Causal Powers and Social Ontology
Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in social realm.
|Enheter & grupper|
Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK
|Tidigt onlinedatum||2018 mar 23|
|Status||E-pub ahead of print - 2018 mar 23|
|Peer review utförd||Ja|