shaped by a variety of decisions and bargaining processes that took place in an inter-parish and intra-parish context” (Winter and Lambrecht 2013, 123).

A second distinctive trait of social policy during the nineteenth century was an increasing emphasis on work ethic. In an earlier period, almsgiving – in the Catholic tradition – was seen as a way for the giver to get closer to salvation. From now onward, however, providing for oneself and one’s own dependants was paramount (Johansson 2001: 38–39). Recipients often needed to demonstrate that they were willing to work, and that they were merely impeded from doing so because of sickness, old age or lack of employment. If one failed to demonstrate such willingness, one would generally be seen as “undeserving” rather than “deserving” of support (Midrè 1990, 185). There was a firm belief that hunger, or the threat of hunger, was necessary for fighting idleness among the lower classes. If benefits were too great, the labour market would be upset and the poor would have no incentive to work. This was regarded as something similar to a natural law, with societal consequences (Polanyi 1944: 116). In England, the emphasis on work ethic was intensified through the new Poor Laws of 1834; other countries, as we will show, followed suit, restricting access to relief and attaching it to harsh work requirements (Johansson 2001: 43).
A third distinctive trait was institutionalisation: the poor, and otherwise excluded groups, were confined and removed from society. In the workhouses, the poor had to work hard in return for material survival. Poverty was generally considered in terms of moral deficiency of the individual. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the main goal of poor relief was to keep the poor alive. But over the course of the nineteenth century it became more ambitious, as the disciplining institutions took on the role of improving, curing, and normalizing the character of the poor (Åman 1976: 242; Midré 1990: 14–15; Leerkes 2016). Social assistance, in this context, became “a sacrament of moralization, control and dissuasion, far exceeding the capabilities of the old logic of alms” (Procacci 1991: 165). Poor relief was not yet regarded as a social right (Marshall 1950). Even if an individual was legally entitled to claiming poor relief, it was not a citizenship right; the price was stigmatization and social de-classification. Recipients were often denied the right to move, and to own property, and they often needed to demonstrate a reformed character in return for support (Berge 1995; Johansson 2001: 42).

The reigning belief was that poverty was a natural and unavoidable feature of social life. The poor could be respected and considered virtuous if they adhered to social values and accepted their situation. It was hence not the poor in general that were the main concern of early social policy, but the “deviant poor” (Althammer 2014a). One of the most significant examples of this category and particularly relevant here is the vagrant – the itinerant poor, the control of whom was the goal of much legislation and regulatory activity. Economic and social restructuring were the underlying causes of the increase in the number of vagrants. Vagrants were seen as potentially criminal, but they were also threatening because they broke with societal norms. In Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis, the vagrant was feared because he challenged the prevailing notion of order. This was partly because he was masterless and therefore not under perceived proper control, but also because his movements were aimless and lacking of a precise destination (Bauman 1996). Vagrants lacked steady jobs and refused to show commitment to work, which put them squarely in the category “undeserving” of poor relief. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, there was a recognition that some became vagrants because of the lack of jobs, and that they would work if they could find employment. This cut the group into deserving and undeserving vagrants. In Germany, the deserving vagrants were given a particular “passport” that enabled internal travel and gave access to some poor relief (Althammer 2014b).

In this brief historical overview, we have already touched upon the issue of internal controls of mobility. But we need to provide a little more detail about this phenomenon before we proceed, for in our time, we tend to take the freedom of domestic movement and settlement for granted. It is even enshrined as a human right in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. Historically, however, such movements have been subject to control and regulation. In feudal society, people were tied to the land of their masters, and they were not allowed to travel without their explicit consent. Later, the early-modern state took over this control. As Zolberg (2007) notes, “within the emergent system of states, the personal obligations of inhabitants to their landlords, which implied very limited geographical
mobility, were transformed into those of monarchical subjects, and state authorities reinforced control over the movements of goods and people” (2007: 34). Passport requirements were used to control people entering and leaving a territory, as well as moving about within it. A famous example is the old regime in France. In 1669, an Edict of Louis XIV prohibited subjects from leaving the Kingdom, and imposed requirements on those who did leave to carry a passport authorizing them to do so. Furthermore, commoners that moved about within the territory needed to possess both a passport from their home village, and a special certificate from the local religious authorities (Torpey 2000: 21). These restrictions were met with great antipathy, and it would eventually become a priority of the French Revolution to dismantle them.6

The information required in the passport, and the terms of its validity, often differed among social classes. In Sweden, for example, passport legislation from 1812 and 1824 allowed “known and safe” Swedes to acquire passports that were valid for one year to all domestic destinations. For others, passports were of much shorter validity and needed to detail the road to be travelled and the exact places that would be passed, besides obligatory information on name, type of work, home town, age and physical description. Vagrants and others without permanent residence needed an additional authorization and their passports needed to include the purpose of the journey. And some did not need any passports at all (Lövgren 2000: 205–206). The freedom of movement was hence strictly regulated and structured along class dimensions. This reflects the function of internal passports as described by John Torpey, who notes that “the internal passport may be a state’s principal means for discriminating among its subjects in terms of rights and privileges. In particular, passes may be used to regulate the movements of certain groups of subjects, to restrict their entry into certain areas, and to deny them the freedom to depart their places of residence.” (Torpey 2000: 165).

It did not always take a revolution to abolish passports and other restrictions on movement. One by one, governments in Western Europe dismantled barriers to movement during the period that interests us here: the nineteenth century. Internal passports fell gradually out of use. Denmark abolished internal passports in 1862, Sweden did so in 1860, Prussia followed in 1867, and the United Kingdom, interestingly, did so as early as 1826. The main motive of the authorities was to enhance commerce and to free up labor power for the emerging industrial economies; these regulatory changes enabled the large-scale processes of urbanization that took place in the nineteenth century.

We now proceed to consider our four country cases, in order to examine the relationship between poor relief and migration before the welfare state. The figure below uses data from the Historical V-Dem and V-Dem projects to describe roughly the internal restrictions on movements in the four countries in our sample between the years 1800 and 2000. As the figure shows, England was the first country to abolish

---

6 However, as has been detailed elsewhere, new barriers to movement were erected quite soon after the revolution (Torpey 2000).
internal controls; then Sweden and the United States followed (in the U.S., the Civil War of course resulted in the legal abolition of restrictions on the movements of slaves); Austria came last.

FIGURE 1. Freedom of Domestic Movement in Austria, England, Sweden, and the U.S.

The United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, immigration policy was influenced by liberal political ideology. The Foreign Secretary explained in 1852 that “By the existing law of Great Britain, all foreigners have the unrestricted right of entrance and residence in the country; and when they remain in it, are, equally with British subjects, under the protection of the law” (quoted in Chetail 2014: 30). For a long time, nobody was actually stopped at the border: between 1823 and 1905, “the country was open to entry by rich and poor alike, monarchists and republicans, conservatives and revolutionaries” argues David Feldman (2003: 169). The Aliens Act of 1905 stopped this openness regime, and it is therefore often considered a breaking point (see also Kalm and Lindvall 2018).

Meanwhile, however, internal controls abounded. They were directed both at foreigners and at citizens, and they stemmed from the organisation of poor relief, which was administered and financed by the parishes (Solar 1995). The Elizabethan Poor Law from 1601 codified a practice that had existed for centuries. It established that local parishes were responsible for both financing and administering poor relief. The 1662 Law of Settlement and Removal underlined that each parish was responsible
for *only* its own poor. It also established that all migrants that *were likely to* become poor relief recipients should be deported. In 1795 the Law was changed so that it was now only those that actually applied for poor relief that were deported. This obviously made many needy poor abstain from applying (Brown and Oates 1987: 323-324). In a single year in the 1820s, 44 000 people were internally removed in this way (Feldman 2003). “In fact, the history of the Poor Laws is largely an account of efforts to deny support to, and to deport, the itinerant poor” (Brown and Oates 1987: 324).

The Law of Settlement became very costly to administer. The conflicts and the negotiations between parishes that tried to establish where a particular poor relief recipient actually belonged often became expensive, slow and tedious. Added to this were the costs of actual removal. It therefore became an increasingly popular practice, in the nineteenth century, for the “home” parishes to pay compensations to the “host” parishes rather than receiving the actual poor person (Brown and Oates 1987: 324-325).

There was also a surge in overseas deportations in the nineteenth century. A law permitted poor-law officers to deport all Irish people who applied for poor relief, and 51,000 people were removed on this basis between 1824 and 1831. When it came to other foreigners, local officers did not have the power to remove. These groups were therefore assisted by philanthropic charitable foundations, which carried out the deportations. There were different charitable societies for different nationalities, such as *The Russo-Jewish Committee*, *the Société Francaise de Bienfaisance à Londres*, *the Société Belge de Bienfaisance* and *the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress*. These organizations provided assistance for destitute migrants, but since their funds were limited, they also repatriated migrants to their home countries. For example, charities deported 31,000 Jews between 1881 and 1906 (Feldman 2003). Along with governments, poorhouses, and landlords, charity organizations also organized for paupers to be sent to North America. During the Irish Famine of the 1880s, philanthropists persuaded the government to sponsor the emigration of more than 23,000 poor Irish to go to America (Hirota 2013: 1099).

Although there were no external exclusions at the border, then, there were “external exclusions” in the form of deportations. These deportations were both international and domestic. The local organization of poor relief led to barriers to entry for poor native citizens domiciled elsewhere. There were internal exclusions in the Law of Settlement which denied support to both foreign and national citizens.

**Austria**

The policy toward foreign citizens in *Austria* changed considerably during the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century, the approach was quite hospitable – foreigners were basically granted equal rights with citizens and citizenship was conferred automatically after ten years of residence. Some groups – Jews, Roma, and vagrants – never enjoyed rights equality, however. But the situation changed gradually from the 1830s onward: by the end of the century, foreigners’ rights were diminished
in comparison with those of citizens, and social assistance was always limited to Austrian citizens, confirming our “international internal exclusion” expectation. There was an intricate system of passports and registers keeping track of the whereabouts of immigrants – both national and foreign – and if they were impoverished they were deported. Other grounds for deportation were moral conduct and political ideas. This partial and selective internal exclusion was motivated by economic concerns when it came to social rights, but it probably had other explanations in the case of other kinds of rights.

International migration was a marginal political issue at the time, as Austria, like many other European countries, had more problems with emigration and the loss of labor than with immigration (Baader-Zaar 2003). Internal migration, however, was an important issue. Under feudalism, people needed special permits from their lords in order to leave the estate. Reforms in 1749 increased the state’s power vis-à-vis the feudal lords, and from then on migration and travel regulations were relaxed. But around the same time, new domicile laws (laws of Heimatrecht) were passed, with the purpose of sorting out which authority was responsible for social assistance for the sick and the poor. The right to social assistance was linked to one’s place of residence, and local authorities could deny Heimatrecht to those deemed unlikely to be able to support themselves. Heimatrecht thus denoted a formal affiliation to a particular place, and from 1849 it also became a prerequisite for naturalization for foreigners (von Hirschhausen 2009). If impoverished persons had not been granted domicile where they lived, they were deported to their place of domicile, in a way which seems to mirror the English case. Andrea Komlosy explains that deportation was a business “for thousands and thousands of officials” by the turn of the century (Komlosy 2003: 165).

This legal asymmetry made migrants vulnerable. They became second-class citizens, pressured to accept worse work and housing conditions. The overall objective was to relieve the major cities from the financial burdens that were associated with paupers and other resource-weak groups. One of the tools used was passports. Passports were required for travel within the Austrian monarchy until 1857. The state (Länder) authorities instructed the local authorities to be very selective, and to avoid issuing passports to the elderly, the poor, and migrants with children, reserving documents, instead, for those who were likely to contribute, through their labor, to the areas of destination (Komlosy 2003: 161–164). Again, the administration of social policy had effects for internal immigration policy.

Complying with the domestic external form of exclusion, migration policies in the poor-relief era were restrictive and selective. Even when migration was allowed, the migrant poor were simply deported. And even if that did not happen, the migrant had to live with the vulnerability associated with the threat of deportation. “By conveying papers to their community of domicile, urban centres got rid of the social problems caused by urbanization and industrialization. Here, the interests of the urban bourgeoisie and state security coincided: at the expense of the workers who were migrating between their regions of origin (to which they might be transferred against their will) and the industrial centres which were relying on their labor, but refusing to accept social responsibility for them as residents.” (Komlosy 2003: 165).
Sweden

Sweden required passports for internal as well as international migration until 1860. There were several reasons, among them to prevent emigration, to prevent rebellions, to control trade, and to prevent vagrancy and the roaming about of poor people. The last reason was probably the main one, according to Lövgren (2000): vagrancy was associated with crime, begging and disease – and with burdening the poor-relief system. Those who lacked permanent abode were subject to increasing control efforts in the first half of the nineteenth century. From the early 1820s onward, there were repeated calls in parliament for relaxing control over travel in order to enhance business and trade. There were also appeals to the freedom of movement of the individual. But at the same time, the poor – and especially the vagrant poor – were subject to increasing control efforts, as pauperism was regarded as a major social threat (Lövgren 2000; cf. Panican and Ulmestig 2017).

As in Austria, internal migration was a more significant issue than cross-border migration. Two legal arrangements were especially important. The right of domicile (hemortsrätt, note the similarity with the Austrian term) assigned each person to a particular locality and its parish. The parish had responsibility to support its own poor, but not any others. It gave poor people a meagre sense of material security, but at the same time restricted their freedom of movement. The husbonderätt held that the one that enjoyed the fruit of someone else’s labor should be responsible for his subsistence. A master had husbonderätt over his farm workers, and a parish had husbonderätt over its residents. But the reverse was also true: the one who paid for subsistence had the right to the recipient’s labor – which again meant that the poor needed to work hard for their support (Åman 1976: 127). A poor-relief recipient lost some of his/her rights and thus did not have equal citizenship (Berge 1995).

We have not found any clear evidence of the internal or external exclusion of immigrants from other countries as a result of poor relief in Sweden in this era (but see Kalm and Lindvall 2018 on the first decades of the twentieth century). The domestic internal and external exclusions directed against native migrants were more significant.

The United States

The United States differed from the European countries since it was a major destination country for migrants. The composition of immigrants changed over the nineteenth century, as the share of unfree migrants fell dramatically. Within the group of free migrants, there was a change from more to less skilled migrants, mostly from Northern, Southern, and Eastern Europe (Hatton and Williamson 2005, 31–51; Livi-Bacchi 2012: 47–51). In 1882, immigration policy was federalized, as the Immigration Act and the Chinese Exclusion Act were imposed. According to one view in the literature, immigration was essentially free before that, but newer research shows that this is exaggerated.
Northern and Southern states had very different motives for their movement controls in the pre-Civil War era. The main incentive for Southern states was to preserve the institution of slavery. There were ever-present fears of uprisings among slaves, which is why states wanted to control movement, so that free blacks would not arrive and stir revolutionary sentiments (Law 2014: 121–125). In the Northern states, where most of the European immigrants arrived, the story was different. All of them had migration controls in place; they were most rigorous in Massachusetts and New York. There is evidence of nativism (especially in Massachusetts) as well as racism when immigrant origin countries shifted from Northern to Southern Europe. But it seems that the main motivation of the Northern states was economic – they wanted to avoid the costs of having large numbers of paupers and sick immigrants landing on their shores. In New York in 1860, 86 percent of those who were on poor relief were foreign-born. As in the UK, there was no national welfare regime, and the sick and poor were the responsibility of local and state authorities. The impetus for state authorities was therefore to remove immigrants, either to elsewhere in the US or back to their home country.

It therefore seems that there was selective international external exclusion even before federalization. As in the UK case, charitable organizations were involved. Through their participation in state-level Boards of Commissioners, they participated in the removal of large numbers of immigrants (Law 2014: 119; Hirota 2013: 1102–1103).

Internal freedom of movement was from the beginning both highly valued and subject to restrictions for certain groups, which demonstrates that there was selective external exclusion within the country. No IV of the 1777 Articles of the Confederation reads: “The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States” (Avalon project 2016, emphasis added).7

Conclusions

In the period investigated here, then, we find indications of internal and external exclusions of foreigners only in the United States (which is the only major destination country in our sample). By contrast, international immigration was not a major political issue in European countries. The population was still seen, through a mercantilist lens, as “the wealth of the nation,” and emigration was regarded as a greater threat than immigration. While immigration of foreigners was usually very small, however, internal migration was a much more salient issue. There is support for both the external and

---

7 Freedom of the movement is not explicitly mentioned in the 1787 Constitution. It has been suggested that the reason for this may be that it was already considered so fundamental that there was no need to spell it out (Mount 2016).
the internal exclusion hypotheses in Europe in the context of internal migration – that is, domestic external exclusions. Precisely because of the local organization of poor relief, migrating paupers, the sick and the elderly were not welcome in other localities. These groups were considered potential or actual burdens and were often removed back to their home parishes. Our conclusion is that the mechanisms that the internal and external exclusion hypotheses lead us to expect operated *domestically* in the poor-relief era, before the birth of the modern welfare state.

In some countries, especially in England, the fear of *deportation* appears to have been an important factor. The fear of removal prevented poor migrants from applying for poor relief, pressured them to accept worse labour and housing conditions, and put them in fear of being discovered (in countries without effective registration systems). In all these senses, the position of the poor internal migrant of the nineteenth century is comparable to that of an undocumented migrant today. In fact, Nicolas de Genova (2002) has characterised the vulnerability of undocumented migrants as stemming from constantly being “deportable,” a situation that is very similar to that of the nineteenth-century migrants that we have investigated here.

In this paper, we have thus argued, on the basis of qualitative case studies, that in the pre-social insurance era, before the 1880s, the distinction between citizens and foreigners was not yet very significant in terms of social policy, at least not in Europe, but the local organization of poor relief appears to have led to constraints on *internal* migration, within countries, and to have been a driver of deportations of paupers and other “undesired” migrants. The main conclusion that we draw is that the latent conflict between social policy and migration policy has deep roots in modern societies in both periods, and was partially but not entirely transposed from the local to the national level with the emergence of the modern social-insurance-based welfare state. The defining characteristic of our own time, it seems to us, is that these questions about the allocation of authority over both social policy and immigration policy has a new urgency. Paradoxically, but then again perhaps not paradoxically, what we observe in our own time is both a new transposition, from the national to the *supranational* level, and a return to the old problem of competition among localities, as the allocation of refugees among municipalities in immigration destinations such as Sweden has become a major political issue.

---

8 There was a very similar system in the Low Countries (Belgium) (Winter and Lambrecht 2012).
References


