Utopology
A Re-Interrogation of the Utopian in Architecture
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2017

Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):

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UTOPIA – the word is simultaneously evocative of hope and dread. As a concept it is stupendously problematic, and yet despite its alleged passing into irrelevance, utopia still remains a household word. Why is this so?

Utopia has been reduced to a category. We place a solution in the category of the utopian or, conversely, the not-utopian. Without fail, discussions involving utopia will eventually veer toward debates on whether a book, project, or building is utopian or not. Utopia reduced to such a category invokes both a problematic universality and a convoluted end of history – perhaps nowhere more so than in the field of architecture. However, if we begin with the problem to which the solution is a response rather than the solution being proposed, we soon realize that utopia is more complicated than a simple image of a perfect future.

The study at hand re-interrogates the utopian concept. The question is not what architecture is utopian, but how and why architecture is utopian. Utopia is reinterpreted as a concept predicated on survival and a desire for a better way of living, rather than on immortality and perfection. Utopia in this sense is monstrous; its function is to challenge the presuppositions that define the horizons of our imagination, and to show us that the future is not predetermined: the future is fundamentally open.

What assumptions, then, are formative of how architects relate to the future and utopia when projections of that future perfect have become irrelevant?

If the projection of a perfect future is impossible, yet intimately associated with the architect, utopia becomes paradoxical for architects. Utopian desire is instead expressed in other ways, consciously or unconsciously. The study argues that the present worldview is dominated by what is here dubbed the Network-image; we think of everything in terms of networks, privileging connections over form, and the architect is again assuming a new role for herself as a manager, rather than an expert.

Networks offer different ways of working with architecture. Rather than specifying the forms of the future (projections), architects can and do work by defining and elaborating protocols that enable and cultivate connections which, according to the prevalent narrative, build transversal collectives that can potentially transform the world. However, there are other implications linked to these new opportunities. Any network is governed by multiple protocols, and the architect as manager becomes inscribed in a logic of control. There is an implicit notion that architects can produce architecture that is self-governing, participatory, and implicitly egalitarian (and instrumental in opening up the future) through designing protocols. This assumption urgently needs to be interrogated.

The discussion in this study centers on the need to challenge the Network-image itself, and not only to take our role in it as given. The dissertation is an argument for considering the how of imagining the future with more scrutiny, and it offers a set of principles and a terminology for discussion to enable further research on the subject.
UTOPOLOGY
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A RE-INTERROGATION OF THE UTOPIAN IN ARCHITECTURE

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LUND 2017
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Marzahn, Berlin, 2011. Arriving in Marzahn is a straightforward affair, quite literally speaking. To reach the locality in the north-east of Berlin, one simply follows broad and uncompromisingly straight Landsberger Allee from the city’s center. Landsberger Allee is at once ostentatious and deeply modest. An array of reminders of the recent past lines the approach to Marzahn: there are concrete floorplates of former industries; conspicuously empty tracts of land; business parks offering up miniature high-rises with blue-tinted windows; semi-derelict Plattenbauten; repetitive, prefabricated concrete buildings, rhythmically punctuated by signs announcing “space to let” at very cheap prices. Landsberger Allee then crosses over the commuter train tracks, and one arrives in Marzahn. The enclave at the very edge of Berlin is infamous for all the wrong reasons: unemployment, right-wing extremism, and a general, lingering air of hopelessness. Marzahn was one of the last grand projects of the former German Democratic Republic. Over the course of a single decade, it transformed from a small village to an urban entity with approximately 100,000 inhabitants by the early 1980s. Enormous concrete monoliths cropped up around the small village.

When the Wall came down, the once-central showcase for East Berlin was suddenly hurled into the periphery. Marzahn was instantly outdated, and its symbolic value became an encumbrance. The district was now considered a problematic area. Eventually, the city got around to re-considering Marzahn and what could be done with the place. One of Figure 1 (opposite): Marzahn village with the housing blocks in the background. Photo by author.
the most visible conscious efforts was Eastgate – a very garish,
decidedly aerodynamic and utterly brash shopping mall that
seems to have descended on the center of Marzahn from outer
space. I came to be fascinated by Eastgate. Its curvilinear and
shiny façades and its diner aesthetics and details such as the
fact that it even penetrated the ground on which it stood; it
even has its own little crater to emphasize its otherworldliness.
At night, the ethereal effect is amplified by intergalactic light-
ing. The implicit message is that it may transport you; it may
open onto the “real” world outside – a glamorous, shiny place
whose primary attraction is that it is not Marzahn. Inside, East-
gate promises to whisk you away, and to make you another,
fascinating person in the process, with bookshops overstocked
with travel literature; travel agencies and tanning salons; win-
dow dressings intended for a climate where palm trees were
abundant. Every sign pointed somewhere else.

One might be tempted to declare Marzahn the final
resting place of utopia and to designate Eastgate its headstone.
It would fit so well into the story of the city that unheroically
built a dam to hold back capitalism — the dam that inspired Francis Fukuyama to declare us to be at the end of history and the triumph of MTV over bureaucracy when it broke. But a declaration like this would, like Fukuyama’s infamous declaration, be premature. The central argument that will follow is that we need to re-interrogate utopia. Not its contents, but what lies behind it, how it is formed, and, importantly, how it is expressed.

This study will require one specific leap of faith from its reader. That leap asks that you, the reader, momentarily suspend the intuitive, or presumed given definition of utopia as the image of the perfect future at the end of history. I will here argue that utopia is instead a desire, expressed in different ways, including but certainly not limited to visions, nor perfection, nor immortality or the end of history. I will argue that these are specific expressions of a utopian desire contingent on context, discourse, ideology and other factors. To limit the utopian concept to this very specific — and in a present context unimaginable and narrow definition — renders a broader, more nuanced, and more

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1. “We” is perhaps the most treacherous and presumptuous of pronouns; it presumes a shared identity, which by nature is distinguished from not-we; it is thus by nature presumptuous and exclusionary. In this sense, it is also potentially useful — it has the potential to force “us” to question and reform our presuppositions.
fruitful discussion on utopia impossible. My aim is to undo presuppositions concerning the utopian.

It is sometimes easier to see what has been lost in the process of history, in this case the utopian projection, than to see that which is new and emerging. What if utopia never disappeared? What if utopia as the projection of a perfect future and the end of history, allegedly dead and buried, was but one of many incarnations of the utopian? What if the core of the utopian concept is not immortality and perfection, but the desire for survival? And if so, what if there are other, new, utopian expressions that we fail to register as such because we are clinging to a very specific understanding of the utopian? What if our failure to register these expressions means that they are ostensibly working for change, but in effect act to preserve the status quo? Admittedly, this is a long series of ‘what ifs,’ but I believe them to ask some very pertinent questions, and they will thus serve as departure points for this study.

Introducing Utopology

Utopia’s historiography is invariably simplified and reduced. The Italian architectural historian and theorist Manfredo Tafuri once wrote that “The need of artistic avant-gardes to legitimise themselves has always led to a paradox: the new is justified by deforming the past.” This is certainly true of the story of utopia itself. I will argue that there is a problem with utopia, petrified as it is in the annals of modernism, as the image of a perfect future, and that the problems of architects’ relations to the utopian as outlined by Tafuri have partially transformed and should be looked at anew. A definition such as this one belies the continued presence of ideology in architecture, as well as something that is located deeper within the subjectivity than ideology (here used in a broader sense than its Marxian meaning); I will call this something the Network-image. The absence of any ideological content is precisely the image cultivated by neoliberalism, which invariably is presented as perfectly logical and natural, despite all the evidence to the contrary.3

Locking the meaning of utopia into one specific meaning that remains confined within the architect’s utopian paradox was succinctly summarized by the architect Rem
Koolhaas: “Without reference to utopia, [the architect’s] work cannot have any real value, but associated with Utopia it will almost certainly be complicit with more or less serious crimes.”\(^4\) When utopia is locked into this specific and from a contemporary perspective ridiculous meaning, it propels the naturalization of the ideologies presently dominating discourse and discussion. Confining utopia to one specific meaning lets us believe that there is no underlying ideology or image of thought that conditions how the world is perceived and understood.

The only possible relation an architect can have with utopia in its fixed meaning with the above paradox is what American literary theorist Fredric Jameson dubbed “anti-anti-Utopianism.”\(^5\) If utopianism and anti-utopianism are both unacceptable, the double negation is the only way left around the paradox. However, a more productive approach may be to dissect the concept of utopia itself, to study its anatomy and its constitutive parts in greater detail, and through this, hope to establish a more nuanced and more versatile definition of the utopian – one that begins to unravel the complexities and complications of the utopian on different levels and through the lens of the architect.

*Utopology* is an attempt to gain better understanding of the drives, the effects, the ideologies, and the intentions of the utopian. Its contribution to research is that it offers the departure point for a nascent field of study of utopian influences and impulses on a different level than the tired canon of architectural and literary perfect futures. The term Utopology is a combination of *utopia* and *topology*.\(^6\) Utopia combines the Greek eu-topia, or the good place, and ou-topia, or no place, and the tension between these two is perhaps one of reasons for the terms continuous allure. Topology is a branch of mathematics that discusses rules of geometry. More specifically, it is the study of the properties of an object that are preserved when the object is deformed, stretched or twisted (but not torn).\(^7\) Utopology here is an exploration of the different utopian topologies, and approaches the concept of utopia in a topological way at the same time. This study is an attempt to aim the spotlight on the utopian concept rather


6. While uncommon, the term “Utopology”, is not unheard of in an academic context. One could suggest that Utopology is closely related to the research field utopian studies, but as I outline Utopology, it has a narrower focus on the utopian concept itself rather than content and other aspects included in utopian studies.

than the utopian content of specific utopian mediations. I aim to dissociate the concept of utopia from its default likening to “the image (literary or otherwise) of a perfect future” and raise the question of whether this future is by necessity a perfect image, or if it is necessarily located in the future. My ambition is to open discussion of the utopian concept, and give nuances to the inky black and manically phosphorescent white in which it is currently depicted.

The binary nature of the utopian is problematized all too rarely. Architects, buildings, plans, and so forth are categorized as utopian or not-utopian; there is no in-between. If utopia is absolute, what is its antonym? There is no consensus on this issue, and this short elaboration will begin picking at the most commonly used antonym to utopia, dystopia. Dystopia can be understood as an alternative vision where the future is cast as a nightmare rather than perfect, and it remains a popular genre. The direction from the present – where the dystopia is authored – to the abominable future is a downward-pointing curve. But does not this curve also extend backward in time, into the past, where things were better than they are perceived in the present? In that sense, dystopia simply recasts the past as utopian, rather than the future. This logic goes for the early Renaissance as well as the harking back of the Greeks to the Golden Age. Simply because utopia is located in the past does not make the dystopia un-utopian; it is only a reversal of direction. The call for change of course is the same, the occupation with the future is the same, and the critical dissatisfaction with the present is the same.

Instead of the category’s binary distinction between the utopian and not-utopian, the focus here will be on the utopian desire. This is a primarily unconscious desire that can be considered the origin of utopia; in the context of this study, utopia considered an expression of this desire. Thus, utopia can be a projection of a perfect world, but it is by no means a prerequisite. There are other ways of expressing utopian impulses. We can instead consider these impulses as seeping into media and into the world – utopian desire leaks into the lifeworld. The distinction between utopian desire and utopian expression is central to the study. If the utopian is an impulse, one

8. On a meta-level, there is another question that is difficult to dodge in terms of Tafuri and Utopia, concerning the notion of what Tafuri calls operative criticism or operative historiography. In a chapter in Theories and History of Architecture, Tafuri discusses the historiography of Bruno Zevi and others who, in Tafuri’s view, were re-writing history in order to accommodate and justify utopia. History was in this sense put into a reductive order, which in turn legitimized the modern utopia. This reduction produced one coherent modern thrust forward – a teleology that was indeed problematic. Could one not argue that postmodern historiography (ironically, as befits postmodernity) in turn does the same to utopia itself, locking it into its specific meaning of the projection of a perfect future? And, in the same vein, would not the anti- or post-utopian message of historiography of late be – much in the same way – operative criticism in its own right? This is not a case for resurrecting that utopian thought, but merely for nuancing and elaborating the utopian concept in a Utopology. In this sense, Utopia’s petrification is a conscious product of the postmodern narrative, which suddenly complicates the image somewhat.
can deduce that utopia, as expressed, is never absolute, nor is it objective. The utopian impulse provokes Ideas in the form of problems emerging from the unconscious. These ideas are conditioned by what the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze refers to as the image of thought. In turn, these problems are actualized in the form of propositions, proposed solutions, images, plans, protocols, projects, etc. But the relationship here is by no means one-way, on the contrary, all these actualizations of solutions may well affect the subjectivity that makes the associations that forms ideas.

This defines certain constraints, or certain limits to the utopian imagination. The utopian impulse, understood as the desire for a better way of being, can be considered an unconditional (un-deconstructible) aspect of human existence predicated on survival rather than immortality. Utopia as an expression of a utopian impulse is mediated, and it is simultaneously content and a tool that affects the world. A conscious utopian expression can set out to represent a better way of being in one way or another, but it will invariably affect the world in one way or another, though perhaps not in the way the author intended.

The most fundamental objection here is that the introduction of nuance robs utopia of its constitutive qualities. This, I will argue, is not only historically incorrect, but it is also a position that loses all sight of the effects of the utopian beyond its content. Furthermore, such a binary utopian concept lends itself to the post-utopian obfuscation of ideological content on which I have already touched. Nuancing and dissecting the utopian concept, I argue, serves to overcome the narrative that other futures are impossible. It serves to introduce the utopian aspects of contemporary ideologies, and to shed light on the horizon of imagination that conditions our worldview at any given moment. Furthermore, such a dissection serves to discuss the very notion of societal transformation that is continually implicit in many artistic and architectural practice. It is not uncommon to read of a project’s “utopian potential,” presented without further analysis of the underlying problems, horizons of thought and imagination. I believe Utopology can contribute directly and indirectly to all of these discussions,

9. Gilles Deleuze uses the image of thought in different meanings. Perhaps most famously in his assault on the presuppositions of philosophy, in Difference and Repetition, but the term is used in broader meanings elsewhere. See Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

10. A definition I borrow from Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 229. It should however be noted that my interpretation differs from Levitas’. In the idea of utopian expression, I include both function and content, whereas she appears to focus primarily on content.

which remain central to the architectural field in its broader sense.

Utopia, to answer the question posed in this chapter’s title, certainly does not rest in peace, in Marzahn or elsewhere. On the contrary, it is inevitably with us. Utopia as an image of a perfect future may well be dead, but if we permit ourselves to move beyond the binary opposition that has characterized utopia far too long, we find that utopia and the utopian impulse are not only alive, but also very much a part of what keeps us alive, helping us to survive in a world that is perpetually changing.
With the ultimate goal of putting utopia back on the table, the study at hand aims to un-moor the utopian concept from the narrow and binary definition within which it is currently confined. Re-considering utopia in the field of architecture specifically does not mean that I seek to reopen the Pandora’s box of perfection and images of shining cities on the horizon. Instead, the aim is to introduce nuance, precision, and critical thinking into the utopian concept. This could be called a kind of thinking with utopia. As long as the utopian concept remains embedded where it is – as an image of perfect future, with a binary distinction between the utopian and the not-utopian – the concept will remain less than useless.

Architects search for meaning and purpose, and this firm and definitive meaning and purpose is precisely what I seek to rid utopia of. As we look back across the 20th century, the dangers of utopia scream at us from where utopia is currently lodged: utopia is the conclusion of ideology, the end of history; it would mean certain totalitarianism, and it is thus readily mocked.

Utopia’s definition, or meaning, became petrified through a grand narrative – the neoliberal – which positioned utopia as the perfect tree-topology, rigid, dominant, and oppressive. But mocking utopia also serves to conceal
implicidy utopian aspects, and it is here that utopia with nu-
ance, conditioned by the milieu, becomes useful.

Returning utopia to the table is not necessarily a
creative moment; it could rather be understood as a critical
moment, an opportunity to discuss the utopian aspects and to
undo aspects of socially constructed reality that prevent critical
consideration of the world. Of course, there is also a utopian
undertone in that critical moment, as it will in extension infer
a better world that has not yet been given form.

I argue that this is sorely needed, as utopia can be a
great tool – not for coming up with the correct answer, but
for articulating the right question at an opportune moment.
This may appear paradoxical at this point, but as we shall see,
utopia can be used as a tool to challenge that which is taken for
granted or naturalized. Utopia is, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari note, where philosophy becomes political, and utopia
links philosophy to its own epoch.12

By reformulating the utopian concept and contextual-
izing it in architectural theory, I hope to contribute to an effort
that aims to “un-unthink” utopia in order to enable a differ-
ent practice.13 What I hope to bring to that discussion is the
reformulation of the utopian concept and the consequences
that emanate from an immanent and contingent utopian de-
sire that considers utopia in its broader context of its plane of
immanence and strategies of mediation. While many of these
attempts focus primarily on the architecture, the built or pro-
posed objects themselves, my focus is oriented more toward
the figure of the architect, or the architect’s self-image if you
will. This area has great potential to facilitate understanding ar-
chitecture in a broader context, and that means understanding
the architect’s role as within the relations of production.14 I aim,
then, to contribute to an understanding of the utopian, not in
terms of the architecture itself, but in terms of the architect
and her production.

An ambition such as this also aims to put critical theory
in architecture back on the table again. Critical theory should
be understood in a broad sense here, including other theo-
rists than those habitually grouped under the critical theory
banner.15 The key element is critically assessing and discussing

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12. They write: “it is with utopia that philosophy be-
comes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its
highest point.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is

13. See for instance:
Reinhold Martin, “Critical
of What? Toward a Utopian
Realism,” in The New
Architectural Pragmatism:
A Harvard Design Magazine
Reader, ed. William S.
Saunders (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota
Press, 2007). Nel Janssens,
Utopian-Driven Projective
Research Exploring the Field
of Metaurbanism (Göteborg:
Chalmers University of
Technology, 2012). Felic-
ity Scott, Architecture or
Techno-Utopia: Politics after
Modernism (Cambridge,
Robin Wilson, Image, Text,
Architecture (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2015). Nathaniel
Coleman, Utopias and
Architecture (London:
Routledge, 2005). Robert
Klanten and Lukas Feireiss,
Utopia Forever: Visions of
Architecture and Urbanism
(Berlin: Gestalten 2011).
And many others.

14. The last formulation
is borrowed from Walter
Benjamin, “The Author as
Producer,” in Understanding
Brecht (London: Verso,
1998 [1966]).

15. Critical theory is
predominantly associated
with Theodor Adorno, Max
Horkheimer and others of
the Frankfurt School. To this
group, I add thinkers such
as Gilles Deleuze, Jacques
Derrida and others.
architecture. In this sense, I want to argue for the relevance of theory in architecture in the first place.

Arguing for theory in architecture may seem like kicking in an open door, but in the present context, which favors making and doing over critical reflection, the door is not exactly open. Even the architects who define themselves as critical of the present mode of capitalism, for instance, appear to favor practice at the expense of theory. My main objection is that in the desire to move forward (in whichever way), these practices end up too focused on agency and propositions and lose sight of the underlying problem or idea.

While such an approach has many advantages, it will undoubtedly also take many things as givens when there is little space for critical reflection. I want to scrutinize the broader connections between architecture and ideology (both terms used in a broad sense), certainly, but also how these connections are conditioned by what we could call the horizons of imagination or the image of thought.

In terms of utopia and architecture, opening a discussion such as this will place Italian architectural theorist and historiographer Manfredo Tafuri in a central position. Tafuri maintained a Marxian view of ideology, broadly understood as a “false consciousness.” From this follows a real, concealed underneath the myth, and unmasking that real is the critic’s task. I will instead advocate an understanding of ideology as something that is also conditioned by the current horizons of thought, which are partly conscious and partly engrained in the unconscious. Concepts, and ideologies, are produced within this image of thought or plane of immanence, but the concepts and ideologies also serve to redefine and reform the plane of immanence. There is, in other words, no real underneath, and there is no teleological aspect of history.

Putting critical theory back on the table in terms of utopia also means discussing the problematic aspects of utopia that Tafuri quite correctly identified. However, some aspects of the image of thought have transformed since Tafuri, and there is a need to rephrase how utopia works in relation to architecture now. In many ways, utopia in its locked-in

16. Here, I am not primarily thinking of the protagonists of “Critical architecture” of the 1980s and the 1990s, but rather of a newer generation of critically aware practitioners, including aaa, EXYZT, Assemble, Jeremy Till, etc. who seek to merge critical thinking with a pragmatist or projective approach to architecture.


position only presents us with the opportunity to discuss the false problem, where every solution is readily falsifiable. This study aims to contribute to the discussion on utopia, the role of the architect, and critical theory in architecture, and to make a theoretical argument for the urgency of taking these discussions more seriously.

The study at hand explores a variety of interlinked questions. Four of the most central of these questions are discussed briefly here. The operative word here is *explore*; this study does not aim to produce definitive answers, but rather to enquire into the implications of each question. Broadly speaking, these four questions also constitute the framework of this study. While different parts of the study correspond to different questions, the reader will also find them overlapping and interwoven to a degree; this is essential to the structure of this study.

The first question is primarily a theoretical and philosophical one: *How can the utopian concept be reconsidered in order to become a useful concept?* This question requires some specification. Perhaps most pertinently: *for whom* do I intend to make utopia a useful concept? The abridged response to this question is: *for the architectural discipline* – as a conceptual tool. Two other implicit presumptions in the above research question should also be addressed promptly. The first of these is that the utopian concept is currently not useful, and the second is that there something to be gained from attempting to regenerate a concept that many adamantly believe should be committed to the annals.

These two presuppositions are not independent of one another. I argue that utopia in its current definition – as an image of a perfect future – is counterproductive to architectural theory and theory in a broader perspective. In this sense, I consider the utopian concept in its present form as the ultimate “tree structure;” we fail to comprehend, and much less engage with the subjectivation and ideological aspects inherent in the horizons of imagination between which we find ourselves at present. I argue that challenging these horizons is necessary, and that utopia may serve as a tool for such an undertaking; by highlighting the effects of
what I call arboraphobia – which conditions both neoliberal capitalism and those practices intent on opposing it – the act of regenerating utopia will indirectly assist in rendering these horizons of thought, and their limitations, more visible.

As mentioned above, I have no interest in restoring the utopian concept as it was. 19 At the same time, I believe that a more nuanced, more dynamic, and more reflective utopian concept, predicated on survival and change rather than perfection and the end of change, never really disappeared – it is simply being expressed differently. What could be called a utopian impulse – the underlying desire for a better way of being – is in this way unconditional. To “unthink” thus becomes futile, but also somewhat ridiculous as an exercise in suppression. We are utopians in ways of which we are sometimes not necessarily conscious.

Utopia invariably implies a desire for change and for a better, more just organization of society (the content of this desire is, of course, subjective). The absolute in utopia as the image of the perfect future provokes a certain antipathy towards proposed change; propositions that challenge the limits of imagination can invariably be derided as “utopian.” This only holds true as long as utopia remains synonymous with the projection of perfect future, and it is here that architectural discourse all too often ties itself in a knot. This dichotomy of the utopian is not a productive dichotomy; on the contrary, it is both conservative and pessimistic.

I will explore the question of the utopian concept by discussing the works of the German philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) and the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). What I have set out here is essentially Bloch made immanent by discussing him through the lens of Deleuze and Deleuze’s notion of immanence. This unquestionably desecrates Bloch’s theories to some extent, but this is not a project about Bloch; it is a project about the continued influence of the utopian in architecture, and I maintain that it is urgent that we move beyond the tired di-

19. In this respect, I largely (although not wholeheartedly) agree with Tafuri’s critique of the utopian concept. Tafuri launched a scathing diatribe against architects’ engagement with utopia where he emphasized among other things that that modern utopia fails to respond to the relevant question, and that utopia as a projection is employed as a tool for pacification that makes us forget the injustices of the past and present, and so forth. Manfredo Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development (Progetto E Utopia) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976 [1973]).
chotomies that characterize the utopian concept in virtually every discourse.

Perhaps the most fundamental distinction in reconsid-

ering the utopian concept builds on the distinction between 

the utopian desire without a given medium that is unconditional 

in seeking a better way of being – and the utopian expression, ex-

pressions of the utopian, of which the projection of a perfect 

future constitutes but one. I argue that this distinction opens 

up utopia for discussions both on utopian desire and its ex-

pressions. What, for instance, is the influence of the medium 

via which the utopian desire is expressed on the concept of the 

utopian itself? What are the channels through which this uto-

pian desire is expressed? What do these channels presuppose 

and entail, and what, then, does utopia in fact do? Distingui-

shing between a utopian desire and utopian expression is not 

idealism as such; there is no “true” utopia to be uncovered, 

but rather a desire that invariably reflects its milieu in different 

ways. Utopia, in that sense, is never “pure,” nor is there a true 

utopian impulse, obscured by the effects of the lifeworld. Rat-

her, the approach is process-philosophical, in that it follows a 

process of becoming that does not lead towards any final state 

per se, and nor does it originate in any predefined content. I 

would be the first to argue that utopian desires are about the 

better rather than the perfect.

Ultimately, this study proposes the term “the utopi-

an without utopia.” A paraphrase of a term coined by the 

French philosopher Jacques Derrida, 21 this is a non-teleo-

logical definition of utopian desire that may be telic in its 

expression on occasion, but not necessarily in the underlying 

desire.

The second question, then, is: How can this redefined utopian 

concept be discussed in relation to architectural history and theory? The pre-

supposition here is that a need emerges through this question 

to re-read architectural history bespectacled with the glasses of a 

reconsidered utopian concept. Redefining the utopian concept as a desire opens up for reconsideration of the history of the architect and her relation to this desire. One of the consequences of the distinction between utopian desire and utopian expression is that the utopian impulse does not disappear, as

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suggested in the common narrative of utopia’s demise with postmodernity. I will instead explore an alternative hypothesis: that with the end of grand narratives, the utopian could no longer be expressed through projection, but instead “seeped” through other expressions and took on what could be called a “spectral” appearance.23

Exploring this question, I will discuss very few architectural objects, and instead focus on the conception of architecture as a discipline, its horizons of imagination, its self-definition, tools and shared beliefs. In a historiography still dominated by the dialectic and (possibly) its end, the present moment is a problematic one. We find ourselves at the end of dialectics, but not necessarily at the end of broader modernity.23 Even if utopia is a modern concept, its history is not necessarily limited to the grand narratives of modernity, and I will not place the alleged moderns in the center, but take an open-ended approach that permits history to move onwards and outwards, rather than remain in fear of a paradoxical modernity that constituted both a tradition and the perpetual breaking free from tradition.

This study follows a line through history that is defined according to how a given period relates to the future, and how utopian impulses are expressed. This account suffers from all of the shortcomings of any other attempt at dividing history into periods: it generalizes; it is decidedly Euro-centric; the material used is historiographic rather than primary; it is not without interpretation, etc. I take these liberties since this study is not primarily a historical survey, and the account of history serves foremost to unlock the discussion on utopia in architecture.

The modern-centric focus of the architectural discipline locks utopia into its modern medium: the projection of an image, or the blueprint. Every engagement with utopia — just as every periodization (post-modernity, post-post-modernity and the alter-modern are but a few) — first and foremost relate back to the modern. By the same mechanism, utopia remains locked into its modern reflection. Considering utopian impulses beyond the utopia as a haunting presence therefore requires a slightly different interpretation of

22. Similar arguments have been expressed by Derrida in *Specters of Marx*, and by Reinhold Martin in *Utopia’s Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again* (Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

architectural history. Rather than glancing anxiously over its shoulder, this interpretation is able to discuss what potential other paths there are. In other words, I endeavor to engage with the utopian without resorting to nostalgia or to the weary caricature of the hero-architect.

The third question addressed is: How does a reconsidered utopian concept transform discussion on the utopian in relation to contemporary architectural theory and practice? The segment dealing with this is called “The Age of Hopeful Monsters.” In it, I will discuss the contemporary imaginaries of utopian impulses and their expressions, the presumption being that there is a utopian desire to discuss.

If utopias are expressions of utopian desire – which I here argue is predicated on change, and “infinite finitude” rather than immortality – the utopias of the present need to be evaluated according to how effectively they challenge the dominant image of thought.

In this sense, utopias are evaluated in terms of what they do rather than in terms of their content. In the evaluation of a utopia, in other words, the focus tends to be on the problems being posed more than on the solutions proposed. In order to develop the third question then, I ask what, precisely, is the dominant image of thought? Here, I will argue that the dominant image of thought could be dubbed the Network-image; in a sense, the designation provides both a system of justification and a horizon of imagination at present.

This is a discussion of the utopian expressions identified in the present, and their potential to challenge the dominant image of thought. Inevitably, the architectural projects discussed are violated somewhat. I take the liberty of considering the architectural project through the lens developed in this study rather than assuming the proclaimed relation to the utopian expressions of the architects behind the projects.

In addition to this, there is an implicit fourth question in any utopian deliberation: the perennial Where to? With the risk of disappointing the reader, I should already here emphasize that I will not provide any exemplar, model, or conclusive answer. The point of this study is to enable the
discussion of utopian problems and provide a conceptual framework for their analysis, not to present a solution.

**Perspective and Use**

This study aims to make a contribution to the architectural discourse for the intended primary audience of the broader discipline of architecture. “Discipline of architecture” is intended to encompass more than a practice-centered definition, aiming to include criticism, education, historiography, research into architecture, urban studies, cultural studies, and other practices that overlap with architectural practice, but which would be peripheral to a practice-centered definition. I discuss the discipline rather than practice in order to focus on the roles of actors within the discourse. In other words, I consider the discipline of architecture in a broad sense as those who form the discourse, which itself is wider than practice, and whose outlines are even more blurred.

The study itself can be broadly categorized as architectural theory. The term has a plethora of definitions and even more connotations, and it may be prudent to discuss the term in greater detail. The view on architectural theory depends, broadly speaking, on one’s view of architecture. To a practicing architect, a theory is something that guides design; it is, in this sense, an “architectural ideology,” as defined by the architectural historians Claes Caldenby and Erik Nygaard in their *Arkitekturteoriernas Historia* from 2011. Through this definition, architectural theory is defined as a prescriptive theory, or a normative theory; much of what is traditionally considered architectural theory, such as the treatises by Vitruvius and Alberti, can be included. Both of these carefully outline how architecture should be practiced.

From a research perspective, theory functions somewhat differently. As an example, the architectural theorist Hilde Heynen defines architectural theory’s relationship to practice thus: “The relation between architectural theory and architectural practice, on the other hand, seems to me to be indirect: architectural theory might have a relation to architectural practice that can be labelled as ‘framing’, ‘questioning’, ‘criticizing’, ‘challenging’ or ‘positioning’. I do not believe, however,
that architectural theory can in one way or another ‘guide’ or ‘orient’ practice.”

Architectural theory, in other words, aims to understand what architecture is, what it does in society, and how it is practiced; in a word, it is reflective. This latter definition is a closer approximation of how I view and address architectural theory in this study.

Manfredo Tafuri once defined operative criticism (and historiography) as the active deformation of history that justifies a desired projection into the future. This deformation is invariably a reduction, or an accentuation of certain historical traces or phenomena into an order that permits the active practitioner – in this case the architect – to define a future that befits his or her project. The problem, in Tafuri’s eyes, stemmed partly from the fact that architectural writing was (and is) predominantly produced by active practitioners of architecture; i.e., architects, who seek to justify their own values (ideologies) through operative historiography. The proper function of architectural criticism and historiography is, in Tafuri’s view, demystification, to show the underlying structures that defined architecture, to fight the production of myth with history. Thus, Tafuri insists on a strict separation between criticism and practice in architecture, lest the two be confused and history become a tool of myth-production rather than criticism (and the most problematic myth of all is, of course, that of utopia).

It is not uncommon for architectural research to attempt to bridge the (here perhaps over-dramatized) gap between theory and practice, and this is one way for architectural research to acquire a direct practice-related relevance. But this is no easy task, and most attempts veer over to one side or the other.

Deleuze uses the “relay” to explain how he understands the interrelation of theory and practice: “practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall.”

Where Tafuri envisions criticism and historiography as tools to unmask architecture, Deleuze envisions theory as enabling other praxes. Tafuri argues that the connection be-

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25. Hilde Heynen, Lecture at the symposium Contemporary discourses on Architecture, Lebanese University, Beirut, May 13-14, 2004


between history and theory would turn history into an “instrument of theoretical reasoning elevated to a planning guide.” 28

If we overlook the distinction between historiography/criticism and theory, which changes depending on what one puts into these words, the difference is that where Deleuze sees cross-fertilization, Tafuri sees only cross-contamination between theory and practice. 29

A purely critical approach, like some of Tafuri’s own work, often ends in a cul de sac, with no apparent path forward. Such an outcome is problematic from an operative perspective (and academia today certainly is tilted towards the operative or projective), as there is no way to act on this information except to start over. From the other perspective, an operative outcome appears naïve and painfully reductive in its scope. Its critical merit is highly limited in that the proposition or proposed path forward is highly problematic from a critical perspective. While I would not posit these perspectives as mutually exclusive, they are exceedingly difficult to combine, as will become apparent in the studies of architectural projects that do attempt to combine them.

My own perspective 30 on architecture and utopia remains unreconciled. I keep two incompatible images in my mind at all times. On the one hand, I am educated as an architect and have practiced architecture for several years. On the other hand, in the last five years I have been engaged in research, and have here been exposed almost exclusively to a theoretical perspective with a focus on architectural theory as outlined above. A balancing act ensues: I do not share Tafuri’s puritan Marxist position that there is a distinction between ideology and truth, and that this truth can invariably be found in the material conditions underneath layers of myth.

On the other hand, again, I find almost every attempt at combining theory and practice to be lacking critical reflection, and thus tending toward the vacuous or superficial. A case in point is the recent turn to the “post-critical” in architectural theory (or practice rather), or the cultivation of affects without reflection beyond the shallowest understandings of the political. 31 My contribution is thus on what I would hesitantly call the meta-level of the utopian rather than in providing a theoretical approach to practice.
utopian prescription. The proposition is instead intrinsic to the opening up of the utopian concept to focus on the problem rather than the solution.

The answer to the question of how one relates theory and practice has implications here in terms of both structure and use. Bridging the gap between theory and practice would require a certain outcome of this study; a way forward, a problem and its solution. On the other hand, taking a purely critical stance does not necessitate such an outcome, and it may well suffice to formulate a problem without necessarily providing its solution.

One could instead suggest that theory and practice constitute different strata, where theory in this sense would condition practice, and vice versa. To some extent, however, these are different dimensions, and there may well be a certain value in not attempting to merge them, but instead allowing them to inform and condition one another indirectly. This is an unfashionable approach in many ways, but it also serves to underscore the relevance of theory as distinct from practice, rather than subservient to it.

In this sense, this study is architectural theory, indirectly aimed at practice and primarily addressed to the diffuse community of architectural theory. Conspicuously few of those in this community are active in architectural practice; thus the primary audience for this study is in academia and predominantly, but not exclusively, in architecture. I maintain that the relevance of this dissertation reaches beyond the architectural discipline, and it is thus intended to be read outside of the architectural discipline as well. Some of the concepts introduced here could also be useful in related fields of study. The study is secondarily intended for practicing architects with an interest in theory. The practicing architect may find herself frustrated by the absence of prescriptions or solutions contained herein. However, I believe that this is precisely where architectural theory is most relevant: in discussing the framework for solutions of architects.

PART 1:
THE ANATOMY OF UTOPIA.
Reduced to one specific meaning – the perfect organization of society – the utopian concept is petrified and can be discarded on the rubbish bin of history, or so the story goes. Elaborating on the situation, the background, and the philosophical construction of the concept, I set out here to rehabilitate the concept of utopia beyond the wonted binary distinction between the utopian and the not-utopian. Un-mooring the utopian concept from the utopian idea with which it has become conflated reveals a concept predicated on survival that is far from absent in current architecture, and life.
Utopia & Modernity

Utopia is a modern conceptualization. While it is habitually interwoven with ideas of modernity and grand narratives, this relation is neither necessarily self-evident, nor straightforward. Before we get to utopia and the utopian, it is necessary to briefly discuss the problematic aspects of how we understand modernity – whether we perceive it as a period or as a condition. I will suggest that we should be more critical when it comes to modernity’s centrality in our understanding of ourselves in history.

The Belgian architectural theorist Hilde Heynen differentiates between modernity as programmatic (i.e. as a condition) and modernity as transitory (i.e. as a period). I will briefly discuss both in relation to utopia. Programmatic modernity is eloquently represented by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who proposes that modernity is “an incomplete project” formulated by the Enlightenment. Modernity, then, is a condition that is neither overcome nor replaced.

The modern condition

Modernity as a condition is shrouded in myth, paradoxes and controversy. Perhaps the most influential idea regarding the modern condition of the last centuries is the dialectical, includ-
ing the dialectic of Enlightenment, Hegelian dialectics, dialectical materialism, and many others. Very broadly speaking, most dialectical models are teleological; whether the telos is Freedom or Communism, history progresses towards the objectively rational organization of society.

Heynen notes that: “Modernity refers to the typical features of modern times and to the way that these features are experienced by the individual: modernity stands for the attitude toward life that is associated with a continuous process of evolution and transformation, with an orientation toward a future that will be different from the past and from the present.”\(^34\) This could be considered a common or standard definition of modernity, as defined from within the condition of modernity itself—its founding legend, if you will. The current, the new, and the transient: these three levels of meaning all refer to the peculiar importance ascribed to the present in the concept of modernity.

Modernity is what gives the present the specific quality that makes it different from the past and points the way toward the future.\(^35\) Heynen continues: “Modernity is constantly in conflict with tradition, elevating the struggle for change to the status of purveyor of meaning par excellence. Already in the eighteenth century, modernity is thus a condition that cannot be pinned down to a fixed set of attributes.”\(^36\) Other factors also play important roles, but they are all too often omitted; one of these is the relationship between modernity and Christianity, and another is modernity and capitalism in its successive forms, which will be an implicitly recurrent theme in this study. Both of these factors have had a tremendous impact on the way utopia is conceptualized and mediated, and both will be developed below. However, the Mexican poet Octavio Paz articulated the most blatantly obvious contradiction in the above statement when he asked: how can modernity simultaneously be a tradition and the rejection of tradition?\(^37\)

In contrast is the French philosopher Bruno Latour’s conclusion, succinctly summarized in the title We Have Never Been Modern and hammered in over and over again throughout the pages of the book. Latour sets out to undo the constitution of modernity, which he asserts is based on a closed loop where

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\(^34\) Heynen, Architecture and Modernity, 10.

\(^35\) Ibid., 9. Oddly, although Heynen references both Octavio Paz and Matei Calinescu, she still presents modernity as born \textit{ex nihilo} rather than as something that emerged over centuries.

\(^36\) Ibid., 9-10.

“purification” and “interpretation” serve to establish a self-referential system of thought, with the assistance of Marxist criticality. Here, modernity is positioned as a period characterized by a certain belief system, and the very overcoming of this belief system disqualifies modernity.

If we have never been modern, utopia as the plan for a perfect future comes into a different light, becoming something that corresponded to the belief systems of what Latour calls “the Moderns,” rather than something taken for granted. If modernity is but a collective belief, or an image of thought, utopia becomes untethered from progress and can be examined and interrogated in greater detail. However, this does not mean that modernity as such is rendered irrelevant in this project. Instead, it implies that modernity’s credentials should not be taken as givens, but rather as part of the context in which the concept of utopia forms and develops. It makes the discussion on utopia more, rather than less relevant, since utopia is in many ways the perfect exponent of some of modernity’s unresolved issues regarding spirituality, determinism, and the future, or change and permanence. Perhaps the most relevant part of modernity to this project is the unfurling of the future ahead of humanity, which rendered the future a site onto which utopia could be projected, as discussed in the introductory chapter.

Arguably, the dominant way of thinking about history and historiography in the broadest sense remains centered on the notion of modernity. Like utopia, modernity is habitually reduced to having a singular meaning, narrative, or destination. This is problematic in many ways, perhaps particularly when discussing utopian aspects, as the still-dominant conception of utopia – projection of a perfect future – remains intimately associated with modernity, and nowhere more so than within the discipline of architecture.

Octavio Paz notes that modernity, real or imagined, is a distinctly Western concept, since it cannot be dissociated from Christianity. Modernity is habitually contrasted with Christianity, but as the Romanian literary critic Matei Calinescu notes in Five Faces of Modernity, this break is neither particularly clear nor definite. Calinescu outlines four sequential phases...
through which modernity gradually departs from the Church, and it is in this context that Utopia emerges and assumes an important position. The first phase that Calinescu identifies is the medieval use of *modernus*, which is contrasted with *antiquus*, new vs. old. Here, the modern does not define itself in opposition to Christianity. The second phase is one of gradual separation between modernity and Christianity, taking place from the Renaissance and on through Enlightenment.

Initially, modernity only manifested itself in non-religious affairs, and the moderns imitated the classic eras until they finally deemed their own achievements superior to those of the classic cultures. The future, which had previously been defined by the return of Christ and the final judgment, began to unfurl.\(^{40}\) Ultimately, the humanist ideas of free thinking individuals emerged, and the human being was considered free to shape his or her own destiny – and only then did modernity emerge as a counterforce to Christianity. The third phase centers on the Romantic era of the 18\(^{th}\) and early 19\(^{th}\) centuries, and the “death of God”; this was the phase during which temporal conceptions essentially changed from cyclical to linear.

Building on Octavio Paz, Calinescu suggests that: “The myth of the death of God is in effect nothing but a result of Christianity’s negation of cyclical time in favor of a linear and irreversible time – the axis of history – that leads to eternity.”\(^{41}\) The fourth phase commences somewhere in the middle of the 19\(^{th}\) century and is, according to Calinescu, “mainly concerned with exploring the consequences of God’s unthinkable yet already banal demise.”\(^{42}\) It is within the extensive timespan encompassing these four phases that utopia as perfection, emerges, and the paramount notion of the future becomes increasingly important.

The relationship between Christianity and utopia of modernity is a highly productive path along which to think, and as Calinescu notes: “On the whole, then, modernity, even if it attempted to do so, did not succeed in suppressing man’s religious need and imagination; and by diverting them from their traditional course it may even have intensified them in the guise of an untold flourishing of heterodoxies – in reli-


\(^{41}\) Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity*, 61.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 62.
gion proper, in morals, in social and political thinking, and in aesthetics.” However, its importance when utopia and the utopian ideals of the plan emerged can, according to Calinescu, hardly be overstated.

As Calinescu notes, from the beginning, the utopian blueprint has been involved in its own fundamental paradox, “The clash between the utopian criticism of the present and the antiutopian criticism of the future.” Since modernity builds on continuous change – according to Calinescu, change is synonymous with modernity – and utopia as the perfect future is static, the end of history, utopia has in this sense been irreconcilable with modernity from its inception, and yet it played a fundamental role in historical development. Utopian blueprints are thus used to both critique present organization and to enforce or control future organization. This double role is important, as it opens up for a utopia that affects the present and the future, or which appears to work on the future, but instead works in the present. The utopian blueprint must be simultaneously considered a tool of dominance and a tool against dominance; this tension is common to conceptions of utopia throughout history. Utopia, then, has no fixed relation to the blueprint, or to the future for that matter; these are but expressions of utopian desires.

The modern period

If one considers modernity as transitory; that is, as a period rather than a terminal condition, a number of interesting issues emerge and other problems begin to crop up on the horizon. Some periodizations have more valence than others, and others are specific to their disciplines. Almost all periodizations aim to pinpoint a recent shift that characterizes a new world order. One does well to keep British philosopher Peter Osborne’s pertinent opening remarks regarding the concept in his The Politics of Time in mind: Osborne notes two assumptions underlying historiography and modernity. The first is that discussions on modernity (as a period) tend to assume that the term can be used unproblematically in reference to a chronologically distinct period. The second assumption is that it is possible to dissociate the very ideas of modernity and periodization from

43. Ibid., 62-63.
44. “Directly linked to the decline of traditional Christianity’s role is the powerful emergence of utopianism, perhaps the single most important event in the modern intellectual history of the West. In hindsight, although man was certainly a utopian dreamer long before, this appears to have been the eighteenth century’s most significant legacy to our modernity, obsessed as it is with the idea and myth of Revolution. Indeed, the rage for utopia – either directly and positively or by way of reaction and polemicism – pervades the whole intellectual spectrum of modernity from political philosophy to poetry and the arts.” Ibid., 63.
45. Ibid., 68.
a modern view of time in the first place; that is, that we can see modernity from the outside. In this sense, modernity still very much colors how we see the world; it is deeply ingrained in the prevalent image of thought.

Dividing time into periods presupposes a beginning and an end. Such historic duration is never clear-cut; there is superimposition, cross-breeding and there are hybrids, not to mention the small events that shape larger historic events, but they themselves go unnoticed. When history is divided into periods, all of this is usually lost. Historiography also produces presuppositions, and these are particularly discernible in the relation between modernity and the utopian. There are many ways of periodizing history, and none of them are innocent. Periodization invariably violates history. All periodizations of history are political in perhaps blindingly apparent ways. Euro-centrism, or at least a focus on the northern hemisphere, is probably the most obvious objection to any of the habitually accepted periodizations. In a periodization such as the one centered on modernity, history subjugates the rest of the world to the order of Europeans in a way that no longer can be considered acceptable.

In many accounts of history, modernity and the modern continue to be the protagonist, even when the period has allegedly passed. We are no doubt living in modern-centric times, even if they are not considered modern in themselves. Modernity haunts us with a vengeance. The very moniker postmodernity refers back to a modernity that is no longer, or that has mutated into a form of hypermodernity. Nonetheless, it still puts modernity on the central stage. Dividing history into pre-modern, modern and postmodern illustrates the conundrum at hand; how can anything succeed postmodernity in such an account, except possibly some form of resurrected modernity? The paradoxes of imagining or periodizing what succeeded postmodernity become apparent upon brief examination of a few recent attempts to put a name on the legacy of postmodernity.

Notable in this context are the ideas around a metamodernism developed by cultural theorist Timotheus Vermeulen. Metamodernism, according to Vermeulen, distinguishes itself

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47. It can of course be argued that neither modernity nor postmodernity have in fact come to an end. One interesting side to this discussion is in the small book Svar På Frågan: Vad Var Det Postmoderna? (The Answer to the Question: What was the Postmodern?) In the postscript, Fredric Jameson raises the question of whether postmodernity could be considered to have passed, and argues that it has not. See Sven-Olov Wallenstein, ed. Svar På Frågan: Vad Var Det Postmoderna? (Stockholm: Axl Books, 2009).
from postmodernism thus: "Whereas postmodernism was characterised by deconstruction, irony, pastiche, relativism, nihilism, and the rejection of grand narratives (to caricature it somewhat), the discourse surrounding metamodernism engages with the resurgence of sincerity, hope, romanticism, affect, and the potential for grand narratives and universal truths, whilst not forfeiting all that we’ve learnt from postmodernism.”

This synthesis of modernity and postmodernity no doubt appears problematic. Another proposition is the admittedly cumbersome term post-postmodernism, outlined by American literary critic Jeffrey T. Nealon in the 2012 *Post-postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Just-in-time Capitalism* (with a clear reference to Fredric Jameson’s seminal *Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* from 1991). Post-postmodernism is defined thus:

[T]he initial “post” in the word is less a marker of postmodernism’s having finally used up its shelf life at the theory store than it is a marker of postmodernism’s having mutated, passed beyond a certain tipping point to become something recognizably different in its contours and workings; but in any case, it’s not something that’s absolutely foreign to whatever it was before. (Think of the way that a tropical storm passes a certain threshold and becomes a hurricane, for example: it’s not a difference in kind as much as it is a difference in intensity – or, more precisely, any difference in kind is only locatable through a difference in intensity.)

The terms both assume continuity rather than a break, that is, an addition or superimposition (synthesis or intensification) with which I do not necessarily disagree. *Metamodern* and post-postmodern are both defined in relation to modernity and postmodernity as the logical amalgamation of the two, and both aim to articulate a condition that is “different” enough to warrant its own period. In that sense, both preserve the centrality of modernity in history, illustrating the difficulty of leaving modernity behind.

Architectural history has its own periodization criteria, and they are not unrelated to broader images of thought. Some of the criteria correspond broadly to art history and the notion of architectural style, whilst others are specific to the architectural discourse. In the American architectural critic Charles Jencks’ definition, for instance, postmodernism...
UTOPOLOGY

has been periodized in the tradition of art history as a finite period, since succeeded by various other periods. Outside of architecture, it remains debatable whether modernity or postmodernity can, in fact, end. Much has been written on the topic of periodization in architecture, modernity, modernism and postmodernism, and I will not delve deeper into this discussion, but instead simply acknowledge that there is no particular consensus on periodization, and the constitutive elements in different systems of periodization are by no means uniform. To reiterate: periodization is never innocent, and periodization does things. It is, as Osborne would be the first to state, political.\(^5\)

Arguably, in such a historiography utopia becomes locked in the very specific modern meaning of utopia that this study attempts to upend. If the moderns believed in grand narratives, progress and revolution, if we follow the French philosopher Jean François Lyotard,\(^5\) and if postmodernity is broadly characterized by a rejection of grand narratives, how is any synthesis possible? How can one continue to think about and around a utopian concept that moves onwards without a grand narrative? In some ways, this study attempts to answer that question, but it must deliver the wider utopian from modernity in order to do so. Therefore, I want to remove modernity’s centrality to history, here, locally. Such an act does not necessarily apply to the historiography of humanity or even architecture, but it is instrumental in un-mooring utopia from its intrinsic connection to the modern.

Whether one considers modernity a condition or a period, utopia becomes either paradoxical or locked into a specific meaning that can no longer be relevant. In the first case, utopia is the end of change and thus explicitly anti-modern, and in the latter case, utopia becomes a ghost that we cannot escape as we keep referring back to a modernity that we no longer consider applicable to us. In either case, we are haunted by a utopia that remains undead – simultaneously present and absent. Neither is useful, and, if utopia is predicated on desire rather than the specific incarnation as an image of a perfect world, neither can account for the

\(^{53}\) Osborne, *The Politics of Time*.

lingering utopian remnants – in Marzahn and elsewhere – as anything more than ghosts of ridiculous dreams.

**Utopia Takes Form**

The term “Utopia” is habitually credited to Thomas More and his eponymous book, although it can readily be argued that he simply put a name on an already existing desire. Though it is often left out of utopian discussions, at the center of More’s work is the major fundamental shift to the plane of immanence of early modernity; i.e. the notion that humanity shapes its own societal order, and in extension, its destiny, as opposed to divine determination. This change can be said to have opened up the future as a category or dimension. Even if Utopia did not depict a future per se, it permitted the invention of the future. For the future to be invented, one must conceive of time as linear rather than cyclical. The directions and organization of human society were increasingly considered to be in the hands of humans, and were consequently a subject of discussion and politics.

More’s work opened up for a genre with similar ambitions, a canon of works imagining how things could be otherwise, and depicting this other society through an image, or a description of that other society. Like More’s, these societies were located “elsewhere” rather than “elsewhen.” If we categorize More’s Utopia as a “utopian image,” or a utopian projection, this can be considered to be comprised of what the French architectural theorist Françoise Choay refers to as “portrait space” and “model space” in *The Rule and the Model*. Central to the understanding of More’s work is that the book, according to Choay, superimposes two images of utopia, “one of a place, the other of a prototype.” The first of these “depicts the spatial features that make Utopia a uniquely individual place, is determined even in the particular features of its buildings by the contingencies of physical geography and history. The second image, which I shall call a model, retains of Utopia itself only delocalized and reproducible spatial features, and otherwise deals exclusively with the human order and a strict system of cultural norms.”

Choay touches briefly on the model space’s relation to the future and Utopia’s instrumentality, but since hers is first and foremost an analysis of form, these questions remain
secondary. Choay writes: "More’s critique is not merely contestatory: it has no significance in itself but rather supplies the matrix for a social model. To each of the defects inventoried by his objectifying lens corresponds, as if reflected in a mirror image, an inverse quality.”59 There is, in other words, more than mere negation of the existing societal order in More’s Utopia; it also contains something partially instrumental. The portrait space, which in some (but not all) ways resembles the England of the time, is not dissociable from the model space. Through this, More’s Utopia can act as a mirror.60 As images, both model space and portrait space are snapshots, without any temporal dimension. There is no futurity in More, or rather, there is a potential of a different world, of the other image, held up as a mirror. Choay takes this to mean that through his work, More discovered that society shapes itself, and that the order of tradition and habit can be changed. However, Choay asserts, rather than open up the future to a plethora of alternatives, More proclaims that the order of Utopia is the only other way society can be organized.61

Over the course of the following centuries, the relation between portrait space and model space, which in More are presented parallel to one another, shifts. Choay, who is bound by her limitations on utopia as form, notes the next significant shift in her analysis of Sinapia, an anonymous 17th century utopian text. The shift in question represents what Choay refers to as “Hyperspatialization,” whereby portrait space and model space merge, and the utopian text thus becomes a plan to be directly implemented. Sinapia is presumably one of the last geographical utopias, and is also a thinly veiled mirror of Spain; located in the southern hemisphere with the corresponding coordinates of the Iberian Peninsula, its name is an anagram of Ispania.62 For Choay, Sinapia introduces two shifts from More’s Utopia that signal the conflation between the rule and the model that she tries to prove.

The first of these two shifts is the intent of actual spatial implementation, as opposed to More’s “speculative exercise.”63 Choay suggests that it is no coincidence that this model emerged from Spain, whose colonial ventures in the New World meant, among other things, planning cities from

59. Ibid., 149-50.
60. Choay writes: “By virtue of the spatial model, the critique can act as a mirror. Instead of evoking an inversion of the society under critique with conceptions that are intangible and imprecise, More fixes it in an image (he uses the term imago), giving it a body and an identity. This reference is clearly affirmed by the fact that the model is not dissociable from the portrait of Utopia on which it is superimposed, a portrait that illusively but unmistakably reflects England itself.” Ibid., 153.
61. Ibid., 154.
62. Ibid., at 205.
63. Ibid., at 209.
scratch. The second shift is the incorporation of the rules for architecture to adhere to in the model. This can be taken, as Choay suggests, as the beginning of conflation of the rule and the model, but I would add that it could also be read as the beginning of the notion of the temporal dimension and change of society over time in the form of progress; this notion would grow increasingly more important during the next century. Choay does not necessarily distinguish between space and time. One of her criteria for utopia is simply that it is located “elsewhere,” meaning that whether it is located in the future or on a remote island is not necessarily of any major importance. But while Choay strives to show a certain consistency of utopia throughout the centuries within some categories, I aim to show a concept that changes with society, and the implications in terms of function are thus essential.

According to Choay, More’s two images remain distinct from each other throughout the book. More’s utopia, then, can at most be indirectly considered a model or a blueprint in function in Choay’s account, but not directly. Thus, the model space in More’s work is readily characterized as detached from the England located between the lines of the work; it is geographically distant and unknown. The full implications of this reformation of the utopian concept, which essentially shifted utopia’s meaning and instrumentality at the same time, were analyzed by the German historian Reinhart Koselleck in the essay “The Temporalization of Utopia.”

Koselleck notes that the shift from locating utopia as a place to a temporal location was logical; around 1770, there seemed to be very few white spots left on the map where the remote island of utopia could be located: “The utopian spaces had been surpassed by experience.” Locating utopia in the future gave it infinite space and infinite reproducibility. According to Koselleck, this shift had two fundamental implications on how utopia was considered. Firstly, it meant that the chance of “discovering” a hidden utopian land, was over: the mediation offered by chance was no longer available. Utopia was now clearly a product of the author’s mind. Secondly, whereas lost sailors who “stumbled” on the geographical utopias had no reason to account for how they had sailed to get there, utopia located in the future meant the necessity to provide a road-map

65. Ibid., at 86.
to the future: “The argument from today to tomorrow, out of the present into the future, demands other criteria for credibility than the great leap across the water.” In this sense, utopia became the projection associated with the concept it is today.

Koselleck argues that in conjunction with the location of utopia in the future, utopia also became associated with the Enlightenment ideals of “perfection” in a secular sense, and that utopia thus moved to align with the objectives of Enlightenment philosophers. “With perfectibility, with the capability of becoming perfect, the goal is completely temporalized and incorporated into the human agents themselves, without an end point.” It is here, Koselleck reminds us, that utopia becomes an integral part of the notion of progress (towards perfection), forming the basis for utopia as it is habitually understood, with all of its ideological implications.

Already here, utopia has changed from distorted reflection (in More) to blueprint in Sinapia. However thinly veiled, Sinapia was still nominally geographically displaced rather than temporally, and the next step in the formation of the utopian concept was a temporal dislocation. As Koselleck notes, with the shift from space to time, utopia changes from an image of another world and becomes a plan for the world – it becomes a projection of a future, possible or impossible. The significance of this shift is often underplayed. The shift fundamentally altered what utopia was capable of, and the use to which it could be put. Thus, the utopian plan emerged. It is in this capacity that utopia is associated with architecture and architects; this is where we can, for the first time, discern the utopian concept of the architect.

Utopia became subsequently intimately associated with the idea of progress. Koselleck writes that the word progress itself came to take on a radically different meaning in the 18th century, and the same can be said for a series of other words. “Progressio, progressus has unlike the theological profectus gained new meaning on [sic] its neo-Latin, French and English settings: the openness of the future which is at the same time conceived as increasingly controllable.” Here, Koselleck outlines the two different lines of meaning implied

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66. Ibid., at 88.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., at 89.
69. The perfect or the rational order of society remains associated with the utopian. These two are not interchangeable, but they have in common that they are both assumed to be an objectively optimal organization of society, without need for further change.
in the shift of meaning of the notion of progress: the natural progression, which fundamentally means that things grow old and die; and a connection with perfection. “To discover the eternal laws of nature or art – or, as it was demanded in the eighteenth century, also of politics – means to define a finite aim.” Progress, then, becomes connected to truth. I would add that those truths permit the very specific definition of utopia. In other words, without the idea of progress, there can be no perfect society in the future.

The rapidly growing fascination with the future constituted a momentous shift. Koselleck notes that political prognostication had previously been considered stable and cyclical, where the past is repeated in the future, binding the past and the future together in what can be described as “static mobility.” He reminds us that progress “opened up a future that transcended the hitherto predictable, natural space of time and experience…and thus provoked new, transnatural, long-term prognoses.” As a dimension, the future started to make an increasingly sizable impact on the present in two ways in particular: firstly, the future approached us at a vastly increased speed; and secondly, the future was now decidedly unknown, but could be mastered. These two were linked as the accelerated passing of time deprived the experience of constancy and introduced new factors, making the complexity of the unknown qualities incomprehensible.

In the work *Critique and Crisis*, Koselleck paints a different portrait of the genesis of the utopian plan in the Enlightenment, connecting the development of the utopian plan and the political dimension. In Koselleck’s view, the utopian plan emerged by necessity through the Enlightenment critique of the Absolutist State. According to Koselleck, supposedly rational critique had to establish “the pledge of a tomorrow in whose name today could in good conscience be allowed to perish.” Or put differently, an image that would justify the tearing down of the Absolutist state. Enlightenment critique, in Koselleck’s view, had no choice but to become utopian.

According to Koselleck, the Absolutist State and its subsequent critique were also necessary starting points for the establishment of what he calls “the philosophy of history,” also
called the philosophy of progress, where the future would be just – or free, if we follow Hegel. Thus, utopia became a practice of establishing an image of the end-state, where the injustices of the present are already resolved.

What has been perhaps less discussed is that this utopian expression was also a means at the same time; it constituted an operative element. In Koselleck’s view, the plan becomes a form of indirect political power in the hands of the Masons and the Illuminati. Koselleck argues that one of the reasons for the notoriety of the Illuminati lay precisely in the philosophy of history; that while the organization was ostensibly without form, or of unknown form, the Illuminati made their long-term objective – the abolition of religion – public to their enemies. One might add that they operated through what the latter-day US Secretary of Defense and advocate of the Iraq War Donald Rumsfeld would have considered the “known unknowns.”

Koselleck suggests that as an indirect plan, the long-term objective of the Illuminati offered the promise of rationality, and he goes on to define the instrumentality of the plan in this context: “What does this identification of indirect political planning with the course of history mean? It shrouds the possibility of revolution yet it conjures up revolution itself.”

In the light of this, the abolition of the state is planned, but revolution becomes unnecessary, as the outcome is given from the start. This theme is central to the study: “The assurance of victory ruled out the need for direct conflict.” Koselleck notes that no specific Illuminatus was charged with the responsibility for politically bringing this about; it was a foregone conclusion inherent in the notion of progress.

The secret organization added another topos of imagination onto the others, which combined proved a very potent image – so much so that the legend of the Illuminati is still used in popular culture occasionally. To the outside, the Illuminati appeared to be directly preparing for the revolution. By making their long-term objectives open secrets, the plan itself...
appeared imminent and the revolution underway, while not actually furthering their objective:

The philosophy of history was simply indirect political power. Awareness of the political character of the historico-philosophical concealment of political plans associated with the indirect assumption of power highlighted the political significance of the tension between State and society, even if in Germany only of the secret society. The lifting of the historico-philosophical veil from concrete planning brought the Utopian final goal the abolition of the State dangerously close. Revolution came into view.\textsuperscript{81}

Utopia in the form of the plan, in other words, becomes revolutionary without the need for actual revolution. Koselleck writes that "The philosophy of history seemed to bridge the gap between the moral position and the power that was aspired to."\textsuperscript{82} The plan is indirectly political; it brings the far end near, envisioning the other world and omitting all the political changes and the hardships necessary to get there, and the revolution is, inherently, a foregone conclusion. Progress constituted a topos in which the utopian image and the utopian plan merged into one and the same. Utopias, as expressions of a utopian desire, affect the world on their own, as schemes or plans, and are not simply containers for utopian content.

What must be discussed, however, is how these schemes in their various incarnations affect the world. This effect will furthermore shift with the horizon of imagination, the ideological context and the perspective of the world. There is, in other words, nothing absolute about utopia as a concept; it has shifted according to context. In this sense, I argue that utopia cannot be reduced to a binary – utopian/not-utopian – and that there is no given definition for utopia. Instead, utopia as an expression of utopian desire is shaped by the plane of immanence and the media of its expression, and its reception. These all condition what can be imagined at a given moment, and importantly, these shift constantly in response to changing societal conditions. In extension, utopia as it is considered in the architectural field of study is an anachronism. Utopia, associated with progress, has only a comic/tragic role to play in a world where the future does not hold the promise of a better world, but only more of the same or catastrophe. It is difficult, however, to break out of

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 134-35.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 130.
this conception, as architects’ self-image, practice and perspective is fundamentally constructed around the notion of progress and the conflation between utopian image and utopian plan. Ultimately, the architect is largely defined through her projection of futures.

**Projection & architect**

The history of the architect as a professional figure is closely connected with the idea of projecting an image of the future. The architect came to be associated with utopia as the concept denoted a temporal rather than a geographical displacement. Architectural theory and historiography tend to focus on buildings rather than on the role and self-image of the architect. When discussing a utopian concept shifting with its time, these aspects become a pertinent topic; in many ways, the role and self-image of the architect define a specific relation to the dominant ideology and to history, theory, and utopia.

I argue that the idea of projection is in many ways constitutive of the architect, who was a disciplining figure from the beginning, exercising control over the previously powerful Gothic journeymen who built the great cathedrals, in France and perhaps elsewhere. Deleuze and Guattari note that:

> the ground-level plane of the Gothic journeyman is opposed to the metric plane of the architect, which is on paper and off site. The [journeyman’s] plane of consistency or composition is opposed to another plane, that of organization or formation. Stone cutting by squaring is opposed to stone cutting using templates, which implies the erection of a model for reproduction.

The architect is partially constituted by the plan as an instrument of control. The plan is a projection into the future. Projection – etymologically, throwing something forward, pro-jetere – in architectural terms entails the proposition for a built structure of some sort that is expressed in drawings and other media to be realized in the future. The likelihood that the specific proposed future will come to pass varies from instance to instance. The principal focus, both here and of this study, is not on the projection’s potential or actual

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84. The origin of the architect during the renaissance is more complicated than this, and involves a desire for status on behalf of the architect, who – as opposed to the master builder – is educated and can communicate in a learned way with the educated patron of architecture. See also Spiro Kostof, ed. *The Architect: Chapters in the History of the Profession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 125.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF UTOPIA

realization, but on the very projection itself and its effects as a projection.

According to the architectural historian Robin Evans, there are two distinguishing features that demarcate the architect from other artistic disciplines. The first distinction is the not-yet. Architects draw something to be realized at a future date, while artists for the major part of history have interpreted phenomena.\(^85\) Architects project.\(^86\) Reductively put, architectural production currently involves producing assemblage instructions for a future structure. These include drawings, specifications, contracts (not to be confused with the structure itself) and a rhetorical component that is instrumental in producing anticipation and desire (for the proposed future). To clarify, I neither propose to define architecture, nor describe how the design process influences the design etc. I am merely pointing out that the output of architectural practice can, with a certain amount of generalization, be reduced to instructions for assemblage and rhetorical material.

If progress constitutes the dominant imaginary, working with the future naturally lends the architect a certain credibility – if we believe in the future, it makes sense to believe in progressive architecture; the architect can consider herself a scientist or engineer-genius, practicing what has been called "solutionism."\(^87\) If tomorrow will, in either case, be better than today, the potential of the future is unbound. Progress came to serve architects of the late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) century extremely well in terms of the architect as a prominent figure in society, ostensibly representing a common good – in certain respects, this association lingers on to this day in the architectural profession. It is through progress, I would argue, that architecture becomes a public affair of shaping the collective future in physical form. Architects are in this sense historically bound to the notion of projection, and the architectural idea of utopia is likewise bound to the idea of throwing an image forward. Reinhold Martin writes:

The great majority of modern and protomodern utopian architectural propositions from Ledoux to Le Corbusier have entailed making a picture of an idealized world – a project, that is – and then launching it like a projectile into the future. Oddly enough, the entry of this utopian image into the real, its moment of im—

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86. Beginning with the Renaissance, the practice of drawing appears to be the common educational element of architects. See Kostof, The Architect, 135.
pact as it were, necessarily marks the millennial — or apocalyptic — end of history, in the sense of an ongoing historical dialectic: when and if Utopia actually arrives, it’s all over.88

Evans outlines the instrumental power of architecture emanating from the drawing:

Drawing in architecture is not done after nature, but prior to construction; it is not so much produced by reflection on the reality outside the drawing, as productive of a reality that will end up outside the drawing. The logic of classical realism is stood on its head, and it is through this inversion that architectural drawing has obtained an enormous and largely unacknowledged generative power: by stealth. For, when I say unacknowledged, I mean unacknowledged in principles and theory. Drawing’s hegemony over the architectural object has never really been challenged.89

This is a central argument to the notion of projection in architecture. Where a utopian text is invariably rhetorical, it can essentially only be rhetorical and nothing more. Architectural instructions, on the other hand, invoke a reality-to-come in a different way than a text or an artwork, which both employ media in which the critical distance to reality is beyond question.90 Architectural production, in that sense, is ostensibly more of a direct threat, or promise than the others, lending a certain gravitas or reality content to architecture that is missing from literature and art; it is the power of the plan, which is highly problematic in and of itself.

The second characteristic Evans emphasizes is so deeply engrained in architectural culture that it is often overlooked: architects do not work on the object of architecture, i.e., the building, but with and through representations of it. Architects are, Evans writes: “never working directly with the object of their thought, always working at it through some intervening medium, almost always the drawing, while painters and sculptors, who might spend some time on preliminary sketches and marquettes, all ended up working on the thing itself which, naturally, absorbed most of their attention and effort.”91 There are many nuances of this, and architects do engage with the building on site, in negotiations in courtrooms, with users after completion and so forth; thus, this should be read as a broad principle rather than absolute truth. However, Evans’ argument rightly highlights that there is not necessarily a straight line from drawing to
building, though such a line is oftentimes assumed. As Evans points out, there is invariably a translation process. In addition, there is a complex web of other factors and actors to acknowledge (legislation, planning permission, engineering, real estate, etc., to name but a few). Architects, however, have a tendency that is partly built into their education to conflate representations of the built edifice and the built edifice itself. As Kester Rattenbury puts it in the introductory chapter to This Is Not Architecture:

The culture of treating unbuilt, imaginary designs as architecture is essential to the design process as taught and used in the Western world. You design by means of representing a non-existent project. This is instilled in architectural students when imaginary projects are discussed in the studio as though they were real buildings, and it never leaves the culture. Unbuilt competitions and other proposals figure large in the CVs of most architects, young or old, famous or not, who seek the status of high architecture. Often, if you’re unfamiliar with the projects, it’s impossible to tell which, if any, actually exist in built form.92

These aspects of architectural practice are not products of the 20th century; as Evans notes, they have been there since the emergence of the modern architect in the 15th and 16th centuries. Going some way to explain the conflation of drawings with built structure is perhaps the Platonic Idealism that has remained intrinsic to architectural practice. Architectural historian Adrian Forty writes in Words and Buildings that the concept of design "has allowed works of architecture to appear, paradoxically, as both pure ‘idea’ and at the same time as solid material objects; it takes its place in the modernist triad with ‘space’ and ‘form’."93

Platonism also served the elevation of the architect and the patron in discussing the exclusive and supposedly refined language of the drawing. The British architect Jonathan Hill remarks: "The architectural drawing established a new etiquette of communication between the various parties involved in architecture, allowing architects to communicate with patrons as learned equals, who acquired prestige through each other’s support."94 Platonism, then, was built in from the start, where the ideal was built into the division of labor between workmen and architect: “In the new division of labour evident in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, design, conducted in two di-
mensions rather than three, was distinct from construction and the construction site.”

It is thus not unexpected that the architect’s relation to the future is an image of the ideal future. Such a proposition is readily accommodated within the profession’s tools of trade, and the effects of drawings have been overlooked precisely since they are conflated with a direct proposition. The idealism emerging through design is furthermore also a product of the architect’s relation to the future. The architect is a figure who by definition exercises an element of control over the future, and with the evolution of science and the onset of the modernism of the industrial society, this element of control became increasingly central to the architect’s self-image. Here, utopia became the ultimate solution, the end of all inefficiency and injustice.

The idea of controlling the future remains, and it is amplified in architecture. Projections can also become tools of dominance of the future. Ildéfons Cerdá’s management of the industrial city in the plan for extending Barcelona of 1859 can serve as an illustrative example. In Choay’s account of the birth of urbanization, the contemporary city is first introduced as being “ill”, and the author subsequently proposes a remedy. Choay’s genealogy places Cerdá as a starting point for an urban tradition that principally concerns the management of the city and its population; in that respect, it could be considered biopolitical in Foucault’s sense.

Choay considers the model, the strand leading from More, to be clearly visible, not least in the juxtaposition or mirroring of the good and the bad city. Choay suggests that Cerdá manages to “weave” the model — with its origin in More’s Utopia — and the treatise — traced back to Alberti’s de re aedificatoria — together into a composite text by means of introducing an “origin-narrative” that is a figment of his imagination, or at least existed outside of history.

One could suggest that this period is characterized by the entrance of science, and the idea of the city as a problem to solve, or to manage. The architect and her “solutionism” become oriented toward the solutions she offers for management, rather than the object of architecture itself. Whilst most other models in previous eras were concerned with the system in its entirety, discipline and biopolitics opened for a focus
on management, where the model becomes an instrument of managing the future; in other words, of managing progress and of managing the population. What can be suggested is that science provided incentive for change, tied into the utopian impulse that was associated with the origins of the utopian concept. One mustn’t forget that the utopian socialists of the 19th century – Robert Owen, Charles Fourier and others – regarded themselves as scientists as well.\textsuperscript{99} Science and the model (primarily, rather than the treatise) combined to create something that could be considered a development of the model, and suddenly the model as a medium became directly comparable with the present reality, which greatly reinforced the power of the model. The content was often considered utopian, however, the message – that is, how the medium changed reality – was, as Tafuri later would note, not revolutionary in any emancipatory way.

\textbf{The opening up of utopia}

In this prologue, I have outlined the starting points for the study ahead. Utopia is not an absolute concept if one follows its history. It does not have an absolute meaning, nor can we satisfactorily distinguish between that which is utopian and that which is not-utopian, unless we define utopia according to its expressed form alone. This, however, becomes problematic as soon as one traces the genealogy of the concept. The conception of Utopia is invariably contingent on different factors, including the horizons of imagination, the medium through which the utopian is expressed, and the situation in which it is expressed, in addition to the ideological aspects. The utopian concept is consequently open to nuance, to variation, and to multiplicity. I argue that there exists an underlying utopian desire, expressed through a variety of means and media. It should be remembered that the expression itself affects the world around it, and I will argue that the principal aspect of utopia is not the content proposed, but its effects as proposal.

Thus, the projections must be considered in terms of effect rather than content; they must be looked at rather than looked into. In this sense, projections are never innocent. Pro-

\textsuperscript{99} This is an interesting line of thought which I will explore further at another point in time. For a useful introduction to these, please see Choay, \textit{The Modern City: Planning in the 19th Century} (London: Studio Vista, 1969). Or Lyman Tower Sargent, \textit{Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
jection is, as Reinhold Martin has noted, far more complicated than simply throwing something forward. There is an element of manifesting the prevalent power relations by making the future into an image of the present that invites a haunting from both past and future, which certainly haunted the early modernist attempts to overturn this role by building for the masses rather than for wealthy patrons. Architecture is a practice that always promises a different (better) world. It is thus inextricably linked to utopia in a broader sense, but not necessarily only through projection, even if this is considered the constitutive practice of the architect. As will be discussed, there are other ways of expressing and working with this promise.

100. Martin, Utopia’s Ghost, 147.
UTOPOLOGY &
A UTOPIAN CONCEPT

What I call Utopology is fundamentally the scrutiny and transformation of the presuppositions of utopia. This project does not strive to rescue or resuscitate some “true,” untainted utopia; rather, it aims to create a utopian concept able to capture the breadth and nuances of the utopian. Through analysis and reorientation, I hope to develop a utopian concept that challenges the presuppositions and limitations that define the present horizons of thought.

The departure point for this utopian concept is derived from Ernst Bloch and the utopian impulse, and its development draws on elements of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy. Bloch’s work could be said to hinge on two specific quotes from Karl Marx. The first sets out the importance of critical work and of seeing the world beyond mystifications: “humanity has long possessed a dream which it must only possess in consciousness to possess it in reality”; and the second, from Marx’s famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach, emphasizes the importance of political action: “[p]hilosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world; the point is to change it.”

What I find specifically interesting in these quotes is that when they are put next to one-another, they illustrate the beginning of a utopian approach where the mind and imagination are contingent on the world outside, and vice versa. If we only have to possess a dream in consciousness in order to possess it in reality — and if the point of philosophy is not to


interpret the world, but to change it — the utopian endeavor must entail working very carefully with imaginaries and in relation to that which already exists.

The utopian concept I will outline in this chapter is different from what I will call the colloquial definition of utopia. The colloquial definition of utopia could also be described as an image of the perfect future organization of society.

The cardinal error committed by the colloquial utopia is that it routinely considers the utopian concept a category (confined to a genre of cultural expressions, a period or similar). By assigning utopia a category, it acquires an identity, and is thereby exclusionary. There is, in other words, an inside and an outside of the utopian. A series of expressions are bundled together inside, and the discussion of other expressions does not concern what they do, but whether they fall inside or outside the utopian category. This applies to Koolhaas’ utopian paradox, which seems to consider utopia a category to which architects can choose to relate, or not. To make matters worse, the category to which utopia is habitually reduced is defined by one simple question: what is the perfect organization of society?

The colloquial definition is defined through what it proposes alone: perfect organization. Secondly, it is also habitually defined as transcendental, seen as the end of history, and the end of change. Thirdly, it is distinguished in binary fashion: things can be utopian or they can be not-utopian, and discussion often veers into establishing the criteria under which things can be considered utopian, while leaving what utopian means presupposed. Fourthly, a colloquial definition of utopia presents utopia as a solution to an overdetermined problem. In an overdetermined problem, any solution can be tested directly against the problem and reality, and any solution will automatically be found wanting, and thus false.

In contrast, the utopian concept presented here differs from the colloquial definition on all of the above points. I define the utopian as expressions of a utopian desire that I argue are predicated on survival rather than immortality. It is in other words neither content-based, nor transcendental. This desire is unconditional, and it is expressed in different artifacts in different ways. This means that virtually every artifact is a utopian
expression in some way. The categorical distinction between the utopian and the not-utopian becomes untenable from such a perspective, leaving us instead with different kinds of utopian expressions, and different utopian problems.

Utopian desire is not prefigured to address one universal utopian problem; instead, the utopian problem is formed in the mind, but not necessarily by the mind. Experience or sensation and the utopian impulse trigger imagination and memory, and ideas come into existence. This idea emerges in the form of a problem, to which the mind, memory, and imagination subsequently formulate a solution. This solution is a utopian proposition; it bears a relation to the problem, but cannot coincide with it. As the idea transforms from problem to proposition, it passes through a Deleuzian “image of thought”, or the presuppositions that condition thought.\footnote{Virtual and actual are understood here as used by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition. Here, the virtual and the actual comprise two opposite sides of the real; that is, both are real, but mutually exclusive. The passage from virtual to actual (actualization) is never a straightforward process; the virtual-real does not coincide with the actual-real. The relation between the virtual and the actual seems to fall very close to Derrida’s notion of the messianic without messianism, and his focus on the “without.” The same goes for the process from actual to virtual. Eugene B. Young has summarized the virtual as “a state that contains all possibilities (and therefore cannot be ‘realized’) by virtue of the philosophical concept or idea which expresses differentiated variations (in contexts that are historical, aesthetic, scientific, political, etc.) by retaining some features of chaos (infinite speed) but occupying a relative position with regard to its survey or problem.” Eugene B. Young, Gary Genosko, and Janell Watson, eds., The Deleuze & Guattari Dictionary (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 331.}

In this scheme, the utopian solution is consequently relative to the problem, but it cannot solve the problem as such. It can instead change how the problem is actualized; the solution can eliminate images of thought, and this is the role of the utopian concept I present here. The role of the utopian is then not to show us the true (perfect) way to organize society. The role the utopian is instrumental in permitting us to see the utopian problems more clearly and it should thus be considered in its instrumental capacity. The utopian proposition is in this sense conditioned by both the problem and the image of thought, but it also re-defines the image of thought. The utopian proposition provokes other encounters, other ideas, other problems, and, invariably, other solutions. For these to be effective, and to challenge images of thought, they need to be aimed at the extensive system of shared beliefs that go unquestioned under the guise of common sense, or presuppositions. This is what I consider to distinguish bad utopias from good ones. Where the former reinforce the presupposed, the latter cast light and doubt on presuppositions.

**Departure Points**

In a definition borrowed from Ruth Levitas’ The Concept of Utopia, utopian desire is the desire for a better way of being.\footnote{Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, 209. What this “better” refers to is a central aspect of the problem, it cannot be comprehensively resolved.} The desire itself is unconditional, and largely unconscious.
It permeates imagination, ideology, and artifacts, including architectural production. This provides us with multiple levels on which the utopian is conditioned. There is a utopian desire, and the aim cannot be described in terms of constancy and perfection, but I will argue, survival and change. This desire seeps into the conscious, and as it does so, it is conditioned by image of thought.

This definition of the utopian builds primarily on Bloch. Bloch’s work is used as a point of departure for this study, and this section aims to give the reader an operational understanding of the non-categorical utopian concept. Making a distinction between utopian desire and utopian expression perhaps invites criticism or accusations of a Platonist treatment of the utopian. I strongly refute this, however, as the ideal here is always local, always contingent on the world outside, and never transcendental or pure in an ideal way. Desire is not coupled to anything universally ideal, but rather with another world. Following Bloch, the desire is principally unconscious, but affects the conscious as well as the lifeworld. It should perhaps be emphasized that this desire is subject to manipulation and affected by experience.

What is here called utopian desire is expressed in both programmatic propositions; i.e., projections of perfect futures, as well as unconsciously present in virtually every artifact in the form of utopian impulses. As Wayne Hudson, one of few academics who has written extensively on Bloch in English, notes, there is a “utopian aura” surrounding “a new dress, advertisements, beautiful masks, illustrated magazines, the costumes of the Ku Klux Klan, the festive excess of the annual market, and the circus, fairy tales and kolportage, the mythology and literature of travel, antique furniture, ruins and museums, and the utopian imagination present in dance, pantomime, the cinema and the theatre.”

In artifacts, there remain undischarged utopian impulses. There are affinities to Deleuze’s notion of the virtual-real, impulses that remain unconsciously expressed, futures that never came to be. As will be discussed later, the
virtual-real does not coincide with the actual-real; the two cannot coincide. This notion of what I call a utopian synecdoche in everyday objects, or of fragments of the future in the present, is a common theme in Jewish mysticism, as the Russian philosopher Boldyrev notes.\(^{106}\) Bloch’s utopian synecdoche is however more complicated than elements of the ideal being present in artifacts. For Bloch, the essential aspect of this is the potential to change the world, or the new imaginaries opened by the utopian presence in the objects themselves. In other words, there is no one “true” utopia or ideal, but something that functions and inspires or catalyzes change on the one hand, and is on the other hand one of an almost infinite number of such potential other worlds. The projection of a future perfect can thus occupy many roles, but it can never be a perfect future.

One of the key tenets that Bloch borrows from Gnosis is that the view of the present is invariably obscured – there is no vantage point from which the present (and even less so, the future) can be observed with any clarity. Bloch refers to this as “the darkness of the lived moment.”\(^{107}\) Any utopian plan, in this sense, serves to produce change rather than provide a final blueprint. Even where the author of the plan does indeed intend to provide a blueprint for the future, and actually does implement his/her blueprint in the world, this is but one step in an open-ended process.

The utopian expressions produced will then, in and of themselves, engender other thoughts, other possible worlds, and so forth. The essential aspect, to Bloch, is the openness of the future. Thus, utopia is not necessarily limited to that which its author defines as utopian or not. Reinhart Koselleck has noted “A good author of good utopias evidently has very little desire to be a utopian, in the same way that Machiavelli was no Machiavellian, or that Marx did not want to be a Marxist.”\(^{108}\) The same is most certainly true in contemporary architecture; odes to the “real” are abundant and assertions of realism are mandatory, and all the more so the further the project strays from the existing. Instead of categorizing artifacts as utopian or not-utopian, the discussion centers on: in
what ways artifacts are utopian, to what end, and, importantly, to what effect?

Thereby, what has been identified as “utopian” from the start – the explicitly utopian – becomes particularly interesting. The explicitly utopian sheds some light on precisely how we try to imagine ourselves out of the present. The explicitly utopian can then be used to analyze and compare the implicitly utopian, and vice versa. While I argue that this approach is largely congruent with Bloch’s view of the utopian, there are other possible interpretations, notably one by Fredric Jameson, who proposes another distinction in the introduction to his *Archaeologies of the Future*. In this distinction, which he bases on Bloch, the “utopian impulse” is invariably utopian and unconscious. In Jameson’s view, this can then be contrasted with the “utopian program,” which is the consciously authored utopia, or the explicitly utopian, which is only ever a mirror of the present, a negation and thus critique.

This distinction is in many ways unfortunate. On a fundamental level, it disqualifies Bloch’s entire process-philosophy by severing the conscious from the unconscious; Bloch is adamant regarding the processual relation whereby the conscious is influenced by the unconscious, and the socio-material conditions abstract utopian images. It should be noted that the relation between unconscious and conscious which Bloch employs is by no means unproblematic, and it will be interrogated in the course of this chapter. Jameson, however, locates the utopian solely in the unconscious, while that which has a program is by definition something else.

From Bloch’s perspective, the programmatic utopia would be an expression of utopian desire. As Peter Thompson puts it: “Rather than representing a programmatic or fixed teleological inevitability, Bloch argued that utopia would emerge as a concrete product from the process of its own creation and that it therefore represents the filling of the dialectical gap between contingency and necessity, between what has happened and what might happen”.

Building on this, the relationship between utopian expression and utopian impulse becomes dialectical in Bloch’s perspective.

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whereby progress towards the (communist) utopia moves via failed utopias and many other cultural expressions towards increased concretization.

In Bloch’s view, utopia as an image of a future perfect world should never be taken literally. It instead constitutes an abstract utopian image, i.e. an image that works instrumentally to bring about utopia, but itself cannot contain a blueprint for utopia. As Thompson and Žižek write in the introduction to their anthology The Privatization of Hope, “The abstract is, therefore, what Bloch calls a reified processual moment, crucial in its contingent role within history but meaningless in its own right. The truth of an abstraction or a fact can be discerned only on the basis of understanding it within the nonsimultaneity of past, present, and future as we experience and anticipate them.”

The key to understanding the relationship between the utopian desire and the utopian expression lies in the category that Bloch dubbed the “noch nicht,” or the Not-Yet. This concept is applied in a variety of meanings with different implications. Wayne Hudson writes:

Utopia is ‘now’, in the sense that the intensive content which men search for under the name of utopia is present in the lived moment. ...utopia, however, is also ‘not yet’ in at least three senses. It is ‘not yet’, in the sense that it has never come to be and functions normatively against the inadequate which has become actual. Hence the failure of utopia is a reason for its survival... Utopia is also ‘not yet’ in the sense that it is something which men have envisaged in different forms through the centuries. It has not eventuated, except in isolated moments and fragmentary experiences, but the fact that it has been anticipated and foreshadowed (as a result of the operation of not-yet-conscious knowledge) adds to its power, and increases the intuitive conviction that it is not wholly ungrounded. Moreover, its pre-appearances are themselves potentially productive, and can be thematised and mobilised as a programme for human action. Finally, utopia is ‘not yet’ in the sense that it is still not fully possible, and looks ahead to new contents and developments beyond the limitations of the present world. It has a critical, meta-eschatological function against the foreclosures and premature disenchantments of current conceptions of possibility.

As both unconscious desire and as fragments in the lifeworld that contain a certain utopian content, utopia is simultaneously now and Not-Yet. These fragments and the unconscious are not themselves fragments of a universal ideal, but rather
functional entities, inspirational and instrumental when it comes to change.

According to Bloch, the Not-Yet operates on many interrelated levels. The first of these levels addresses the relationship between the unconscious, or the preconscious as Bloch calls it, which he discusses in an admittedly simplistic model. In this model, Bloch envisions two edges between the conscious and the unconscious.

One of these is the edge over which memories disappear, become repressed and settle into the No-Longer-Conscious; this is where Bloch locates the Freudian unconscious. Over the other edge, ideas emerge from the unconscious into the conscious in what Bloch refers to as “forward dawning.” To exemplify this, Bloch contrasts night-dreams and daydreams; in his model, night-dreams refer to the No-Longer-Conscious, suppressed memories, and daydreams cross over from the Not-Yet-Conscious.¹¹⁴

The Not-Yet not only refers to the formation of ideas, but could hypothetically be extended to encompass reality itself. Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek refers to Bloch’s “Ontology of Not-Yet-Being,” a process-philosophical orientation where reality is in and of itself unfinished.¹¹⁵ As a discussion example, Žižek brings up quantum reality:

Heisenberg, Bohr, and others, (...) insisted that this incompleteness of our knowledge of quantum reality points to a strange incompleteness of quantum reality itself, a claim that leads to a weird ontology. When we want to simulate reality within an artificial (virtual, digital) medium, we do not have to go to the end; we just have to reproduce features that make the image realistic from the spectator’s point of view. Say, if there is a house in the background, we do not have to construct the house’s interior, since we expect that the participant will not want to enter the house, or the construction of a virtual person in this space can be limited to his exterior – no need to bother with inner organs, bones, etc. We just need to install a program that will promptly fill in this gap if the participant’s activity will necessitate it.¹¹⁶

In terms of the utopian, if reality is perpetually unfinished (turning a blind eye to the theological questions this opens), it is left in a constant state of becoming. From such a perspective, utopia is not an image in the present; however, an
image in the present may be part of utopia or, rather, help bring change about that is utopian. Hudson notes that:

What is at stake, then, in Bloch’s work is utopia as presemblance that can be harnessed and set to work. Bloch held that manifestations of this reality could be found throughout the human world and that the neglect of it led to a lack of insightful models for political, social, legal, and cultural change. Nonetheless, the manifestations of this psychotemporal reality were not merely subjective. Rather they could involve anticipatory knowledge and be related to developing possibilities.117

The question that is perhaps at the center of how utopia is habitually understood is that of the telos—a historical purpose, or an end-point that motivates the struggle for a better way of being. Telos and its problems are very much at the center of the utopian discussion in the “unthinking” of utopia. This is notably the case in the architectural theorists Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter’s 1978 Collage City, where the pair declared utopia (projection) as a case of the present oppressing the future, advocating a “utopian poetics” au lieu de a “utopian politics.”118 Again, one could argue that the elimination of the telos associated with utopianism undoes the utopian concept itself, but I argue to the contrary, along with Bloch, and suggest that it is instead the reduction of utopia to image and telos that locks utopia as a concept into an unproductive dualism. Bloch contributes to the utopian concept, eliminating the utopian as category, and instead introduces a utopian impulse based on unconscious desire. At the same time, Bloch draws on elements of Gnosis, messianism and mysticism for a famously self-contradictory system of thought that the utopian concept developed here seeks to elaborate and develop.

A Non-Categorical Utopian Concept

In what follows, I will outline a utopian concept that is not based on using utopia as a category, but rather an understanding of the concept founded on a desire. The concept outlined here is the utopian concept that undergirds the study as a whole.

Utopian desire

I will here outline utopian desire through an adaptation of Derrida’s “the messianic without messianism” from Specters of
Marx, transposed to utopia according to the formula of “the utopian without utopia”. The point I will elaborate is originally Bloch’s, namely: the future is open to be formed and history has no predetermined destination. In the argument that follows, I outline an argument for utopia as an open future or the opening of the future. This is the utopian without a telos, or the utopian without utopia.

Utopian desire for a better way of being is not a matter of choice but an unconditional desire, even if it is expressed in multifarious and contradictory ways. In what follows, I lean primarily on one specific reading of Jacques Derrida, by Swedish philosopher Martin Hägglund in Radical Atheism; and Hägglund’s preface to the Swedish edition of Specters of Marx (Marx spöken), specifically the notion of “the messianic without messianism,” which is a very close approximation of how I read Bloch’s utopian impulse.

In stark contrast to the conventional readings of Derrida that outline a spiritual “turn” in Derrida’s thinking, Hägglund casts Derrida as a “radical atheist.” He throws new light on this by re-orienting Derrida’s entire project according to principles of “negative infinity” (infinite finitude) rather than “positive infinity” (uninterrupted duration). Through such a re-orientation, Derrida’s focus shifts to survival rather than immortality as humanity’s unconditional affirmation. I propose a similar re-orientation of the utopian, directing it toward survival rather than the eternal perfect future. There is a certain inherently Darwinian aspect to this, implying that to survive means to change, or to transform. Producing change is what permits life to continue – and this is also a very Deleuzian point. Consequently, the utopian is oriented towards change, rather than the perfect society.

It should be noted that Hägglund’s interpretation of Derrida is controversial, directly contradicting for instance philosophers Simon Critchley, Giorgio Agamben, Daniel W. Smith and many other respected academics who have read analogies between messianic of Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, respectively, where the legacy of Martin Heidegger is interpreted in terms of a return to the transcendental. Hägglund considers this a misinterpretation, suggesting instead that the meaning of


121. Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 3, 44, 91.


123. Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 79.

Derrida’s messianic is in fact a direct contradiction to that of Levinas.  

According to Hägglund, the fundamental error made in all of the above philosophers’ interpretations is placing Derrida alongside Immanuel Kant in terms of unconditional Ideas, in the assumption that the conditional idea of Law should aspire to the unconditional idea of Justice, even if unconditional justice remains forever unattainable. Hägglund is adamant that Derrida’s view of the unconditional Idea is incompatible with Kant’s. Hägglund’s reading shows that Derrida considered the absolute not only unattainable, but also fundamentally undesirable. Absolute justice, for instance, would mean the end of time, since it would render the future and the past identical, thus robbing the past of any possibility to leave traces and meaning absolute death. Following this logic, utopia would not be the realization of the perfect, never-changing social order, but rather the opposite: an embrace of the ever-changing society. The struggle to make a better society is then not pointless, but rather the essential aspect of the utopian.

Derrida sets out a theory on time in which the present as such merely divides that which is no longer from that which is yet to come. The past, in this sense, is not there-in-itself, but nor is it entirely absent. The same goes for the future. In Derrida’s text, the presence of past and future is a spectral presence. The ghost is simultaneously present and absent — or rather, simultaneously not-present and not-absent. History produces ghosts, and history must produce ghosts; otherwise we would be at the end of time, and if the past and future were absent, there would be no traces, no ghost, and essentially no life.

Any demarcation, as Hägglund notes, and any definition of a community is essentially and necessarily an exclusion, which in turn produces ghosts. Time is by definition “out of joint,” which is a condition for anything at all to happen. Derrida refers to this as a hauntology, instead of an ontology. Injustice is, in this sense, inscribed in the very possibility of justice; it does not come secondarily, as a perverted or mediated ideal.  

Traces are made in space to demarcate time, and Derrida refers to this as spacing, or the becoming-space-of-time and the becoming-time-of-space. According to
Hägglund, Derrida is not writing in this sense about transcendental or positive infinity – i.e., immortality – but of negative infinity, or survival, which in this study is subsequently associated with the utopian impulse as the desire for a better way of being. “The notion of survival … is incompatible with immortality, since it defines life as essentially mortal and as inherently divided by time. To survive is never to be absolutely present; it is to remain after a past that is no longer and to keep the memory of this past for a future that is not yet.”\textsuperscript{130}

Hägglund defines positive infinity as “uninterrupted duration”\textsuperscript{131} whereas survival is based on negative infinity, “infinite finitude.”\textsuperscript{132} This, in turn, gives rise to interesting questions in terms of the utopian. Utopia is habitually associated with positive infinity or uninterrupted duration, and one aim of this text is to re-orient the utopian concept to infinite finitude. Hägglund maintains that “Every form of duration [...] requires the negative infinity of time that does not allow anything to repose in itself, since it consists in a relentless succession from one time to another. Without succession duration would be the same as absolute immobility, since there would be no passage of time that marked it as duration.”\textsuperscript{133} And absolute immobility cannot be dissociated from “the petrification of death.”\textsuperscript{134}

The temporal can never be in itself but is always disjoined between being no longer and being not yet. Thus, time itself is constitutively out of joint. Or more exactly: time itself is the impossibility of any “itself.” This is not a paradox but follows from analyzing the minimal definition of time. Even the slightest temporal moment must be divided in its becoming: separating before from after, past from future. Without such division, there would be no time, only a presence forever remaining the same.\textsuperscript{135}

Time, then, is constitutively out of joint, with the present forever disjoining the past and the future – and we have to “combat this disjointure in the name of a better, a more just society,”\textsuperscript{136} and the definition of justice will forever be conditioned and thus incomplete.\textsuperscript{137}

Utopia, then, is not about the realization of the perfect future or aspirations for the perfect future in the absolute sense; such an ideal becomes synonymous with death. Instead,
utopia becomes associated with the messianic promise – not in the religious sense, but in a sense that Hägglund maintains is radically atheist. Bloch makes a statement to the same effect in The Principle of Hope, where he writes: “Without atheism messianism has no place.” In a similar vein, Derrida writes that messianicity is “universal structure of experience, and which cannot be reduced to religious messianism of any stripe.”

The messianic, to Derrida, refers to “the coming of an eminently real, concrete event, that is, to the most irreducibly heterogeneous otherness. Nothing is more ‘realistic’ or ‘immediate’ than this messianic apprehension, straining forwards toward the event of him who/that is coming. I say ‘apprehension’, because this experience, strained forward, toward the event, is at the same time a waiting without expectation [une attente sans attente] (an active preparation against the backdrop of a horizon, but also exposure without horizon, and therefore irreducible amalgam of desire and anguish, affirmation and fear, promise and threat).” However, the relationship between messianicity and utopia is somewhat more complicated, in that Derrida asserts that “one could not so much as account for the possibility of Utopia in general without reference to what I call messianicity.” I suggest that it converges with the utopian as a desire for an open future, as also Bloch would posit it, rather than any specific future.

According to Derrida, the messianic “mandates that we interrupt the ordinary course of things, time and history here-now; it is inseparable from an affirmation of otherness and justice. [It] must thereafter negotiate its conditions in one or another singular, practical situation, we have to do here with the locus of an analysis and evaluation, and, therefore, of a responsibility. These must be re-examined at every moment, on the eve and in the course of each event.” The messianic is in other words oriented toward the future in the present in ways which appear strikingly similar with Bloch, where utopia must be obscured from the present, and the point is to change the world. The messianicity that Derrida sets out is a critical one – through analysis and evaluation, but is practiced through practical situation. This structure is reminiscent of Bloch’s cold and hot streams of Marxism, the first analytical and the later
activist. Messianicity is also ubiquitous; Hägglund notes that the messianic promise to Derrida is a condition for all hope, marking the opening of the future.\footnote{143. Hägglund, \textit{Radical Atheism}, 133.}

In response to Jameson and Hamacher, who compare messianic without messianism to Walter Benjamin’s “weak messianism,” Derrida emphasizes significant differences: while weak messianism remains associated with Jewish Messianism, whereas the “without” denotes a break, it “bears no relation to the messianistic tradition.”\footnote{144. Derrida, “Marx & Sons,” in \textit{Ghostly Demarcations}, 250.}

In that sense, any convergence can only be in the form of an \textit{asymptote} between weak messianism and the messianic without messianism – the lines approach one another but never meet.\footnote{145. Ibid. This can be compared with the relationship between the virtual-real and the actual-real in Deleuze, which will be discussed below.} Derrida distances the messianic without messianism from the messianistic tradition, since the former has neither “the memory of a determinate historical revelation,” nor “a determinate messiah-figure”\footnote{146. Ibid., 251.}: “The very structure of messianicity without messianism itself suffices to exclude these two conditions.”\footnote{147. Ibid.}

This study will posit the utopian without utopia in precisely this way in relation to utopia as a future perfect world. Just as the specters must invariably be present in Derrida, the undisclosed utopian impulses of futures-to-come must live on and survive in the present.

Derrida notes that the word “messianic,” invites misunderstanding. He assigns the word itself pedagogical and rhetorical value. Messianicity resembles messianism without being reduced to it or identifying itself with it. He opens the question whether the messianic instead “precedes and conditions” determinate forms of messianism, and could thereby be considered “radically independent of all such figures.”\footnote{148. Ibid., 255.} However, the word messianic remains associated with Judeo-Christian messianism, even including the pivotal “without” – and by retaining the word messianic, Derrida’s intention is partly to leave the question open with regard to precisely how it relates to the tradition with which it is commonly associated.\footnote{149. Ibid.} The same tension could possibly apply to the relationship between utopia as it is outlined here and the colloquial conception of utopia. The same hypothesis might be very interesting to entertain: that the utopian without uto-
pia precedes utopia, and is in that sense radically independent of More and his entire legacy.

The utopian without utopia, however, differs from Derrida in one aspect as read through Bloch. The utopian without utopia here means utopian desire without the perfect future; as Derrida puts it: the difference between faith and religion. Faith, on the other hand, remains valid, and from the perspective of the individual utopian expression as a functional entity rather than as a blueprint, the “without utopia” by no means disqualifies the formulation, articulation or expression of utopias as functional entities. Rather than an abolition of utopia as a concept, I here outline a utopian concept that is unconditional, but which is expressed through conditional utopias.

Utopian desire does not have a telos or an absolute; rather, as it is expressed in various media, it takes on certain forms which in themselves are operational, affecting the world towards change, or, alternatively, affirming the status quo in one way or another.

The utopian without utopia is then the utopian without telos, the utopian without a determinate purpose. It embraces “negative infinity” (infinite finitude), the struggle for utopia without an endpoint. Boldyrev notes: “Bloch’s philosophy is not teleological in a sense of a given goal. It is, rather, a philosophy of action organized around Marxist praxis and a philosophy of an unaccomplished universe.”\(^{150}\) This is the philosophical starting point for the notion of utopia as a monster, challenging by way of its very existence.

**Invention and subjectivity**

Along with Deleuze, I would argue that subjectivity is not given, but something formed through repetition (habit and memory forming patterns) and experience. In this sense, we are not born with an original subjectivity; rather one is formed from encounters in life. The obverse side of that argument is that this hypothetically also means that somebody else can form our subjectivity for us.

One of the problems that occupied Deleuze in his first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, written on the philosopher and empiricist David Hume, was: “how can a subject transcend-
ing the given be constituted in the given?"¹⁵¹ This is a central question for Bloch as well, particularly regarding the notion of “transcending without transcendence.”¹⁵² Deleuze argued that empiricism habitually failed to account for two aspects of human existence: invention and belief.¹⁵³

According to Deleuze’s reading, David Hume maintained that invention could be accounted for by the associations that the mind forms as it arranges impressions. Each impression is associated with other impressions, and the sorting or arrangement of impressions and experiences by the subjectivity here is determined in the unconscious.

One aspect of this is that each human mind will organize these impressions differently, and different associations will result. The associations of experiences made by the mind are what prompt ideas and invention. In Deleuze’s reading of Hume, there are three principles according to which an association is made: these are contiguity, resemblance and causal relation.¹⁵⁴ All of these produce associations which ensure “the mind’s easy passage from one idea to another.”¹⁵⁵ Impressions call on other impressions that resemble them; impressions also attract other impressions in proximity in time and space; and thirdly, there is an attraction between ideas in terms of a causal relation – the association between heat and fire is one example.¹⁵⁶ In addition to this, ideas and associations appear in different passions, pre-personal or pre-cognitive intensities such as fear, pleasure, pain, and so forth. Depending on affectual intensity, the ideas and associations will appear stronger or weaker to the mind; these passions will also depend on circumstance.¹⁵⁷

Furthermore, associations and ideas become more prominent with repetition. The subject, her associations and passions, are in other words not given, but developed. How the mind forms associations depends on external principles: circumstance, regularity and consistency. When this association pattern begins to form a coherent system, this system is what is Deleuze considers as subjectivity.¹⁵⁸ As the Swedish philosopher Fredrika Spindler notes in relation to Deleuze’s notion of subjectivity: there is no subject who organizes the ideas, rather the ideas organize the subject.¹⁵⁹ The subjectivity,
on the other hand, is more than the ideas that form its system. The subject qualifies ideas, and the association of ideas in turn produces other ideas with other affective intensities. The subjectivity that reaches beyond the given (impression) and forms a system of belief could be considered to transcend the given (without transcendence). The subject holds certain beliefs based on previous experience, for example that the sun will rise tomorrow. These beliefs are based on the ideas that have formed them, through associations and passions.

**Utopian problems**

In the colloquial definition; utopia is considered solely in terms of a solution – which is only natural, as the problem to which utopia responds has acquired the status of being singular and given: What is the perfect organization of society? Precisely this problem, its determination, and its presuppositions are what I want to examine and reformulate with regards to utopia. It should be emphasized that this section is an appropriation, bastardization, and vulgarization of Difference and Repetition’s intricate account of thought and ideas, which has been adapted to fit the context of this study.

A utopian proposition is a solution to a utopian problem, but as Deleuze reminds us, every problem gets the solutions it deserves. The colloquial definition of utopia plays a peculiar role here. Associating utopia with one singular problem effectively isolates it; this is particularly true as the problem can be considered a false problem. To use another Deleuzian term, the colloquial utopian problem is false because it is overdetermined, that is, it can be described as a problem whose solution can be considered true or false. And, as any proposition to the above problem is always-already imperfect, utopia as a concept is invalidated.

Following instead the definition of the utopian concept outlined in this chapter, there is a multiplicity to utopian as a problem, and I argue that it is urgent to prioritize the utopian problem instead of assuming it universal. If we accept the notion that the solution is determined by the problem, the utopian must concern itself with determining the problem. If the unconscious fails to synthesize a problem, this failed synthesis will emerge as a proposition in the conscious mind, filtered through the image of thought. The problem cannot

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160. Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 28; Spindler, Deleuze: Tänkande och Blivande, 132.

161. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 158

162. Ibid., 159.
be considered a given – if it is meant to effect change, this is a fundamental prerequisite of the utopian. If the problem adheres to the accepted, that is to doxa, so will the solution it engenders.

I argue that the role of utopia should instead be considered in terms of how it challenges this doxa. Here, the Deleuzian term the image of thought serves to capture the role that common sense plays; an image of thought is here used in a way to describe the presuppositions from which thought takes as its ground, the horizon of imagination, and as very close to what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the plane of immanence in What is Philosophy? as an image of thought:

The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one's bearings in thought. It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts and presupposes such an image.\footnote{Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{What Is Philosophy?}, 37.}

Thought is invariably conditioned by presuppositions, which can be considered pre-philosophical, and are applied as preconditions as active thought begins to consider a problem. I argue that the world cannot be seen in a pure, unfiltered state. The image of thought is in this sense not ideological in any simple meaning, although it certainly has ideological ramifications. The role of utopia is to eliminate the images of thought. While these will invariably be replaced by others, the aim is to approach a different and less muddled view of the problem, which will thus engender different solutions.

As useful as it may be in other circumstances, I argue that the pragmatist motto of starting from where we are has bred a culture within architecture in which the problem is considered beyond the control of a discipline that no longer believes in its own autonomy. The role of the architect is solely to provide solutions to these given problems. Rather than challenged, the presuppositions are celebrated; common sense is reinforced rather than questioned, and architects who oppose the present incarnation of neoliberal capitalism share the same presuppositions as those who uphold it. I will return to this at length in the section on the Network-image, which I consider the dominant image of thought in contemporary society and

The image of thought that conditions the problems architects address is partially determined by the architect’s self-image. If the architect considers herself a craftsperson, the built edifice is certainly central to her understanding of architecture, quality and potential are in the execution and materials; if she considers herself an artist working in relation to ideals, then architectural history and the disciplinary context present an image of thought related to historiography, philosophy bent toward essentialism; if she considers herself a scientist, the problem-solving is central, as the built object acquires value as architecture through the illusion it offers, which is itself presumably defined in quantitative terms; and if she considers herself a manager, then the ability to construct viable instrumental projects defines her architecture, and the connections she establishes, rather than the built edifice, define the outcome.

I maintain that it is possible to consider the architect from all these perspectives, but I argue that they are not the same, and they cannot be measured in the same units. In order to understand the relationship of each of these perspectives to the utopian, we must relate architecture to the problems to which the architect proposes solutions. This is not an apologia for an autonomous discipline, but in fact quite the contrary: it is a call to see architecture as shaped by the problems to which architects attempt to respond – problems that stem from many other origins than the architectural discipline.164

So, if we decide to focus on the problem before the solution, the immediate question that arises is from where does the problem emerge? This has already been discussed to an extent in relation to the formation of subjectivity through Deleuze, but it should be elaborated on further.

What in the above is called “idea” is synonymous with a problem. This problem, again, begins with a self that experiences an event or a physical sensation. This is subsequently unconsciously synthesized, and ends up as a failed synthesis, incongruous and problematic. Bloch has a similar line of rea-
soning, arguing that the insight gained is that something is missing (Etwas fehlt). This “something” is not a lack, but rather a primarily unconscious desire for something ungraspable, and it continues to be impossible to determine in terms of a solution.\textsuperscript{165} The utopian problem is an expression of a desire, but it remains unsolvable in a comprehensive way. Deleuze would designate the problem as virtual and the proposition it engenders as actual.\textsuperscript{166} The problem’s nature is open; there is no way the problem can conclusively be solved – and, as noted in relation to Derrida in the above, it is certainly not desirable to completely resolve utopian problems, as it would mean the end of change and hence death. We must be haunted by past and future, or there is no life.

The role of utopia in the concept I am developing here is, as has already been mentioned, on the one hand to work against presuppositions about how to live. This falls very close to definitions of how philosophy should work, but, as Deleuze and Guattari note in one of their rare mentions of the utopian, “it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point.”\textsuperscript{167} In this perspective, the similarity appears warranted. Utopia, here, is considered primarily in its critical functions.

On the other hand, the effect of removing presuppositions is that we see the world more clearly and with less distortion. However, as there is no such thing as an unobscured view of the true conditions of life. This means that critique does not simply eliminate presuppositions; it invariably also adds other presuppositions enabling other worlds. If, for instance, negation is not simply a tool to uncover the unobscured underlying truth, but also implies and suggests – as any proposition – another world, then the critical utopian proposition is also engaged in making propositions.

Utopia never serves only a critical function; it is always implying and hinting at another organization – this is an element of utopian desire that has lingered long after the alleged demise of utopia. The American historian Russell Jacoby distinguishes between blueprint utopias and iconoclastic utopias in his 2005 \textit{Picture Imperfect}. Blueprint utopias are based on the image

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{166} In some respects, Deleuze and Bloch share many views, but one distinction here is that Bloch believes that the problem can be solved, even though we may not know how. Bloch calls the final resolution Heimat, a state that is both familiar and utterly different. Deleuze, on the other hand, seems to suggest an asymptotic relationship, where the virtual and the actual can never overlap. I agree with Deleuze here and maintain that the two will, by definition, never overlap. Bloch, \textit{The Principle of Hope}, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 1335-36.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{What Is Philosophy?}, 99.
\end{itemize}
of the future, crisp and clear down to the last detail, while iconoclastic utopias refuse to make any image, but Jacoby does not suggest that iconoclasm is simply about the destruction of images:

[The iconoclastic utopians dreamt] of a superior society but […] declined to give its precise measurements. In the original sense and for the original reasons, they were iconoclasts; they were protesters and breakers of images. Explicitly or implicitly they observed the biblical prohibition on graven images of the deity. “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image. […] Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them” (Exodus 20:4-5). This prohibition, of course, entailed no disrespect of God. On the contrary: it honored Him by refusing to circumscribe Him. In the same way that God could not be depicted for the Jews, the future could not be described for the iconoclastic utopians; it could only be approached through hints and parables. One could “hear” the future, but not see it. 168.

Iconoclastic utopias contain no image and no measurements, but this does not mean that they are devoid of dreams of a better world. The negation can, in this sense, keep a problem open rather than permit it to be determined through the image of thought. Yet, there is something that goes slightly beyond this; there is not only a problem there, but also a hint, a form of anticipation. Utopian impulses, in this sense, work on different senses, as Jacoby points out above, they are certainly not reducible to an image.

**Utopian propositions**

A utopian proposition or solution responds to the unconscious problem. The problem is undeterminable in the sense that there is no conclusive solution that corresponds to it, but only partial and fragmentary solutions that serve to make the problem better understood. The problem conditions the solution, but the solution invariably also conditions how the problem is expressed as a proposition by affecting the image of thought. The relationship is in other words reciprocal. The utopian proposition is in this sense instrumental, what is central is not what is being proposed, but what the proposition does in terms of effects, what it challenges, and which avenues of thought it opens up. It should be emphasized that this instrumentality is never direct. The idea, the connection or association, is always

filtered through the images of thought; in this sense, it is never true.

To further complicate things, if the point of utopian expressions is to challenge the presuppositions and thereby begin to pose problems in a different way, it is thus not only a question of negation, nor is it only a question of one solution; the solution is implicit in the problem. In this sense, negation is never only negation. It responds to a utopian Idea on one level, and the removal of images of thought serve to make actualizations, offering fragments of solutions that do not constitute part of an overall solution, but rather new ways of approaching the problem. The iconoclastic anomic moment is as utopian as the nomic, if not more. Utopia is about avoiding the simple solutions in favor of the better posed problems.

According to the colloquial definition of the utopian as an image of perfect organization of society, a utopian proposition – say a blueprint – responds to a very specific (overdetermined) problem. Every proposition that falls outside of this is not-utopian. Every proposition that falls within this definition is demonstrably false; i.e., it is not perfect. In this definition of the utopian, focus is always on the content, on the proposed organization, on that which can demonstrably be proven false. The fact that it is an image; how images affect us; the circumstances under which we encounter the image; and to what other ends the image works, become invisible with respect to the utopian according to this colloquial definition. If one argues that the role of the utopian is to challenge the image of thought – which certainly applies to the colloquial utopian definition itself – then the utopian proposition must challenge common sense.

Instead, as utopian propositions habitually accept the images of thought as given, they consequently engage in reinforcing common sense, naturalizing the presuppositions within which they are invented. This is partly Manfredo Tafuri’s critique of the modern avant-garde in Architecture and Utopia, although he phrases it in terms of ideology rather than image of thought. In the section Hopeful Monsters, I will argue that in


170. Tafuri would fervently deny such similarities. See Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia.
a similar way, the arboraphobia that characterizes both neoliberal capitalism and attempts at resisting or overcoming neoliberal capitalism presents false problems. This does not make such endeavors un-utopian (and how could it?), but it does make them abstract in Bloch’s sense: they do not bring things together very effectively.

Discussing the utopian in terms of what it does rather than it contains, and in terms of the effects of Utopia rather than the proposition therein, entails a discussion on the utopian solution itself and how it is expressed. Such an instrumental perspective of the utopian can be attributed to Bloch. According to Bloch, we can never grasp utopia as anything but a step on a path that may lead somewhere (or nowhere); utopian propositions themselves are principally considered by how they affect the world, by their function, as Bloch puts it. Wayne Hudson elaborates on this:

Bloch emphasises the productivity of utopia: its cognitive function as a mode of operation of constructive reason, its educative function as a mythography which instructs men to will and desire more and better, its anticipatory function as a futurology of possibilities which later become actual, and its causal function as an agent of historical change.171

The utopian function, to Bloch, transcends without being transcendent in itself. Bloch writes: “Thus the utopian function is also the only transcendent one which has remained, and the only one which deserves to remain: one which is transcendent without transcendence. Its support and correlate is process, which has not yet surrendered its most immanent What-content, but which is still under way.”172

Utopian solutions are being affected, but they also affect. Here, it may be pertinent to recall some of the controversial Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan’s quips on the functions of media. McLuhan’s signature phrase is that “the medium is the message.” McLuhan proposes that the message; that is, the changes that occur in the world, are intrinsically linked to the medium of communication employed rather than the content communicated through that medium.173

A pertinent question arises in terms of architects and their expressions of utopian propositions: what presuppositions are borne in the very medium of expression? Another dictum


of McLuhan’s is: “the ‘content’ of any medium always blinds us to the character of the medium,”174 and this is perhaps never truer than when discussing utopia. This is very much the same in terms of utopian architecture, where the content shown is taken as a blueprint, but at once blinds us to the changes in social reality that emanate from the very proposition itself. Architecture and its use of media is a fascinating, if problematic field of study. Architectural practice is predisposed to media that portray the future in terms of images of the world to come, and it is far too easy to look into these images instead of looking at the images precisely as images.

To complicate things somewhat, McLuhan insists that the content of any medium is another (older) medium, which in turn encapsulates another medium,175 and so on: the book’s content is text, the text’s content is language, and so on. Any utopian proposition passes through a sequence of media, and, as a result, we tend to look far too closely at the medium contained within the primary medium, instead of analyzing the effects of the medial sequence in turn.

Extreme as he may be, McLuhan raises a valid point which will be recurrent in this study: the intended function of any utopia is not the same as its actual function in its situation. The effects (which can be virtual) of an actual proposition cannot be planned. It is absolutely fundamental to interrogate the medium. As media theorist Brian Larkin puts it: “What media are needs to be interrogated, not presumed.”176 Media are, as the Canadian theorist Harold Innis famously reminded us, invariably biased.177 At the same time, architects tend to confuse images and blueprints with constructed reality, and furthermore, architecture schools tend to encourage this confusion with “dry-runs.” To reiterate: the media with which we associate utopia also influence the utopian problem through the image of thought and not only the solution, as the influence is mutual.

In the context of this study, I primarily discuss how architectural mediations of utopian desire in response to utopian problems function, but corresponding arguments could of course be applied to planning methods, including vision planning, scenario planning, back-casting, etc. Media are not neutral, and the tools with which one prognosticates, plans and relates to

174. Ibid., 9.
175. The German word "verschachteln", implying a box within box within a box, describes this encapsulating relation particularly accurately. See also McLuhan, Understanding Media, 18.
the future influence the solution and the problem. They do not simply imply a value-neutral response to given problems. It is never a one-way process.

Consciously or unconsciously, the utopian desire is expressed through a variety of solutions to utopian problems through media and artifacts, and even through things that stretch the notion of medium beyond its habitual use. If philosophy is primarily communicated through language, texts, and books, the utopian is expressed in a cacophony of conflicting and inflicting media, producing discords as well as accords in ways that may well have the potential to challenge the defining images of thought.

All architecture has a certain utopian content, Koolhaas refers to this as “architecture’s dirty little secret.” But the intensity of the utopian varies between different utopian expressions. The utopian content of any architectural proposition is relative to the change it effects, to its capacity to unsettle presuppositions. Utopian intensity is in other words, measured in its effect. A more intensive utopian proposition challenges presuppositions better than less intensive ones.

If the function of utopia is to challenge the problem and the image of thought, at the same time, in architectural practice, it also invariably becomes a question of challenging the presuppositions inherent to the media employed. Theory will not only analyze what is presented, but it will also analyze how a utopian architectural endeavor is presented and what the effects of this are. Philosophy is habitually articulated, expressed in language, text, and books. Architecture, architectural practice and architectural theory are unstable constructs, invariably shifting, and the media of utopian expression form the foundation for discussion of the underlying problem, and how any proposed solution relates to that problem. Analyzing utopian architecture also becomes a question of analyzing the presuppositions of the medium or media through which utopian problems are actualized.

Such an approach also requires an elaboration of the term medium that departs from McLuhan’s understanding of medium as an “extension of the self,” and instead uses medium to denote that through which architects create architecture. This

178. Koolhaas, Content, 393.
179. McLuhan, Understanding Media.
stretches beyond the material – drawings, specifications, etc. – to include other immaterial media, including protocols, organization, events and so forth. In the context of this study, the term medium is used to catch architectural practice’s output. Medium is understood as where utopian actualization is expressed.

To take one example, architects such as the German architecture collective Raumlabor Berlin have adapted their practices to mimic other practices based on network thinking and, arguably, management theory. The result is architectural practice as social practice in real time, with participants rather than plans. The utopian problem to which this practice responds is different from what the blueprint responds to, but both can readily be considered utopian.\textsuperscript{180} As a curated, activated, environment, the medium expresses an arguably ideal network that is better than the previously existing network (which lacked community). This can thus be considered a utopian solution opening up for an interrogation of the medium and the mediation.

However, another important principle to emphasize is that of nested media. The content of any medium is, as McLuhan reminded us above, invariably another (older) medium. This is a key phrase that tends to obfuscate analysis of architectural production. As will be discussed, the project, the platform and similar media that are not visual may still contain visual elements, images, plans, etc. However, I will argue that the utopian problem is not actualized through the content of the image, but through what could be considered organization as medium. Incidentally, this nesting of various media also means that any utopian solution contains different layers, and potentially different solutions to different utopian problems in a sequence, making any utopian proposition a multifaceted construct containing a multitude of propositions that function on different levels.

Utopian solutions nested in this way may well indirectly contradict themselves. Excessive focus on the proposed solution in one medium obscures both the complicated, nested nature of utopian actualizations and any analysis or discussion concerning the underlying utopian problem.

\textsuperscript{180} The phrase “utopian potential,” for example, is taken from Jan Lisegang, in Raumlabor, Acting in Public (Berlin: Jovis, 2008), 33.
These two key problems need to be discussed in terms of utopian solutions.

**Utopia & ideology**

This section is a further elaboration on the topic of ideology and the utopian, including concept, idea, and expression. The focus is on the notion of subjectivity, which, as discussed above, is developed rather than given. It is shaped by external circumstances, which in turn means that certain aspects of the subject are susceptible to conscious and unconscious manipulation by external forces. This is the topic of a growing body of theory, which I will explore briefly here.\(^1\)

If the subject is developed, surely it can also be produced? If ideology produces subjects, multiple questions arise that I will attempt to formulate. The first is: to what extent is the subject produced? Does this amount to determining subjects, thus leaving little or no ground for challenging the dominant image of thought, itself formed by ideology? And, in extension, if subjects are produced, how does one (as an architect in our case) subvert this production?

The process of manipulating and actively developing subjects is sometimes dubbed “subjectivation,”\(^2\) and it occurs in relation to most ideologies. Subjectivation takes place on a number of levels. It is the manipulation of the associations discussed above through frequency of certain experience, and it is the affective manipulation on a pre-personal level of the passions that also condition ideas. Affects form the pre-cognitive and exterior sensations that affect subjectivity, connecting a certain passion or mood to a specific experience, and repeating this until the subjectivity makes associations and reacts instinctively as trained.\(^3\)

There is nothing new about subjectivation. Soldiers are trained to react instinctively – this is central to the logic of military training. The way affect works necessitates one distinction, as Italian sociologist and philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato has noted: whereas military training sought to bypass the conscious mind and make the body react without reasoning, subjectivation is instead a formation of the mind, building up spiritual memory as opposed to merely conditioning a soldier’s

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3. There are many definitions of affect. For an overview, see Nigel Thrift, “Spatialities of Feeling,” in *Non-Representational Theory*, or Seigworth and Gregg, *The Affect Theory Reader*. 
bodily memory.\textsuperscript{184} This is what Lazzarato calls “n oo-politics,” working on the Greek noûs, the intellect or the “highest part of the soul.”\textsuperscript{185} In the introductory chapter of Cognitive Architecture, architectural theorist Deborah Hauptmann elaborates on this and states that “noopolitics is broadly posited as a power exerted over the life of the mind, including perception, attention, and memory.”\textsuperscript{186, 187} If experience has always informed the unconscious, not only in terms of repressed memories, but also in its capacity of association, it is only during the last 50 years that this modulation of the unconscious has become instrumentalized and theorized.

Swedish philosopher Sven-Olov Wallenstein notes that this is a fundamental change, “[t]his mutation must be understood as transcending the sphere of art as well as politics, and it affects the very fabric of life, the underlying substructures of the mind.”\textsuperscript{188} The consequences of this development can hardly be overstated: “This power and this politics would inscribe themselves on the most fundamental level of mental life, where our most basic affects and ideas are organized, where memory, fantasy, and intelligence emerge, perhaps even where a certain ‘neural plasticity’ is at work.”\textsuperscript{189}

In terms of utopia and the utopian, the problems arise if the noo-political is considered total in its plastic sculpting of subjectivity. Extending this argument, Wallenstein asks: “In the name of what should we resist, and what resources could be mobilized if our bodies and cognitive faculties are formed and sculpted all the way down to the neural substratum by forces that exceed consciousness?”\textsuperscript{190} In terms of the utopian, the effect of a thorough noo-politics would be the petrification of utopian concept, reproducing the existing without the possibility of deviation. Then again, there is a question as to whether the mind is conditioned or determined by this construction of subjectivity. I would argue that conditioning is at play, and while it would never be total, that does not mean that it could not approach total. The virtual and the actual are indirectly, rather than directly, interwoven.

This puts the utopian in a precarious position. As a desire, utopia is without concept or idea. As a concept, the utopian responds to and formulates a challenge inherent to the


\textsuperscript{185} Lazzarato, “The Concepts of Life and the Living in the Societies of Control,” 190, Note 5.


\textsuperscript{187} Ibid. 182.

\textsuperscript{188} Sven-Olov Wallenstein, “Noopolitics, Life and Architecture,” in Cognitive Architecture, 56.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 56-57.
horizons of imagination. The utopian problem in this schema emerges through associations, offering solutions to the problems that are posed or implicit in the utopian concept. If the utopian desire is unconditional, it is the only unconditional aspect of this schema. All other aspects are conditioned by circumstance and ideology in a wider meaning, but I argue that there is something else: that utopia is not determined in this sense, and that the world is not a closed system. Like Deleuze, I am inclined to relate to an underlying chaos.

**Summary of a Utopian Concept**

The utopian concept I have outlined in this chapter is based on the notion of an underlying utopian desire that is predicated on survival rather than immortality. Basing the utopian concept on a desire rather than considering it a category eliminates the problem inherent to the colloquial definition of utopia as a genre with delineated boundaries. In this sense, all artifacts are utopian expressions in one way or another, but the specifics as to how, why and to what effect are variable.

Utopian problems are provoked from experience in relation to utopian desire. They are in the unconscious and virtual, or without form. As they enter into the conscious, these problems pass through an image of thought that distorts them, and they emerge as propositions, or responses to virtual problems.

In this sense, the presuppositions of thought condition how propositions engage with the underlying problem. Utopian propositions are considered in terms of what they do, rather than what they contain. What they do is in turn determined in relation to the image of thought; that is, how they affect the image of thought within which the proposition itself is actualized. Utopia’s instrumentality thus becomes relative to the extent to which it challenges common knowledge and whether it actually manages to affect how architecture is considered. According to this logic, a utopia that eliminates images of thought is a more important utopian proposition than one that reaffirms the existing images of thought and accepts them as givens.

The image of thought addressed is different from ideology in the Marxist sense (“false consciousness”) in that we cannot access the underlying true perspective on the problem, but only a
less distorted one. The problems are virtual (real, but virtual) and the propositions actual (and also real), and the problem and solution are functions of one another, but they cannot converge into a single image that would permit us to see the problem as it is.

Any utopian idea or problem thus remains true to its etymology, residing no-place, as it never can be fully or comprehensively actualized. Utopia’s famous ambivalence between no-place and good place also remains accurate, as it becomes clearer and better through the utopian propositions, which eliminate presuppositions that obscure the idea and permit solutions to better correspond to the ideas. The utopian without utopia – the two can never coincide, and while “without” remains absolute, it does not preclude the utopian.

According to the utopian concept outlined here, not only problems, but also subjectivity are formed by experience. How the mind unconsciously associates and synthesizes problems is conditioned by a pattern of thought shaped by previous experience. As the individual’s subjectivity in this sense is formed external to the mind, based on repetitions, it can also be actively molded. This stands as a counter-force to the role of utopias to question common sense. A core principle for any dominant ideology is the formation of the subject on a pre-philosophical level. This means that hypothetically, the mind itself, even beyond the image of thought, can be sculpted. Though somewhat simplified, this is the basis of what Lazzarato refers to as “nloo-power.” This power reasserts the common sense, or the associations the mind is “meant” to make. Taken to its extreme conclusion, through controlling experience, the mind would be “formed and governed” all the way down to the unconscious, to borrow a phrase from Wallenstein, leaving no room for resisting the dominant ideology, as there would be nowhere left to resist from.

This perspective, on the other hand, assumes that experience can be conditioned completely. And, in response, in the very expression of the utopian propositions there are other virtualities, other problems, other conditioned solutions that are not necessarily determinable or possible to condition from the outset. McLuhan infamously noted that the medium is the message, and that there is more to mediation than its content. The effects occur


on many different levels and on different strata. And presumably, the majority of propositions will abide by the doxa, especially in architecture with its limited critical distance and troubled self-image, and there will invariably be exceptions that function unpredictably or act consciously or unconsciously on other strata.

In this way, I consider it important to orient utopia against images of thought rather than in relation to ideology. A utopian proposition against an ideology tends to be imagined in a very direct way – its instrumentality is measured in terms of its direct defiance of the production of subjectivity. This means reproducing many of the elements of the image of thought that serve an ideology particularly well, thereby indirectly reproducing the ideology by failing to address the form of thought itself. Utopian propositions, in this sense, must be evaluated in terms of how they instrumentally challenge images of thought rather than their ideological content. And, as a part of this, it becomes paramount to analyze different aspects of the utopian, going beyond the categorical definition. What I call Utopology thus includes analyzing the problem in relation to the proposition; how this problem is formulated in the solution; how the form of utopian proposition relates to the content; how the form affects the formulation of the problem; the level that can perhaps be described as meta-utopian of the utopian concept itself and the utopian expression; and what the utopian is in relation to what we can know, or believe we know about it.

193. This could also be discussed in terms of Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of the “magmatic;” the stratum of experience differs from the stratum of the physical, making the effects exponentially unpredictable and uncontrollable by any given action. See Rosen gren, “Magma” in Cornelius Castoriadis Key Concepts.
UTOPIA’S GHOSTING

This section traces the alleged demise of the colloquial utopian, as well as how it came to take on the spectral qualities we habitually associate with utopia. I argue that the utopian impulse remains even where the utopian Idea of perfection has become untenable and the solution in the form of projection ridiculous. In “A Brief History of Utopia,” I discussed the problematic relationship between utopia and modernity and how utopia came to be associated with progress. This chapter addresses the (extended) moment in the 20th century when progress, teleology and perfection became increasingly problematic and implausible, and how utopia was subsequently unthought and actively suppressed in the architectural discourse.194

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when in history the disenchantment with progress emerged. Progress has always had its detractors, one of the more vitriolic of whom was Charles Baudelaire, who wrote in the Exposition Universelle in Paris in 1855 on the topic of progress: “this modern lantern throws a stream of darkness upon all the objects of knowledge; liberty melts away, discipline vanishes. Anyone who wants to see his way clear through history must first and foremost extinguish this treacherous beacon.”195 The growing disillusion gained pace with the First World War, the barbarism of and trauma from which touched many protagonists of the modern avant-garde. Walter Benjamin’s critique of progress in “Theses on the Philosophy of History” is an articulate and precise coupling of progress and the notion

194. The “ghost” and the notion of “unthinking” of utopia are borrowed from Martin, Utopia’s Ghost.


Figure 4 (opposite): Utopia for sale. Photo from upstate New York, 2017. Photo by Rossana Bartoli.
that the idea of progress, and projection, do things in their contemporary context.

In an architectural context, the end of belief in progress remains intimately associated with the emergence of postmodernity or postmodernism, which is often considered to have sprung forth from a single paradigmatic event, such as the demolition of the notorious Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St Louis hailed by Charles Jencks as the death of modern architecture. While this is a somewhat reductive approach, it does depend on how one defines postmodernity; however, the definition of postmodernity is notoriously subject to a lengthy debate without any consensus. Any definition becomes difficult in relation to Tafuri – while Tafuri certainly could not be considered postmodern in any of the conventional senses, he certainly was instrumental in ushering in a disenchantment with architecture’s transformative capacity, and he, probably more than anyone, served to dismantle the heroic self-image of the modern hero-architect.

This does not mean that I will not consider a postmodern discursive context. On the contrary, I believe this to be decisive for the spectral forms of the utopian. It may well be argued that postmodernity caused utopia to be “unthought,” as Reinhold Martin contends. Sven-Olov Wallenstein elaborates Martin’s argument and asserts that the unthinking was the result of postmodern architecture’s transformed relationship to capital and capitalism. Martin, as well as Wallenstein, argues that architecture here becomes a “crucial agent” of capitalism rather than an expression or reflection thereof; hence architecture’s inability to consider alternatives, and hence the need to unthink utopia.

The unthinking I wish to propose does not indicate that utopia disappeared, and nor did utopian desire. Utopia was, in Martin’s term, ghosted. More than an ideological crisis, architects were instrumental, driving the development of the capitalism within which they practice. One could suggest that it also was a crisis of an image of thought, and of a utopian image that was – as has been discussed – rightly considered paradoxical. Projection was no longer a valid utopian medium, and perfection no longer a legitimate goal. Utopian desire


198. Martin, Utopia’s Ghost.

199. Martin touches upon this in the final chapter of Utopia’s Ghost.
thus lacked a medium within and through which it could be enunciated or expressed. The ghost of utopia as a conceptual metaphor, which is Martin’s principal theme of elaboration, will be discussed in the following chapter, where its theoretical implications and lasting influence will be examined in greater detail.

Progress and its Discontents

Progress in its many guises is closely associated with Hegel and the three spirits (subjective, objective and absolute). In this study, progress is defined more reductively as the assumption that tomorrow will be better than today. And, ultimately, history moves towards an end (of suffering): Hegel calls this end Liberty, and Marx dubs it Communism. Progress is closely related to the utopian image of a perfect future; it is the final destination. Progress provided utopia with a temporal frame into which dreams could be projected. Whereas progress on the one hand made utopia a serious subject of theory and practice (at least in periods), it at the same time also suggested that erroneous utopias would be eradicated and the utopia was still to come; that is, the perfect future would come regardless. Most of the major ideologies that emerged over the 18th and 19th centuries embraced a general belief in progress that differed primarily in terms of content – communism, liberalism, a degree of conservatism, as odd as it may sound, and social democracy.

There is an Oscar Wilde quote, the recital of which is practically compulsory in utopian studies circles: “A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.” However, the idea that Humanity (Wilde’s capitalization) sets out to reach utopia after utopia on what is possibly an odyssey that leads forever forward is no doubt problematic, as Walter Benjamin will explain. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that Wilde’s perspective of utopia is linear and somewhat reductive. The compulsive quoting that it enjoys evidences a common and reductive understanding of the


temporal and medial dimensions of utopia.\textsuperscript{202} Furthermore, in practice, the quote is a truism, spared from closer scrutiny.

On one level, one could suggest that belief in (a however local) progress and a better tomorrow constitute a raison d’être for the architect. Architects are in this sense locked into a specific relationship with the future, providing images and projections of this better tomorrow. However, projection itself is not necessarily a straightforward affair, as Reinhold Martin notes:

\begin{quote}
At first, projection may seem a simple enough matter of making projects, that is, of inventing still-unrealized (and perhaps unrealizable) alternatives to what exists, and thrusting them forward into the future as a kind of ideal target or negatively, as a dystopian or apocalyptic warning. In practice, however, projection of any sort entails far more complex rearrangements of past, present, and future.\textsuperscript{203}
\end{quote}

Projection is never as straight a line as that implied by Wilde; the utopian is never simply about setting sail, it is always haunted by past and future, while at the same time, haunting both past and future. Although he focused exclusively on the past and on historiography, this was an issue for Walter Benjamin, whose diatribe against progress in “Theses on the Philosophy of History” began problematizing projection and progress. Progress, according to Benjamin, served to legitimize exploitation and ultimately also fascism in Germany at the time. The social democratic embrace of the idea of progress had become what was holding social democracy back:

Social Democracy thought fit to assign to the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest strength. This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren.\textsuperscript{204}

Progress here opened for an understanding that no matter how bad it is, the present will eventually lead to redemption, regardless of the “empty times” that were on the way. Progress and the image of redemption, Benjamin argued, served to gloss over atrocities and injustices as inevitable steps on the way. Squarely in Benjamin’s target sits the notion of linear time, which arguably served well to break or possibly replace Christian eschatology, but ultimately served to propel a multitude


\textsuperscript{203} Martin, *Utopia’s Ghost*, 147.

of other interests, including fascism. In this sense, Benjamin could be said to disqualify the utopian Idea what is the perfect organization of society?, as this Idea fails to account for struggle or injustices, and instead functions to preserve the dominant order.

**Tafuri’s Indefatigable Critique**

In architectural theory, Manfredo Tafuri’s seminal *Progetto e Utopia (Architecture and Utopia)*, published in 1973, discusses progress and architecture from a position that appears at least partially inspired by Benjamin’s. Despite its diminutive dimensions, *Architecture and Utopia* can be read in different ways and covers a vast terrain and a multifaceted line of argument. It has also been enormously influential in architecture; architects often seek “to put Tafuri behind us,” by declaring the book irrelevant to present conditions. One reason for this is the damning verdict that *Architecture and Utopia* passes on modern architecture and, even more so, on the modern architect.

In Tafuri’s account, utopia is concerned with the question of the rational organization of society – overcoming the contradictions inherent in the capitalist society, and thus the overcoming of injustice – and this is precisely what architecture actively countermands. Several of these contradictions are presupposed in the modern avant-gardes’ attempts at solving the rational organization of society. Through accepting the logic of development – and thereby implicitly accepting the metropolis and work as given – any hope for overcoming contradictions is lost. Tafuri leaves very little room for the architect to work in any transformative way, and suggests that the proper cause of action would be to strive for an architecture without utopia, or “sublime uselessness.”

*Architecture and Utopia* built on a pair of longer essays, originally published in the journal *Contropiano*, where the tone was set by “Per una critica dell’ideologia architettonica,” published in English as “Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology.” Tafuri set out to unpick the convoluted relationship between architecture and ideology. Following German Sociologist Max Weber, Tafuri sets out to radically reject “any compromise between science and ideology,” thus setting up what today must be an

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impossible distinction (see any book by Latour, for instance), but which follows in a Marxian tradition of distinguishing truth from ideology. The objective: to heroically stare reality in the face without flinching or resorting to false hope or nostalgia.

Analyzing Tafuri’s methodology, Carla Keyvanian suggests that the other influence in Tafuri’s early writing — that is, in addition to classical Marxist critique of ideology — is how Roland Barthes elaborated critique in the work *Mythologies*. Keyvanian traces this back to *Theories and History of Architecture*, where Tafuri is more explicit in his methodology and relationship to history, reminding us that myth functions as an instrument of control, reality is distorted into ideology, and history is distorted into nature, and serves to justify and naturalize the bourgeoisie ideology.

In contrast to classic Marxist analysis, Barthes advocates the study of appearances as a necessary element of seeing what really is there: “In what appears as a paradox, Barthes states that in order to get to the ‘true’ concept hiding behind a fact one has to analyze the form it assumes, i.e. its apparently most superficial aspect, rather than the content of a fact. Because the content of the message of myth is what is meant for us to be seen, and is therefore deceitful.”

Tafuri’s quest for a truth uncolored by ideology is thus pursued through the study of the very surface presented by ideology, the myths of architecture, the city, and utopia. The underlying, obscured truth is perhaps more explicitly developed by Tafuri’s fellow writer in *Contropiano*, the Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari, who introduced his version of dialectics, a variant of negative dialectics. The fundamental difference between negative dialectics and e.g. Hegelian dialectics is that according to negative dialectics, contradictions are neither resolved nor overcome; on the contrary, they are instrumental in propelling capitalist development and forming subjectivities through the myths. For this purpose, the contradictions become masked and naturalized rather than resolved. Contradictions, in short, drive capitalism; crisis is the natural mode of existence, and it does not lead to overcoming capitalism.

According to Tafuri, the function of architecture: that is, what architecture does, is to mask the reality of contradictions, and instead sets out to mediate rather than overcome.


210. Ibid., 16.

211. Ibid., 17.


them. Already in the opening sentence of *Architecture and Utopia*, Tafuri notes that the function of bourgeoisie art is to “[t]o ward off anguish by understanding and absorbing its causes.”

Art and architecture are considered to possess agency, to have a function beyond their content; architecture serves to mask the underlying contradictions of capitalist society. This works on different levels. One is the naturalization of the urban condition (as something organic), first in the form of the city, naturalized by, for instance, Marc-Antoine Laugier in the 18th century, and at the beginning of the 20th century, in the metropolis.

Utopia becomes the logical response prompted by intellectuals’ sense of guilt over their own unproductiveness in the 19th century. No longer satisfied with standing on the sidelines, intellectuals sought to engage actively and instrumentally in bringing about the rational order of society. Like any revolution, such a project involved two phases: the anomic and the nomic. The first is the abolition of what is, its values, and its ideological constructions; and the second is the formulation of a new order. Intellectuals, artists, and architects became engaged in both of these phases, particularly in the early 20th century avant-garde.

The project of destroying the values of the old order, the anomic, is clearly legible in the works of Dada and Futurism. Exposing the constructed values of the bourgeoisie in all their banality would open up for clearer thinking about the rational world beyond the myths. Tafuri was highly critical of this approach, as it came with its own presuppositions and ideological content that it failed to acknowledge. Some of the fundamental contradictions were taken as given, even in the anomic aspects of the transformation of the world; this approach has clear affinities with the Hopeful Monsters that will be discussed later in this study.

The other side, the nomic, came to be expressed in the plan, which was necessary to ward off the dangers of “deflagration” of the movement. The plan became attached to the “ethics of development.” Put differently, the plan or the nomic moment accepted the logic of development which in itself contained a variety of contradictions that the plan subsequently set out to mediate rather than expose. Thus, the plan

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215. See also Sven-Olov Wallenstein, who writes: “In this process, architecture, together with other arts, plays the role of trailblazer: in anesthetizing the subject it paves the way for another compliant subjectivity, it programs a new experience through a subterfuge that lets modernism appear as a protest against alienation and fragmentation while it in fact is one of the primary instruments for accelerating and rendering it not only acceptable, but also desirable.” Wallenstein, *Architecture, Critique, Ideology*, 21.


218. Ibid., 60.

219. Ibid., 56-57.
was ideological from the start. One example is what Tafuri refers to as the ideology of work, the notion that while liberation from work was on the agenda of every avant-garde movement, they invariably ended up promoting re-organization of work as the means to liberate the workers from work. The plan departed from and internalized the contradictions that prescribed work as the way to liberate the proletariat from work; since this new work would be planned work, the contradictions were considered acceptable.220

Yet, as the plan was itself ideological in character, by accepting presuppositions of ideological character, it remained close to reality and was “stripped of any trace of utopianism.”221 The utopia of rational transformation became a tool for capitalist prefiguration; in Deleuze’s terms, the possible was mistaken for the virtual. Since the plan accepted the negative logic from the outset, the ideology of the plan, its sole potential was as a tool, re-organizing the contradictions to further obscure them. Tafuri notes: “Architectural science was totally integrated with the ideology of the plan, and even the formal choices were only variables dependent on it.”222 The plan, starting out from the contradictions, only permitted mediating the contradictions – never overcoming them, and ensured the future as a function of the present. The utopia of reason thus merged with the interests of capitalist production.

In the terms of this study, one could suggest that the utopian idea is based on a contradiction and is subsequently actualized over and over again in ways which are no longer considered ideological. The contradiction becomes assumed as given. The reasons for Tafuri’s animosity toward operative historiography become clear; in order to justify the present, the historian will invariably make assumptions, but be unable to understand the masked contradictions.223

Following this line of argument, Tafuri argues that the avant-garde failed to comprehend the negative nature of the capitalist metropolis, which he considered a tool for forming subjects who were seeking meaning through consumption. The modern avant-garde accepted the metropolitan condition as a given, failing to realize its ideological nature, and the avant-garde exacerbated
the situation by amplifying the fracturing shock of the metropolis. Following Massimo Cacciari, Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin, at the turn of the century the metropolis constituted a new condition that could essentially be described as a capitalist machine.

Cacciari sees the metropolis as a productive entity, bringing forth subjectivity that absorbs shock and subsists through consumption. The metropolis thus naturalizes shock and contradiction, thereby producing new subjectivities, much along the line of reasoning that currently underpins the theories of noo-politics introduced by Maurizio Lazzarato. Cacciari writes:

Vergeistigung and “commodification” merge together in the blasé attitude: and with this attitude, the Metropolis finally creates its own “type”; its general structure finally becomes social reality and cultural fact. Money has in this instance found its most authentic bearer. The blasé type uses money according to its essence, as the universal equivalent of the commodity: he uses it to acquire commodities, perfectly aware that he cannot get close to these goods, he cannot name them, he cannot love them. He has learned, with a sense of despair, that things and people have acquired the status of commodity, and his attitude internalizes this fact.

The metropolitan subject thus enters into a false consciousness in Marxist terms, failing to see that far from being a neutral or given condition, the metropolis is capitalist ideology par excellence. The metropolis, then, is a form of life and formative of life in capitalism. In his recent book on Tafuri, Project of Crisis (2013, 2005) Italian architectural historian Marco Biraghi notes: “The form of dialectics is the form of the negative asserting itself positively, of a productive contradiction. To study dialectics, then, means to study the very form in which contradiction, or the negative, is reintegrated into the system, made useful in relation to it.” For Tafuri, seeing this condition with sober Weberian eyes also meant acknowledging that the loop indeed was closed, and that there is no way out of the presented conundrum.

Tafuri’s critique of the modern avant-gardes has its basis in that the avant-gardes – including Futurists, Dadaists, Constructivists, De Stijl, and so on – all embraced the metropolis as a given and represented and thereby naturalized it. Although one could discuss whether the contradiction here is
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ideological or constitutes part of a very convenient image of thought for industrial capitalism, Tafuri’s point remains valid: instead of interrogating and challenging the condition of the metropolis itself, the avant-gardes focused only on how the subject dealt with the experience of the metropolis, or was even set free through it.

Architects, particularly the social democratic architects of the Weimar Republic, made a similar error. Martin Wagner, Ernst May, Bruno Taut, and others accepted the basic premise that the city had “assumed the structure of an industrial machine, solutions had to be found within it for different categories of problems.” Consequently, they addressed the metropolis by re-thinking its parts, without questioning the underlying structure. And, ultimately, Tafuri reads the Siedlungen, the housing projects, produced in this era as tragic, nostalgic attempts to counter the metropolis and its contradictions. According to Tafuri, by attempting to introduce an equilibrium and a general anti-urban ideology in the Siedlungen, the architects did not present any overcoming of contradictions, but merely a feeble dream of escaping the city as such.

This unconditional acceptance of the metropolis and Tafuri’s critique of the avant-garde are well worth keeping in mind, there is a certain resonance of this in a more recent context. I will return to this in relation to the contemporary utopian discussion and the explicit acceptance and adoption of the network and the Network-image – a condition rarely interrogated in greater detail. While this study uses a different framework than the Marxist analysis and realism, Tafuri’s critique remains valid: why is the capitalist metropolis accepted as a given in the avant-garde?

Utopia and the plan of the avant-gardes are a case of addressing the false problem. The solutions of the virtual formulation of the question fail to have transformative effects, as they essentially fail to put forth the right problem. As Deleuze notes in Bergsonism, “the problem always has the solution it deserves.” The avant-garde failed – and spectacularly, in Tafuri’s view – to pose the right problem. To Tafuri, the mistake is ideological; it is an error of “false consciousness” that determines all that follows. The ideological error of
failing to see things with Weberian sobriety is perhaps a less black and white issue in the current frame of the work, and the problem should not necessarily be formulated in such a one-directional fashion.

The image of thought, I would argue, is not ideological as such, but it may well serve ideological purposes. The very binary opposition between ideology and truth is in this sense a presupposition with which I do not agree. Instead, I would like to emphasize how the utopian idea is affected by the image of thought, as well as how the medium used to actualize the virtual will also affect the result. The presuppositions that Tafuri perceives in the avant-garde are also presuppositions that I will argue can be identified in the Network-image.

Another question deals with the agency of architectural production, considering that there is no untainted, “true” view that can be adopted. Although I would not subscribe to Tafuri’s radical and reductive view on the metropolis and its function(s), the question of agency should be addressed in relation to architectural production. Implicit in this question is a very important insight: the agency of art or architecture may not be visible from the vantage point of its production. Put differently, the function of a work of art or architecture may not be what the creator or author intends, but must be analyzed in a broader context that also includes its mediation and situation.

Problems of Projection

Utopia was discredited, not only by Tafuri and the disenchantment with progress, but also from a liberal perspective. Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter joined the critique of utopia (of politics), suggesting in their influential 1978 Collage City that by planning the future, architects were in fact dominating that very future. This is again another take on the notion of temporality, whereby only the past (or present) haunts the future; we are not haunted by the future. There are several peculiar aspects to this approach, including the notion that the present could be considered ideologically neutral and that we
could choose not to haunt the future – that, of course, is not an option.

It furthermore appears to suggest that the future is incapable of shaping itself. Thereby, in theory, Rowe and Koetter are themselves depriving the future of agency in ways that the future might not find acceptable. While I will not go deeper into that argument, I will emphasize that the crisis of projection that emerged over the course of the 20th century and peaked around 1970 did so for different reasons. Particularly on the left of the political spectrum, it has been suggested that this was a “logic of defeat” when the hopes of the 1968 movement were heavy-handedly quashed by the state. Rowe and Koetter’s advocacy of a utopia of poetics rather than politics however served to exacerbate the crisis of projection, of utopia, and of theory in general.

During the 1970s and 80s, architectural theory and theory transformed in general. There are many versions of the demise of utopia, from Jean-François Lyotard’s end of the grand narratives in The Postmodern Condition of 1979 mentioned earlier in this study, to Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, or Francis Fukuyama’s neo-positivist “end of history” and the emerging plane of immanence that came to fall into the category of postmodernity, that highly unstable term which may denote a condition or a period, depending on one’s view.

If we, like Reinhold Martin suggests, hold postmodernism as a discursive formation – that is, as discourse rather than condition – but do so hesitantly, a few changes can be quickly pointed out in doxa, economy, and, incidentally, architecture occurring around this time. In many ways, the texts of postmodernism define utopian desire without an expression. Architectural postmodernity was – or I maintain, is – a befitting mire of confusion and contradiction. From the inaugural texts by Charles Jencks, which set out a very specific and highly limited definition of what constitutes postmodern architecture, to a variety of other definitions, the postmodern is usually periodized in architectural history. I consider this problematic, as it invariably leaves another open question: what replaced it? One could suggest that postmodernism was characterized by a disenchantment with

230. The word “crisis” is used here in its colloquial meaning as a decisive point rather than the crisis of negative dialectics.


233. Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.

234. Perry Anderson’s The Origins of Postmodernity, a historical overview of the emergence and rise of a transformed condition or a transformed modernity, outlines a period of change and simplifications and misunderstandings.


236. See earlier discussion.
Enlightenment ideals, political ideology in the broad sense of the word, and, crucially, the notion of progress, as per Lyotard. This general crisis of ideals, came to pass within the discipline of architecture as a crisis of utopia and a crisis of projection (of the plan). Martin goes so far as to suggest that one of the key characteristics of postmodernity in architecture is the “unthinking” of utopia.”

Utopia (of reason) was, Tafuri asserted, thus allegedly relegated to the dustbin, and utopia became defined through projection, perfection and totalitarianism. This highly reductive view of utopia remains; for many, utopia haunts us only from the past, e.g., in the form of the ex-urban housing estates of late modernism. Some have suggested that a crisis of the future also took hold in conjunction with utopia’s crisis. In his book After the Future, Italian theorist Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi suggests that the Sex Pistols’ “No Future” was a succinct summary of the paradigm of everything after 1977. Berardi discusses the “slow cancellation of the future.” This is, he emphasizes, not a cancellation of a future as a dimension per se, but rather the “psychological perception” of the future as the locus of change; that is, the total exhaustion of progress, and the total pointlessness of projected utopias. Utopia, unthought, is thus considered a spectral abomination of the past.

**Architectural crisis management**

Architecture and architects began to work around the problem of the plan or of projection. In the 1980s, architects such as Peter Eisenman began to investigate what architectural projection entailed, for instance in his axonometric models of House X. Architectural theorist Tahl Kaminer sums up Eisenman’s approach:

> A technique such as parallel projection is brought into being and widely adopted in order to solve specific problems, often of the most practical type, or to articulate a theory or worldview. Once a technique is widely practiced and professionals are trained to use it, the technique begins to shape the profession itself, dictating prejudices, biases and preferences.

Here, the presuppositions of architecture begin to be associated with the techniques and media used. This could be considered characteristic of the practices usually referred to

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as critical architecture. The term was allegedly coined by K. Michael Hays in his 1984 article “Critical Architecture: Between Culture and Form.” In the article, the content of which is informed by Tafuri’s position, Hays apparently sought to open a way out for the architectural profession from the charges made by Tafuri beyond his advocated silence as the only justifiable approach of the architect. Hays’ study of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s (second) Friedrichstraße high-rise from 1922 actually suggests that rather than accepting the metropolis as a given, Mies van der Rohe had attempted to reflect on it, and how it produced and fragmented life and experience in the metropolis. The undulating glass façade that reflected and refracted the metropolis returned a fragmented image. Critical architecture then was architecture that, simply put, reflected (on) society. The focus on architects and architectural processes sought to establish a relative autonomy for the architect, an autonomy to explore and consider the question: what is architecture? from different

Figure 5: A model of Albert Speer’s Welthaupstadt Germania is moved underground. Photo by author.


243. Although the silence of Mies van der Rohe’s architecture is, in itself, considered a comment on the contemporary metropolis, Tafuri emphasized its absolute asemantic quality. See Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia, 148.
perspectives; or, as Martin puts it, it was “architecture about architecture.”  

_Embracing the contradictions_

Parallel to this development there was another development, which interestingly could be read as the anti-thesis of Tafuri’s antipathy for the metropolis; this was perhaps best represented in the nascent Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), most prominently represented by the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas. Koolhaas’ famous “culture of congestion” could be read as an affirmation and an embrace of the shock of the metropolis, a way of delving deeper into that shock, and seeing what emerges on the other side. Gail Day, in her description of the Euraille’s Espace Piranesian or of OMA’s proposition for the Parc de la Villette, writes of embracing the shock, the “infernal complexity” or “dynamique d’enfer” that, rather than planning and knowing the outcome generates an unpredictable outcome. In other words, rather than determining the future through projection, the architect sets

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244. To a similar effect, Martin notes: “Through the 1970s and 1980s, much of the work […] exhibited an almost neurotic preoccupation with the discipline’s own history, as if to insist that this was all that it was about; it was architecture about architecture, and nothing else.” Martin, _Utopia’s Ghost_, xviii.

245. In _Project of Crisis_ Biraghi writes of the relation between Koolhaas and Tafuri in the 1970s and outlines a conflict of interest that may have been the background for naming Koolhaas’ and Zenghelis’s office.

out projecting incomprehensible complexity beyond control by conditioning certain aspects of the built environment.

All of the above could be read as attempts to engage with what Jürgen Habermas, in reference to Bloch, called “The place into which mankind has imagined God and the gods, after the decay of these hypotheses, [which] remains a hollow space.” OMA used projection to generate the un-predictable, succinctly expressed in a concept borrowed from Mosei Ginzburg: the Social Condenser from the Narkomfin Building, which in OMA’s words became: “Programmatic layering upon vacant terrain to encourage dynamic coexistence of activities and to generate through their interference unprecedented events.” In an interview with Alejandro Zaera, Koolhaas noted that in this respect, the problem he sought to resolve was “how [to] combine actual indeterminancy with architectural specificity.” This is distinctly different from Ginzburg’s machine for producing socialists. Marco Biraghi emphasizes this direct opposition between Tafuri and Koolhaas in Project of Crisis, noting that Koolhaas discussed contradictions on various occasions and maintained that they should be exacerbated rather than dissolved.

Turning Cacciari’s logic upside down, Koolhaas appears to want to utilize the very contradictions and shocks of the metropolis to avoid getting locked in by the projections upon which architecture is so firmly predicated. This position is often considered post-utopian or anti-utopian, in that it stops short of prescribing. In Tafuri’s view, such a practice would presumably be considered prescriptive through its affirmation of the metropolitan Nervenleben in the first place. Simply avoiding prescription of the exact usage of a space does not alleviate the architect from responsibility. Koolhaas is very aware of this; hence his claim that there is “in the deepest motivations of architecture something that cannot be critical.” To Koolhaas, the only tenable position is affirmation, where Tafuri saw only the possibility of withdrawal; nonetheless, their analyses do overlap here.

In Delirious New York, Koolhaas goes so far as to refer to the city as “Capital of the perpetual crisis” in what is presumably a direct, if ironic, reference to Cacciari and Tafuri. From the start,
the mission statement of the Office for Metropolitan Architecture was to embrace contradictions. This put them on a direct collision course with Tafuri, who suggested:

In this phase it is necessary to persuade the public that the contradictions, imbalances, and chaos typical of the contemporary city are inevitable. Indeed the public must be convinced that this chaos contains an unexplored richness, unlimited utilizable possibilities, and qualities of the "game" now made into new fetishes for society.\(^{253}\)

A series of responses emerges to the crisis of projection, all of them addressing this crisis in their own way. Whilst critical architecture interrogates the tools of projection and the architect in the search for autonomy, Koolhaas takes the obverse path, following Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour’s seminal *Learning From Las Vegas* in a celebration of the “real.”\(^{254}\) Koolhaas, like Venturi and Scott Brown, explicitly avoids attempting to project any judgment on the phenomena he observes, and remains highly derisive of those who claim an ethical position in architecture.\(^{255}\) Rather than attempt to grapple with the condition of the Metropolis, he decides that it is “almost alright,” as Venturi would have put it, and sets out to prove that. Koolhaas, in this sense, uses the very nature of the contradiction to overcome the crisis of projection – to Koolhaas, the contradiction becomes a means to move beyond the utopian dilemma of meaning vs. becoming complicit in various crimes in a peculiar twist. Koolhaas wrote in collaboration with Oswald Matthias Ungers, Hans Kollhoff and others in 1977 in *The City in the City: The Green Archipelago*:

> The problem is no longer posed as the designing of a completely new environment, but rather as the rebuilding of what already exists. Not the discovery of a new order for the city, but the improvement of what is already there; not the discovery of new conceptions, but the rediscovery of proven principles, not the construction of new cities but the re-organisation of the old ones – this is the real problem for the future. There is no need for a new Utopia but rather to create a better reality.\(^{256}\)

The text emphasizes the unreal character of utopia and juxtaposes the authors’ own proposition with it, as well as, one may add, a critique of Tafuri’s brand of modernism – embracing a reconfiguration of components rather than rethinking their position within the system. Yet, there is more to Koolhaas and utopia, if one follows Sanford Kwinter’s essay “Flying the bullet, or when

\(^{253}\) Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 139.


\(^{256}\) Ungers et al., *The City in the City*, 126.
did the future begin”, which distinguishes between “optimism” and “utopianism”, where utopianism is left as the projection of the perfect world. In Kwinter’s version, optimism sounds tangential to the utopian impulse introduced by Ernst Bloch who discussed the need for “militant optimism.”

Kwinter writes:

…for Koolhaas truly radical optimism is incompatible with utopianism: Optimism recognizes an inherent propensity or directedness in any disposition of historical things (even the post-historical “fragments” or the passive drift of cultural “plankton” to which Koolhaas alludes), a direction or propensity that may be drawn out and followed, while utopianism remains imprisoned within the moral universe of what “ought” to be, and so can call on no materiality whatever on which to impress its chimerical shape. Optimism and danger, very simply, are affirmations of the wilderness of life – of the life that resides even in places and things – while utopianism remains an affirmation of the stillborn universe of the metaphysician’s Idea: transcendent, fixed, and quixotically indifferent to the vivid roilings of a historical world.

By now, it is apparent that one cannot simply assign Koolhaas’ optimism to a post-utopian era; one must instead consider the utopian and its expressions more closely and define utopian desire and utopian Ideas in more precise terms, and that is what this study sets out to do. When we leave behind the cul de sac which is the periodization of the modern-postmodern, another way of thinking forward begins to take shape, where the unknown is embraced and producing an embryo of a Hopeful Monster, which would soon emerge.

**Specters of Utopia**

I argue that utopian desire has certainly not disappeared, but the crisis of the plan or the projection has constrained it to take on other forms. Furthermore, this crisis also challenged the utopian problem, and not only its solutions. In order to overcome this remnant desire with neither Idea nor solution, utopia was assigned to one specific and by now unfashionable idea: perfection, which was, obviously, a false problem. This strategy, I argue, permitted the “unthinking” of utopia, as Reinhold Martin puts it.

In his 2010 *Utopia’s Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism*, Again, Martin argues that the unthinking of utopia broached above could not only be explained through a disenchant-
ment with modernism and the association with totalitarianism that was forming the utopian relationship in the 1960s and 70s. Instead, Martin argues that the disillusion in architecture was produced by new economic conditions that demanded the unthinking of utopia, and that architecture was not only the exponent of this other world order, but rather became an agent of that world order, where architecture shifted — and I am stretching Martin’s argument somewhat here — from plan to control in a way that is perhaps most closely associated with cybernetics. The discrediting of utopia was hence not due to the end of grand narratives, but rather a by-product of a predominantly economic shift in terms of rising corporate power that replaced state power, and this shift affected every aspect of life and cultural production, including architecture.

As a result, utopia as projection became unthinkable, and utopia was consequently unthought, at least for the time being. Utopia provided a convenient common enemy. By reducing the utopian concept to its most banal definition, one could construct a straw man whom one could without hesitation confront, or even a ghost in itself, being untimely in more ways than one.

As an alternative to this, I offer the utopian definition and the distinction between utopian desire and utopian expression to continue tracking the utopian in the age of the allegedly post-utopian. In this sense, utopian desire did not disappear simply because the concept was banalized; it had to shift form. Utopia was cast in a very specific role, a role that Tafuri had no doubt played a part in formulating, but from the opposite end of the political spectrum.

In a sense, one could, like Martin, argue that the utopian required a re-formulation of the rules. In an interview with Lee Stickells and Charles Rice, Martin elaborates on how he configures architecture and utopia in the postmodern architectural context: “Despite Tafuri, there is no ‘retreat’ in postmodernism; there is a rewriting of the rules of the game. It only looks like a retreat when seen from the point of view of the avant-gardes, that is, from the point of view of militant, authorial intent.” Martin also argues that utopia thus

259. Martin writes: “under postmodernism, cultural production has been repositioned as a laboratory for auto-regulation, wherein power is redefined as control, and especially self-control.” Martin, Utopia’s Ghost, xiv.

did not disappear, as is habitually presumed in historiographical accounts of postmodernism; rather, it was looking for new outlets, new expressions, new media, and, importantly, a new desired aim.

Perfection, with its stasis and the death to which it ultimately led, was no longer a viable aim for which to hope. The utopian Ideas were consequently in need of a reformulation, but instead received ridicule and reduction. This utopian desire without an expression took on a spectral character; it sought other expressions, other ways of becoming reformulated into something that could be worked with. Martin notes: "Utopia stands ultimately for an entire system of representation and reproduction that is no longer available to architecture, rather than as an idol whose enchantment led modernism astray. And Utopia’s ghost stands as the permanent possibility of its unexpected return, as ghosts do." Utopia would return, as Martin puts it, “transfigured.” I argue that this transfiguration is one of the principle utopian characteristics, however, it takes on the spectral qualities in relation to the utopia reduced to projection of a perfect future, itself a haunting apparition.

In this sense, could one not here turn the tables and suggest that the banalized utopia is what becomes spectral, rather than the underlying utopian desire that continues to change, as it always has? Locking utopia into a very specific and banal meaning produces a utopia confined within a utopian hauntology. Following such a hypothesis is not without its own problems and its own paradoxes, as will become apparent in the upcoming chapters. This new utopian impulse is different. It has not been explored thoroughly, but it is problematic in that it is based on the utopian potential, rather than projection.

The ghosting of utopia-as-projection had many consequences. Utopia became mired in contradictions and mirrors. Utopia became further entrenched as projection, which was unthinkable, leading architects to explore the “claustrophobic interiors” of postmodern existence. Martin develops this argument in relation to architecture, tracing certain postmodern peculiarities. His examples contain passages that lead
“precisely nowhere” and end in an anti-climax of never arriving anywhere. Martin cautiously suggests that one could read a “visor effect” into these passages, and that there is something utopian in these paths to nowhere. They are projections that do not project a solution, “refusing to take the form of a project – a kind of inadvertent or accidental project that appears indirectly, in an almost unrecognizable return of the repressed.”

The visor effect comes from Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Hamlet in the opening pages of *Specters of Marx*. Derrida discusses it almost in passing, and yet it is an interesting line of thought with regard to the relation of architecture (here as a discipline) to utopia after utopia as a projection became unthinkable. Martin shows, among other things, that the utopian remained at the edge of the field of vision, a haunting presence in its very conspicuous absence. We cannot see utopia in the postmodern architecture; we see only the armor, a “stage prop,” through which utopia peers out at us.

I argue that the failure to lead anywhere puts the spotlight squarely on the troubled relation between architect, projection and utopia. Projection and its complications become particularly difficult here, as there is simply no established way of expressing utopian desire, as there is no alternative that has succeeded projection. While these projects could by no means claim to have any utopian content, they may nonetheless be considered to perform a certain utopian function. The refusal to project, or to provide meaning or coherence would thus function on the utopian levels in different ways, and in a performative sense rather than through their content. However, the crisis of utopia by no means marks the end of utopia; as we all know, crisis is often accompanied by opportunity. Etymologically, crisis comes from the ancient Greek for ‘decision,’ indicating a possible change of course rather than necessarily an endpoint or demise. The crisis of utopia could be considered a starting point for a shift in the utopian Idea and the problem it sets out to solve, where overcoming the contradictions, in a Blochian sense, becomes unperceivable from the “darkness of the lived moment,” and instead of projecting an order, utopia begins to concern itself

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263. Ibid., 163.

264. Ibid.

265. Our inability to see where we are and where we are going. See Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*. Vol. 1, 290-95.
with what could be called monstrous thinking, which focuses on the opening up of the future as the only viable alternative to a perceived all-encompassing capitalism.

**The archipelago as a hinge**

There are other expressions of this visor effect as well. One particular type into which Martin delves is the idea of the archipelago. Defined in the barest terms, the archipelago is a collection of islands connected — and separated — by water. The archipelago consists of a series of discrete heterogeneous territories within a larger, homogenous, territory. As a utopian idea, from an architectural perspective, the archipelago offers a kind of a hinge — as the title of this section implies — between the utopia of determinacy (perfection) and one of indeterminacy (openness), or in the terms of this project, a hinge between the ghost of utopias past and the Hopeful Monster.

The surrounding territory constitutes an infrastructure, connecting and separating the islands. It has a form — be it the Manhattan grid or the enclosure provided by the Berlin Wall — and within this larger territory there are a multitude of other territories, independent of one-another, each developing without any constraints other than those imposed by the connective territory that surrounds it. In some accounts, the archipelago presents a series of islands that are only bound by their structure; they have no influence on one another, but exist in splendid autonomy within their respective territories. Here, we can begin to discern, in an architectural context, two important concepts that will return in the coming section. The first is the nesting of one territory within another, and the second is the relationship between these territories, where the containing territory provides an overall protocol, a set of rules that regulates the relation between the framed (island) and the framing (sea). In this sense, the archipelago here works as a hinge to the next section of this study: Hopeful Monsters.

The archipelago itself also functions precisely like a hinge, connecting two planes, relating them to one another and aligning them along one axis but leaving alignment optional along another. Instead, it brings elements of the two together in one point where they connect and revolve around one another. For Koolhaas, who may be considered one of the more pro-

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266. Monstrous thinking here denotes thinking that “forsakes the desire for an image of thought,” which however is more complicated than it may seem at first glance. Keith Ansell Pearson, ed. Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer (London: Routledge, 2002), 3.

267. Two of the architects discussed in this section, Ungers and Koolhaas, have taken opposing views on the relation between the islands. Koolhaas describes Manhattan as “an archipelago of solitudes” (citing Nietzsche), while Ungers writes of a ‘dialectic city,’ establishing links between different ‘theses’ rather than the simplistic modulation; each part is in itself incomplete and dependent on the others. Koolhaas, Delirious New York, 120. or Oswald Mathias Ungers and Stefan Vieths, Oswald Mathias Ungers: The Dialectic City (Milan: Skira editore, 1997).

268. I have cast Koolhaas as a utopian here, principally in terms of utopian tension between the freedom from constraints Koolhaas discusses and the autonomy he despises.
form two poles, as Koolhaas noted in 1991, “There is no need for a strategy to integrate it [chaos], because it happens in such abundance. What we tried over the last three years is more to define our relationship to it.” Koolhaas has furthermore suggested that the role of urbanism is the “staging of uncertainty.” Somewhere here, utopia becomes a more complicated and multilayered structure. Do the individual islands of liberty constitute the utopian, or, alternatively, is the utopian expressed through the determinate structure? If the structure is considered utopian, must not utopia then be considered first and foremost in terms of its potential rather than its content? These questions will return in different forms throughout the remainder of this study.

The archipelago is, in this sense, distinguished from other attempts at indeterminacy at an urban level. It is tempting to compare it with, for instance, “Non-Plan: An Experiment in

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271. Ibid., 36.

Freedom,” authored by Rayner Banham, Paul Barker, Peter Hall, and Cedric Price and presented in an article in New Society in 1969. “Non-Plan” is another exponent of the crisis of projection, a disqualification of determinacy in planning, and implicitly of both projection and the planner. The authors propose abolishing planning in three specific zones and later evaluating the effects. The purpose of this proposed experiment is to see what the taken-for-granted role of the planner and the plan actually do, and determine whether it is beneficial, pointless or, as the authors hint, oppressive. The distinction from the archipelago is significant. There is no role for the planner in the Non-Plan, it is a straight abolition of the determinate – the definition of the area is a non-act rather than an act in itself – whereas in the archipelago, the architect or planner again plays a role, thanks to the double protocol or double territories. In “Non-Plan,” freedom is the absence of control (in the form of the planner), and the utopian element is the disposal of the plan. In the archipelago, the architect or planner becomes a manager of the structure of the whole, setting the frameworks within which freedom is exercised.

One archipelago is Koolhaas and Madelon Vriesendorp’s 1972 project The City of the Captive Globe, originally one of the parts of the project Exodus, but later presented as an individual project. This vision of Manhattan is a “dry archipelago where each block represents an ‘island’ while the fast moving traffic that ensures their relative isolation corresponds to the water.” Here, the territory or form within which the archipelago is set the grid of Manhattan, a grid that is “the capital secret of Manhattan, describing a city of 1500 identical ‘places’ that are indistinguishable from each other on the ground and rely therefore on architectural pyrotechnics to distinguish themselves from each other and to establish an identity.”

Each block is one plot, and each of these constitutes “ideological laboratories […] equipped to suspend unwelcome laws, undeniable truths, to create non-existent, physical conditions to facilitate and provoke speculative activity.” The archipelago is thus a highly architectural response to the suddenly complicated practice of projection, where a new role is invented for the architect as the manager of utopian potential, or, as Tafuri might have phrased it: a manager of mediating


275. Ibid., 331.

276. Ibid.
and exacerbating contradictions.\textsuperscript{277} Ironically, the archipelago in itself does not necessarily resolve any of the contradictions of utopia; its openness exists only within the framework of the whole, and thus there is the end of history (the structure itself has a finality to it) and openness (in the individual islands that can evolve in whatever direction is desired).

In his quest for the ghosts of utopia, Martin discusses another archipelago in which utopia haunts the architectural practice. The focus is on The City in the City (originally published as Die Stadt in der Stadt), a project briefly introduced above that was carried out in 1977 by Oswald Mathias Ungers, Rem Koolhaas, Peter Riemann, Hans Kollhoff, Arthur Ovaska and others.\textsuperscript{278} While the origin of the project is uncertain, it is clear that Koolhaas provided what could be called a script for a summer school in Berlin, and that this script was subsequently amended by Ungers and the others.\textsuperscript{279} At the same time, Ungers had been writing about utopian communities in America in collaboration with his wife, Liselotte Ungers, and published Kommunen in der Neuen Welt: 1740–1972, which, as archi-

\textsuperscript{277} Similar approaches crop up regularly in discussions on participatory design. Note, for instance, projects by Chilean architect Alejandro Aravena in recent years. The architect becomes the designer of freedom’s scaffolding. This has been a popular trope within the architectural practice, at least since the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{278} Unger et al., The City in the City.

\textsuperscript{279} See ibid. In Aureli’s account however, the authorship is primarily attributed to Ungers; see Aureli, The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 178.
tectural theorist Pier Vittorio Aureli notes, could be considered a pre-study for the archipelago as a model of not one utopia, but of many.280

The City in the City project envisions the city as an archipelago of different lifestyles. The backdrop is a depopulating West Berlin, and the architectural project consists in designating a series of preservation zones of metropolitan intensity, urban islands in a green sea of forest within the confines of West Berlin.281 Each of these islands offers an alternative suited to specific individuals. In many ways, it is difficult to avoid the utopian potential implicit in the proposition – again, not a utopia aiming for perfection, but one of a very specific kind of openness, a liberal utopia of endless choice.282

Here, we can perceive the starting point of the monster or Hopeful Monster, which rather than determining the future attempts to un-determine it. In this sense, there is a passage from utopia as a ghost to its incarnation as a Hopeful Monster. The soul-searching of the haunted architectural profession here provides the departure point for the new, emerging, utopian idea that will be discussed at length.

It should be noted that the monstrous utopia of the coming chapters is of another kind, proposing another kind of openness. The archipelago concerns itself with modulation283 of endless alternatives to suit every fantasy, not the opening up of the category future itself. This is a version of the indeterminate that proliferates rather than resolves. Generating difference becomes a technique of control here, a way of managing the connections between entities.

It could in this sense be likened to the very rudimentary distinction that philosopher and theorist Isaiah Berlin made between negative and positive liberty, the former is understood as “freedom from” (constraints) whereas positive freedom denotes “freedom to” which Berlin sees as a more dangerous and ideological type of freedom.284 In many ways, such a distinction is oversimplified in its habitual use; for example, what is considered a constraint in terms of the negative? Language, image of thought, etc.: all subjectivity-forming aspects could readily be considered constraints in themselves. In this sense, such a distinction becomes useless in the present


281. The project has been widely publicized over the last five years; hence the rather cursory description here.

282. Like all Koolhaas’ projects, there is what could readily be called a utopian tension that remains under-articulated in the assertive claims of ‘realism’ in OMA’s works.

283. Modulation is a term employed by Deleuze in his “Postscript on the Societies of Control” to denote how a control society operates through differentiation between what Deleuze calls “dividuals.”

context, beyond showing how the archipelago is imagined to harbor utopian potential. That is, modulation and protocol are very direct constraints on freedom in their own right.

Tafuri noted that “[c]haos and order were […] sanctioned by the historical avant-garde movements as the ‘values,’ in the proper sense of the term, of the new capitalist city […] It is order that confers significance upon chaos and transforms it into value, into ‘liberty.’”\textsuperscript{285} The archipelago could thus be seen as an exponent of the same construction, which could readily be considered part of capitalist society in itself. As Koolhaas notes: “The Grid – or any other subdivision of the metropolitan territory into maximum increments of control- describes an archipelago of “Cities within Cities.” The more each island “celebrates different values, the more the unity of the archipelago as system is reinforced. Because ‘change’ is contained on the component ‘islands,’ such a system will never have to be revised.”\textsuperscript{286}

Koolhaas very deliberately avoids asking the question about the metropolis that Tafuri lambasted the avant-gardes for failing to ask – this is already determined by the name Office for Metropolitan Architecture – but this does not make Koolhaas’ archipelago any less utopian. I position the archipelago as a hinge to the Hopeful Monsters that the upcoming chapter will explore: part ghost – and part monster. The archipelago is the vanishing point of the architect-projection-utopia triad, connecting openness and projection. If utopian desire without an expression is the renunciation of utopia, the archipelago marks a shift to the alternative: a partial renunciation of projection (of meaning and content), which I argue is symptomatic of Hopeful Monster Utopias. But this is not necessarily without its own problems: as we have already seen, this renunciation of projection is sometimes rather illusory in that the architect instead projects the frameworks and structure within which the supposed freedom is enacted.

\textsuperscript{285}Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia, 96.

\textsuperscript{286}Koolhaas, Delirious New York, 296.
PART 2:
THE AGE OF HOPEFUL MONSTERS
Part 2 swiftly moves from then to now. It is an attempt at understanding the utopian in current architectural theory and practice. Such an undertaking is no doubt precarious, any account of the present is mired in the very plane of immanence it sets out to discern. This goes for this study as well. This is an attempt at seeing how the image of thought that I call the Network-image conditions utopian Ideas, and what the effects of these preconceptions are. The aim is to perceive, analyze, and discuss the utopian Ideas — and the expressions that respond to these — obscured by the habitual petrified utopian conception.
AN INTRODUCTION TO MONSTERS

Monsters & Monsters

If utopia is rethought, and no longer marred with ideals of perfection and finality, how then is utopian desire expressed? I have already argued that the utopian is monstrous per definition; this monstrosity of the utopian is now rising to the foreground. It is a monstrosity that aims not for the end of history, but rather its continuation, instead of looking for the true order, it attempts to free us of the very notion of a perfect society. The monstrous utopian expression shows us the world is not ordered, and that the future is open. This openness is undecided, undetermined, and chaotic. Monsters are almost invariably considered negative, as they show us that which is beyond what we assumed we knew, but at the same time, the monster also shows us that the future is not determined; there is hope for change (rather than perfection). The monstrous in this sense is unsettling in both positive and terrifying ways at once, and it is important to remember that whether it is positive or terrifying depends on the monstrous encounter rather than the monster itself.

If Thomas More’s Utopia (the book, not the island) envisioned a world in which humanity defined its own fate, it did so by challenging the doxa that declared that societal order was a given. In this sense, More’s Utopia had certain monstrous
qualities; even if it depicted the perfectly static societal order, it showed that the organization of society was not given — it eliminated an image of thought.\textsuperscript{287} I argue that it makes sense to consider the utopian in terms of the monstrous, in terms of what it shows instead of what it depicts.

Before analyzing the utopian expressions related to the Network-image, it is necessary to examine the notion of the monstrous in relation to the utopian more closely. Utopia predicated on survival is a monstrous concept; its logic is change, but rather than a planned and measured change, it is a wild one.

Deleuze discusses two different kinds of monster: the chimera, a monster composed of identifiable parts in a monstrous synthesis; and the monster as the underlying chaos rising to the surface.\textsuperscript{288} If the chimeric monster is itself an entity — something which is terrifying, but a form nevertheless — the second type, which is the type of monster relevant to Deleuze, is part of the chaos underlying all the orders that we impose on the world. Deleuze writes: “It is a poor recipe for producing monsters to accumulate heteroclite determinations or to overdetermine the animal. It is better to raise up the ground and dissolve the form.”\textsuperscript{289}

This type of monster emerges from the chaotic background, and can be distinguished from this background, but nevertheless cannot exist as an “autonomous positivity,” it is part of the background and as such not an exception, as the Swedish historian of ideas Jonnie Eriksson notes in Monstret och Människan (‘Monstrosity and Man’).\textsuperscript{290} This type of monster is in that sense topological rather than physiological. With this distinction, the monstrous is always present, but only on occasion discernable.

The monster becomes distinguishable from the background, but is unable to be fully distinct from this background. The monster rises from the background to the surface, and thus lets into the world the underlying chaos that philosophers have traditionally believed to be ordered. Deleuze refers us to Francisco de Goya’s etchings and Odilon Redon’s paintings for illustrations of this kind of monster. In Goya’s Los caprichos for instance — a series of works with a combination of etching and aquatint — the monsters blend with the background; they are
The etchings have sharp lines, defining certain shapes, but with the grey aquatint applied to the background (including the monsters), the monster appears to be rising out of this background.

As Eriksson notes, this type of monster is invariably staged; the monstrosity is topological, scenographic and cinematographic. The monster, in other words, is in the experience of the monstrous, and in extension, monstrous thought. In this sense, the utopian monstrosity lies in understanding that nothing is settled, that there is no order given, that the image of thought assumed is an imaginary stability – perhaps necessary, but never true.

The Monstrous Utopian Expression

Thus understood, the monstrous utopian expression shows the openness of the future by showing us precisely the constructed nature of the image of thought, and it embraces this experienced moment, which is simultaneously terrifying and possessing of endless opportunity. Etymologically, the monster comes from the
Latin monstrum, which is related to monere, meaning to warn, as well as monstrare, meaning to show. The monster that shows us something is how the utopian monstrosity works, and it ultimately shows us the world without the filters or the order we impose on it. Since it shows us an openness, it is an instrumental utopian expression, illustrating the nature of the problem of how to live (better) by removing the constrictions we habitually impose on life.

Another important aspect here is that the way it shows us this openness is through the staged experience. Content is in other words less relevant than how the utopian expression shows us this openness. The instrumentality thus appears in the utopian expression’s capacity to show us something, rather than its direct instrumentality. It is not question of breeding utopian monsters, but rather of staging the monstrous utopian experience. It is also a question of revolt rather than revolution. If revolution has a plan for tomorrow, revolt defines one very short moment where everything hangs in the air undecided, the moment before order is imposed.

This is a way of approaching the utopian question without the presumed determinism of the plan or the image. The monstrous utopian then appears to offer a solution to the question posed by Australian philosopher Elizabeth Grosz: “How to think of direction or trajectory without being able to anticipate a destination?” This however means that the monstrous utopian does not provide a recipe for action, the deliverance of the alternative, and so forth, but its task is to eliminate images of thought that propose that there is an underlying order in the world. The monstrous utopia unsettles the future. The monstrous quality of the utopian was introduced in the chapter on the utopian concept: utopia can be considered a monster in that its role is to challenge presuppositions. In this sense, utopian thinking is monstrous thinking, and it denotes thinking here that – as Keith Arnell Pearson notes in relation to Deleuze – “forsakes the desire for an image of thought.”

Chimeras

If the monsters above dissolve form, chimeric monsters are monsters with a form. The chimeric monster is a hybrid, or
a reorganization of limbs that produces an unrecognizable hybrid beast. If the monster described above is an absolute monster that unsettles how the world is understood, the chimeric monster is a relative monster that produces new syntheses. In terms of the utopian monstrous expression, one could perhaps suggest that the absolute monster is the underlying chaos seeping into the world that shows the essentially ungrounded nature of existence. The chimera is de-formed, an abomination in a fundamentally grounded world.

Where the absolute monster shows a fundamental unsettling, the relative monster shows an openness that negates the order but is ultimately the exception to the normal. In this sense, the chimera does not forsake the desire for an image of thought, as Ansell Pearson noted above, and as a result, focus is on the false problem. They may thereby reinforce dominant images of thought under the guise of the monstrous.\textsuperscript{296}

Architects have a propensity for chimeric monsters – various hybrids and combinations are de rigeur in architectural practice.\textsuperscript{297} This can be considered a chimeric form of utopian expression, a desire for change, but less intensive than the absolute monster discussed above in that it primarily focuses on bringing parts together which should in turn generate the monstrous hybrid. This will be discussed in detail; at this point, I wish merely to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between different types of the monstrous. The question we have to ask ourselves when it comes to utopian expressions is in what way and to what extent they are monstrous?

\textbf{The complex monstrosity of cyborgs}

An interesting case that appears to fall between these two definitions of monstrosity is the American theorist of science and technology Donna Haraway’s infamous cyborg, from her seminal “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century.”\textsuperscript{298} On the one hand, the cyborg certainly is a hybrid. It is chimeric in its combination of human and not-human into something that can perhaps best be considered in terms of the not-not-human. At the

\textsuperscript{296} Could one not discuss Tafuri’s critique of the rearrangement of the means of production in the metropolis (Architecture and Utopia) in that the architects of the avant-garde considered revolutionary in terms of a chimeric monstrosity, a recombination that ended up reinforcing the dominant image of thought, rather than challenging it? This would presuppose that one overlooks Tafuri’s conception of ideology, but it is an interesting prospect nevertheless.

\textsuperscript{297} This will be discussed in further detail later. One example is Koolhaas, who in Content discusses OMA’s proposition in the competition for the design of Parc de la Villette in Paris in terms of “programmatic layering upon vacant terrain to encourage dynamic coexistence of activities and to generate through their interference unprecedented events.” Content, 73.

same time, the cyborg is unsettling the idea of what it means to be human.

The cyborg is in this sense both chimeric and not: it is relative and absolute. In one way, Haraway unsettles the categorical definitions we apply to understanding what it means to be human, or what it means to be female. Could one not perhaps suggest that she uses the chimeric monstrous to dissolve the form of the categories (monstrous in the absolute sense)? That she shows the underlying chaos on which we have imposed ideas of an order? If so, could not “A Cyborg Manifesto” be thought of in terms of working on two different levels or two different strata? In that case, the cyborg itself is a chimeric monster, but Haraway’s contribution is not the production of cyborgs; they are already here. Her contribution is on another level. Her conceptualization of the chimeric cyborg unsettles categories and thereby shows how the monstrous comes to the surface. In this sense, Haraway is thinking monstrously, forsaking the desire for an image of thought, when thinking about chimeric monsters.

If this seems plausible, we will have to be very careful about how we approach the monstrous utopian expressions and analyze their monstrous intensity in detail. In order to do that, it is necessary to discuss the milieu or the image of thought within which the monstrous utopian expressions emerge today – which I call the Network-image – and how architectural utopian expressions set out to challenge this image of thought.
THE NETWORK-IMAGE

Networks define how we understand and act in the world in this day and age. Over all else, the logic of the network privileges connections (or edges). Connections produce value in themselves. Connections have come to form both means and ends in a worldview, which I here have dubbed the Network-image. I argue that the Network-image constitutes the dominant image of thought at present or the plane of immanence from where we begin to think. We (in a broad sense that certainly includes architects) live within the Network-image, where the manager or the curator becomes the role model as the agent primarily in charge of forging connections within the network. The possibilities offered by the Network-image are lauded frequently: the new tools for architects and the opportunity for architects to work as “instigators” and “catalysts” rather than designers of buildings clearly indicate an architectural role that has been redefined by and through the Network-image. However, the other side of the Network-image – the cybernetic origins; the notion of control through protocols; and the concealment of power in distributed systems – are under-analyzed, and as the Network-image becomes naturalized, they become invisible. Interrogating the Network-image in terms of origin, structure, and effects is clearly an urgent task.

The Network-image outlined in this chapter is a form of the discourse, a topology within which certain concepts are possible to imagine, whereas others are impossible. Imagining utopia as an image within the Network-image is complicated, unless the power of imagination is deferred beyond any author.
On the other hand, the notion killing off the author (and determinism) eliminates neither utopian desire, nor utopian expression. It is however significant that utopia in the Network-image is not predicated on perfection or progress, but on the very deferral of the author, which is sometimes mistaken as the deferral of author-ity. This text will show that this is not necessarily the case. The Network-image is based on another conception of futurity and the future than the expressions of utopian impulses influenced more directly by Enlightenment values.

I wish to emphasize four fundamental points about the Network-image in the following: 1.): In many respects, the Network-image is defined as a contrast to the tree structure. I refer to this as arboraphobia, the fear of trees. Since everybody knows what a tree is, there is a tendency to presume the network as the given form rather than something to be critically interrogated; the network, in other words, is not natural but habitually naturalized. 2.): By now, nearly every aspect of society is saturated by the Network-image, including architecture, and this ubiquity is far more insidious than the conscious allusions and instrumentalization of networks in the architect’s practice; it becomes an image of thought. 3.): There are many kinds of networks, with different characteristics, and since arboraphobia tends to define itself through negation, it is often overlooked that this reduction obscures precisely how networks are governed. It is a reduction that obscures elements of control and power are invariably present in the network itself. 4.): Networks all have one thing in common: they prioritize and exist in the connections, and as a consequence, everything that falls outside this connective perspective becomes effectively invisible from within the network itself.

Arboraphobia

“We’re tired of trees,” Deleuze and Guattari proclaimed in the introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus*. This declaration neatly sums up one of the key issues with networks around which this discussion will revolve: where precisely are the trees today? The network is presented as the universal solution to the rigid, hierarchical, and oppressive, and it tacitly takes on the inverse characteristics: emancipatory, flexible, creative, and so on. In
this sense, the network is presented in its most immaterial and abstract sense; it is a gas rather than a solid like the tree. Particularly, both capitalism and the resistance to capitalism, both management manuals and the informal manuals for political activism are now defining themselves through their opposition to the tree-structure’s carefully composed power-relations. We are all tired of trees, and thus the network has become ubiquitous to the extent that many would argue there is no outside of the networks.

The network is consequently understood as both emancipatory and totalizing – a utopian proposition by any definition. The first characteristic of the Network-image, then, is the fear of trees. The logic of arboraphobia is simple enough: the network is everything that the tree is not. Hence, all of us project our dreams and hopes onto the perceived infinite capacity of the network. As mentioned above, the problem here is that the network and the Network-image are taken to be the ground from which all else emerges, and the Network-image itself is thus rarely scrutinized.

In their 2004 paper “Notes on the State of Networking,” media theorist Geert Lovink and writer and film-maker Florian Schneider noted that there is a discrepancy when it comes to power and the network: “we would all love to believe that decentralized networks somehow dissolve [sic] power, over time. Meanwhile, networking environments also create specific dispositives, that are coordinating new forms of power and that consist of a variety of elements.”

The Network-image should, in other words, not be considered neutral or transparent in itself; on the contrary, its workings should be interrogated. Does the Network-image’s auto-definition in an arboraphobic perspective lead to the perpetuation of an endless array of solutions to false problems?

I maintain that a shift occurred that can be illustrated by contrasting the Gilles Deleuze around 1968 with the Gilles Deleuze of 1990. Deleuze’s collaboration with Félix Guattari on the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia oriented their work in opposition to the hierarchical, rigid, and oppressive power structures that constituted the hegemonic power structures at the time, or the tree structure. Against this, they fa-


302. Deleuze and Guattari; Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003 [1972]).
mously posited the rhizome, a horizontal, rather than vertical structure without any definable center or hierarchy which spreads and functions independently of centralized organization. The shift that will be discussed in this chapter proposes that the rhizome has not only been adopted by those resisting the dominant ideology, but also by neoliberal power structures themselves. Deleuze refers to the shift in the short essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” published in 1990, indicating it as a shift from the disciplinary society to a society of control where the factory is replaced by the corporation. Control works differently than discipline, and power works through heterogenization and by modulating differences. Where the factory enclosed individuals, the corporation is by comparison a “gas” that fills the space between “dividuals.” In the Network-image, power is exercised by managing the connections between people.

**Outlining the Network-image**

The Network-image, certainly an “unimaginable globality,” as Umberto Eco put it, is comprised of a variety of phenomena, beliefs and technologies. The contradictions inherent in the Network-image (for example the contradiction between control and liberty) are not detrimental to the network or its logic in any sense. Instead, the conflation and superimpositions are employed to do various things, including re-shaping power relations, re-organizing labor, building new subjectivities apt to self-control, cultivating the redefinition of liberty, and so on. The long list continues to grow. The Network-image is the ground from which we start out, whether we are seeking to affirm the current mode of capitalism or to resist it. In this sense, it is often difficult to distinguish between these two ostensibly obverse practices. While the fact that capitalism wholeheartedly embraces the network in all its forms is not necessarily unexpected, it is perhaps surprising that resistance to capitalism also considers the network to be the condition in which resistance must take place, and indeed the only place where resistance can exist (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s work Empire and its sequels come to mind here), mirroring the relationship


that Tafuri found so problematic between the avant-garde and the metropolis.

Scrutinizing the fragments of the network is not equivalent to renouncing the network; my ambitions are not Luddite in that sense. What I wish to do is to challenge the problematic habit of mind of accepting the network, its logics, and its technologies as fundamentally neutral and emancipatory. The Network-image, in other words, should never be accepted as a given but instead as something that needs analysis. The principal point of interest is thus not the networks themselves, but rather the variety of levels affected by the network, how the network as an idea permeates more and more aspects of society, including the social, the cultural, the political, and the discourse itself— including, of course, utopian problems and solutions.

**What is a network?**

Currently, we are often told that “everything is a network”: “Mark Zuckerberg: people are networks. Donald Rumsfeld: the battlefield is a network. Bruno Latour: ontology is a network. Franco Moretti: Hamlet is a network. David Joselit: art is a network. Guy Debord: the post-capitalist city is a network. John Von Neumann: computation is a network. Konrad Wachsmann: architecture is a network.” Networks are social, political, financial, technological, digital, ontological, cultural, personal, etc.—all at once. A preliminary characterization of the network is supplied by Anthony Burke and Therese Thierney, who outline the fundamental premise for a networked society:

A network is an abstract organizational model, in its broadest sense concerned only with the structure of relationships between things, be they objects or information, which can be applied to the organization of anything from friends lists to genetic algorithms to global military operations. Networks consist classically of nodes, or non-dimensional points of connection, and links, equally non-material connections that usually conform to one of several organizational topologies such as centralized, distributed, bus, or mesh, which effect the nature of the relationships they embody and how they may be analyzed and understood. As a complex energy and material system, what typically qualifies a network are parameters of performance, related to flexibility, self-organization, and adaptability.

To this rudimentary definition, one could add several parameters noted by Manuel Castells. The first is the openness of the network: “Networks are open structures, able to expand
without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they are able to communicate within the network, namely as long as they share the same communication codes (for example, values or performance goals).”

Networks, in other words, are formless (since they have no boundaries) and therefore theoretically infinite. Another characteristic of the network is the peculiar relation between inside and outside in the network; things viewed from inside the network that are within the network are perceived as infinitely proximate, but things outside the network are perceived as infinitely distant, even if viewed from an outside perspective.

That which is outside of the network is, in extension, rendered invisible to the network, or from within the network. From within the network, what is outside is without significance except in the capacity of being integrated into the network. While this does not amount to a definition of networks, it could perhaps serve as the starting point for discussing what networks are, and more relevantly, what they do. Providing any singular definition of what networks are or do is risky and opens up for reductive understandings of the network – and if the network is anything, it is most certainly neither unitary nor singular, but rather a multiplicity all in itself. Finally, in this introduction, it may be important to recall what sociologists Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello remind us: that networks are not new, and it is the privileging of networks and the tendency to see everything as networks in one way or another that is new.

The network is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. It promotes freedom and shapes subjectivities and, I will argue, its own forms of utopianism. This double role is simultaneously the most interesting and under-researched aspect of networks. Power structures transform with networks; they do not dissolve. Media theorists Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker argue in *The Exploit* that networks operate through protocols which are at times contradictory, or basically paradoxical. Protocol is here understood as that which makes connections in a network possible. This includes all kinds of protocols on technological, political, and social levels, from diplomatic protocols, through standards and computer protocols. Since any given network is governed by multiple para-

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309. “The topology defined by networks determines that the distance (or intensity and frequency of interaction) between two points (or social positions) is shorter (or more frequent, or more intense) if both points are nodes in a network than if they do not belong to the same network. On the other hand, within a given network, flows have no distance, or the same distance, between nodes. Thus, distance (physical, social, economic, political, cultural) for a given point or position varies between zero (for any node in the same network) and infinite (for any point external to the network)” ibid., 501-02.


doxical protocols, networks and the Network-image manage
to function within both neoliberal capitalism and those intent
on resisting the same. Where one protocol is structured in an
anti-authoritarian way as a distributed system of direct demo-
cratic action, there is another protocol that governs the extent
of the first protocol, defining, for instance, the extent of the
network (which must be dynamic). This second protocol can
be rigid and hierarchical, but becomes obscured to the point
of invisibility by the open and rhizomatic protocol it contains.
Hence, networks can be fiercely anti-authoritarian and author-
itarian, simultaneously and seamlessly.

The problematization of this relation is central to un-
derstanding the Network-image and Network-utopias. The
second protocol that orders the first is what is referred to as
“control.” This differs from the disciplinary societies that func-
tion through enclosures (factories, schools, etc.); control func-
tions by defining and managing the networks. In this sense,
networks are, as Galloway and Thacker suggest, “the horizon
of control.”

In organizational terms, control is related to what we
can call the contemporary management culture, which Boltanski
and Chiapello analyze in The New Spirit of Capitalism. By defining pro-
tocols for networks within the corporation with office manuals
or in the form of defining parameters for projects, the role of
the manager becomes the role of a catalyst, an enabler, and
coach instead of that of someone who commands and oversees
every assigned task.

To literary theorist Seb Franklin, the network is also
a set of metaphors that serve to transform how subjects see
themselves and each other. He writes: “Beyond the specific
embodiments of cybernetic principles in economic and man-
agement theory across the second half of the twentieth century,
it is ultimately the broader epistemic turn, the reformulation
of the subject and of social interaction as systems of feedback,
control, and information transfer, that represents the most tell-
ing endowment passed from cybernetics to late capitalism.”

One of the more peculiar ways in which the two
protocols described above are kept apart and the elements of
control are hidden away can be found within the structure of

312. Ibid., 36.

313. The transition from
Taylorism to contemporary
managerial practices is
more complicated; there is
an intermediary step where
the office workers were
presented with the prospect
of a meritocracy within the
workplace which, in some
ways, may have been a
tool to keep up hopes and
keep labor unions out of
the office. See Nikil Saval,
Cubed : A Secret History of
the Workplace (New York:

314. Seb Franklin, Control:
Digitality as Cultural Logic
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2015), 80.
corporations like Google. Images of the work environment at Google, showing adult playgrounds replete with slides and fussball tables, can be contrasted with the server farms that are very much “a thing out there,” as opposed to the networks Bruno Latour analyzes, which, he asserts, are “not a thing out there.” Perhaps this is true in his sense, but in another sense, the network is very much a thing out there when discussing for instance the internet. A useful example here is John Gerrard’s photographic project Farm, which set out to document Google’s physical structures in the same way Google documented every other space imaginable. As John Gerrard put it in an interview: “The internet doesn’t not exist. It is physical. There is a great cable running under the Atlantic Ocean from Ireland to America. There’s a new set of infrastructures which are great information railways being put into place. I became interested in asking: what does the internet look like?”

Networks permeate almost every aspect of daily life as technology, as metaphor, as analytical method, as organizational model, and, of course as architecture. This simple juxtaposi-

Figure 10: Image from Google’s “Press Corner” depicting “Life at Google.”

The relationship between playground and mechanized computer farms is further complicated by the fact that even on the playground, Google works through the Network-image using a system of management based on the notion of control. There is a double set of protocols at work within this playground reality which makes it take on a far more sinister dimension. The internet is not an image, but it is often represented through images, which is how the apparent paradox between Google’s server farms and offices produces an image of the paradoxical character of the internet.

The network is not natural as such, but it is habitually and increasingly naturalized. It is vital to remember that the network is not only a technological construct, but also a social and cultural one; one should thus critically examine any claim made about the network on different levels. I argue that it is in this social/cultural dimension that a new form of utopianism can be discerned. The multiple dimensions of the network are often acknowledged by network evangelists and their detractors. Deleuze and Guattari note in Kafka that “a machine is never

Figure 11: John Gerrard, Farm (Pryor Creek, Oklahoma) 2015. The physical incarnation of the internet, Google data center. Image courtesy of the artist, Thomas Dane Gallery, London and Simon Preston Gallery, New York.

316. For more on Google, but with a different starting point, see Peter Jakobsson and Fredrik Sernstedt, “Googleplex and Informational Culture,” in Media Houses: Architecture, Media and the Production of Centrality, ed. Staffan Ericson and Kristina Rieger (New York: Peter Lang, 2010).
simply technical. Quite the contrary, it is technical only as a social machine, taking men and women into its gears, or, rather, having men and women as part of its gears along with things, structures, metals, materials."

This certainly applies to the Network-image. In one of the exuberant odes to the networked economy emerging from Silicon Valley during the 1990s, the technology magazine Wired’s founding editor and technology guru Kevin Kelly writes in his exuberant New Rules in the New Economy:

The great innovation of Silicon Valley is not the wowie-zowie hardware and software it has invented. Silicon Valley’s greatest “product” is the social organization of its companies and, most important, the networked architecture of the region itself – the tangled web of former jobs, intimate colleagues, information leakage from one firm to the next, rapid company life cycles, and agile email culture. This social web, suffused into the warm hardware of jelly bean chips and copper neurons, creates a true network economy.

Both Deleuze & Guattari and Kelly note this diffusion of work where personal networks become one’s primary selling point. What one can do is no longer considered in splendid isolation, but primarily in connection to others. Networks are ubiquitous, and they have been naturalized and superimposed to a point where their role becomes obfuscated as we are reduced to seeing the world through networks and consequently become unable to perceive anything or of anything beyond.

Control in Networks

Power and the image of that power have traditionally been associated with one another. The manifestation of power asserts the power to do other things, and in its most simple form it puts one individual at the center. This person becomes associated with power, and becomes an icon of her own power. Power works differently within the Network-image, possibly more insidiously, and without the icon as an identifiable center of power. This does not mean that power disappears, but merely that it becomes distributed, and this is by no means is synonymous with its dissolution or emancipation; it only means that it is exerted in other ways. In the short text
“Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze emphasizes a shift from the factory/enclosure to the corporation/network. Deleuze suggests that management by modulation and adaptation is what defines the relationship between the corporation and its employees: “Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point.”

Power is exerted not through discipline, but through control.

**Protocols**

Networks are managed by protocols. Protocol is a term with diverse applications, as media theorist Alexander Galloway notes; the term simultaneously denotes “a diagram, a technology and a management style.” A protocol is a set of governing principles that enable communication in the form of rules and standards. Protocols are “the rules make sure connections really work.” Following Galloway and Eugene Thacker, I would argue that protocols simultaneously facilitate networks and constitute the logic that governs what happens within them.

The multiple and ostensibly contradictory protocols mean that networks can be considered “slightly schizophrenic, doing one thing in one place and the opposite in another” but this contradiction is what makes them effective.

If one makes a rudimentary differentiation between networks and systems as the former being open and the latter closed, both the openness of the network and the object of the system is managed through protocols.

Galloway writes in Protocol: “Shared protocols are what defines the landscape of the network – who is connected to whom.” Galloway studies the internet – not its metaphors of “collectivity, connectivity and participation,” but the protocols that govern the internet’s structure and its organization on a technological level. On the most fundamental level, Galloway identifies two ostensibly contradictory protocols that govern the internet. The first is TCP/IP, a distributed network that connects computers around the world into a nebulous and, in some ways uncontrollable entity. This is the protocol most commonly asso-
associated with the internet, and according to Galloway the source of the mythology of a free and uncontrollable digital age.

In contrast to this, there is DNS, a protocol that sets addresses and governs how to locate specific pages. Rather than a distributed system, this protocol is an inverse tree structure: reading any web-domain backwards shows that the top-domain is invariably under some authority’s control, just as the domain name is under somebody’s control, etc. A very small number of servers “remember” where things are on the chaotic and bustling internet, and these few servers permit users to access websites. This system is the order of the internet so to speak, and without it, one would be unable to associate a “www” address with a specific IP number, for instance. Both of these two protocols are necessary – the horizontally organized TCP/IP, as well as the vertically organized DNS. The internet and the network are not metaphors, as Galloway carefully stresses. However, they are often understood in metaphorical terms, which reduces the complexity of the protocols involved. The very tension between the two modes of protocols – the horizontal and the vertical – constitutes the environment for “protocological control.”

Management culture

In addition to working on the level of the corporation and its resources/employees, the network works simultaneously on the level of redefining the corporation itself, as Boltanski and Chiapello note: “work is said to occur in a network, for the firm’s boundaries become blurred, with the organization now seeming to comprise nothing more than a mass of more or less enduring contractual links.” Instead of a hierarchical, linear work model that is strictly organized in segments, the corporation is formless, perpetually reshaped and adapting, consisting only of the connections linking those within and these connections to those outside of the corporation.

This represents a fundamental shift from the enclosure that constituted the factory, which regulated the inside and which still could be traced in the management culture of the 1960s – where, according to Boltanski and Chiapello,
merits should determine the individual’s success within the company, at least in theory. In that sense, personal connections and networks were played down, but in the reformed corporation that Boltanski and Chiapello encounter in the 1990s, the very same connections are what constitutes the assets of both individual and the corporation as a whole. Deleuze remarks that “Marketing has become the center or the ‘soul’ of the corporation. We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world.” The network, symbolized by the diagram, becomes the image of the corporation, but what is significant for the network is that it is not a form (except in a topological sense) and it is not an image, in that it does not have any limits; it only determines a constellation of nodes and how these interrelate, nothing else.

Boltanski and Chiapello, like Deleuze, define the shift as a “spirit” – the “New Spirit of Capitalism,” necessary in order to motivate workers and managers in a system that no longer has any real pretense to blind meritocracy, nor any clear career prospects. Investigating the mechanics behind the shift, the spirit, then, is connected to ideology, which falls rather close to the “image of thought” in Boltanski and Chiapello’s interpretation, rather than the Marxian definition. This image of thought is predicated on a set of justifications that justify the ideological order to promote and retain actions and predispositions that are compatible.

The justifications themselves increasingly relate to the network and its logic. Boltanski and Chiapello assert that the freedom offered by the network-organization as compared to the hierarchical corporation of the 1960s becomes the principal motivation for the workers. No longer hierarchically organized, the corporation instead becomes flexible and responsive. Boltanski and Chiapello note that they are “implementing the flexible, inventive organization that will be able to ‘ride’ all ‘waves’, adapt to all the changes, always have a workforce that is up to date with the most recent knowledge, and secure a permanent technological advantage over competitors.” This is of course the other side of a network logic, stipulating that the network simultaneously

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330. Ibid., 71.
means more efficiency and more freedom (for the individual worker). This is essentially an adaptation to a world that is unpredictable and continuously disrupted through technology and flows of capital.

The manager is most certainly the protagonist of the Network-image, deeply entwined in many other contemporary fascinations, and, importantly for this study, the utopianism associated with the network. The role of the manager is to produce synergies; the manager functions as a catalyst and enabler rather than as a disciplinary figure. The manager has a vision, and this is essentially a problematic concept, as the “vision” is by no means necessarily an image, despite the semantic qualities of the word in question. On the contrary, the object of the manager is to bring aspects, workers, nodes, specialists, clients, projects etc. into constellations where the effects cannot be predicted; if the effects were predictable, they would not be innovative as such.

Managers are ‘intuitive’, ‘humanist’, ‘inspired’, ‘visionaries’, ‘generalists’ (as opposed to narrow specialists), and ‘creative’. The universe of the manager is opposed to that of the cadre as the reticular is opposed to the categorical. The manager is network man. His principal quality is his mobility, his ability to move around without letting himself be impeded by boundaries, whether geographical or derived from professional or cultural affiliations, by hierarchical distances, by differences of status, role, origin, group, and to establish personal contact with other actors, who are often far removed socially or spatially.

Managers, in other words, do not formulate outcomes, but enable the workforce or project team to reach it by providing a protocol. Thus, managers “must get all sorts of people to work over whom they have little formal power. Consequently, they are supposed to assert themselves by means of their ‘skills’ and ‘charisma’, define actors thanks to the effectiveness of their ‘network’ of personal relations’, which provides them with information and aid, and galvanize people by the power of their ‘vision’ and their skills as ‘midwives’ of other people’s ‘talent’ and developers of potential.”331 The manager is in this sense one step removed from the outcome of the project, since s/he neither works on it directly, nor formulates the desired outcome in concrete terms. The manager remains as an eminence gris in the background however,

331. Ibid., 78-79.

332. Ibid., 78.
ready to step in and take credit for the organizational aspects of the project itself, while those working within the project achieve their satisfaction from having performed a task freely and independently in accordance with the protocol. The manager thus receives credit for the creative part: bringing things together, making things happen – which is essentially an exercise of control within the network, as it defines the parameters within which the project takes place – and the participant workers are credited with the more mechanic achievements within the parameters defined by the manager.

Since capitalism appears to value managers significantly higher than those within the confines of the project, i.e. those who produce the content, as is evidenced in salary discrepancies, status etc., one may logically assume that power lies with the manager, even if s/he executes it in the manner described above. The project is defined and delineated by the manager and subsequently filled with content by those on the “team.” Boltanski and Chiapello remind us that “The firm’s culture and values, its project, the leader’s vision, the ability of the firm’s head to ‘share his dream’ – these are so many stimulants that are supposed to encourage the convergence of forms of individual self-control since the controls voluntarily exercised by everyone over themselves are more likely to remain consistent with one another if their original source of inspiration is identical.”

The Architecture of Control

Architects are by no means immune to the Network-image, and the architect is becoming more and more steeped in management culture. Architects go from designing the built object to working through protocols. Every so often, it is proposed that the edges of architecture are changing, the edges are in motion and the horizon is expanding before us. I wish to discuss something of a Copernican reversal of that statement in terms of the Network image: What if the horizon is not moving, but we are in fact in motion, and, as a consequence, the horizon appears to be expanding? Is the center of architecture moving as architecture is assimilated into the Network-im-

333. Ibid., 80-81.

334. An example is the shift in architectural specifications, which formerly comprised specific instructions for making architectural components, but are now expressed in terms of their performance. This could be considered a managerial approach to architectural practice that does not set out to define the thing in itself, but an instrumentality of the component. See Katie Lloyd Thomas, “Building Materials: Conceptualising Materials via the Architectural Specification.” Middlesex University, 2010.

age, thus merely creating the illusion of territory expanding ahead of us?

Writing in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, in her Architecture: The Story of Practice Dana Cuff perceived a shift that had taken place in recent decades.\textsuperscript{336} Although she contends that the vast majority of architectural practices still are one-person offices, the proliferation of management culture (here used to refer more to the 1960s type of manager) is becoming apparent. There is a stratification within architectural practices, distinctions appear between managers and experts; this is a transformation from a more traditional architect role. In some ways, Cuff suggests, the transformation of the architectural practice may even mirror the transformation of corporate culture in order to ease communication. Cuff notes that “[w]hen the architect’s organizational web intersects with the likewise tangled client web, chaos threatens. Managerial skills then take precedence over design quality, coordination over intense individual efforts, moving things ahead over doing them well.”\textsuperscript{337}

Cuff’s account was presumably concurrent with a transformation, while the hierarchical structure of the traditional architect office was being replaced by a more corporate culture. Cuff contrasts the “practice oriented business” with the “business oriented practice,” and she begins to make out a new turn in practice, which lacks a specific theory at that point. She writes: “There is an abundance of writing, but not theory, on marketing, management, and legal issues, all of which has arisen out of law and business and not from architecture itself.”\textsuperscript{338} She goes on to argue for a stronger integration between the “drawing-board design” and “management and business issues” where the “enforced separation in thinking is detrimental to practice, where the results are that great designers cannot make ends meet and well-run offices cannot win design awards. At present, the proposition that good business practices can be integrated with excellent building design is greeted with a fair amount of skepticism.”\textsuperscript{339} This, I would argue, is an indication of a shift in architectural practice that emanates from the center


\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., 237.

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., 196.

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 255-57.
rather than the edges of the discipline, and since Cuff wrote *The Story of Practice*, it has become increasingly articulated.

This implies a shift in the self-image of the architect. The re-definition is necessary, as it makes the architect relevant, but a redefinition also comes with a shifted perspective, and, ultimately, a different perspective on architecture. Such redefinitions line the history of architects – one famed example is Ildéfons Cerdà, who began to portray himself as a scientist out to cure the ills of the industrial city. The urban planner – and the architect – redefined themselves as scientists, or experts able to provide solutions. While this is an oversimplification of a nuanced and multifaceted modernism, the center of the discipline arguably shifted somewhat here as well. The architect as expert is a common figure; Buckminster Fuller, C.A. Doxiadis, arguably also Le Corbusier, and many others of CIAM and later movements could conceivably be labeled experts.

I argue that with the Network-image, another such shift is underway. The architect is currently re-imagining herself as a project manager, a role that differs significantly from that of the expert. For example, in relation to protocols, the roles are almost the opposite; where managers formulate certain protocols, experts primarily adhere to given protocols, and their role as experts depends on standard codes of conduct; i.e., on following protocols. The shift from expert to manager is precisely what I mean when I discuss a shift of the center. Ultimately, it was through this shift that the projections and prognoses that dominated architectural discourse until recently were replaced by the formulation and experimentation of protocols. This transition was perhaps most visible along the edges of the architectural discourse, but in many ways, it is an adaptation to the context – to the world around it – that is being trumpeted loudly, but which has been present for a far longer time. It is also simultaneously a transition that involves the work, the thinking, and the organization of work among architects.

**Experts & managers**

There is a fundamental difference in how experts and managers relate to networks, and this difference can perhaps shed light on how the center of the architecture discipline
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has shifted. Buckminster Fuller’s geodesic dome and Paul Baran’s famous distributed network can assist in illustrating this. While the two networks resemble one another on paper, their likeness stops there. By juxtaposing the two different networks, various distinctions and differentiations between different kinds of networks or geometries become discernible. Fuller’s geodesic dome is first and foremost a structure. It is delineated in space, it can be described geometrically as a Euclidian object. In terms of its relation between the whole and its part, the geodesic dome has a famous logic: each node and lattice is equally important for the structural integrity of the dome as a whole. The structure as a whole depends on many, in themselves, weak points. The distributed system is the opposite. It can be (slightly dramatically) described as an un-form. It does not have a defined end, but extends in each direction into hypothetical infinity. It is in this sense not a structure; it is not a Euclidian geometry but graph theory or network topology, considered in terms of nodes and edges, but not bounded form. In the distributed system, each node and edge is equally un-important for the integrity of the whole; that is the entire point of the distributed network. One could somewhat simplified posit that the architect as expert works within the system that is Fuller’s dome – a form and therefore a closed system – whilst the architect as project manager works through enabling a constellation of edges or connections that are instrumental. As will be developed later, this is the theoretical construction of the project in a project management sense. If the expert concerns herself with form, the project manager privileges only connections. In this sense, the built object of architecture becomes secondary to what it does, and in some instances, it becomes superfluous.

For architects, working as project managers enables working with architecture in new and innovative ways by building connections and by enabling systems to emerge within the networks. However, it also means that architects and their works become inscribed in a logic of control, which may not be apparent within the Network-image. The first of these aspects is often discussed and celebrated, has become a popular image in recent years, reproduced and discussed in a variety of texts. Basically, the distributed system was part of the nuclear resilience plan, set out as a communication system in which all nodes were of equal importance. In contrast to centralized and decentralized systems, there was no single fixed point in the distributed system that could be attacked in order to incapacitate the system in its entirety. This became the model for the ARPANET, which was developed by the US Department of Defense during the 1960s and is the predecessor of the internet. See Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications,” (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1964), 4-6; and Galloway, Protocol, Chapter 1.

To me, this is one of the more interesting points in Constant Nieuwenhuys’ New Babylon, which grappled with undoing the determination of form in order to promote Homo Ludens’ freedom within the structure. In many ways, New Babylon is a clash between the determination of architecture and the un-form of the distributed system.
whereas the second has received far less attention. Another aspect of importance here is that architects are not autonomous. Even where we may consider ourselves project managers, those hiring us may well consider us experts. The architect is then performing two roles simultaneously in a highly paradoxical manner. She is at once in charge of one project as a project manager – which is also the role on which architectural theory predominantly, if not exclusively, focuses – and at the same time she also functions as an expert in another project – following another protocol and performing a part within this project. The duality of holding two defining roles within the same project is difficult to maneuver. It assigns the architect a certain agency within her own domain, but simultaneously puts this very same agency into another context. The architect’s agency is re-contextualized within this context, possibly being made to mean something very different and have other effects than those intended by the architect. While this duality is more readily present in projects where there is a client with a project of their own, wherein the architect’s project is nested, it can be traced in almost every architectural project.

According to Boltanski and Chiapello, experts are important personæ in a reticular society. They are bestowed with great status, their value lies in being able to perform specific tasks extraordinarily well; and, I might add, in the case of architecture this may mean following protocol – i.e., preparing instructions for the erection of an edifice. The status of experts remains lower than that of managers, since managers are, by definition, more flexible and more transversal in their connections. Although architects prefer to think of ourselves as project managers, distinct from the “expert” professions located “within” the frame of the architectural projects, such as engineers, for example, from another point of view architects and engineers are habitually lumped together as a single category of experts. In some senses, the position of a project manager offers a certain freedom from what I will describe as the protocol of architectural production, which concerns the professional role of the architect and the protocol for how architectural services...
are provided. At the same time, it inevitably means that the project is inscribed in a different power structure that is by no means transparent.

The architect as an expert is expected to follow a sequence of design stages. The architect is obliged to act as if a project will result in a building. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) publishes a manual of best practice for architects – “a systemic operational framework” – entitled *The Architect’s Job Book*, which begins with the chapter “pre-agreement” in which architects are instructed to clearly define their role with the client, to offer services that correspond to the client’s needs, and more. After this, follows a design process that results in a building according to steps A through K – this is the defining protocol to which the architect is bound.

On the other hand, in one manual from 1991 whose title designates it for project managers in the construction industry working with architects, the construction project involves 65 steps. “Hiring an architect” is step 23; i.e., a third of the way through the construction project. The manual defines the architect’s role in the project as follows: “The purpose of the architect is to transfer the concept of the project into the plans and specifications from which a builder can bid and build the project.” In the context of project management, this clearly describes an expert role rather than a managerial role.

It is rather telling in terms of the scope of the respective projects that *The Architect’s Job Book* begins with the appointment of the architect, whereas the project management guide outlines an entirely different project, framing the architect’s project as a segment. The architects’ protocol involves following the steps in the best practice manual, thereby a) bestow a project with a certain degree of competence b) through this competence, build both credibility and anticipation for a possible future development. Depending on the type of project, the eventual materialization of a planned edifice may be the client’s project, but it is not at all safe to assume that the client’s intention is to construct an edifice simply because this is what architects, according to their protocol,
do. The engaged architect is the architect as expert, and she has little choice but adhere to protocol and perform the task she is assigned – she is expected to present a solution, which usually takes the form of a proposed building.

The architect as project manager engages in a project where results are measurable within the scope of the project itself and in relation to its aims. As a project manager, the architect organizes resources and sets outlines of her project. Any such project in urban territories do however invariably have effects beyond the measurable output of the architect’s project, and this is where the architect often becomes instrumental in projects that are defined through entirely different parameters than those measured. As project managers and experts, architects are, inscribed in a variety of projects, some of which are visible from the point of view of the architect, while others may remain concealed.

**The case for the architect as manager**

It is perhaps significant that the shift I want to emphasize came into architectural practice from the outside, as Cuff notes above. Architectural theory instead had to try to catch up, which may explain to a certain extent how theory assumed the Network-image as a given: it was not invented, but instead became an adaptation to an external “reality,” seen through the lens of the Network-image.

In many ways, the debate in architectural theory that became known as the “critical vs. projective debate” was a watershed moment, significantly altering practice in architecture. The debate, which reorganized architectural practice to network logic, started around the millennial shift when the American architect Michael Speaks published a series of articles dedicated to “design intelligence” and the end of theory. The tone was bombastic from the start and Speaks declared the obsolescence of theory – defining theory as French poststructuralist philosophy translated into an Anglo-Saxon context, and claiming that theory was only useful when subordinated to practice and its contingencies. Speaks invokes

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349. Michael Speaks, “Intelligence after Theory,” *Perspecta* no. 38 (2006); “Design Intelligence and the New Economy,” *Architectural Record* 190, no. 1 (2002); “Theory, Practice and Pragmatism,” *A+U Architecture and Urbanism* 09, no. 372 (2001). It is, on a side-note, interesting to trace how the use of ‘intelligence’ has spread throughout many works of architectural theory since. How the starting point in the “real” that is indicative of a different realism than that of, for instance, Manfredo Tafuri. ‘Intelligence’ as it is habitually employed is not engaged in seeing what is veiled, but assumes instead that there is no ideology.
management theorist Peter Drucker in defining this new pragmatism as innovation.  

Speaks’ texts are sweeping and generalizing, but among the fundamental points he raises is the assertion that the nature of knowledge has changed, that knowledge is “No longer stored in national banks of metaphysical truths, today knowledge is manifest as intelligence used to manage these organizations in a world where remaining competitive is literally a matter of life and death.”  

He continues:

In Speaks’ view, the early 20th century vanguard (his term) was based on “philosophy,” — although he fails to clarify what he puts into this term and how it influenced architectural practice — and architecture functioned as a solution to externally formulated problems. Here it is perhaps easiest to exemplify with Le Corbusier’s attempts at optimizing quality of life — crudely put, with access to light + trees. The dominance of “philosophy” was then broken by “theory,” which set out to interrogate practice and formed “critical architecture,” which Speaks asserted was doomed to be a dead end from the start:

Stuck between a world of certainty whose demise they had been instrumental in bringing about, and an emergent world of uncertainty into which they were being thrown headlong, theoretical vanguards were incapacitated by their own resolute negativity. Tethered to a critique of Modernism and truth, they suffered its fate second hand and are today mere historical not contemporary concerns.”  

This eventually led to the emergence of a new form of practice that Speaks quite oxymoronically dubs “post-vanguard practice.” Speaks suggests that while vanguard practices are dependent on preconceptions (ideas and theories), post-vanguard practices are “more entrepreneurial in seeking opportunities for innovation that cannot be predicted by any idea, theory or concept. Intelligence is today the source
of all value added and consequently the source of all that is innovative.”

Design intelligence, in Speaks’ view, extends beyond the architects’ traditional domain (if this is considered the production of assemblage instructions for built structures) to encompass “branding, and marketing consulting to product and building design.” This light-footed knowledge-based approach can be compared with Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis of management theory in the 1990s in general. They write:

With the learning effects and transfer of information between different (and potentially) competing firms it induces, this enhances the general level of information and savoir faire. In very general terms, these analyses foreground the importance of information as a source of productivity and profit. [The integrated large firms] therefore present themselves as particularly well suited to an economic universe where the main source of value added is no longer the exploitation of geographically located resources (like mines, or especially fertile land), or the exploitation of a labour force at work, but the ability to take full advantage of the most diverse kinds of knowledge, to interpret and combine them, to make or circulate innovations, and, more generally, to ‘manipulate symbols’, as Reich puts it.

The central point in Speaks’ perspective appears to be the notion of the proposition that emanates from the “real.” If previous modes involved solutions (to given problems) and questions (of the nature of architectural processes), the proposition is that which formulates its own brief out of the locally given. In that sense, it is a form of self-organizing architectural practice, where the outcome invariably transcends results anticipated or indeed anticipatable in the brief. The point is that the future cannot be anticipated; that is, the projection of a future is neither possible nor desirable, but rather, a better tomorrow emerges from the process of forming itself.

Speaks furthermore discusses the contrast between “innovation” and “problem solving,” where innovation is the hallmark of intelligence based practices and problem solving a remnant from earlier times.

Manifestos are the expression of an avant-garde and are ultimately meant to bring forth “the new” ... But it is precisely the new and the linear, non-interactive means by which it is achieved that is today called into question by the most innovative practices of architecture. The new is the final product of a plan, a theory, manifesto, and practice under this avant-garde model is nothing more than
what management thinker Peter Drucker calls problem solving. Problem solving simply accepts the problem given, in this case by the avant-garde, and works on it until a solution is realized, a final design. Practice, then, simply follows directions and adds little or no value along the way. Innovation, Drucker tells us, works by a different, more entrepreneurial logic where, by rigorous analysis, opportunities are discovered that can be exploited and transformed into innovations. While problem-solving works within a given paradigm to create new solutions to known problems, innovation risks working with existent but unknown conditions in order to discover opportunities that could not have been predicted in advance.

Here, the architect as manager comes into sight. Assessing the resources at hand (what the “real” offers), the manager puts together a team to begin considering the implications of the proposition, including problem and solution. Similar strategies (or tactics, rather) echo in many forms throughout architectural discourse; one example is in Beatriz Colomina’s “Soft Manifesto,” where, in a discussion of the Japanese architectural duo sanaa’s work, “...the statements actually spell out the steps in the design process. It is almost like shoptalk that takes us through the process. This mode of statement itself might be a new kind of subtle manifesto, a soft manifesto, refusing to define the future yet organizing it into a set of determining points.” A kind of “projective practice” becomes discernible here which does not set out targets, and where the architect does not make projections (at least not with known outcomes), but rather experiments with the given in various ways to create the unexpected. This could be considered a protocological architecture: the architect does not primarily engage in the projection and production of an edifice, but in the design of protocols that enable projects to happen.

Project is a keyword here, marking a shift in architectural approach that will be discussed in a later chapter. For the time being, it will suffice to highlight the project as opposed to the building. One indication that there has been a shift is that “project” has come to be the ubiquitous word for defining architectural endeavor. Architecture has become project-based, a necessary step in integrating into management culture and the network; only the organizational technology of the project can organize work in a management culture. The project is by no means synonymous with the building. In fact, one of its most useful traits is that it is distinct from the building. The

357. This can be compared with a discussion on the distinction between the virtual and the possible in Deleuze’s thinking. See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 211-14.


360. A similar shift is emphasized in Dan Hill’s introduction to *Future Practice*, 11-12.
innovation and intelligence of which Speaks writes, the integration of management and design – all of this requires the organizational technology of the project in order to become operational.

If Speaks’ advocacy of management theory is in plain text, the article “Notes on the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism” by Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting is more implicit in its allusions to management and control.361 The article begins by taking stock of critical architecture, which in their view has come to be considered the dominant architectural paradigm. Somol and Whiting consider critical architecture an exhausted project since it essentially looks inward, into an imagined autonomy of the discipline, and backward.

As an alternative, Somol and Whiting offer what they outline as the opposite: projective architecture. In their view, projected architecture is directed both forward and outward, prioritizing “the possibility of emergence” over autonomy. Emergence “promises that serial accumulation may itself result in the production of new qualities,” which in turn are linked to “the diagrammatic, the atmospheric and cool performance.”362 The point is that the projective approach does not set out a single image as the desired outcome, but rather aims to enable the emergence of several images or several scenarios that are effectively invisible from the outset. In this sense, the projective architect enables self-organization. Somol and Whiting offer what they call a new form of disciplinarity based on the architect’s ability to design and think like a designer as the expertise offered by the architect in different situations. This new disciplinarity is focused on performance, and practice becomes instrumental.

This entails a new expertise of the architect; when architects engage with “topics that are seemingly outside of architecture’s historically defined scope – questions of economics or civic politics for example – they don’t engage those topics as experts on economics or civic politics, but rather as experts on design and how design may affect economics or politics. They engage these other fields as experts on design’s relationship to those other disciplines, rather than as critics.”363


362. Ibid., 74.

363. Ibid., 75.
This means that architecture is by no means medium-specific, but moves much closer to, for instance, management theory. Somol and Whiting set out such an agenda according to which architecture becomes a managerial practice that “respects or reorganizes multiple economies, ecologies, information systems and social groups.”

The architect’s project may be, as Somol and Whiting note, in the realm of economics or civic politics; the essential aspect is that architects engage with it as designers, working with the tools of atmosphere and anticipation. Thus, the outcome is not so much planned as it is a self-organizing process that originates and is defined and delineated by the situation to which it reacts. “With a projective practice the distancing of critical theory is replaced by a curatorial attitude.” While Speaks’ and Somol & Whiting’s texts arguably do not precede a seismic shift, but instead constitute a realignment of architecture’s self-image to what is commonly perceived “reality” of best practice in the Network-image on a level going far beyond architecture.

The network in critical practice

The arguments and pragmatism of the projective position have continued to be very influential in the debate between critical and the projective architects. However, there have been several attempts at reconciling the critical (of capitalism) with a projective, pragmatist approach to architectural practice. Here, I will refer to this admittedly very diverse category as critical practice. It can be defined as a notion of intelligence borrowed from Speaks and the light-footedness and rejection of old forms of projection. Here, the networks are built around specific participants rather than responding to traditional clients, and the architects operate with what could be described as a curatorial approach, which shares many similarities with the managerial approach. The curator – a title which has shifted enormously in meaning over the last two decades as art has also re-oriented itself to the Network-image – has a role of managing connections (between both different artists and different artworks), and serves as a coach.
and enabler who builds connections to make things possible, but generally does not produce content herself. Perhaps the most networked form can be identified in relational aesthetics, a term coined by the French curator Nicolas Bourriaud in the 1990s to discuss art that saw enabling the formation of relations between participants as its primary function. In a reference to Félix Guattari’s The Three Ecologies, a recurring theme in attempts to grapple with monster-utopianism is the utopian potential of the transversal connections, the possibility of generating relations that otherwise would not be generated, and therefore spark transformation. Utopia is here approached in terms of its transformative potential rather than its content.

Critical practice is defined in different ways. Here, I will look at the term through the lens of the 2011 book Spatial Agency, written by Nishat Awan, Tatjana Schneider, and Jeremy Till. Theirs is clearly a network-oriented practice: “Buildings and spaces are treated as part of a dynamic context of networks. The standard tools of aesthetics and making are insufficient to negotiate these networks on their own[.]”

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368. Félix Guattari, The Three Ecologies (Bloomsbury: Continuum, 2008).

Again, the focus is on the managerial and network-issues rather than the building. The authors state that they find the equation of “architecture=building” to be a factor that exacerbates the commodification of architecture. Here as well, the shift is a step away from the building-oriented to the process-oriented, instrumental, projective, practice. The focus shifts from what architecture is to what it does, and architectural practice shifts with it. There a subterranean case of arboraphobia permeating this practice as well. The authors write:

Traditional architectural practice may be associated with predetermined action, or of anticipating the world dogmatically, through its habit of playing out established themes. Against this a critical practice or rather, to use the accepted word, “praxis”, starts with an open-ended evaluation of the particular external conditions, out of which action arises with no predetermined outcome but with the intention to be transformative.\footnote{370. Ibid., 29.}

This can be compared with Speaks’ comments on innovation above,\footnote{371. “Innovation [...] works by a different, more entrepreneurial logic where, by rigorous analysis, opportunities are discovered that can be exploited and transformed into innovations. While problem-solving works within a given paradigm to create new solutions to known problems, innovation risks working with existent but unknown conditions in order to discover opportunities that could not have been predicted in advance.” Speaks, “Theory, Practice and Pragmatism,” 22.} and I would argue that the similarities go far beyond mere resemblance. While Speaks is explicitly market-oriented and speaks for the entrepreneurs, Awan, Schneider and Till orient their book, as the subtitle states, toward of “other ways of doing architecture.”\footnote{372. Summed up, their approach to criticality is barely distinguishable from Speaks’ above: “Critical is here not seen as a merely negative function but one which starts with a critical evaluation of existing conditions in order to make them better.” Awan, Schneider, and Till, \textit{Spatial Agency}, 29.} In this sense, both the practice and the counter-practice use the same frame of reference, the same starting-points, and even the same tools in remarkably similar ways. In both cases, the architect is an enabler of certain (or uncertain) events which are beyond an architect’s control. In Speaks’ argument, this is the “work” of the architect, and the architect should certainly receive credit for it. In Awan, Schneider, and Till’s argument, the event triggers processes beyond the architect’s control (this use of control will be problematized in a later chapter), which are therefore self-governing. The architect is thus simultaneously credited with the end result, but does not define it. In Spatial Agency, the authors define the role of the architect in terms of agency: “the agent is one who effects change through the empowerment of others, allowing them to engage in their spatial environments in ways previously unknown or unavailable to them, opening up new freedoms and potentials as a result of reconfigured social space.”\footnote{373. Ibid., 32.} Again, the agent
is in a function very similar to that of the manager and the curator.\textsuperscript{374} The notion of “agency” is key in the term \textit{Spatial Agency}. Awan, Schneider, and Till note that in a dualism between agency and structure

\begin{quote}
[1]he primacy of the freedom of the individual to act suggests a lack of engagement with both the limits and opportunities of wider spatial and societal structures, and sanctions the retreat into an autonomous world of form-making and crafting, undisturbed by external factors. On the other hand, the primacy of structure would lead us to believe that individual action in the spatial field is always at best constrained by, at worst completely determined by, the overarching societal structures.\textsuperscript{375}
\end{quote}

Referring to Anthony Giddens,\textsuperscript{376} the authors transform the dualism to a duality by suggesting that agency is not necessarily at the other end of the spectrum from system. Thereby, “buildings are not seen as determinants of society (the primacy of the individual) nor as determined by society (the primacy of structure) but rather as in society.”\textsuperscript{377} The agent, then, is one who negotiates this relationship, and “[a]gents act with intent but that intent is necessarily shaped and reshaped by the context within which the agent is working. An agent’s action is guided by an initial transformative intent, but because of the dynamics of the structural context, that intent has to be responsive and flexible.”\textsuperscript{378} Agency, in this sense, is the ability to act otherwise. Giddens notes that “[a]ction depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events.”\textsuperscript{379} Furthermore, the agents are reflective in their actions; they “maintain a continuing ‘theoretical understanding’ of the grounds of their activity.”\textsuperscript{380} My point here is that it is precisely the Network-image that becomes impossible to perceive from such a perspective. Anything outside the Network(-image) becomes invisible, and hence the Network-image becomes a given. This is the shift of the ‘center’ of the architectural practice, an integration into the Network-image.

The arboraphobia returns in other forms of practice. One notable example is the German artistic and architectural collective Raum\textsuperscript{la}bor, who define themselves in opposition to the rigidity of the municipal authorities. Their projects “set an ephemeral, soft, playful, flexible, mutant, eventful idea of

\textsuperscript{374}. Compare with how Boltanski and Chiapello describe the function of the manager: “[managers] must get all sorts of people to work over whom they have little formal power. Consequently, they are supposed to assert themselves by means of their ‘skills’ and ‘charisma’, define actors thanks to the effectiveness of their ‘network of personal relations’, which provides them with information and aid, and galvanize people by the power of their ‘vision’ and their skills as ‘midwives’ of other people’s ‘talent’ and developers of potential.” Boltanski and Chiapello, \textit{The New Spirit of Capitalism}, 78.


\textsuperscript{376}. Giddens, \textit{The Constitution of Society}.

\textsuperscript{377}. Awan, Schneider, and Till, \textit{Spatial Agency}, 31.

\textsuperscript{378}. Ibid.


\textsuperscript{380}. Ibid., 5. Again, there is an association to intelligence and intelligence agency, but presumably the other works imitated Giddens, rather than the other way around.
space against an existing social and spatial ueber-determi-
cation." Raumlabor appear here to disqualify any legal mandate of representative democracy, and without remorse: “Who decides how public space should be structured and built, using what materials and in what shapes? In whose interest is it that public space looks the way it looks? How can these systems be softened up or bypassed?” This disqualification of any tree structure, or tree structures in principle, is not without its own host of problems, including that it intimately mimics the neoliberal argument for dismantling state power. Here, again, it is a question of defining oneself in favor of networks by defining oneself in opposition of trees.

A similarly arboraphobic justification is presented in \textit{Spatial Agency}. The authors argue that architects must engage with the networks, lest they risk being “reduced to polishers of static form and technical manipulators of stuff in the name of efficiency and progress. These are activities that consolidate, and pander to, the demands of the capitalist production of space, with shining form just another bauble in the endless production of commodities, and efficiency part of a wider programme of spatial control in which lives are measured and ruled by the dictates of the market.” The Lefebvrian influence is palpable here, but there is a question central to this position: is the state still the formidable foe that it was around 1968? Is it really the tree that should be the via negativa definition of the network? For this is what capitalism has also become. The shiny glass towers, efficiency, and progress are all still part of capitalist production, but the networked practices are just as much part of a far more insidious capitalism, with elements both of management discourse and of control (through protocols). These aspects are invisible from a position that takes the network as a given, but they remain essential in order to understand what critical practice in architecture means.

There is something very specific in the nature of management culture’s “project” that defines it and what it is supposed to do in very narrow parameters; that is, the project creates its own network, and everything that falls outside of it – the unmeasured – becomes irrelevant to the project itself, and thus automatically invisible from within.
the Network-image. Concerning the representation of diagram, Franklin notes that “only black boxes (standing in for neurons, computers, workers, or what have you) and their interconnections (or inputs and outputs) can be included. Anything “inside” the box or outside of the categories of input or output is left to fall out of representation altogether, a fate that directly scales up to the dispossession of those forms of life.”

Franklin points to a shortcoming of what he refers to as “network epistemology”: “One targets or is targeted, or else there is no ‘one.’”

The convergence between practices that can be considered “post-critical”, inspired by Speaks and Somol & Whiting, and “critical practice,” and the surprisingly extensive common ground between the two could be considered indicative of the wide-ranging influence and the formative nature of the Network-image in architecture in a broad sense. Both of these perspectives establish the architect as manager, although the premises under which she manages differ, as does precisely what she manages. The convergence is in the relation to networks and their management, rather than in terms of relations to capitalism. This, it could be argued, can be traced back to that very phrase we’re tired of trees quoted at the start of this chapter. It is precisely the arboraphobia – a phobia that is no doubt particularly potent within architecture, considering our relation to doubts and denunciations of the utopian – and this arboraphobia is what I suggest has become spectral, it is the fear of the ghost of a tree that no longer is there.

**Hopeful Monsters**

If we return to utopia, which is no longer an image or a blueprint, then what is it? One answer to that question lies in the idea of the diagram itself. Unlike the image, the diagram is topological and has no given organization. It can be altered on a whim and at a moment’s notice. The diagram can arguably be used as the promise of visions to come rather than the vision itself, and it always comes with the promise of perpetual change through redrawing the diagram’s connections. If the image or blueprint represents the tree in its linearity and the

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386. Ibid., 167.
imposing potential of totalitarianism, the diagram represents openness and the rhizome.  

Utopia as an expression of desire is in the enabling of change, of making transformation possible. Thus rephrased, utopia instead becomes in extension a project of revolution or revolt – whatever one puts into that term. It is here that things begin to become problematic, not least since revolution has its own Enlightenment baggage. As a constructive project, pluralism and open-endedness are vital characteristics of any utopian discussion. This means that it is impossible to provide utopia with a content; the focus is rather on a form that provides the protocol for a process to unfold.

I argue that the most common utopian approach today is what I refer to as Hopeful Monster Utopias, and it is a chimeric logic of monstrosity. Hopeful Monsters adopt the logic of the Network-image and strive to combine its components in novel ways in order to affect change.

The term Hopeful Monsters is taken from biological theory, where it has a long – and it should be noted problematic – lineage. The term was coined in the 1930s by German-American biological theorist Richard Goldschmidt as a way to think about radical transformation in evolution; how nature “invents” new species. Goldschmidt designated hopeful monsters as the outcome of radical transformation in the genetic material, where an organism would macro-mutate; that is, from one generation to the next, its genetic material would radically change into an entirely new constellation. The organism born with this radically different DNA would be a Hopeful Monster that might hope to survive and thrive. Critics soon pointed out that such a radical rewriting of the DNA would kill the organism in the vast majority of cases, but Goldschmidt suggested that macro-mutations would occur along chutes that had evolved over a longer time, providing corridors within which genetic material could change without killing the organism.

Problematic from the start, the Hopeful Monsters theory was discredited over time and disappeared from the peer-reviewed pages entirely for large parts of the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1970s however, the term was reanimated by the American palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould, who, presumably
influenced by systems theory, suggested another reading of Goldschmidt’s original texts (with some calculated omissions of the more problematic parts). Gould proposed that the idea of macro-mutation could be modified, and that Goldschmidt had been correct in principle. Gould instead posited that the mutation itself was miniscule; that is, the change in the genetic material was not radical, however, the small changes could still cause large effects in the adult organism, giving rise to new species.  

It is but a short step to instrumentalizing the Hopeful Monster into a plan, or diagram, for producing utopian monsters. The monster-utopias’ aim is to challenge the presupposed and the ideologically naturalized. This takes place on different levels. One is on the level of subjectivation, by attempting to construct other encounters, other connections, other communities that are – to borrow a term from Félix Guattari – transversal. In the absence of a natural subject, the formation of subjectivity is susceptible to manipulation. Subjectivity is formed through repetition in experience that conditions the subject into accepting certain conditions as natural and given. Overcoming such conditioning of the subjectivity is itself not outside of these processes. This can be discussed at length in relation to the Network-image, which also serves to inform Guattari when he argues that the only way to challenge what he refers to as Integrated World Capitalism is by taking control of the means of production of subjectivation, and subverting them.

Thus, the basic premise of the Hopeful Monster Utopias is as follows: By re-appropriating the machinery for the production of subjectivity, other social constellations, other worlds, and other subjectivities than those prescribed by the dominant order become possible. This is a logic of re-combination, whereby the utopian act is to provide a “safe space” or heterotopian space where such encounters can take place. Utopia is in this sense not the unsettling of the categorical utopian concept that I argue for, but rather utopia’s internment (and taming). Within this “safe space” or territory, the utopian becomes a utopian potential. Through combining discrete heterogenous elements into – hypothetically – monstrous syntheses, this utopian potential is actualized. The utopian solution


or proposition does not happen here and now in this case, but at the same time it does: this is one of the paradoxes of the Hopeful Monster. Although the utopian potential is generated, the utopian-ness of the generative space is equally important.

The rallying cry of the alter-globalization movement of the early 2000s — “Another world is possible!” — begins to make sense here. The point is not in defining this, but in making it possible for it to emerge. This is the idea of a positive or emancipatory future beyond the idea of progress. In terms of the monstrous, these are attempts at producing chimeric monsters, positive forms, which in turn are acceptable according to common sense since they a) emanate from a participatory process (making them inherently emancipatory); and/or b) are at any rate territorial and local rather than universal. The Hopeful Monster is what it does, not what its content happens to be. The content is less important and less utopian than the Hopeful Monster itself. The act of combining, of forming networks is the utopian act; that which is in fact connected is but one example of a theoretically infinitely replicable process.

This potential for replication is what gives the Hopeful Monster its utopian potential for transformation. The revised Hopeful Monster theory suggested that very limited alterations to the DNA could affect the organism significantly, and thus make radical change possible. In the context of Hopeful Monster utopias, this means that local and situated change through establishing protocols can multiply and be repeated indefinitely. The term “scaling,” commonly associated with the Network-image, is perhaps what best describes this alleged potential of the Hopeful Monster. Scaling has come to denote a rapid increase in revenue that far outpaces increases in operating costs. In terms of the utopian, it refers to the possibility of multiplying utopian propositions, as they are protocological; their application does not necessarily require any investment. This makes their potential, in theory, without limit, and this is where they connect with the Hopeful Monster theory above. In this sense, the Hopeful Monsters offer a recipe for transformation rather than the content of this transformation, and this recipe is in the form of a protocol. The Hopeful Monster as outlined here and as practiced in
the examples discussed thus abides by the Network-image’s logic.

We find traces of Hopeful Monster utopias in Silicon Valley, in the Occupy movement, in the Arab Spring, in the disruption of the present order in the name of something yet to be determined. What is remarkable is how similar they all are, regardless of motive or agenda. They all are formed by and through the Network-image. There is a long tradition of self-organization (with its silent double self-control in the background) that served as the foundation for the counter-culture movement of the 1960s, evident in The Dome Cookbooks, The Whole Earth Catalog and so forth, and its influence continues in Silicon Valley. Utopia is practiced; the connections take place, otherwise nothing can hypothetically be generated. This sets Hopeful Monsters apart from for example, Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Jean-Baptiste André Godin, and others who, as Foucault might have put it, set out to produce “liberating machines,” images of a just society to be proven empirically. What distinguishes Hopeful Monsters from earlier utopian conceptualizations (image) and utopian desire without an expression (lacuna or visor) is that there is no image of a final state, only a transformative structure that is instrumental in itself, and therefore simultaneously means and end.

Considering utopia in this way requires a conflation of means and ends; they essentially become one and the same. As utopia becomes instrumental, it has become increasingly common to discuss utopias in terms of their “functions.” Function in this case is used almost interchangeably with McLuhan’s term “message,” but where the message has largely unexpected or unintended consequences; the function in utopian discussions is often intentional. This distinction is vital; the unpredictable relation between medium and message should always be kept in mind when discussing “function.”

The notion of utopian functions and utopian instrumentality is widespread in contemporary utopian discussion and theory. To take one example: Karin Bradley and Johan Hedrén reason similarly in their recent Green Utopianism. Their understanding of utopian functions is based on Bloch


(presumably) and they define these functions as: “1. Exploration of alternative socioenvironmental orders,” where utopianism provides concrete (though not in Bloch’s sense perhaps) examples of what abstract political theory holds up as alternatives; “2. Utopianism as reflexivity and critique,” where utopian projects constitute “regulative ideals” and mirrors society in order to form a critique of that society; “3. Stimulation of the will to change and the power of imagination,” where neoliberalism’s claim to be the only alternative is challenged, which the authors relate to Jameson’s call for a party of anti-anti-utopianism; and “4. Transgression of current orders and structures,” also linked to breaking free from the restrictive view that the world cannot be changed, where transgression becomes a utopian act.392 Another example: on the very first page of a recent publication on utopias in architecture, Re-searching Utopia, where the frame is constructed in the introduction to the book:

[U]topia provides the required momentum for an open and critical discourse on the present while also acting as a source of inspiration, as an engine and a catalyst for social and technical inventions. Utopias break through the boundaries of common thought patterns and actions. The imaginative nature of the utopia forms a key that can help us question habitual ways of thinking, conventions and behavioral patterns, to discover new connections and information and to understand them in the context of new models for the future.393

Architects, here, become enrolled in working with the definition of protocols, with a fundamental organization that permits connections to generate themselves. Or, from the perspective of multiple protocols: the architect becomes engaged in the projection of defining the protocols that in turn define, permit and restrict self-organization. Architecture, in this sense, becomes a generator of indeterminacy.

And yet here once again we come dangerously near the outlines of what Foucault would have defined as “machines of freedom,” which he considered a contradiction in terms. Foucault says in the interview “Space Knowledge and Power” that:

Men have dreamed of liberating machines. But there are no machines of freedom, by definition. This is not to say that the exercise of freedom is completely indifferent to spatial distribution, but it can

392. Ibid., 9-11.

only function when there is a certain convergence; in the case of di-
vergence or distortion, it immediately becomes the opposite of that
which had been intended.\footnote{394}{Foucault, “Space,
Knowledge and Power,” 356.}

Foucault is adamant that freedom as such can never be inherent
in the structure of things, that “[t]he guarantee of freedom is
freedom.”\footnote{395}{Ibid., 355.} This is one of the conundrums of architecture in
the Network-image. Architects may no longer make blueprints of
utopia, yet as architects shift to making generative mechanisms
for new ideas, they are to a great extent engaged in the definition
of machines for freedom through designing protocols.

The following chapters will discuss the two most dom-
inant attempts at generative architecture that build and enable
connections rather than material structures. These are the project
and the platform. These are not unrelated to each other, but both
play a role in re-considering utopianism in the age of the network
through various generative mechanisms. Both can be considered
devices for framing activity in one way or another, they provide
a structure within which content is generated. The hope lies
in generating the previously unimaginable, which will in turn
produce another set of connections, and so on. There are some
overlaps between the two; platforms and projects can be con-
tained within one-another without a problem, one may well frame the other.
Figure 13: A photo of Raumlabor Berlin. Photo by Raumlabor. “A good author of good utopias evidently has very little desire to be a utopian, in the same way that Machiavelli was no Machiavellian, or that Marx did not want to be a Marxist.” Reinhart Koselleck.
THE PROJECT AS PROJECT

If the Network-image serves as a lens through which we see and imagine the world and through which architecture is practiced, what then are its effects on architectural production, on utopian desires, on utopianism, and on utopian expressions? The most obvious effect is a privileging of building connections over the built edifice. Although architectural criticism often still focuses on the object rather than the project – it is, after all, much easier to depict the object – the object has arguably long since been secondary to its process of design, or the solutions it offers. As a result, the habitual view that architects are engaged to make projections that ideally should result in edifices is increasingly inaccurate.

The architect in the Network-image works with, through, and by projects. The project has become the predominant organizational tool of architectural production, and the architect no longer envisions herself as an expert providing solutions (to externally formulated problems), but as a project manager who builds connections and protocols that affect the world in direct ways. If the modern meaning of the word project could be summarized as a commitment to a non-contemporary time, it would seem that the contemporary meaning is acquired from project management without grand narratives of progress, Enlightenment, or dis-alienation. I will argue here that the Network-image’s utopianism can be and is habitually
expressed through the construction of the project through an instrumental utopian expression that is – while different from the projection – no less utopian. In terms of project management, the project is an undertaking defined by a set of protocols according to which is carried out. The focus is not on the telos, but on the instrumentality in the act of carrying out the project itself. In terms of temporality, the project is no longer a commitment to a future, but a promise to do something now, which will in turn affect the future.

The built edifice is not necessarily the outcome. It is instrumental to the project itself, with its aim of building connections and expanding networks; in this sense, the building could be categorized as a means rather than an end. The project, on the other hand, is consequently not means to an end, but instead conflates means and ends into the project itself. Projects are defined by protocols, and as one recalls, the architect is playing several roles within several projects simultaneously.

Grasping the extent of the shift requires interrogation of the projects themselves rather than the buildings. This means shifting through the detritus around what is commonly associated with architectural practice and that the research material that is generally considered superfluous from an architectural perspective after completion of the building, such as press releases, media attention, the production of anticipation for the building, the financial arrangements, how share prices fluctuate in response to the anticipated building, and so on. These parameters are all central in understanding the architect’s work in a project-oriented context; in a sense, we need to stop looking at the building entirely in order to comprehend the projects behind.

I should like to mention that I have written on this subject in other contexts in collaboration with my colleague Helen Runting, and many of these thoughts have been developed through that collaboration.396

The ubiquity of the project in creative industries, in research, in politics, and in technology is readily asserted. The project has become the standard mode of organizing and evaluating labor, resources, and virtually every undertaking. Art critic Boris Groys goes as far as describing the project

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as “the major preoccupation of contemporary man.” The focus of this text is certainly no exception: a quick survey of Sweden’s ten largest architectural offices reveals that they all categorize their undertakings as projects (regardless of whether these are built projects or not). In other words, a discussion on what the project is and what it does is highly pertinent.

What is a Project?

The Project Management Institute (PMI) was founded in 1969 and is currently based outside Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with subsidiaries on other continents. It is a non-profit organization that defines standards and ethics in terms of project management. The PMI publishes a survey of what project management entails (distinguishing good from bad project management, etc.) in the volume A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge. Here, a project is defined as: i.) a temporary endeavor, within predetermined temporal limits, ii.) with the explicit aim of producing a unique product or service as a result. Temporary in this case does not apply to the product/service/result, but to the undertaking to create it. Unique means different from day-to-day operations, which is what distinguishes the project from operations. In these prosaic lines, the project becomes associated not with grand narratives, but with very localized and situated endeavors to innovate new products or services (or new connections, I might add).

In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello propose that we are inhabiting a “reticular society,” dominated by what I refer to as the Network-image. They assert that there is a new logic at play, “the projective city,” within this reticular society. The network itself, they note, is pure flow without form. A network is always open and always able to re-route. Within networks, the project assumes a particularly important role as it becomes the primary organizational technology, an instrumental form in a formless world, a system. In a key passage, Boltanski and Chiapello outline the organizational qualities of the “projective city” and argue that previous concep-

398. At the time of writing: White, Sweco, Tengbom, Link, Wingårdhs, Arkitekterna Krook & Tjäder, FOJAB, Liljewall, AIX and Temagruppen.
400. Ibid., 4.
401. The authors examine the justification of different statuses between individuals; that is, which characteristics determine one’s status within any given modality of capitalism, or the agreed-upon logic by which one is judged. This draws heavily on the earlier study On Justification by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, in which the authors define different logic as different polities. In The New Spirit of Capitalism regimes or logics of justifications are referred to as “cities.” Each city is a logic of status. Thus, the insipirational city assigns status to the saint or the inspired artist; the domestic city attributes status according to seniority; the reputational city is organized around how one is perceived by others; the civic city in turn favors those who are representational; the commercial city values s/he who is able to sell commodities; the industrial city is based on efficiency. Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2005); Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
tions of how the city works are poor models for understanding the reticular society:

In a reticular world, social life is composed of a proliferation of encounters and temporary, but reactivatable connections with various groups, operated at potentially considerable social, professional, geographical and cultural distance. The project is the occasion and reason for the connection. It temporarily assembles a very disparate group of people, and presents itself as a highly activated section of network for a period of time that is relatively short, but allows for the construction of more enduring links that will be put on hold while remaining available. Projects make production and accumulation possible in a world which, were it to be purely connexionist, would simply contain flows, where nothing could be stabilized, accumulated or crystallized. Everything would be carried off in an endless stream of ephemeral associations which, given their capacity to put everything in communication, constantly distribute and dissolve whatever gels in them. The project is precisely a mass of active connections apt to create form— that is to say, bring objects and subjects into existence—by stabilizing certain connections and making them irreversible. It is thus a temporary pocket of accumulation which, creating value, provides a base for the requirement of extending the network by furthering connections.

Within the Network-image, every actor prioritizes connections. The connections of a person or a node define which projects they can engage in and what instrumental systems they can form. In this sense, to build connections is to build agency— the more connections, the greater the agency. Connections, in the project, are therefore both means and ends. The project then is a series of links formed to create something specific in accordance with a set of protocols. Like protocols, projects must be considered as nested; one project almost invariably exists within others, even if this does not appear to be the case if one’s perspective is within any given project. Depending on the situation, this may mean several things from the architect’s perspective. The client’s project may be opaque to the architect. Corporate structures themselves are nested in fantastically complex and deliberately obscure ways involving anonymous corporate holding constructions. As a result, the architect and her project become inscribed, or entangled, in a web of projects with often conflicting intentions, where a project sits within another project and so on in chains that appear local but may be part of a global strategy to achieve something else entirely.

This is the nature of the current modus of capitalism. The tree is still there, but it is remains out of focus; what you see is not what you get— and yet we surprisingly often miss

The lesson here is that the project can never be taken at face value, and its logic can never be considered singular. It is never about the building — the larger picture is always over the horizon. Does this sound paranoid and contradictory? It is admittedly both. Project management and its theory tend to focus on that which falls within one's project, that is, the subjects of one's control rather than the control beyond one's own realm. Accordingly, the project is not a neutral construction, but one with its own presuppositions: a temporal frame with a beginning and an end; the valorization of connections and participation; the reverence of the manager as a benevolent enabler; and an inability to see beyond the nested content and to see how the project itself is nested in other projects with other purposes and other effects. How one relates to the project as a construction becomes not unlike hearing concrete poetry read aloud; where the words sit on the page, how they relate to a whole and one another is as important as the content, and losing their

403. Consider the so-called Billionaire’s Row (Bishop’s Avenue) in Mayfair, London, where some of the city’s most exclusive property is rapidly falling into dereliction, becoming “ghost mansions.” The owner chain is too complex to comprehend who actually owns the real estate, and it would often appear that the responsible entity is not necessarily informed of this fact. The asset becomes abstracted into numbers, and its physical form crumbles.
situation means losing the visual aspects for understanding the poem. The project is where the network acquires form, and this form is essential to grasp. Read only as network, only as flow, the sense is lost.

The Production of Anticipation

The notion of affect, or of a pre-cognitive intra-personal influence that comes in below the conscious, has received considerable attention lately, to the extent of talking of an “affective turn” in theory. The precise meaning of the term has yet to solidify; as the geographer Nigel Thrift notes, it is used in many different ways. What these have in common is that affect is usually referred to as a mode of un-reflective thinking, sometimes with reference to Spinoza’s notion of bodies affecting other bodies. Affect works between subjectivities (or, alternatively, between subjectivities and environments) and affect the subjectivity (which, in turn, affects others in turn) on a level below feeling, or below that which is consciously registered. It can even be assumed that feelings are produced in part by affects, which are then expressed through emotions.

When architectural theorist Jeffrey Kipnis suggests that architecture could function like a soundtrack in a movie; that is, that an architecture oppositional to the capitalist structures that define it could subvert the meaning of the architecture produced, like a soundtrack that subtly but incontrovertibly alters the meaning of the scene it accompanies, he is referring to the notion of affect. It appears as though Kipnis offers us soundtrack dissonance as an alternative to Tafuri’s silence here, an outline of a projective architecture that produces unexpected sensations while seemingly adhering to protocol. This is one utopia operandi (a crude portmanteau emphasizing the instrumentality of the utopia) within the Network-image, and it will be discussed at length. Here, anticipation is a desire for something that is not-yet, and it is a highly useful affect that becomes a very valuable commodity in an economy with its sights forever set on the future. Anticipation-production is already at the center of the professional practice, and its use in oppositional ways is certainly imaginable, but such a proposition needs first and foremost to investigate precisely how affect


408. A common technique in cinema, used to great effects by among others Stanley Kubrick, memorably so in A Clockwork Orange.

and anticipation are already used within the global capitalist system. If one shifts focus from the affects of the constructed edifice to the anticipation produced by the architect through her own production, there are a host of perhaps less obvious, more surreptitious approaches, indicating a broader transformation of architectural practice.

These practices are less obvious in that their preferred outcome appears to be the construction of an edifice. It is this very appearance which I would argue is surreptitious, since they appear to adhere to what could be considered the traditional architectural protocol. One engages an architect to follow certain steps, e.g. A through K in a design process, which should produce a building, but the architect is instead, wittingly or unwittingly, pursuing another goal nested within a project structure. Here, it is pertinent to think of architecture in terms of an expanded project that involves many more actors and a variety of projects, meaning that the architectural project becomes inscribed in a different logic beyond the building itself. The expanded project can be contrasted with the production of buildings, from the architect’s perspective comprising the process from sketch to building “completion.” In the age of the expanded project, it is no longer safe to assume that architects or their clients plan or even desire a building in the first place – building anticipation may work just as well as building an edifice, and perhaps even better as anticipation is fast while construction is famously slow and expensive.

To discuss the production of anticipation, I have divided architectural production into two categories: a rhetorical component and building assemblage instructions. While reductive, the division regards two aspects of what an architect does that have a long history in the profession. Both categories refer directly to what architects produce rather than the material building itself, and both come before the building has gone on site. The rhetorical component comprises visualizations, descriptions, models, etc. Building assemblage instructions include the material necessary for a building to materialize: drawings, planning documents, financial calculations, specifications, etc., all of which signal that there is a rationale to the not-yet building, which is ostensibly in the process of

410. There are of course many other aspects of the professional architect’s work, such as construction management, arrangements with subcontractors, education, and so forth. For the intents and purposes of this study, I will focus on the output – what could be considered the ‘creative’ side of the architectural practice – that precedes the construction.
becoming materialized. Within the confines of the project, the building assemblage instructions sometimes become part of the rhetorical component, and even the obverse would be imaginable. The notion of production of anticipation becomes a force in its own right, with its own effects on the world. The architectural production thus has an agency, precisely as building assemblage instructions and the rhetorical component. This is easily forgotten if one continues to equate architecture with the production of the built environment.

As the Network-image has become more integrated in architectural production, the production of anticipation has displayed increasing signs of sophistication. Anticipation-production aims at making a wider group of people invest in the project – financially, or as fans devoting time and energy, reproducing and disseminating the project further. The production of anticipation’s agency is to build productive connections that perform a function within the overall project. Anticipation-production is in other words instrumental within the larger project, whatever that may be.

The connections produced add value to the project, and anticipation produces new opportunities, raises property values and thus constitutes capital in its own right. Network technologies have made it easier to disseminate and build social networks of fans, and they have furthermore taken anticipation-production to new media not commonly associated with the architect’s toolbox, which I argue must be considered in this context and in the frame of the project as something fundamentally different than the projection. Something that is particular to all the practices described here and the projects is that they become invisible in retrospect; when the building is finished, the ephemeral aspects of the project are considered superfluous and vanish. However, I would argue that they are highly important to comprehend the nature of the architectural project within the Network-image.

The project-oriented nature is habitually interpreted as a part of the rhetorical component rather than as something more broadly instrumental. Consider as an example the Danish architect Bjarke Ingels Group’s (BIG) 2015 crowdfunding cam-
campaign for the development of a smoke-ring-blowing smoke stack at a power plant in Amager, Copenhagen. The campaign called on the public to pledge the suspiciously low sum of USD 15,000 towards the prototyping and development of the smoke stack; “Help BIG turn fiction into fact by transforming the smoke stack, a symbol of the industrial era, into a communicator for the future.” I would argue that this is an example of a nested project, where the first project – the crowdfunding campaign – aims to secure funding to build the smoke stack, yet the rather low sum requested indicates that it is essential that the crowdfunding does not fail. And here is the next project, which is about anticipation building and the production of fans, generating positive publicity to further produce new fans and so on, and to getting the public to sympathize with the architect and the project at large.

This, of course, sits within the project of constructing a waste-to-energy plant in an urban area, and of celebrating the sustainability focus of the plant and the authorities. And, again for Ingels, it is part of a larger project of building one’s

own brand. In that sense, there is simply no straight line between donations and materialization.

The campaign itself drew as much publicity in architectural press as the proposed building itself, if not more.412 “Why wasn’t this money included in the project’s budget?” asked the writers at the architectural online magazine ArchDaily.413 This question misses the point of how crowdfunding works in building anticipation and creating fans. ArchDaily mistakenly focuses on the presumed linear process, presenting the architect as victim, and asking: “has visionary architecture really been reduced to a near charity-case?” Bjarke Ingels explains the need for crowdfunding thus: “Because the power plant is publicly owned, they can’t spend money on art, so we have to seed fund the generator ourselves.”414 This statement raises more questions than it answers, as ArchDaily also notes. Many other aspects of the construction could be scrapped with a similar logic, such as the ski slope on the building’s roof; the façades could be value-engineered, and there certainly exists some funding for public art in Denmark, even if the ring-blowing smoke stack were to be considered “art” as opposed to “architecture.”

Another logical – if speculative – explanation, would be that the Kickstarter campaign is part of the project of anticipation-production, generating invested fans who will ultimately have nothing more than a t-shirt415 and the status offered by being participants to show for their engagement.416 The publicity the campaign received additionally produced more fans, as well as a situation where Ingels appears to be a creative genius held back by bureaucracy’s failure to accommodate his virtuosity. Individuals who contributed ended up financially supporting not only Denmark’s most successful architect’s office, but also the client, the Amager Resource Center, which is a municipal organization.

Essentially, the project in its expanded sense ostensibly does one thing (raises funds) while doing something else through those same mechanisms (producing subjectivities and reception). Thus, a project will have a dual or expanded character. The other half of the project is managing reception and producing subjectivities, planting ideas and expectations.

412. What I here refer to as the architectural press is primarily constituted by the blogs and online magazines that have largely come to take over the ‘News’ section of the architectural paper journals.


416. Comments on the Kickstarter webpage include: “It’s [sic] a great honor to participate this project in this way as an archi student in Sydney.” “What a beautiful project when art is meaningful, consistent with the “genius architectura loci” and respectful of the here, the now, the there and the future!”
This half – what the funding campaign is meant to do – remains unspoken, but it is essentially the most prolific aspect of the project. The second, unspoken, aspect of the project is network oriented, and it would be almost impossible without the Network-image and the project organization. Crowdfunding is invariably organized around funding projects. It is an infrastructure for projects, but again, ignores the nested nature of projects, and it is a tool used in the practice of architecture as it is defined in the Network-image.

**The shimmering 8 house**

**EDINBURGH, 2013**. I am about to show a visualization of Bjarke Ingels’ 8 house on a projector at a conference. It is a famous image of a famous building, displayed prominently on the practice’s website, that conveys the unreal character of the 8 house, its immaterial sheen – standard fare for a rendered image. Right before entering the lecture hall, I go through the presentation with my colleague and her partner, and he asks if I am certain this is a rendering. Having worked in that field...
for years, I assure him that it is. He points out that there is no foliage on any plant, which would not be the case in a visualization. Astonished, I realize that he is absolutely correct; it is a photograph doctored to resemble a rendering. Following a linear process of how architects work, this makes no sense. Clearly, this is not intended to enhance the possibility of the building materializing; its logic is different. Instead, it could be suggested, the logic is another, where the project of the architect is focused on anticipation-production even after the fact of the building itself. This, in turn, suggests an expanded project of the architect, and a different function of the rhetorical component.

Visual material, an array of seductive, shimmering images of futures (possibly) to come, photomontages, renders, and visualizations all precede the fact of the building itself. This is the make-up of the rhetorical component in the vast majority of cases. This type of visual material goes back a long way in the history of the practice, at least in its Beaux-Arts tradition of schooling architects through competitions. Think of the photomontages of Mies van der Rohe, which arguably launched his career;\(^1\) the illustrations of New York by Hugh Ferriss;\(^2\) the image-oriented works of the 1970s Architettura Radicale;\(^3\) the list goes on. The affinity between the architect’s output and visual culture is intimate. It is often assumed that the rhetorical component is there to convince others of the oeuvre’s value—a jury or a client for instance—but it should be stressed that this is not necessarily the case, especially not with a view to the expanded project.

The image is no doubt the most conspicuous instrument in anticipation production, as the affective register invariably is very effective in images.\(^4\) Photomontages have become commonplace, considered a natural accompaniment to almost every architectural project; since their instrumentality is assumed given, they are often left unanalyzed, precisely as accompaniment or illustration rather than exponents of the expanded project itself.

There are many kinds of photomontages. A very basic distinction taken from the work of Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s *Remediation* is between immediacy and hypermedi-
Bolter and Grusin define immediacy as "[a] style of visual representation whose goal is to make the viewer forget the presence of the medium (canvas, photographic film, cinema and so on) and believe that he is in the presence of the objects of representation." In the case of architectural visualization, this would be the photorealistic photomontage that makes distinction between the existing and the building-to-come difficult or impossible. The other form is hypermediacy, which is "[a] style of visual representation whose goal is to remind the viewer of the medium." Here, this is a photomontage that emphasizes the not-yet of the photomontage; it defines the dream as dream, with implicit utopian connotations. Where immediacy emphasizes the proximity between the present and what could be, hypermediacy emphasizes the gap between the two.

Immediacy abounds in architectural practice, although it is going out of fashion. Architectural publication and awards previously focused on the just “completed” (as the grossly inaccurate architectural term goes). This is no longer so. Over the last decade, publication culture has been in transformation. Online digital platforms specialized in architecture – such as Dezeen, ArchDaily, A Daily Dose of Architecture, Designboom, or Architizer, etc. – prioritize speed; new news invariably attracts more visitors than old news. As a result, publications prioritize the image of the building over the building itself. The architect’s own press releases find their way into publications without editorial intervention with alarming frequency. Likewise, award ceremonies in architecture, such as the World Architecture Festival, now have established categories for projections (“Future Projects”) that mirror the categories for completed buildings. Print journals often follow suit, dedicating pages to the “upcoming” projects, which are showcased rather than discussed.

In this context, immediacy plays a central role: it bestows images with their own existence. The proposed becomes very nearly indistinguishable from the “completed.” The physical and the not-yet merge together in unpredictable ways – immediacy in photomontages becomes a shortcut to the future, or so it would seem. There is a temporal shift here whereby the not-yet collapses into the present time and creates a certain confusion.

422. Ibid., 272.
This confusion is productive; it changes the world in itself – the building appears imminent and can thereby change flows of capital; apartments can be sold off plan in what could be considered a backward capitalist idealism; the actual apartment becomes but a reflection of the reality of the image. The connections and the transactions are constructed around the image, and the building becomes a confirmation of the image at best; even more awkward is that the apartment may even be referred to in terms of its visualizations after completion. The image and its affective potential are essential in the production of anticipation. Along these lines, one could allude to the field of visual culture, the production of glamour and of envy. And what is being envied is not necessarily the material reality, but the image of that material reality; thereby once again, the image is as real as the material edifice, or, one might even argue, even more real in some senses in terms of aesthetics and of what is perceived.

I argue that the relation is in some ways different in architecture from, for instance, advertising, which also sells products as images in many instances. In architecture, the image sells something that is not modified reality, but something that “not-yet exists.” Furthermore, the architect, as designer of the “product” of architecture is engaged in the production of the image – the development of the image and the development of the proposed material edifice take place in tandem, and even if architects outsource the production of the image to an expert, the image continues to influence not only the consumer of architecture but also the architect herself.

The complexity of this relation becomes apparent when turning to hypermediacy. If immediacy in photomontages cultivates the impression that what is in the image is already real, hypermediacy makes the image’s content appear unreal. Taking Bjarke Ingels’ 8 house as an example, the effects of hypermediacy reveal an intricate interplay between image, architecture, and fans. I have previously written on this project in collaboration with my colleague Helen Runting, and much of the following is indebted to that collaboration.423

The 8 house exploded onto architectural media with its first appearance in a video presented by Bjarke Ingels on YouTube in 2009 and sustained its strong media presence after

it was completed in 2013, which is rather a rarity these days. Fans reproduce the 8 house and its signature image – a photograph taken precisely from the ‘x’ at the center of the ‘8’ – with insatiable fervor. Almost without exception, architects standing for the first time in this spot exclaim: “this is so much like a render!”

The 8 house has the quality of making the material appear unreal, and this unreal-ness is what provides it (and many other of Ingels’ built projects) with an exceptional allure. The ideal collapses into the real, and the two become impossibly joined at the hip at an incredible angle. The 8 house is a reverse immediacy in this sense. It is not an image purporting to be a materialized building, but a materialized building purporting to be an image.

Analyzing the 8 house’s representation on the photo-sharing website flickr in terms of its images “tagged” with either “8 house” or “8-tallet” reveals a strong preference for digitally manipulating the photos of the completed building to resemble visualizations, enhancing the “unreal” or “immaterial” qualities of the building through excessive saturation, filters, and high contrast. Another interesting aspect here is the camera’s location; roughly 12% were taken from the exact point – the x – where Lindhe’s image was taken. This shot is more than twice as prevalent as any other perspective, reproducing what appears to be the intended spot for appreciating the building.

The built architecture appears to be organized around the anticipation-production, rather than the other way around. The photogenic affective aspects, the shimmer, is reproduced by legions of fans across the world and shared and disseminated as images. The building remains unreal even as material fact. Architecture certainly does something here, but the instrumentality is not considered solely in terms of function, rentable space, and so forth, but more importantly, in affects produced and reproduced. The rhetorical component takes precedence over the built fact in a way that is distinctly influenced by the network, and the architectural project is radically expanded far beyond the building in and of itself. The project here is about building fans, expanding networks, and managing anticipation through a variety of media, including...
the building itself as a means to build networks rather than as an end.

This requires a re-interpretation of the mechanics of the rhetorical component. It is not a precursor to the building intended to convince the world of the advantages of the proposed building’s materialization – it is the other way around. This is one of the aspects of project-oriented architecture that is often overlooked, but which is vital for understanding how the project affects the practice of architecture. In the perspective of hypermediacy, the complicated idea of the project is taken further, collapsing the distinction between materialized and the image in new ways that only make sense if we imagine the project to be about something else than the materialization of the proposed building.

**Hyllie & the borders of the real**

Malmö, 2016: Standing on Hyllie Stationstorg on the outskirts of Malmö is a peculiar experience. From this square outside of the train station, one sees an intensely rural place with explicit urban ambitions. The conflicting impressions of density and emptiness appear to make little sense. There is a sensation that somebody attempted to construct a toy-version of lower Manhattan in the middle of a field here, which, incidentally, is not too far from the truth. Very little remain from the plans from the early 1990s; instead, Hyllie took a different turn, the area is planned in preparation for skyscrapers that have yet to arrive.

Considering the practice of architecture in the context of the project instead of the building also transforms how the building assemblage instructions work and what they do in terms of producing anticipation. I should emphasize once more that the building assemblage instructions are to be read through the project rather than as a precursor to a built edifice. Like the rhetorical component, building assemblage instructions affect the world directly as well as indirectly, serving to build networks, to establish projects, to connect networks all on their own – where, when, and if the project’s proposition materializes, this also becomes instrumental in the project rather than an objective. This reverses many accepted truths
concerning the architect and her work. The ambivalence between the architect as expert and as project manager becomes a productive ambivalence here; the architect is engaged in the production of anticipation as a part of a larger project, but appears to be engaged in following her professional protocol. The professional protocol grants a certain gravity and credibility to a prospective projection, which in turn produces anticipation for the future to come. Again, the anticipation is what is being capitalized on, sometimes in ways that make the potential construction indifferent from the project’s point of view. The architect, in short, produces the simulation of a building proposition.

The professional protocol of the architect bestows reality on a simulation – the proposition becomes “real,” as the authorities have few ways of determining whether a proposition is real or fake. And, as Jean Baudrillard stated in “Simulation and Simulacra,” the authorities are constitutionally bound to engage in what he refers to as the “strategy of the real,” assuming that the proposition is real, and consequently introduce it into the planning system as a real proposition.  

Otherwise the simulated nature of Law itself would be exposed. Such simulations are almost impossible to retroactively determine; more often than not, there is a speculative element in large construction projects. For the authorities, any large project will have to clear a few hurdles, adherence to comprehensive plan notwithstanding. The first is whether or not the developer has the resources to carry the project through, the second would be if the calculations made by the developer for the project’s economic feasibility are credible or not, and both are based on prior experience. 

This becomes more interesting when there are no precedents by which to judge any proposition, when a situation arises where the parameters habitually employed to distinguish the feasible from the unfeasible become useless. Without precedent, the limits of the possible immediately become porous, and suddenly (almost) anything could be deemed possible. Such a situation arose in the late 1990s on the outskirts of Malmö in an area that has come to be known as Hyllie. After decades of negotiations, a bridge over the
Öresund to connect Copenhagen in Denmark and Malmö in Sweden was finally underway here. In addition to this momentous construction and the transformation of the region that would accompany it, a tunnel was being planned that would effectively provide Malmö with a rail-connection to Europe. Malmö was a battered industrial city with a tattered brand, and it desperately needed to reinvent and transform itself. On the Swedish side, the bridge would land in what was at the time effectively windswept farmlands dotted with little villages outside the Malmö metropolitan area, which is incidentally also where the rail tunnel would surface. The prognoses for the effects on the local economy and what this new gateway to Sweden would mean upon completion fluctuated wildly, and since such a connection was unprecedented, the effects were unforeseeable. Various plans were launched during the 1990s, for the most part suggesting low-density residential developments.

Hyllie’s windswept fields have since become home to a series of skyscrapers that have notoriously failed to materialize. This series of non-materializations provides perhaps more
questions than answers, but in the following I will offer one possible reason why different actors keep proposing the construction of skyscrapers in a field.

The sequence began in 1997, when a Norwegian developer and hotel entrepreneur named Arthur Buckhardt much to local bewilderment presented plans for a 261-meter-tall hotel designed by the architect Gert Wingårdh, to be constructed at the future bridgehead – effectively in the middle of nowhere. The preconditions were that Buckhardt would be able to construct the hotel – Scandinavian Tower – to open in connection with the completion of the Öresund Bridge. By May of the following year, the projected height of the hotel had increased to 301 m, by July 317 m, and by September, 325 m. The last increment was allegedly in order to trump the new antenna on the Eiffel Tower in Paris. Local politicians were almost unanimously in favor of the project. The high-rise became a part of the planning for the area in 1999, and was included in the comprehensive plan the following year. It has still failed to materialize in any of its proposed shapes. The regional governing body was torn: experts were in opposition and politicians in favor. The project was delayed, and eventually a new criterion was set up: the tower would only be constructed if it could be completed in connection with the completion of the rail tunnel, then estimated to be in 2005. Ultimately, the rail tunnel was delayed, and Scandinavian Tower was scrapped in 2004, after generating well over 600 newspaper articles and engaging authorities on local, regional and national levels.

Shortly thereafter, another projected skyscraper came to occupy imagination and bureaucrats in Malmö: the Malmö Tower, proposed as a 180 m residential tower with rental flats by Annehem, a real estate developer and manager founded the year before. The high-rise was the subject of an international invited architectural competition including architectural offices as Coop Himmelb(l)au and Snøhetta. The winning proposal was designed by C.F. Møller and presented to media fanfare at the MIPIM in Cannes in 2006. The height of the projected building was soon increased to 216 m. The CEO of Annehem Peter Strand was quoted in the local newspaper, saying that the increase was motivated by


430. As a comparison: in 2003 another spectacular project was presented in the area, designed by Frank Gehry, but far smaller. This project generated a total of 14 articles.

431. Including Länsstyrelsen (the County Administrative Board), Riksantikvarieämbetet, (the Swedish National Heritage Board), and many others.
higher architectural quality and the necessity to build taller to accommodate more flats, as the tower is very slender, in order to make the economy sound. The increments in height of the proposed building maintained media attention and interest. The property developer Annehem was originally owned by a small group of financiers, including two local politicians. The company was introduced on the stock exchange in May 2007, an introduction that resulted in substantial profits for all of the original owners, who had procured shares at a much lower price than the introductory offer. Soon after the introduction, the company started expressing doubts regarding the economic feasibility of the project itself and Malmö Tower was scrapped within a week, with much less fanfare. The CEO motivated the cancellation by stating that they had learned that the costs increase more rapidly than the height when it comes to skyscrapers. For anybody even peripherally involved in the construction industry, this realization is basic knowledge. It certainly should have been to Annehem, where one of the original owners was a key figure in the construction of the Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava’s Turning Torso in Malmö’s Western Harbor, which had far exceeded budget during construction a few years previously.

A third incarnation of the high-rise, called Point Hyllie, was presented by Annehem in late 2007 – do note the dwindling height and ambition that can be traced through the name changes, from Scandinavian Tower, to Malmö Tower and eventually Point Hyllie. C.F. Møller also designed Point Hyllie, and the completion date was set to 2011. The project comprises four phases, the first two of which are lower office buildings of 5 and 7 floors respectively, completed in 2010 & 2012; a 65-meter-tall residential tower that was reconfigured to a hotel was completed in 2015; and the fourth phase, the high-rise of 95 m, originally conceived as ownership flats with a completion date of 2011, is now projected as offices with a completion date in 2017. This date was later removed from the Point Hyllie website. At the time of writing, a space the size of the hypothetical footprint of the building is cordoned off and the hoarding is decorated with bombastic advertisements for the coming skyscraper, but little
Figure 19: Malmö Tower, C.F. Møller. Image courtesy of C.F. Møller.
construction appears to be taking place. In October 2008, Annehem sold out most of its other real estate holdings and divided the takings among the owners, while finance for the Point Hyllie project remained uncertain. Soon after, Annehem was overtaken by Peab, another local real estate developer, and it continues to operate as a subsidiary to Peab.

None of these projections have been sold to the public or politicians through commonly accepted financial logic. Instead, the rhetoric has focused on emotional arguments, regional machismo or simply not made sense. To cite one example, a local politician, Carl-Axel Roslund, was quoted stating that only women questioned the viability of Scandinavian Tower. Ostensibly, we are dealing with a series of attempts at constructing a high-rise in what was an incontrovertibly rural setting, and as there was no logic to support the construction, these attempts inevitably failed.

Hypothetically – and I want to stress that this is a hypothetical argument – one could take a different view. What if we suspend judgment for a moment and suppose that these proposals were not failures based on their simple failure to materialize, but instead highly successful simulations of proposals for high-rises? Without challenging the sincerity of intentions of any of the above-mentioned proposals, one can speculate on the hypothesis that their failure to materialize is not a failure, but instead a basic part of the modus operandi of project-based architectural production. Whether or not the above examples were actually simulations is of no concern; it will have no effect on the end-result. In this spirit, if we consider these proposals not as straightforward architecture proposals but as simulations of proposals, an entirely different understanding of what has and has not been happening on the fields of Hyllie emerges. In order to elaborate on this, I will borrow a fragment of the theories of Jean Baudrillard from “Simulations and Simulacra.”

Simulations are imitations of real-world processes, in this case the proposal of a high-rise, the architect follows the established protocol.

A simulated proposal for a high-rise would be one where the proposing party has no intention of actually constructing the high-rise. According to Baudrillard, society and
law are inherently unable to deal with simulation; it would create a plethora of issues. Instead, Baudrillard claims, order will in most cases treat simulation as the real thing; this is what he refers to as the “Strategy of the Real.”438 Using the fake hold-up as an example, Baudrillard points out the impossibility of arguing in the face of the law that the hold-up was a simulation rather than a real hold-up. The consequences of the hold-up will be real as reality and simulation become intertwined and ultimately inseparable. In short, order; i.e. the dominant power, will use the strategy to “reinject realness and referentiality everywhere, in order to convince us of the reality of the social, of the gravity of the economy and the finalities of production.”439

In terms of the simulation of the proposal for a high-rise, this works the same way: no matter how simulated a proposal may be, how unreal or unrealistic it is, it acquires a certain level of real-ness as it is introduced into planning, which can neither comprehend nor afford to address simulations.440 The situation in Hyllie is exacerbated by the fact that nobody could predict the effects of the bridge’s completion on the local economy with any accuracy, which in turn produced an uncertainty that opened up the field for un-orthodoxy in terms of real estate economics. A project that would have been dismissed as ludicrous in other places became perceived as potentially possible, as the situation was not-yet-quantifiable due to the “known unknowns” as Donald Rumsfeld would have put it. The effects of the simulations themselves were equally unpredictable, as simulations acquire a sense of real-ness; there is no difference from the real thing, and they may still produce the conditions of their own materialization. Regardless of whether or not the simulated high-rise eventually materializes in this case, its acquired level of reality affects the real, material world around it. This is a peculiar and contradictory existence, where the real processes of planning in governmental agencies address the high-rise proposal as a real process and since their work is real, the high-rise proposal is in extension real. The contradiction of the high-rise as simultaneously real and unreal

438. Ibid., 180.
439. Ibid., 182.
440. Planning does however often try to weed out simulations, such as the proposal for a 585-meter-tall high-rise brought to the table between Scandinavian Tower and Malmö Tower by Carl Torsten Bernerstedt: financing for the project was deemed highly uncertain and the proposal politely refused.
Här öppnar
Quality Hotel View, Point Hyllie
-2015
www.pointhyllie.se
opens up “wiggle-room,” or a room to act. If understood as simulations, the projects exploit this room very well.

When one looks at the three proposals above as simulations rather than actual proposals, they make a lot more sense. They all produce effects in what we consider the “real” that are beneficial to their respective creators in terms of publicity and buzz, in terms of building credibility and earning a reputation for progressive action in advance of the introduction on the stock exchange, and in the last case, in terms of ultimately making itself viable. As Georg Simmel wrote in the beginning of the last century: “speculation itself may determine the fate of the object of speculation.”

To reiterate, I am not claiming this is the case in Hyllie; rather I am suggesting that it would not matter if it were. My aim is to establish a logic according to which it would make sense to propose high-rise after high-rise in what is effectively an empty field.

In these cases, the potential profits from a simulation are substantial. There are a series of arguments that would appear to make sense only from such a perspective. Consider for example the notably unorthodox statements given in media – specifically, the idea to make the building taller in order to make it financially viable – which does not make sense given the location, and something that rings false to anyone in the construction industry, especially when applied to a field rather than an urban situation. Another indicator here are the architectural documents and the extent to which they contain detailed information about precisely the amount of rentable space, which is invariably among the first questions to arise in any project of the sort where the intention is to build it. On examination, most of the data that would be included in a feasibility study for a more traditional project is absent from the architect’s drawings. However, the situation in Hyllie was extreme, and it remains a possibility that the information was scarce as the project managers realized that the project would have to take definite form once the situation was more intelligible.

What appears to be a process for constructing an edifice is instead a process for generating the effects that would have been generated had an edifice been planned. The method


442. This does not mean I consider capitalism rational, only that I believe it to act rationally according to its own logic.
is simulation, and the building assemblage instructions produced by the architects become integral to this simulation. The idea of simulation would perhaps be appealing, to the architect (if s/he is aware of the simulation), as it would generate publicity; to the municipality, which would appear growth-oriented and be able to attract other investors to the area; and, of course, to the developer or the developer’s owners, who would make a direct profit from the simulation (in the case of Annehem, these profits would have been connected with the Initial Public Offering and the subsequent sale of shares). This makes the question of whether any of these stakeholders see through the simulation largely irrelevant since according to the logic of the project, it is not in their respective interest to challenge it. The point here is that the project – within which the architect’s project is nested – follows a different logic, and that logic may well be playing an entirely different game than what is openly being stated.

**Utopia, Projection & project**

If utopia as a Project is a telos, or a projection of a future, a utopian project is an instrumental undertaking where means and ends overlap. In the context of the project, the utopian expression has to be understood differently. Deleuze and Guattari remind us that the distinction between “no-where” and “nowhere” is miniscule, a slight shift of the hyphen transforms the meaning entirely.\(^{443}\)

Utopia as a project is never about the realization of a blueprint of the future, but it can readily allude to and propose the protocological parameters of the design of that blueprint. Utopia is in other words not prescribed, but the parameters of the coming prescription may be defined. An example is the Utopian World Championship, a project managed by Jon Brunberg and Annika Drougge in the early 2000s. This was set up as an open competition for ideas, aiming to attract visions for the future; the best submissions were selected by an expert panel and the winning projects distributed to heads of state worldwide.\(^{444}\) Here, the project frames the content, and the content – the blueprint – only gains legitimacy through being framed by the project itself. The act of opening up the

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future, however, can be attributed to the project itself rather than the winning essay, and I would argue that it is through the project’s instrumentality that its utopian potential becomes visible. Similar competitions take place with regular intervals. At the time of writing, there is a call for “500 utopian ideas” connected with an exhibition on utopia at Somerset House in London:

We are crowdsourcing a practical guide to Utopia which will be published in early 2017. Please help us by completing the form below. We would love to include your idea and will let you know when the collection is complete. (…)

DESCRIBE AN IDEA THAT WOULD TAKE US TOWARDS YOUR UTOPIA

Max. 500 characters

Your answer

The utopian ambition is clearly in the competition or collection itself. This opens up the future and is simultaneously imagined to be instrumental in changing the world on its own. The Project of utopia is eclipsed by the project of utopia. Utopia is a curatorial project here rather than an artistic project. It is about building connections and framing, not about the content. Utopia has, simply put, become a managerial project. Utopia is to be generated through building networks, rather than imagined.

**Utopian projects in architecture**

Architecture maintains a complex relationship with utopia. As a discipline that was largely founded on the idea of the projection, utopia in this form – though derided – continues to have a certain allure for architects that Rem Koolhaas succinctly summarized. It is here that the project becomes relevant. If the projection is framed within a project, architecture could be liberated from the paradoxical utopian relationship.

The project is about effect and how it transforms the world; it is not about the specific outcome or outcomes depicted. When the projection is framed by the project as in the utopian competitions and collections mentioned above, utopia
becomes a tool with utopian potential, not a telos. The shift is subtle but paradigmatic; content becomes secondary to network building. In the assimilation of project management theory into architectural theory and practice (including into avant-garde practice) discussed in the previous chapter, utopia remains a sensitive subject. Architects working with distinctly utopian undertakings, such as for instance the highly utopian task of building new collectives, are for the most part loudly distancing themselves from any utopian connotations with their projects; take for instance Raumlabor’s giant “Bye Bye Utopia” in two-meter-tall letters. Architects pursuing utopian projects habitually gloss over any utopian reference as a turn to “reality” or engaging with the “real,” which serves as justification for the project. Utopia-as-project is not intended to have any telos beyond its own effect, but at the same time, it comes with its own set of (ideological) assumptions. The conception of the real, emancipation and opening up, is for instance usually filtered through the Network-image.

Utopia as project, in other words, functions exactly like any other project – it is a commitment to do something specific within a certain time frame and within certain constraints. The commitment lies in the promising to do something, which may include a product or similar, but the having done is central; not the product as a product, but the product as an outcome of process. There are a number of utopian architectural projects that follow the logic of the project. I will briefly discuss two projects with utopian overtones that in many ways follow the logic of the architectural projects discussed above, building on the effects of anticipation and putting them to different use. Neither project specifies its project outcome as the construction of the projection; the idea is instead for the projection to be instrumental in ushering forth another world, or at least inspiring larger dreams.

**The utopian rhetorical component**

Sausade is a Portuguese term denoting a longing for something that is impossible, perhaps for something that never even was in the first place – a hyper-real nostalgia. Such a haunting desire for something that never could be is affectively produced through
architecture’s rhetorical component in the case of the Berg, an architectural project by Berlin-based architect Jacob Tigges and Studio Mila in 2009. The content of the project appears simple enough; it envisions the construction of a 1000-meter-tall mountain on the land of the now defunct Tempelhof Airport in Berlin. It was originally submitted to a competition that was arranged to determine the future of the airport, and almost overnight it became famous, taking on a life of its own. The Berg itself is famously impossible to realize. The German newspaper Tagesspiegel calculated that constructing the mountain would require 47,000 trucks to deliver 20 tons of construction debris daily for a period of over five years to accumulate the enormous mass necessary. And then there’s the question of whether the notoriously unstable ground at the site could withstand such an enormous weight. Even if it could, the traffic of trucks would clog the Berlin traffic apparatus for years, emit untold amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and create endless problems for the city and the planet.

Tigges and Studio Mila envisioned the project not as a solution or an outcome, or even as a proposition, but as an instrumental critique; frustrated with the lack of visions expressed in the competition brief they devised a “placeholder” until an adequately visionary proposition came along. It differs in this sense from a purely critical utopia, which would be a negation of the competition itself, in that it serves a wider purpose of defining a space for the utopian to emerge. It is in this sense a frame for a utopian projection, as yet undefined. At the same time, the Berg is also instrumental in bringing these visions along through its mediation. It very consciously engaged in the production of anticipation, producing *sous* through very deliberate play on affective registers. In many ways, the Berg is attempting precisely the tactic of an architecture of soundtrack dissonance discussed at the beginning in this chapter in relation to “Is Resistance Futile?” by Jeffrey Kipnis. In this case, the mediation strategy – that is, the situation of the images – is what produces the dissonance.

Tigges and collaborators planted images of the Berg in different bars in Berlin.447 Hanging in a worn frame, the image appears as if it were a historical oil painting rather than a

long-listed proposition in a recent architectural competition. Encountering the image, for me at any rate, evokes a peculiar sensation of stumbling over something long lost, but it is of course something long lost which never was. This un-real sensation is the affect of dissonance, where the soundtrack and the film diverge.

The output of the Berg, the meticulous and strategic dissemination of the project, planted into everyday reality for effect, is very much a project-approach. The Berg is a project, not a solution, and it is as a project that it affects the onlooker. It is as a project that the content, the Berg itself, becomes immaterial except as an affective-producing device. The very image itself is a rallying call, not a proposition. Instead, it is intended to generate propositions.

Furthermore, the Berg was always about building connections, promoting something impossible and thereby forming a social movement that could build new networks. It was a project that would invite offers for the architect to appear in panel discussions and publications form central parts of the

Figure 22: Postcard produced as part of the Berg campaign.
project's website. At the center of the project, its driving force, is the production of anticipation through a variety of techniques, yet it is anticipation for something that cannot come to pass, and in this sense, it wants to be interpreted as an icon of utopianism – in this specific case, also of hope against hope. The question however is whether it leads anywhere beyond itself and the promotion of the architect.

**Utopian assemblage instructions**

Architects produce anticipation using a variety of means. The simulation described above in reference to Hyllie has also been employed in other projects with distinctly utopian connotations. Similar techniques are employed to propose open-ended buildings with still-unformed program and purpose. The project is the proposition. The instrumentality of the utopian project is to provoke imagination and imaginaries, to see that another world is possible after all. Artist Sophie Warren and architects Jonathan Mosley and Robin Wilson carried out a project entitled “Planning for Utopia,” later presented in the book *Beyond Utopia.*

“Planning for Utopia” had the ambition to introduce a proposal for a high-rise in Smithfield, London into the planning process. It explored the question: what would happen to a simulated building project if introduced into a planning process, applying the “strategy of the real” identified by Baudrillard?

The aim here was to “establish a critical dialogue with these institutions and find new sites of productive tension between the ‘real’ and the ‘fictional’.” The simulated proposal becomes what Robin Wilson refers to as a “‘critical tool with which to speculate and reveal the limits of our present ‘reality’ and its systems.” The proposed content of a building was kept deliberately non-descript, a vertical common, and the discussion on what this could actually be constituted the aim of the project. In similar ways to both the utopian competitions and collections discussed above and the Berg, the vertical common in “Planning for Utopia” is not content but protocol defining a territory that is itself conducive of utopian ideas. What is in focus here is the utopian potential, the act of opening up of the future.

The outcome of the project is presented in the screenplay, where the (fictional or real) interactions with the planning authorities are recounted. One specific episode involving "Or-

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448. Sophie Warren and Jonathan Mosley, “Planning for Utopia,” *Beyond Utopia*, vol. 5, Surface Tension Supplement (Berlin: Errant Bodies Press, 2012). It should be noted that “Planning for Utopia” is presented as a script for a play; whether or not the events in the play actually took place is immaterial for the purpose of this text.

449. Ibid., 14.

450. Ibid., 15.
organisation B” (played by Cabe) involves a challenge to the “real” nature of the project, where whether a project is real or a simulation appears dependent on whether or not there is a specified client for the project, and when there is no client, the project is deemed not real and consequently cannot be reviewed.

**Discussion & Analysis**

The dominance of the project as an organizational technology means that it has become naturalized to the point of invisibility. At the same time, the project presupposes the Network-image; the project primarily makes sense from a network perspective. The project is an organizational form that builds from Deleuze and Guattari’s “we are tired of trees.” It is how things happen “from below,” but the role of management, the elements of control and protocol are often overlooked in discussions of the project. In other words, we tend to focus on what is happening within the frame instead of focusing on the frame itself. Since the project builds on an arboraphobic logic, its justification...
emanates from the Network-image – it is non-hierarchical, inviting creativity and promoting emancipation as it leaves everybody and nobody in charge (within the frame of the project itself), which is an overly reductive approach.

Boltanski and Chiapello suggest that the project form itself is invariably geared towards “the same heroism,” of the project manager who ultimately builds links and enables the activities of the project’s participants. The project can, as they note, comprise any and every activity, from a Sunday Club to the opening of a factory. Boltanski and Chiapello maintain that the project is enlisted by those opposing the current form of capitalism “by proposing a grammar that transcends it, which they in turn will use to describe their own activity while remaining oblivious of the fact that capitalism, too, can slip into it.”

They do note that the project’s general character and contradictory purposes essentially lead toward the propulsion of capitalism “by proposing a grammar that transcends it, which they in turn will use to describe their own activity while remaining oblivious of the fact that capitalism, too, can slip into it.” They do note that the project’s general character and contradictory purposes essentially lead toward the propulsion of capitalism – and, I might add, the Network-image – regardless of intention. I would argue that the project does not have the capacity to challenge the plane of immanence of the network image, and that the project is essentially only capable of maintaining and reinforcing this image of thought.

Although corresponding broadly to Bloch’s utopian functions (cognitive, mythographic, anticipatory, and catalytic), the projects remain nested within the image of thought that they fail to see. In that sense, this is a case of McLuhan’s dictum that the content of any medium – in the cases of utopia-as-project above, the very obviously utopian-heroic content – blinds us to the nature of the medium itself, as well as to its effects. Not only the content is an expression of utopianism, but so are the project itself and how it is configured. We should therefore question and even challenge the project’s transformative potential.

As a utopian expression, the project remains very abstract, no matter how concrete the content of the project is; the content is not important. In this sense, the project does not necessarily lead anywhere but towards itself and new iterations of the same. The fundamental issue that besets the project is perhaps that very conflation of means and ends, where connections serve both purposes; connections
are both what you want and what you need to get them. There is a clear and present danger that the only “meaningful change” that can emerge from the project leads to another project. As a contrast, I would argue that the meaningful change available is the ability to challenge the Network-image’s hegemony. I acknowledge that this may have to be done from the inside, lest change be isolated and localized, but the first step to such change is acknowledging how the media that are employed relate to the plane of immanence, in this case the Network-image.

Projective architecture, management, curatorial practices and so on all share an inability to engage with the Network-image, which is instead accepted as a given. It could be argued that this logic has permeated how we think and act in a way that goes far deeper than any ideological differences, and that it forms an underlying logic that strangely enough remains outside of the field of negotiation when it comes to the more critically oriented practices.

Media theorist Alexander Galloway’s argues that any practice with aspirations of changing the world must address the network itself and the conditions under which it functions, rather than simply accept the network logic. At the same time, there is a risk in dismissing the project and the network tout court on the basis that it has become a tool of dominance. Mark Fisher reminds us that: “‘Flexibility’, ‘nomadism’ and ‘spontaneity’ are the very hallmarks of management in a post-Fordist, Control society. But the problem is that any opposition to flexibility and decentralization risks being self-defeating, since calls for inflexibility and centralization are, to say the least, not likely to be very galvanizing.”

Does the project, then, per se promote inequality and neoliberal capitalism? Boltanski and Chiapello appear to suggest that this is indeed the case, that the very construction of the project disqualifies its use for other purposes, as it is always-already compatible with capitalism. I would suggest that there might be some potential in the project as a way to engage in challenging the dominant order. This however is only in terms of a meta-discussion on the project and the Network-image. For the Network-image to transform, there

454. Here, I am paraphrasing Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. Ahmed discusses happiness in the same terms: happiness can be considered both what you want and what you need in order to get what you want. The project, which is not unrelated to the notion of happiness – which of course serves as a social lever to establish connections – works in a similar way. See Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 21.


must be a critical confrontation with the image of thought itself; it must become visible.

To the architect, the professional mantra is that we are tired of trees. We still fear those crimes in which we allegedly would be complicit, according to Koolhaas. Justifiably or not, modernism continues to haunt us. But replacing the Project with the project is not without issues. If the Project is culpable because it has transcendental ambitions, the project is equally culpable as a result of its immanent ambitions if it does not set out to challenge the Network-image itself. In order to confront this, there is an urgent need for a multifaceted discussion on what and where power is, and more importantly, what it does that is conspicuously absent from architectural theory.

This would mean an extensive and more critical discussion on the aspects of both management and control that are habitually included in most practices that define themselves in critical or oppositional terms. If practices with transformative ambitions do not acknowledge and rethink the problematic aspects of the network diagram with its inherent exclusion of everything not considered connected, there is a clear and present danger that the same network simply is used for other purposes that are contrary to the architect/initiator, whose project appears central primarily to herself.

Both the Berg and the vertical common refrain from projection and telos; that is, neither project sets out to materialize the proposed content. The act of situating the projects is central. The affinities of the utopian endeavors with the architectural projects analyzed earlier in this chapter are not coincidental. The specific desired outcome of the Utopia-as-project in both of the above examples is to challenge what those behind the project see as shortcomings and a lack of visions in present planning; and ultimately to open up the future for doing things differently. Utopia-as-project works through what Benjamin refers to as technique, aimed at overcoming “the sterile dichotomy of form and content”, and “[determining] the relationship between tendency and quality.”

The project conveys a utopianism where the outcome is a direction rather than an image, and the direction of utopian projects or projects with utopian undertones is invariably a

desire for the opening up of the future – freedom, in short. Of course, freedom itself comes with many nuances and requires further elaboration in each instance. Even if it is usually left an abstract concept, its meaning is an outcome of the project rather than a given. One distinguishing feature of the utopian project in the non-teleological meaning is its susceptibility to being nested within other projects. Its instrumentality and focus on that which falls within the frame of the project itself open up for the project to both become reproduced and co-opted by interests quite contrary to those made explicit within the project itself. Or, put differently, the project lends itself well to other Projects.

Ironically, the Berg turned out to be no more impervious to being adapted to the dominant ideology (in the same way that the work of Superstudio and Archizoom habitually are). Before long, similar projects began turning up in places that, like Berlin, were flat. One such capitalization on the concept of the impossible mountain – and more importantly, the publicity it generated – was the Dutch proposal for a EUR 400,000,000 mountain in the Netherlands, designed by Hoffers Krüger. Not only do the dreams of this mountain look remarkably similar to its Berlin counterpart, but the project’s media impact is almost identical. According to its creators, the project is in fact a serious proposal for a Dutch mountain that will accommodate winter sports.

Perhaps then, it is timely to remember Tafuri’s laments of the modern avant-gardes. In Tafuri’s analysis, the capitalist Metropolis, as analyzed by Cacciari, constituted a machine for capitalist advancement. The Metropolis in itself was flawed on a fundamental level in that its very constitution was and remained connected to industrial capitalism. The nervous life of Simmel and others served to produce docile subjectivities who complied and absorbed the shocks of the contradictions inherent to capitalism. The failure of the avant-gardes, in Tafuri’s view, was a failure to address the very condition of the Metropolis itself. The avant-gardes of modernism, excellently illustrated by Kurt Schwitters’ various “Merzbau[ten]”, which in their constant flux and casual chaos mirrored the Metropolis and reinforced its logic, rather than challenging it. Tafuri in-
stead reminds us that Merz only is the second half of the word Kom-merz, the German word for commerce. The metropolis could thus, according to Tafuri, be considered a capitalist machine, and in Tafuri’s view, the failure to confront the condition of the metropolis on behalf of the avant-garde was one of the main reasons that the avant-garde failed to transform capitalism. It would be easy to apply the same critique on the network-image in general and the project as described in this section in particular – perhaps too easy.

To see the project in the context of the Network-image is a beginning. It means that it can be discussed in terms of its own presuppositions, while simply affirming the project’s nature uncritically – assuming it dissolves power rather than diffuses it (without distributing it) – does little to that effect. As a utopian expression, the project is locked into reproducing itself and reproducing the Network-image. The project is itself constructed on the basis of control through protocol, and any attempt to transcend this requires a project geared against its own nature as a project – a difficult proposition that has yet to be seen.

THE PLATFORM’S UTOPIAN POTENTIAL

BERLIN 2008. Utopia Stock Exchange, or use, was a performance-experiment conducted in the theatre HAU – Hebbel am Ufer in Kreuzberg, Berlin. The experiment had been preceded by a call for utopias, which were subsequently incorporated into shares that the event’s spectator-participants traded during the course of the evening. The physical setting was a peculiar mixture of a theater – with red carpets, dimmed lighting, coat checks with brass railings, velvet curtains – and a stock exchange, with an open floor in the main theater room, from which all of the chairs that usually define the audience’s domain had been removed. As Sebastian Quack, one of the use initiators expresses it, the point is to replace “the utopia of the stock exchange with the stock exchange of utopia.”

On arrival, coats were checked and numbers for trading and the set of shares distributed. In the lobby, there was a live television show interviewing spectator-participants as they arrived, with the share values floating on a ticker at the bottom of the screen. In the main theatre, the sensation of a theater emptied of its seats ostensibly dissolved the hierarchy between stage and audience. Instead, the actors, festively dressed brokers placed themselves at strategic intervals across the floors.

On a large screen, the utopias submitted for trading were presented by their creators. It was a motley crew of utopias, most of them very mundane or playful – from the program that each pair of mittens would come with a third

mitten so that if one mitten was lost, they would still be usable, to a giant slide on Alexanderplatz, or the proposal for all to be happy for “no particular reason.” These utopias were “tested” by a duo of experts who evaluated their reality potential on stage during the event. As the evening took off, four trading periods replaced one another, with generated rises and falls in the share values to trigger trading, and eventually, when the bell rang, all trading stopped. At this point, the most valuable utopia received the share value to develop this utopia into reality.

The setting of the Utopian Stock Exchange was its most utopian aspect by far, illustrated by the chiasmus of turning the “utopia of the stock exchange” around to become the “stock exchange of utopias.” This is the utopian proposition, and the exact nature of the content poured into this vessel of utopian multitude is of less importance. The central aspect is precisely the utopian potential of the stock exchange of utopia: the platform is the utopian expression. As a construct the platform appears to offer a way out of the conundrum haunting the architectural discipline as articulated by Koolhaas. Since the platform is not a prescribed future form, it escapes the determinist connotations, and supposedly also the crimes associated with utopia. Instead, the platform constitutes a protocological architecture, instrumental in itself. This is another incarnation where the built object, the building, which at least previously figured at the center of the architectural discourse and historiography, is either primarily instrumental, or even redundant. The platform’s instrumentality lies in generating other connections than those that would otherwise emerge, and it is with protocological architecture that the architect becomes a manager. Rather than prescribe form, the architect prescribes protocol that distinguishes the platform from the not-platform, and within this frame, self-organization and bottom-up protocols can evolve. This is a way of negotiating utopia as something that is not prescribed by somebody specific, but as in the case above, tongue-in-cheek by the invisible hand of the market. The means become ends, or the ends become means; it is not entirely clear which is which, or even if it makes any difference. The platform is a lucid example of monster-utopianism.

460. See video of the event here: https://vimeo.com/11511157 (accessed September 22, 2016.)

461. Without reference to utopia, architecture lacks meaning; with it, architects become complicit in more or less serious crimes. Koolhaas, Content, 393.
and protocological architecture is where the architect recast as a project-manager comes into its own.

Architecture abounds with platforms and platform-like constellations. In the following, I will discuss a specific type of platform which is a form of social organization that generates or promises to generate the new in the form of unexpected network connections, which in turn promise transformation (scale-less, seamless, and molecular). Three specific contemporary platforms are analyzed: ecobox, betahaus, and Utopia Station. I will argue that these three platforms all constitute examples of similar protocological architecture. All three are working through several nested protocols, but they all actively blur the hierarchical organization of the protocols themselves in order to claim an emancipatory or at least disruptive influence on the status quo through their self-organization. In this sense, they all work through the notion of control as control functions in the Network-image. ecobox, a project initiated by the Paris-based collective aaa (atelier d’architecture autogérée) in 2001 could be described as a self-evolving community garden. Betahaus is a start-up community in software development located in Berlin, initiated in 2009 by a group that now is incorporated. Utopia Station is a platform curated by Molly Nesbitt, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, and Rikrit Tiravanija, instigated in 2003 at the Venice Biennale, but has existed in other incarnations previously and since.

There are many logical overlaps between the three platforms and few, if any, contradictions, which is highly interesting in and of itself. All platforms will be discussed in terms of how they function in different relations, the platform as situated in a context, the platform as protocol or protocols, the governance of the platform, and each platform’s heterotopian character. The empirical material of this text is primarily how the “architects,” in a broader meaning, describe their own platforms, complemented by what others have written about the platforms. In that sense, it focuses more on the discourse around platforms than on the platforms themselves.

Another aspect that is certainly is a common denominator for the platforms included in this study is the notion of mobility and replicability. ecobox has existed in a number
of incarnations across Paris in different parts of the neighborhood; betahaus has established satellite platforms in Sofia, Hamburg, and Barcelona, and Utopia Station has travelled to various locations and events over the years, including the World Social Forum in Brazilian Porto Alegre in 2005 and Moderna Muséet in Malmö, Sweden in 2014. Clearly, other platforms could have been selected, and no doubt one could identify platforms in architectural practice that either function differently or in some ways diverge from the characteristics that are outlined here as constitutive. However, I would argue that many of them could readily be considered working with the same basic Network-form in one way or another.

What is a Platform?

The platform presently performs a curious role. It is ubiquitous, and yet barely theorized. There is a shift from understanding the platform in terms of a plinth to understanding it in terms of an operating system or a generative machine. The shift is from spatial to protocological, but since it is by no means complete, there is a productive superimposition permitting the platform to be both in architectural practice. The principal characteristic of the platform is in terms of territory. It is bounded by a distinction between platform and not-platform; thus, as it has a border, it has a form. It works through being of a different order than that which surrounds it, and it is in that very basic sense heterotopian. Put differently, platforms are heterotopias with “utopian potential.” The platform is defined and governed by protocols, in the plural.

These protocols are rules that determine conditions of interaction, growth and organization. Particular to the platform however is that parts of the protocol adapt to changes proposed from within, or to what cybernetics would call feedback loops, which adapt some protocols to user requests. As defined in this study, the platform is characterized in the following terms: i.) it is clearly delineated from the not-platform – it is a form with an inside and an outside; ii.) it is heterotopian, of a different order than the not-platform; iii.) this different order is defined through and governed by protocols; iv.) it is furthermore a generative machine that produces connections that were oth-
erwise not possible; v.) it is at the same time dynamic, adapting to its users’ needs. In addition to this, one should mention another, implicit, characteristic: that the platform is vi.) a flat form, and that it is explicitly not a tree in any way.

Etymologically, a platform was a platte-forme — a flat form. It came to refer to a “plan of action” or “design” as well as a plinth.\textsuperscript{463} In the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century the platform started to take on another meaning, and the word was also used to designate a political program or protocol for governance. The architectural theorist Benjamin Bratton suggests that all three of these connotations of the platform remain: “One is a set of instructions, one is a situated place where action is played out according to plan, and one is a framework for a political architecture. Already these connotations are slipping and sliding into one another.”\textsuperscript{464} Platforms exist in a variety of contexts, from digital, manufacturing, political, and organizational platforms to architectural and utopian platforms. Bratton suggests that one reason for this is may be that platforms are, by definition, hybrid in nature and thus straddle disciplines making them difficult to study within any one discipline.

The platform is first and foremost instrumental, as Bratton puts it: “Platforms are what platforms do. They pull things together into temporary higher order aggregations and, in principle, add value both to what is brought into the platform and to the platform itself. They can be a physical technical apparatus or an alphanumeric system; they can be software or hardware, or various combinations.”\textsuperscript{465} In the context of this chapter, the platform is first and foremost a machine that generates connections. Its purpose is to generate connections between subjectivities that i.) would not emerge spontaneously outside the platform, or at least whose emergence would be improbable – it works through being different and ii.) connections that are neither planned, nor entirely spontaneous. These are, according to Boltanski and Chapello, among the more valuable connections that an individual can possess in a reticular society.\textsuperscript{466}

The platform is distinguished through a protocological territory. This territory is organized around protocols, such as common standards or language, particularly when it comes to manufacturing and computer platforms. However, in spatial


\textsuperscript{464} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{465} Ibid., 41.

\textsuperscript{466} Boltanski and Chapello, \textit{The New Spirit of Capitalism}. 
form, a platform must be demarcated by a border in order to make it discrete. The platform is in this sense closed (it has a form) and itself constitutes a system rather than a network, if one makes the fundamental distinction that networks are open and systems are closed. It is “other” from that which surrounds it. This “otherness” is most certainly heterotopian. The British geographer Kevin Hetherington, following Michel Foucault, succinctly summarizes the concept thus: “spaces in which a new way of ordering emerges that stands in contrast to the taken-for-granted mundane idea of social order that exists within society.” This permits the platform to build connections that are unthinkable outside.

Protocological architecture

The platforms that are the subject of this text are invariably protocological. Through the design of protocols, the architect can work as a manager, a coach, and a catalyst instead of an expert or designer of objects. Platforms are defined and controlled through protocols, two of which are particularly interesting in relation to the platforms discussed here. These are a framing protocol and a framed protocol. The inter-relation between these should be obvious; the framed protocol is nested inside the framing protocol. The framing protocol distinguishes platform from not-platform and defines the form and territory of the platform. The framing protocol defines a framework within which the framed protocol can function. It serves, in short, to organize content. This applies to a variety of platforms, including industrial standards, operating systems, and the platforms of the architect. This protocol, I argue, is subject to design; it is where the figure of the architect finds her role in the platform. The framing protocol is often overlooked in favor of the contained protocol, the framed protocol with its dynamic and bottom-up character. At the same time, the architect is credited with the platform’s performance, just as the manager is credited when the team she coached performs well. It is on the level of the framing protocol that one finds the notion of control, of managing connections rather than results.

The framed protocol is adaptive to feedback; it is open and transparent, and it is the very reason why protocological architecture can be considered a specific utopian expression.
This protocol is the content; it is, for instance, represented by the submitted utopias in the example of the stock exchange of utopias that opened this chapter. The second protocol provides a tool for feedback loops to define the content of the framework of the platform (but not the framework itself). This protocol responds to the feedback of the participants who collectively define the protocol and are constantly in the process of redefining it, producing a seemingly democratic and dynamic structure.

The platform here becomes process, a becoming, and ostensibly, it is open for constant redefinitions. This is why platforms often are referred to in terms of verbs rather than nouns or “verbed” nouns (see below, “the gardening” in the case of ECOBox for example), stressing their dynamism rather than their being. The emphasis is invariably on the collectivity that developed the framed protocol; this is usually referred to as the community of the platform. The platform is considered to be evolving, and its eventual output is unknowable; it could open up any number of futures and connections. This community furthermore involves the figure of the architect as well; here, the relation between framing and framed protocol becomes obscured. Arboraphobia defines the platform here in terms of it being democratic and flat (in terms of hierarchy), yet this part of the platform is an application within the framework of the framing protocol. Bratton writes: “A platform’s actual processes may be very different from how they are understood by their Users, who may form mental images of those processes based on their own individual interactions or on how the platform has represented itself to them. Platforms don’t look like how they work and don’t work like how they look.” I argue that the framed protocol is what users (and journalists) see, whereas the framing protocol remains obscured. This begins to explain how the platform can simultaneously be considered self-organized and reward the architect figure with status for the creation of the platform.

The second layer is democratic and transparent, while the first layer is not. At the same time, as will be discussed below, there is invariably a tendency that is, in the best-case scenario, a (failed) attempt to integrate the two protocols, or
alternatively, a willful obfuscation of the existence of multiple
protocols. In either case, a complication obstructs the under-
standing of precisely what conditions govern the platform and
where power resides. This is analogous to control society in
general – the protocols that govern society to various degrees
become opaque. Power is clearly manifest in a centralized or
decentralized network; in the Network-image, which is a dis-
tributed system, the exercise of power becomes less identifi-
able, control is subtle and, rather than a tower, its form is, as
Deleuze would have it, the (non-) form of a gas.469

The platforms analyzed in this chapter adapt their con-
tent to the situation. After all, the framed protocol is shaped
locally and democratically, while the framing protocol remains
the same. The platform is in that sense mobile, able to move
from place to place as “platform-concepts,” but as the platform
adapts, it absorbs and adapts to the local; hence the claim that
the platform is situated. This is however not entirely unprob-
lematic, as will be developed below. Particularly with utopian
connotations, the platform is situated in more ways than one,
and it is a machine that is considered universal (yet local).

The possibility for socially lateral connections emerges
through the ostensibly arboraphobic undoing of hierarchies
and conventions (protocols) and the replacement of these by
the flat form of the platform. Platforms bring people together
who would otherwise not have been brought together, and in
this sense, platforms are attributed with a “utopian potential.”
Platforms create something that could be considered outside
of the hegemonic strata of life. Absolutely essential to the defi-
nition of the platform is that it is unpredictable; its purpose
cannot be predetermined. In this sense, the platform promises
change, the precise nature of which is open and to be deter-
mined by its users.

The platform is in this sense the antithesis of the tree;
it undoes separations introduced by a tree-structured society.
Bratton notes that

platforms are not master plans, and in many respects, they are the
inverse. Like master plans, they are geared toward the coordination
of system Interfaces into particular optimized forms, but unlike
them, they do not attempt to fix cause and effect so tightly. Plat-
forms are generative mechanisms — engines that set the terms of

469. To be accurate, in
“Postscript on the Societies
of Control,” Deleuze referred
to the corporation as a gas,
but control is exercised by
corporations and institutions
whose setup mimics the
corporation.
participation according to fixed protocols (e.g., technical, discursive, formal protocols). They gain size and strength by mediating unplanned and perhaps even unplanable interactions.  

As with any simple juxtaposition between trees and the supposedly rhizomatic, caution is again advised here. Networked capitalism is not necessarily a tree (or at least it does not look like a tree), but operates by identical logic, and an identical ambition to create “other” connections; see for instance the example of betahaus below. I will thus argue that, like the project, the orientation against the tree is problematic when considering any utopian generative potential in the platform as machine, since the adversary works by modulation rather than homogenization in a society of control.

 Territory, Heterotopia & Utopia

Unlike space, as the infinitely malleable element of architecture, the territory is bounded, it is produced through acts of territorialization that always relate to an outside.  

The logic of the platform is to introduce indeterminacy into a system that is otherwise considered determinate. It holds the utopian potential of generating new connections that are otherwise unimaginable. However, the platform is a form; unlike the traditional focus of architectural theory, it is a territory rather than a space or place.  

It is recognizably different from its context in that it is of another order; it is therefore demarcated by a relatively sharp border, as opposed to territories demarcated through intensities. In this sense, the platform is invariably also heterotopian in a broad understanding of the concept. What is interesting in the heterotopian is not principally its otherness, but also how it relates to the outside, how the heterotopia and that which surround it affect one another. The concept of heterotopia is nebulous; it involves many definitions, and is usually juxtaposed with u-topia. Such a contrast is incompatible with the notion of utopia to which this text adheres (as an expression of utopian desire, heterotopia most certainly can be utopian). Only a very narrow definition of both heterotopia and utopia would, I argue, render the terms mutually exclusive. A simple example would be the utopian socialists of the 1800s.
(followers of Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, Saint Simon, and others), whose utopian models were enacted. With such a definition, these could not be considered utopian, as they evidently existed somewhere. Yet, there is a utopian projection in all of these utopian incarnations that is the hypothesis of those societal models. The underlying utopian desire in their undertakings is likewise difficult to understand. Following the concept of heterotopia, it is notable that Michel Foucault, who is the thinker most commonly associated with the concept, provides no clear distinction; he remains ambiguous in definitions.

In his famous (among architects) lecture “Of Other Spaces,” from 1967, Foucault contrasted utopia – “arrangements which have no real space”\(^{473}\) – with heterotopias:

> real and effective spaces which are outlined in the very institution of society, but which constitute a sort of counter-arrangement, of effectively realized utopia, in which all the real arrangements, all the other real arrangements that can be found within society, are at one and the same time represented, challenged and overturned: a sort of place that lies outside all places and yet is actually localizable. In contrast to the utopias, these places which are absolutely other with respect to the arrangements that they reflect and of why they speak might be described as heterotopias.\(^{474}\)

This is only one of the instances where Foucault writes about heterotopia. Sven-Olov Wallenstein produced a very useful overview and analysis of Foucault’s use of the term in Architecture, Critique, Ideology.\(^{475}\) Wallenstein points out that Foucault’s distinction between utopia and heterotopia is often oversimplified, for example that it is commonly assumed that Foucault rejected utopia in favor of heterotopia, which may be a rather reductive assumption. But just as Wallenstein points out, the relation between the two in Foucault’s texts is anything but simple, and sometimes interwoven to the point of confusion. “Of Other Spaces” was preceded by a two-part radio broadcast from December 1966, as Wallenstein notes. These two broadcasts were entitled “Les Hétéropies” and “Le Corps utopique,” and the main title of the broadcast was “Utopie et Littérature.” Here, while heterotopia is largely similar to the definition in “Of Other Spaces,” utopia is described in terms of a desire for “an-

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474. Ibid.

475. Wallenstein, Architecture, Critique, Ideology, Chapter 6: Imagining Otherwise.
other and glorious body, or of a soul that would be able to wholly escape the body."

The first documented usage of heterotopia by Foucault however is found in the introduction to The Order of Things from 1966, where heterotopia is contrasted with utopia using the following distinction:

Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to ‘hold together’. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.

Here, as Wallenstein notes, utopia is a mythical projection that offers (false) hope – heterotopia is what Wallenstein articulates as “a radical experience of ungrounding,” a disruptive experience that undoes coherence, monstrous in its effect. It is impossible to precisely define the distinction between utopia and heterotopia through Foucault. What can however be concluded is that heterotopia is not necessarily defined as the opposite of utopia – the two are not mutually exclusive, as Wallenstein also notes. The notion of monster utopias complicates this even more, the monstrous heterotopia of The Order of Things becomes utopian through its effect of destroying the very categories that define order. Such an overlap would require combining the heterotopia of The Order of Things with the utopian desire touched upon briefly in his radio programs. In contrast to this study, Foucault associates utopia with immortality rather than survival, and the relation arguably becomes even more confusing with a utopia predicated on survival rather than immortality. The border between utopia and heterotopia blurs significantly.

476. Ibid., 309-312.
479. Ibid., 317-323.
when utopia is no longer primarily representation and ends, but becomes a means as well.

With the architecture of platforms, when the overlapping heterotopia and utopia is a territory rather than a displaced organ, we must return to “Of Other Spaces” for further elaboration. Here, Foucault sets out a classification of these other spaces, with reference to Borges’ “Chinese encyclopedia.” Foucault suggests that heterotopias predominantly exist in a society with two separate functions: heterotopias of crisis and of deviance. The latter kind involves the institutions that deal with those who deviate from the norms to which society requires individuals to adhere, whereas the former are places of change, of transformation of the subject: boarding schools, military service and honeymoons are all examples Foucault uses.

In this sense, the individual enters into this ritual of passage and emerges as another person on the other side. The platform is similar in one sense: it plays a role in a transformation of the subjectivities that form connections inside the platform, connections that are then brought out of the platform into the world outside – platforms, like heterotopias, are instrumental, transforming something or somebody for the world outside. Where the heterotopia of crisis changes subjectivities, the platform changes relations between subjectivities.

Foucault suggests that heterotopias function in two different ways: either they expose everyday life as illusory or, alternatively, they function as compensation for the perceived shortcomings of the world, a more perfect space. To Foucault, utopia enacted as an expression of utopian impulse would then be considered heterotopian – potentially including the Utopian Socialists and their utopian practices. It is however important to remember Foucault’s two definitions of heterotopias. These are not necessarily compatible, and although Foucault, according to Wallenstein, never elaborates on the distinction or relationship between the two, it is nonetheless essential. That which destroys syntax is certainly different from a compensatory model of another world, but

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480. Ibid., 312-13. Borges wrote of the classification of animals: “animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the waterpitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies” Jorge Luis Borges quoted in Foucault, *The Order of Things*.


482. Ibid., 356.
they may function the same way. They will both be discussed in relation to the platform later in this chapter.

I argue that the platform, by now, constitutes a utopian model in the Network-image in itself. Such a presupposition requires a more nuanced understanding than the utopia of perfection. The platform itself constitutes an expression of utopianism, expressed through the belief that the platform can generate new content and new connections that are otherwise not possible or predictable. The platform and the utopian hope it entails are process-oriented, in that the platform itself is not the telos, but simultaneously means and end. As it is outlined here, the platform posits the possibility of an outside and the unknown “otherness” that can be generated by this outside as the utopia.

Platforms: Cybernetic & Brechtian

The platform is a continuous source of fascination for architects – simultaneously a means of control and of freedom, depending on one’s perspective. I discussed earlier Koolhaas’ fascination with the relation between order and chaos and its architectural implications, and how he has sought to define his relationship to it rather than integrate it into designs. While Koolhaas has maintained this relationship on a programmatic level, the platform does the same on a protocological level, on a level where the self-organization takes place within the framework of the element of control, the framing protocol.

Architects maintain a complicated ambivalence with regards to the platform. On the one hand, the platform as plinth signals the edge of the architectural composition, demarcating, if we follow Italian architectural theorist Pier Vittorio Aureli, the border between architecture and urbanism, which is a highly material distinction. On the other hand, the platform is simultaneously, as architect Alejandro Zaera-Polo suggests, an “operating system.” Paradoxically, the platform is both of these things at once to architects. The abstract logic of the platform is translated into a situated physical milieu.

Platforms have to be analyzed from both of these starting points: the plinth and the operating system. It is essential not to neglect the abstract, cybernetic sense and the elements of

483. See Alejandro Zaera-Polo’s interview with Koolhaas in Levene and Marquez Cecilia, El Croquis, 53 & 79.

484. In Aureli’s view, the platform’s very demarcation against the surrounding urban homogeneity becomes a stoppage for capitalism, a bulwark of form in a world of flows. Aureli, The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 41-42.

control that are central to the platform as protocological architecture. The platform, as considered in this thesis, only works by simultaneously being a plinth and an operating system.

**Fun Palace**

One of the most influential protocol-based platforms in architecture is the mythical, never constructed Fun Palace. Fun Palace combined the different visions of what a platform is, simultaneously constituting protocological and material design, and how one retrospectively reads Fun Palace depends on the type of design on which one focuses. Fun Palace was a project for a “people’s theater” conceptualized by theater director Joan Littlewood in the early 1960s. The architect Cedric Price soon came to be associated with the project and allegedly put himself in charge of its design. A third collaborator whose influence is sometimes overlooked was Gordon Pask, head of the British Cybernetics Foundation.

Architecture historian Mark Wigley refers to the Fun Palace as a “network incubator,” proposing that we read the Fun Palace as a machine able to “generate and sustain the maximum number and variety of social networks.” The Fun Palace was, in short, a platform that continuously shifted shape, never static but instead always adapting to the program going on inside. The Fun Palace shares most of the characteristics of the platform: adaptive, heterotopian, and generative in the sense that it produced new subjects through a democratized and creative education that would be part of what Littlewood refers to as a “war on dullness.”

In many ways, the Fun Palace was deeply influenced by cybernetic ideals of self-organization and self-regulation without any defined telos. The collaboration of cyberneticist Gordon Pask testifies to this; he commented that he felt that the project was “more about ‘seeking out the unfamiliar, and ultimately transcending it’ than conventional ‘fun,’” which defines the platform’s role as an adaptive machine for generating the new, which – cybernetically seen – will involve new connections.

Fun Palace illustrates the conflicting ideas of the platform as plinth and protocological construct, both as resistant to the hegemony of capitalism and as instrumental in it. Wigley

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487. Ibid.
489. Ibid., 73.
490. Ibid., 74.
describes the physical structure of the Fun Palace: “The logic of the project is again that the people occupying the space determine what is happening and thereby redetermine the architecture. The space is continually reshaped by the changing desires of the inhabitants; with up to 55,000 at any one time, there is a continual flux as events and the interconnections between them evolve.”

The Fun Palace does not have the boundaries habitually associated with buildings; it has neither walls, nor roof. It stands on a plinth, which houses all the technical systems and above the scaffolding there is a huge crane that moves back and forward as needed, shifting the components of the Palace as necessary. There is, in other words, both the plinth, designating the territory and its boundaries, and the scaffolding that serves as a very physical manifestation of the protocol of the structure as a whole. The freedom to reshape and change within is subject to these limitations, put in place through the architecture. Yet these protocological aspects are invariably downplayed. There are, for instance, very few representations of the exterior of Fun Palace, and of those that exist, still fewer refer to the


492. Ibid.
ground outside. In the interior representations, the structure that determines what can take place within is equally obscured; the structure is lightly sketched while the moveable parts – the content subject to the framed protocol – are emphasized. Wigley notes in relation to the structure:

> It is all very thin—so light that there is almost nothing there. In the first image published of Fun Palace in 1964, showing a typical slice of the building, you can see that the actual structure has almost disappeared. What is drawn more heavily is the activity spaces, yet even these spaces are trying not to be rooms but zones of a certain atmospheric intensity.

The two protocols – the framing protocol and the framed protocol – are already at work here. Stanley Mathews writes:

> The Fun Palace programme would therefore not be the conventional diagram of architectural spaces, but much closer to what we might understand as the computer program: an array of algorithmic functions and logical gateways that control temporal processes in a virtual device. The three-dimensional structure of the Fun Palace was the operative space-time matrix of a virtual architecture.

The scaffolding and the plinth constituted the framing protocol, defining what is possible within. Already in the early 1960s we can observe a tendency to obscure the framing protocol in favor of the self-organized content subject to the framed protocols. This makes Fun Palace a far more sinister project than originally intended; Mathews contends that Pask’s involvement in the project would “gradually shift the focus of the Fun Palace from Brechtian theatre towards cybernetics, interaction and social control.”

Price however did not consider himself a social engineer, and according to Mathews, he rather sought to establish an “autonomous cybernetic system” where the architect could withdraw and the system would develop independently of any established power. The diverging interests of Pask and Price illustrate a conflict at the heart of the platform in the Network-image. In the Fun Palace, Pask considered the device a medium of control and Littlewood saw it as a revolutionary platform, whilst Price regarded it as a zone of freedom from the forces of society – not an uncommon position among architects. The platform is, in all its versatility, all of those things at once. I argue that all three connotations remain, and this complicated nature results from reading the platform through different protocols and ignoring the others. The platform, I
argue, can thus not be considered oppositional in nature. Furthermore, any platform needs to be considered from each and every one of these angles, rather than reduced to performing one of the functions. The platform is a machine that appears to be doing several things at once, and in fashions that appear—and quite possibly are—contradictory.

The platform is constructed by the two ostensibly contradictory, but in reality complementary, protocols: the framing protocol, which is, broadly speaking, determined by the architect; and the framed protocol, which is determined and altered by participants. The promise that attracted Price, and that is attractive to all architects with the platform construction, is the opportunity not to be a figure of authority; to work with architecture that has meaning without being complicit in determination—in short, utopian architecture. The architect has always been an authoritative figure, as Deleuze and Guattari note in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the architect is introduced by the dominant power to exert control over nomadic craftsmen, and serves as an organ of the church or state (or following Tafuri, we might add: capital). The problem here is that the idea of control is precisely what becomes central, and the cybernetic legacy of the platform comes into focus. Control can be defined in terms of management through protocols that provide opportunity for self-organization within given parameters.

### Platforms

The double nature of the physical platform, where it is simultaneously a territory and protocol has since been developed. Upon detailed examination, one can trace this problematic tension between the elements of material design and of control—not as something exerted over somebody, but as the fundamental element of a protocological architecture.

### ECObox

As the logic of the platform materializes, the platform is subjected to the issues of the plinth-platform: situation, management, and form are key issues here. In Paris’ La Chapelle neighborhood, the architect and artist collective *aaa (atelier d’architecture*
autogérée – the “studio of self-managed architecture”) started to develop a platform they called eco box in 2001, which moved between different locations until 2006. This platform is exemplary for this study. It is a community-oriented platform with utopian and emancipatory ambitions, a garden-concept that connects local inhabitants through the shared construction of the community garden. The project has been widely appraised for its participatory design, which has since evolved and been repeated in various incarnations in the area. Many aspects of this platform merit closer examination. In this text, I have relied on written accounts of the eco box, primarily provided by the aaa themselves.

The platform-aspect of the garden is elaborated by the Paris-based Romanian architect Doina Petrescu in the somewhat problematically entitled text “Losing Control, Keeping Desire.” Petrescu writes:

This garden, called ECObox, has been progressively extended into a platform for urban creativity curated by the aaa members, residents and external collaborators, catalysing activities at the level of the whole neighbourhood. The garden became as such the metonymy of the whole aaa project, functioning as social and cultural space, both

Figure 28: ECObox Paris. Photo by aaa.
utopian and real, nomadic and multiple, through a continual process of fabrication and self-redefinition according to its users’ desires. [...] ECObox is a tool for making the city habitable without domestication and control through official policies or private bodies, but by desiring, claiming, making its memory and its inhabitants’ imaginations more intimate.”

In other words, the platform is a generative machine to enable improbable connections. Its status as simultaneously utopian and real testifies to the conflation of means and ends in terms of the utopia, which is by now potential, rather than telos. To paraphrase Petrescu, the potential is one of generating transversal connections, where the platform catalyzes “the self-regulation of a living society,” the subjects become free through a subjectivation process, the participants become (more) autonomous. In extension, according to the logic of platforms, the platform is instrumental in opening up the future. The platform focuses on a continuous evolution, catalyzing a community over time. The platform is thus considered dynamic, and Petrescu describes how “Children in La Chapelle call the ecobox ‘the gardening’ to mark a difference with other gardens in the area. ‘The gardening’ was perceived as an unfinished garden, a garden-in-progress defined by its very process of fabrication and becoming: a garden-process rather than a garden-object.”

The ecobox is also legitimized in terms of arboraphobia, contrasting direct democracy with representational (and implicitly false) democracy. The existing consultation processes in urban development are declared inadequate and rigid: “Rigid discussion spaces produce rigid conclusions, and liberated speech can liberate space as well.” The opposite, that is, the platform with its community-focus and open forum, is lauded as real as opposed to shambolic. The reader is led to understand that there is “real participation” and the other kind. The platform is here distinguished from the tree; the tree only seeks to confirm pre-established views through the shambolic participation process, whereas the platform offers a community that can negotiate with the state rather than simply be pushed around. The problematic aspects of appropriation and community are not mentioned.

In its physical organization, the garden consists of a network of pallets that form a grid-like structure. Things can be grown in the grid’s holes, forming an archipelago-like structure.

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500. Ibid., 55

501. Ibid., 46.

502. Ibid., 50

503. Community is invariably defined through exclusion, through the distinction from the not-community. As Derrida notes, there is a machinery of exclusion in every identity-formation. See for instance Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 78. Spatial appropriation and community are in this sense always excluding on one level or another. This has been discussed in relation to territorology by Kärrholm, Arkitekturens Territorialitet, 260-61. See also Maarten A. Hajer, Arnold Reijndorp, and Andrew May, In Search of New Public Domain: Analysis and Strategy (Rotterdam: NAI Publishers, 2001), 120-21.
The surface of the garden is a platform containing a multiplicity of holes, a 'hollowed surface' like a new habitable ground. It is the floor of a green living-room constructed on the additive principle of horizontal growth. The individual lots are shaped together with the collective surface, so, in order to construct an individual lot, one has to construct a bit of common ground. It is a physical manifestation of the democratic functioning of the ECObox.

In this sense, the physical framework determines the internal organization of the garden itself; it distinguishes between two categories of territory: community territory and individual territory. The individual is obliged to partake in producing the community territory through the act of delineating the individual lot. This relation between individual and community is different to what is habitual in Paris. This relationship and the demarcation of the community space must therefore be marked in distinction to the context. In short, a border must delineate the otherness of the platform from its context. This is done in an act of separation from the world outside by a holey wall: “Holes have been made in the outside wall as well, to open the hidden space of the garden to the curiosity of passers-by. Boring pipe-holes in the wall was both a DIY action and a community event, celebrating the visibility of the garden to the public eye.”

Eco-box is certainly heterotopian, if the word is used in a broad sense of being of another order (and what space is not?), with utopian potential stemming from the transversal connections generated. Consequently, the other order defined within the platform has the potential to transform relations outside the platform as well. And as the platform responds to feedback, it is dynamic, performing the opening up as well as bringing it about; the platform, in other words, is means and ends in one. At the same time, the extent of this garden is never fixed as such, but adapts to its users: “The garden continues to function while being extended. It changes size and form continually: it is not an established garden but one always becoming, an open-ended process. No social en-

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504. Petrescu, "Losing Control, Keeping Desire", 51.

505. Ibid. On the whole, the holes appear important; they are what connects the platform both to the city (visually) and the ground beneath.

506. Petrescu uses “transversal” in relation to Félix Guattari’s notion of the transversal in The Three Ecologies.
The text “Losing Control, Keeping Desire” touches frequently on desire, on self-organization, and on the auto-generating character of the ecobox community. The architect appears to be a coach, a mediator, or a curator. Petrescu notes that: 

I would argue that the curator is a euphemism for a manager, as the role they perform is comparable. Perhaps the most common argument for dissimilarity between the two roles is that while the manager manages actively, the curator only provides the framework, i.e. the setting within which things develop independently. However, considered in the light of Boltanski and Chiapello’s notion of the manager as enabler through establishing certain connections with a certain instrumentality, the roles become if not indistinguishable, then highly similar beyond mere passing resemblance. The role of the manager is precisely to provide a framework within which things can take place according to the protocol set in place. It is precisely here that we find the sphere of protocological architecture. And protocological architecture works by establishing the framing protocol within which the framed protocol can evolve. The protocols here are mentioned only in passing: “The students who initiated the construction of the garden also made a user guide for its continuation, indicating convenient construction techniques and places where free construction materials (pallets, plastic bottles, gravel, etc.) could be collected in the area. (The first part of the garden was constructed within the framework of a live project run jointly by sixth year architecture students from the University of Sheffield and the aaa team in October 2002.) The idea is that the architect loses control and becomes a participant – but does
she? Establishing protocol and working as curator is to establish a framing protocol; it is to establish control – which again is not control over, but rather a design feature. This is why the title “Losing Control, Keeping Desire” is fundamentally problematic. Control is precisely what makes the gardening possible.

The input and influence of the architect becomes obscured. She is on the one hand a participant, but is credited with the outcome all the same, in the same way a manager presents herself as primarily an enabler rather than somebody actively steering, but is rewarded at the end of the year for the success of the team as a whole. There is a discrepancy here that is central to the peculiar duality of protocological architecture. In an article about aaa published in Domus, the architect Ruth Morrow keenly observes that: “[Petrescu and Petcou] choose to be invisible because their work grows out of being “just another concerned citizen”, sharing the responsibly for their local environment and public space with their neighbours.”\(^\text{511}\) Conveniently, this also permits the architects to not discuss their own degree of control on the project. Rather, the Domus article presents the architects as simultaneously humble and invisible, and as those who should be credited with the project’s aesthetical form, Morrow writes:

> How would such a project manifest itself without the presence of an architect? The aaa brings coherence and style to the process. Even in small amounts, their tincture of design suffuses the process and products with quality. As ECObox has developed, Petrescu and Petcou have subtly shifted and morphed in their roles as cajolers, part-time siblings, designers, technicians, networkers and critics, etc. They have evolved a professionally structured, familial relationship, enriched by its tensions, disappointments, separations and reunions. As experienced teachers, they understand that the pace and depth to which residents engage with ECObox is as architectural as their experience of its spaces.\(^\text{512}\)

The architects are thus simultaneously invisible and in command of the process. I would suggest that this is the double protocols once again: the architects have defined the framing protocol, leaving the framed protocol to the participants. When they are described as “concerned citizens,” they are thus [assigned] to the group of participants too. As a collective, aaa has worked in unorthodox way, and rather than positioning their organization (the collective) in relation to participants, as would be customary, Petrescu and Petcou have integrated participants into the


\(^{512}\) Ibid.
organization as they are needed.\textsuperscript{513} This becomes problematic as participants are integrated into an existing framework of practices that risks making the participant subject to the will of the permanent members of aaa.\textsuperscript{514}

In a conversation with Antonio Negri, Deleuze reminds us that “the machines don’t explain anything, you have to analyze the collective apparatuses of which the machines are just one component.”\textsuperscript{515} The platform permits certain actions, individually or collectively, as long as they adhere to the protocol of the platform. The platform can morph, but only in the directions permitted by protocol, and protocol thus becomes an element of control that sets the outer limits of what participation within would be. As Galloway puts it: “protocol is a technique for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent environment.”\textsuperscript{516} The content is generated by users, whereas the framework is organized by an agent with a role similar to that of the manager. This is however not a simple division of power, but one that becomes more complex. The framing protocol and the framed protocol affect one another, this is the self-regulatory aspect of this platform. The framework conditions the content, but to an extent the content supposedly conditions the framework.

This platform logic applies to most platforms to various extents; while the relationships differ, this is the fundamental organization of the platform. What is of interest in the discussion of control then is the precise nature of the relationship between framework and content-production. As we have seen in Fun Palace, the structure is almost invisible; the same goes for ecobox – the framing protocol, the structure, becomes obscured and masked by rendering the managers at once invisible and crediting them with authorship. This obfuscation is exacerbated by the specific relationship formed by expanding and contracting the agent defining the framework (aaa) according to needs. The platform’s utopian promise is of a freedom from society’s subjectivation and a freedom to have a moment of indecision where anything is possible.

\textit{betahaus}

For the sake of comparison, let us turn to another platform, betahaus in Berlin. Fundamentally, betahaus works in similar
ways to ecobox, offering the same promise utopian potential now and over the horizon, while being a different enterprise. The very name indicates that the platform adapts to its users: software in beta are tested and adapted according to feedback before the final version is launched. Betahaus is forever locked in beta; it is perpetually open, never locked into a final body. The betahaus is an amalgamation of a desk hotel, or co-working space, a launch platform and mixer for budding, aspirational technology start-ups. The name indicates a very similar plasticity to ecobox’s gardening, promising to always become and never to be, to paraphrase the German art historian Karl Scheffler. I first came across betahaus in 2012 while working as an architectural guide for real estate developers. Betahaus headed the list of their requested itinerary. The building and its location are in themselves nothing special – a nondescript and worn down 1950s office building on Prinzessinnenstraße, squeezed in a gap between blank firewalls behind a parking lot in what at the time was off the beaten track in up-and-coming Kreuzberg. What had attracted this group of developers were the protocols of the platform. The first time I brought the board of a real estate developer to betahaus, I worried about bringing a group in expensive suits, dresses, gold watches and jewelry into a decrepit building in Kreuzberg; I imagined that it would provoke the neighborhood’s inhabitants, well-known for their resistance to gentrification. My worries proved unfounded; not an eyelash was batted in betahaus; and as far as I could tell, such visits were a regular occurrence.

Betahaus is run by its “founders” Christoph Fahle, Max von der Ahe and Madeleine Gummer, who formed a small company in 2009 that now exists in multiple locations across Germany and Europe, running other setups based on the same concept that are connected through a network of activities and courses that together constitute a distributed platform. The platform is described in the following terms:

environment we create room between work and privacy in which innovation and creativity is fostered.\textsuperscript{519} Just like in the case of éco-box, the mixture between collective and individual activities is emphasized, and just as with éco-box, the platform-nature of its operation is also accentuated. It should also be noted that both platforms emphasize their community-building and rely heavily on participants’ testimonials to promote the democratic nature of their respective endeavors.

Like any platform, betahaus promises connections beyond the imaginable: “At betahaus, we seek to implement our own ideas from work and life, as well as to invite social entrepreneurs, digital people, makers and designers to share, exhibit, test and further develop their ideas and prototypes in our space. Who knows what may emerge from this flow of ideas…”\textsuperscript{520} The platform, according to its own logic, enables the possibility for the New to emerge through its combination of heterogeneous interests. This nature of this New cannot be defined in advance – how else would it be radically different, and thus New?

In a way that resembles éco-box’s emphasis on community-building, betahaus focuses on the development of its own community, “coworking culture,” which largely coincides with many aspects of the “sharing economy,” including skill- and time-sharing to help each other (within the heterotopian order of the betahaus). Betahaus sets out to build connections and to become instrumental in the development of the companies it hosts. This ambition permeates the organization that is betahaus: the public café (hosting launches and public programs), the hybridization of spaces (Barcamp Area, Innospace, Arena, Loft, etc.) with connotations to private and public spaces, the events that aim to connect startups to venture capitalists and other startups (Betapitch, People in Beta, Betabreakfast, an assortment of practically oriented courses, parties), to the positions advertised: “WANTED: Feelgood Manager (Intern)”, and “Wanted: Assistant Community Manager.”\textsuperscript{521} The somewhat bizarre combination of corporate-speak and community building has by now been naturalized to a point where it no longer appears contradictory. Betahaus has set

\textsuperscript{519} http://www.betahaus.com/berlin/story/ (accessed December 2, 2015)

\textsuperscript{520} Unattributed interview quote in: http://www.thestyleoffice.today/2015/09/co-working-in-berlin-betahaus/ accessed August 23, 2016. The propensity for sentences that trail off, where we are left to fill in the blanks (…) is another similarity with Petrescu’s “Losing Control, Keeping Desire.”

\textsuperscript{521} http://www.betahaus.com/berlin/blog/ (accessed August 23, 2016)
out to exploit a niche and establish itself as the catalytic agent connecting investors and startups; thus, such language appears perfectly logical.

Like ecobox, the organization—the distinction between framing and framed protocols—is diffuse; the overlap between those engaged in the content and the platform is consciously erased. The people who de facto serve as managers are referred to as “founders,” which implies a seniority within the community, but it still puts the managers within the system rather than as the managers of the framing protocol. The people employed by betahaus feature on the website, where the founders, and the tenants are presented as a single community. At the same time, it should be remembered that betahaus is a corporation, and it is distinct from those who rent a desk there, and the prime income for betahaus are its paying tenants. There is a degree of cybernetic control to betahaus; it is self-organized within the framing protocol, but the link between organization and protocols remains badly articulated at best. Yet, even if the protocols are presented as overlapping, there is a very clear

Figure 29: betahaus café area. Photo by Danique van Kesteren.

distinction in betahaus, as there is a business administration behind the organization.

The platform’s own organization is casually referred to on first name basis: “Do you have a great idea for a community event, do you have questions regarding our Office Hours, would you like to get in touch with someone in our community? Get in touch with our Community Manager Tosh!” This can be compared with the very légère-sounding approach to economy and accounting: “Something that has to do with invoicing and accounting? Tine will figure it out with you.”

All of these tend to obscure the very professionally run organization behind betahaus. This junction is one of few where the corporation behind the community becomes visible, even as the corporate aspects are explicitly understated, hidden beneath a blanket of community references.

Betahaus is certainly a different platform than ecobox. The former is a corporation, allegedly with a soul, whilst the latter is organized without profit motives. Their work methods however are very similar. Both appear to function according to the double protocol, and more problematically, both conceal the two protocols by making the platform appear as if it were governed by a single, democratic protocol. Thus, it could readily be argued that their logic is almost identical. Just as was already visible in Fun Palace, the structures undergirding the versatile plasticity of the content of the platform are almost invisible behind the bombastic, voracious content, the becoming.

The (cybernetic) machine, with instant and perfect plasticity in response to feedback, becomes problematic precisely because of its heterotopian character. In order to be different from its background, the platform must have the framing protocol that ensures its continued “otherness”. A machine that is pure protocol can be devoid of form and structure; when it becomes materialized or imagined as architecture, it acquires form, as it does so, it becomes distinguished from the background.

Betahaus and ecobox are simultaneously cybernetic machines and plinths, defined through their double protocols. Both constitute examples of protocol as a management style. Both betahaus and ecobox have ways of paying respect to the founders...
and the (protocological) architects behind the platforms. I would argue that the platform here is produced by the Network-image, its logic of self-control borrowed from cybernetics. Interestingly, the corporation that is betahaus and the altruistic ecobox employ precisely the same device – the platform – to challenge the dominant system, which is invariably perceived as a tree.

The platform is almost without fail presented as a bottom-up democracy where the protocol is defined by the users. This remains a complicated proposition as there are multiple protocols, and while some are indeed shared and defined by the community, the framing protocols function on other levels. In betahaus, the relationship or even the existence of more than one protocol is obscured by presenting everybody as on the same level (it is a platform after all), whereas the same effect is achieved in ecobox by absorbing participants into the protocol-defining entity itself. What and who is part of the platform and what is not; who is enforcing the limits of the platform? In betahaus, this is clear – those who pay membership fees are users – whereas in the case of ecobox, reasons for exclusion are less apparent from the available texts. The platform serves to produce the image of an entirely self-managed, bottom-up arrangement. The idea of the platform serves to mask the relations of production within the platform and promote the Network-image’s idea of direct democracy and the conflict between control and freedom traceable from the Fun Palace onwards. Furthermore, the platform works towards the status of the invisible managers, building rewards for their efforts while ostensibly acting to assist the content producer.

**Utopia Station**

Platforms are decidedly utopian, albeit in more complicated ways than a cursory glance suggests. I would argue that the platforms can be considered utopian on different levels. They are intended to generate unplannable connections, to enable something currently unimaginable from our perspective. In this sense, platforms are instrumental and generative; they are bestowed with the promise of what could be called “utopian potential.”

On another level that is superimposed or interwoven with this, the platform is simultaneously a representation of the utopia it promises. That is, I borrow this phrase from Jan Liesegang. Raum-labor, *Acting in Public*, 33.
for the platform to generate the desired utopian potential it must be self-managing; the platform structure must not restrain the generative potential. According to this logic, the platform must forever remain responsive to the generated content and users. The platform must adapt and evolve in order to generate the New. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, the logic of the platform is allegedly a molecular logic rather than a molar logic, in the sense that it forms from below — at least in theory. But just as Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, the two “cross over into each other.” This is an important point to keep in mind.

One platform that should be included in an analysis dealing with platforms and utopianism is the curatorial project Utopia Station, curated by Molly Nesbit, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, and Rikrit Tiravanija and originally exhibited in the 2003 Venice Biennale. The title, again, makes a referential nod toward the platform (as the mode of interchange, of changing directions). The curators’ ambition is outlined in the manifesto-like “What is a Station?” from the same year. In the text, several characteristics of the platform are laid out: the importance that the station does not “present itself as a finished picture,” but is instead organized according to a flexible plan (by Tiravanija and artist Liam Gillick); the unpredictable effects; that it is shaped as much by the users as the exhibited objects and its productivity, which is a production of connections. The curators state:

> We use utopia as a catalyst, a concept most useful as fuel. We leave the complete definition of utopia to others. We meet to pool our efforts, motivated by a need to change the landscape outside and inside, a need to think, a need to integrate the work of the artist, the intellectual and manual laborers that we are into a larger kind of community, another kind of economy, a bigger conversation, another state of being.

The platform is in other words what enables thinking about utopia, framing utopia. Once again, however, one must consider the platform and its protocological construction. The content and the relative freedom within the delineated, heterotopian space of the platform is far less utopian than the platform itself. This is a dis-

525. With reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction in “1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity” in A Thousand Plateaus.

526. Ibid., 235.


528. “What does a Station produce? What might a Station produce in real time? In this produce lies an activity more complex than pure exhibition, for it contains many cycles of use, mixing of use. It incorporates aesthetic material, aesthetic matters too, into another economy which does not regard art as fatally separate.” Ibid., 160.

529. Ibid., 161.
cussion of management and of the curators’ role in the definition of the space; if the platform generates the content, the question of how the platform affects, mirrors, and challenges the world outside is imperative. Utopia Station aimed to create a platform for discussion on the utopian that would, in extension, change how the world is understood and defined.

As a heterotopia, Utopia Station was conceived of as a place outside the constraints and norms that would interfere with the imagination and exploration of utopian ideas. Art theorist Boris Groys contends that Utopia Station constituted a curatorial project with iconoclastic undertones rather than an art project in itself, writing:

"Utopia Station" was a curatorial and not an artistic project. This meant that the iconoclastic gesture could not be accompanied – and thus invalidated – by the attribution of artistic value. Nevertheless, it can still be assumed that in this case the concept of utopia was abused, because it was aestheticized and situated in an elitist art context. And it can be equally said that art was abused as well: it served as an illustration for the curators’ vision of utopia.¹⁵

The platform, in other words, serves as a representation of a freedom within which the illustrated utopias can emerge. The artworks that make up the content support the overall utopian “opening up” of thought and the future that is the platform itself.

If Utopia Station is an expression of the curators’ vision of utopia, the relationship between the framing protocol and the framed protocol should be discussed in further detail. In the case of Utopia Station, the layout within the platform – its material construction, which appears to be a variation on the archipelago – is theoretically able to host a multitude of different utopian visions. Thus, there is a framework both for the organization of content and for the visitors’ experience and relation to the platform and its content. This is the material aspect of the framing protocol of Utopia Station – the equivalent of the sea in the archipelago metaphor. The relationship between private and community spaces is again subject to protocol. Interestingly, Utopia Station designs for the community in a more direct way than for instance in ecobox.

Visitors would find “a row of large circular benches […], so that you can watch the movement on the platform or silently turn your back or treat the circle as a generous con-

versation pit. Each seats ten people. The circular benches are portable; as an option one could line them up like a row of big wheels.”

In terms of affordance, these benches offer visitors the option of either facing inwards in groups of up to ten people (not more) and partake in a discussion, or, alternatively, face outwards in solitude. Perhaps more interesting is what the benches do not afford the visitor, which is every other potential forming of community. This is the principal aspect of the design, according to the artist Liam Gillick. The idea of non-affordance is likely more at home in an art context rather than an architectural context. In theory, the seating becomes an instrumental actor in and of itself by overthrowing the conventional logic of arranging bodies in relation to one another and thereby attempting to “create a space where there could be the conditions of critical exchange.”

Bluntly put, the benches offer an arrangement of bodies that is different from habit and conducive to different social connections.

Gillick distinguishes his work from that of an architect in that he does not concern himself with content, but only structure, whereas architects, according to Gillick, engage in both content and structure. Or, in the terminology of this study: Gillick considers himself as only working through the framing protocol, while leaving the framed protocol to others, as if the two were unrelated. Gillick seems to argue that his form undoes, or makes impossible, certain habits, and that this enables the visitor/user to re-define herself. In other words, it opens up the future. Thus, on the one hand, his seating arrangements are presented as determining – they permit only certain uses. Through this, he argues, their function is to make a space indeterminate as this opens up for new connections.

According to Gillick, his pieces of furniture are simultaneously instruments of determination and in-determination.

Gillick’s approach here is ostensibly monstrous. It forges the potential of new, unplanned, social encounters that are transversal and aims, in effect, to produce chimeras. He is not interested in determining the content of the transformation to come, but only in enabling it by making the transversal connections possible. This approach could also very readily be considered utopian; Gillick contrasts revolutions started in bars

531. Nesbit, Obrist, and Tiravanija, “What is a Station?”, 199.

532. The concept of affordance is primarily associated with James Gibson, who defined it in terms of what the environment affords the animal – mainly in terms of food, shelter and on. See Chapter 8 in James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 1986), and Sandra Kopljar, Thinking About a Place Not-Yet (Ph.D.-diss. LTH/Lund University, 2016).


534. This appears at least superficially to be reminiscent of Peter Eisenman’s formal attempts in his numbered houses.

535. Gillick’s approach is strangely reminiscent of Koolhaas’ position on the relation between order and chaos and how the architect can possibly relate to chaos, discussed earlier.
and cafés with “hanging out.” Where the former, he suggests, can lead to fascism or communism, whereas “hanging out” has a generosity and retains the potential without unleashing it. Here, the focus is on precisely the pivotal moment, the moment of openness that is associated the revolt (as opposed to the revolution), which Gillick seeks to extend into perpetuity through “hanging out.”

In the case of Utopia Station, it is particularly interesting to note the status of the artist/curator Gillick, who is simultaneously engaged, in collaboration with Rikrit Tiravanija, in the production of the platform’s physical milieu as discussed above, but at the same time considers himself “as a participant rather than an organizer.” This again blurs the line between those who produce content and those who determine the framing protocol. The strategy is once again that those in charge of the framing protocol blend into the background. It is similar to eCbox, where it was a case of expanding/contracting; and aaa, and betahaus, where the founders present themselves as participants, and so forth. Foucault’s notion that liberalism always entails asking whether one governed too much is here almost inverted, and the claim is rather that one does not govern at all.

Discussion & Analysis

With the platform, protocological architecture comes to the fore. Architects working with platforms are engaged in the design of protocols, rather than of space. The architect as a manager replaces previous incarnations of the architect. The protocol defines a space for difference, which must itself be different. The definition of this territory is where the architect’s framing protocol comes to play a part. In this sense, the platform is a form: its borders designate it as different from the rest, established in a constitutional protocol framing whatever happens inside. Within we find the framed protocols, and it is in the relation between framing and framed protocols that I find both the platform and protocological architecture highly problematic; here, the architect, broadly defined as the person who defines the framing protocol, purports to relinquish control;


however, the exercise of control is precisely what makes the platform a form.

Control is not control of or over something, but rather that which provides a form in the first place. In a fully reticular or networked environment, instrumentality would be difficult, and this is where control through protocols enables constellations to take form. As control is what defines any form in the network, there is no “outside” of control in terms of the network. Networks are, as Galloway and Thacker put it, “the horizon of control.” The protocols in focus here are not primarily technological, but rather form the socially constituted mirror of the technological protocols, and work through what has become known as management (project management), which is presented here under the title management culture, and which certainly has profound effects on how architecture is seen in the Network-image. Misunderstanding the nature of control is very common; one is accustomed to thinking of power structures as “exercising control over something”. This misunderstanding leads to, for instance, texts like Petrescu’s “Losing Control, Keeping Desire,” where control is imagined as the architect’s control over the project rather than what enables the project in the first place. The platform is simultaneously image and machine. It cannot be “empty” in the sense that it exists beyond control, control is what defines the platform.

The structure of the two protocols – the framing protocol defining the platform and the framed protocol adapting to participants – is one of the defining characteristics of the platform. The platform is perpetually unfinished; it is always becoming, in perpetual suspense, and cannot be allowed to solidify, lest it close. The idea of a machine that adapts to its users in feedback loops can readily be traced to cybernetic ideas of self-controlling machines, which exist here as instrumental heterotopian orders.

The relationship between utopia and heterotopia is not precisely dichotomous: on the one hand, utopia differs from heterotopia in that it does not exist, whereas heterotopia can be described as realized utopias, which suggests that heterotopia can frame utopia, or express utopian desires. This, I argue, is how the platform works – heterotopia frames a utopian content. In a certain respect, this places heterotopia and utopia very close

to one another, perhaps so much so that they overlap. If utopia is understood as an expression of utopian desire, heterotopia can doubtlessly be considered as an expression of utopianism, as Foucault also suggests in “Of Other Spaces.”

On the one hand, the platform is there to generate the utopian (the prospect of endless opportunity). At the same time, it must also represent this other world; though it sounds paradoxical, it needs to be the machine it attempts to generate. This is the nexus where utopia and heterotopia collide, or rather collapse into one another. What I am suggesting here is basically a conflation of ends and means, where the idea that “everything is possible” is both what the utopian strives to achieve through the cybernetic machine and the condition that needs to exist for the open future to come about. This forms a knot, which is one of the more complicated aspects of the platform and of the inter-relation between heterotopia and utopia.

In The Badlands of Modernity, Hetherington re-examines Foucault’s heterotopia and its relation to utopia. Hetherington elaborates on Foucault’s distinction between “resemblance” and “similitude,” which is made to bear on the “otherness” of the heterotopian space. Hetherington suggests that one can interrogate heterotopias on this distinction, whether the heterotopian space has a resemblance of otherness or the similitude of otherness. In terms of heterotopias, resemblance would appear to be of another order than its context, and similitude would denote a space that approximates another order beyond appearances. Both are heterotopic in Hetherington’s terms, both refuse to accept the given, but there are more sides to this. Something that resembles otherness may, as in the case of the platform, end up re-affirming the established order – here, the Network-image. Hetherington notes that there is an issue of compatibility. Something resembling another order remains compatible with that order, whereas something similar to another order is through this definition incompatible to the order which it juxtaposes.

Like Foucault, Hetherington does not primarily focus on any distinct binaries. He notes that particularly the distinction between freedom and control are impossible – he notes: “Freedom, for Foucault, is an aspect of social control just as

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540. Foucault notes that heterotopias can serve as compensations for the shortcomings of the existing, which itself readily could serve to refute any claim of a clear distinction between the utopian and the heterotopian. See Foucault “Of Other Spaces” in Rethinking Architecture, 356.


social control is implicated in freedom.” There is, in other words, no possibility of having one without the other, which again would explain Foucault’s dismissal of any machines of freedom. Likewise, I would argue that there is no direct binary between utopia and heterotopia; what is visible in the case of the platforms is that there is a superimposition of utopia onto heterotopia; the myth of the cybernetic machine’s utopian potential is inscribed onto the heterotopia of the double protocols.

The important point, as Hetherington notes, is what these spaces perform in relation to other sites, what the heterotopian platform, in our case, actually does – which coincides with the utopian function of challenging the “real” as given. If we take this as the criterion of evaluation of the platform, we may ask: how does the platform relate to its own promise of “utopian potential;” of being able to generate difference? The answer, I would argue, is that the platforms presented here are found wanting. I would suggest that there is a case of disingenuity; platforms are defined and to some extent managed through protocols are presented as self-organized.

The problem, or what I would consider one of the problems, with the platforms analyzed in this chapter is thus neither the platform per se nor its organization, but squarely in the implicit “utopian potential” of otherness, the explicit or implicit claim of another order. The resemblance of otherness, rather than the similitude of otherness, makes a difference here. In this sense, the platform cannot serve as “stoppage” to capitalism, they are simply a re-arrangement of the current order within the Network-image. They do not comprise another image, nor do they aspire to challenge the Network-image in spite of their promises of utopian potential.

The utopian undertone of the platform relates to the platform and its utopian potential rather than to its utopian content – the latter is invariably secondary. This is the fundamental differentiation between the projected utopias and what we can call protocological utopias, of which platforms are certainly one type. If the utopian aspirations are located in the protocol
rather than content, this is due to the network utopian notion of utopias as instrumental, acting to open up the future.

The platform and protocological utopias grow more complicated here. The protocols, and particularly the framing protocol necessarily, become a subject of scrutiny if the platform is credited with this utopian potential. In other words, the platform itself should ideally be empty, like Claude Lefort’s ideal public space in Democracy and Political Theory: “The locus of power becomes an empty place,” and is presented as empty while managers “choose to be invisible,” as in the article on écoobox cited above. This could be considered the platform’s sleight of hand; it is showing us one thing, but doing something else with the other hand. And, still, this is not necessarily conscious deception; it may instead be one that can be attributed to the Network-image’s naturalization.

In the chapter Framework, I set out three questions to be explored, with a fourth, implicit, question tagged on at the end. The first two questions have been discussed extensively, and that discussion will only be summarized here. The final question and its implicit extension into the future will be the focus of this chapter.

The first question concerned how to reconsider the utopian concept in order to make it a useful concept.\textsuperscript{548} I have explored this question by elaborating a utopian concept that differs from a habitual, or colloquial utopian concept. The major differences can be summarized in the following points:

i.) the utopian is not a category where focus is on whether a proposition falls inside or outside the category, but it is instead predicated on an unconditional desire.

ii.) This desire is not predicated on immortality and the end of history, but instead on survival and continual change.

iii.) The utopian is expressed as propositions based on a multifaceted problem – and focus should be on the unconsciously formed problem rather than the solution. The problem is not solvable in any comprehensive way.

iv.) This problem is expressed in utopian propositions, which are conditioned by shared beliefs.
v.) The utopian is functional; what the utopian proposition does is what counts.

vi.) What utopia does is to make change possible by challenging doxa. Its function is to unsettle that which everybody knows; the utopian is in this sense monstrous. The utopian is in the experience of a proposition, rather than in the proposition itself.

vii.) Utopian propositions thus have to perform this function, focusing on the utopian question of “how to live (better)?” whilst still remaining within the horizon of imagination determined by doxa.

viii.) The utopian proposition can never resolve the unconsciously formulated problem, but it may offer a clearer view of the problem.

ix.) As utopian propositions work beyond the conscious, their effects are not predictable in a directly instrumental way. In this sense, all architecture and indeed every artifact is utopian in one way or another. What distinguishes the more transformational utopian expressions from the less effective is a matter of intensity or even monstrosity. This provides a broad outline of the utopian concept that functions as a framework for this study.

The second question concerned how this reformulated, utopian concept can be used to analyze architectural history and theory, and to what effects. This reading can very succinctly be summarized thus:

i.) The utopian concept above is contingent. The study has discussed the contingencies of architecture, including the media associated with architecture – the plan and the image – and how these have been formative in the colloquial understanding of the utopian concept.

ii.) Utopia did not necessarily have a fixed meaning at the dawn of Modernity, it was not necessarily located in the future, nor was it necessarily a plan to be implemented. More’s work Utopia was critical of a society that was unable to understand...
that its organization was derived from human beliefs rather than divine command.

iii.) Over time, utopia became associated with Enlightenment narratives and notions like the future, perfection, progress, and dialectical teleology.

iv.) Most of these were controversial and sometimes paradoxical (such as the notion of a Modern tradition based on the elimination of tradition). During the 19th and the 20th centuries, progress and the form of utopia associated with it became increasingly problematic. As Tafuri argued, the avant-gardes of Modernism presupposed aspects of the world and the metropolis that were essentially ideological rather than given. Rather than oppose industrial capitalism, architectural and artistic avant-gardes came to propel it, assisting in the naturalization of the contradictions inherent to capitalism. Architects ended up mediating and masking the contradictions instead of overcoming them, and the plan became a tool fixing the future in the image of the present (to dispel anguish over the future). And ultimately, architects were too ideological to have any hope of effectuating any political change.

v.) Eventually, Modernity and Enlightenment’s fundamental principles came under scrutiny and were found wanting. Utopia was by then (almost) inextricably linked to what is here referred to as the colloquial utopia: an image of the perfect societal organization. As the meaning of “perfect” became increasingly claustrophobic and its implications problematic, utopia was consequently unthought.

vi.) In the colloquial historiography of utopia, it is commonly accepted that utopia was relegated to the rubbish bin at this point, locked into the false narratives of a Modernity that arguably passed into a postmodernity. Postmodernity cannot but refer back to a modern which it no longer considers relevant.

vii.) Utopia, as Martin argued, then became a ghost in architecture; haunting the profession and neither present, nor absent. In the terms of this study, utopian desire was no longer expressible in the form of a plan or an image; these could only be used as architectural equivalents of the Mahnmal, but as

550. A memorial erected as a reminder and a warning to future generations. See also Fredrik Torisson, Berlin – Matter of Memory (London: Ratatosk, 2010).
warning beacons of the dangers of the future, rather than of
the past. This meant that other forms of expressions and ul-
timately a new self-image for the architect had to be evolved.

viii.) At the same time, a new image of thought was formed: The Network-image.

**Hopeful Monster Utopias**

This brings us to the third question, which sought to address the
contemporary discussion on utopia in architectural theory and
practice. The Network-image is what I consider the dominant
image of thought at present. I argue that it is not primarily ide-
ological; it has a mixed heritage including cybernetics, the US
Air Force, and management theory, but at the same time also
philosophy associated with the May 1968 protests in France,
including the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari and many
other anti-authoritarian thinkers.

This does not mean that the Network-image is without
ideological implications or that it does not suit certain ideo-
logical persuasions better than others – only that it is arguably
not primarily ideological. The Network-image is based on the
premise of arboraphobia, a fear of trees. This is a topological
problem; the tree is associated with the utopias of authoritar-
ian regimes, Modernism, and determination. If the tree is the
problem, the network is considered the solution.

The network topology is often assumed superior pre-
cisely because it is not a tree; the network is justified as a nega-
tion of the tree. This arboraphobic logic obscures the qualities
and premises of the network itself. The network’s own relations
of power, or control, are habitually overlooked. The protocol
constitutes the dispositif of control, and the protocol is by na-
ture nested. Management theory, the “curatorial turn,” and the
architect who considers herself a project manager now all de-
fine themselves according to the arboraphobic, network-cen-
tered logic characterizing the Network-image.

The Network-image offers other utopian expressions,
other utopian media, and other utopian approaches than those
associated with progress and the image. Here, these utopian
expressions are called Hopeful Monsters. The Network-image’s utopia is not an image of a blindingly white city where reason reigns forever and supreme. Instead, utopia is approached through techniques, which in the Network-image have become associated with the unprogramming of the subjectivity formed by neoliberal capitalism. The architect as designer of images is replaced by the architect as designer of protocol, a network-topological form. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this shift is how the Network-image is taken as a given. The logic of the Network-image, the promise of constructing unthinkable connections, is the promise of opening up the future.

In the Network-image, utopia becomes a potential for another as yet undefined future. This would be a local and situated change, if it were not for the protocols. It is through the notion of the protocol that the Hopeful Monster can make a utopian promise beyond itself. Recalling the Hopeful Monster Theory, where small changes in genetic material result in profound change in the organism, a similar theory undergirds the utopian potential in the Network-image. This is the notion of scaling, understood here as the limitless potential of a digital product to be reproduced ad infinitum, rapidly multiplying turnover without comparable increase in operating costs. Every utopian platform in the previous chapter works with protocols that make each project replicable. The utopian promise of change is combined with the equally utopian promise of a self-multiplying architecture bound neither by form nor capital. Combined, these two promises make up the Hopeful Monster Utopia of protocological architecture; micro-politics is seamlessly combined with cybernetic notions of control through the protocol.

The architect takes on a new role in all this. The disciplinary border she is now blurring is the one separating the architect from the project manager. As a project manager, she defines the (architectural) project through the design of a framing protocol that outlines a topological form. Within this a secondary, framed protocol, in turn can be developed by the
nascent community, which in turn lends a democratic sheen to the architect’s project.

In terms of utopia, the Hopeful Monster is a convenient mediation of the utopian paradox that Koolhaas outlined, where architecture without reference to utopia lacks meaning, and architecture with reference to utopia becomes complicit in various crimes. Here, through protocological architecture, it would appear that the architect can generate meaning without becoming complicit in the crimes associated with utopian determinism – provided that she maintains the manager’s role of defining protocols within which projects can unfold.

Arguably, the most perplexing aspect of the Network-image’s ubiquity is that architects of every ideological bent, from those resisting the neoliberal order to those advocating its continued expansion, share this understanding of the architect and her role. The tools to develop and to destroy the neoliberal order are thus allegedly one and the same. The Network-image’s fundamental premise is arboraphobia, and as the Network-image stipulates that liberation beyond doubt is best approached through the not-tree, this overlap is perhaps not so confusing after all. It does however suggest that we are missing something if we remember that it is not the content (here: the use to which the protocol is put), but the form or medium (the protocol itself) that affects the world.

The Network-image justifies itself through arboraphobia. Top-down becomes synonymous with bad and hierarchical, while bottom-up becomes synonymous with good and egalitarian. This, I argue, is far too un-nuanced to comprehend, much less challenge the Network-image’s elements of control and power relations. Within the Network-image, it is presupposed that the visible tree – the disciplinary – remains the locus of power. The absence of (identifiable) trees thus falsely testifies to an egalitarian ambition where power itself is supposedly distributed between participants; again: if the tree is the problem, the network is the solution. Such trivial dualistic assumptions are influential factors behind the Network-image’s success. The first major objection to this is that the tree may not look like a tree. In the Network-image,

552. Koolhaas, Content, 393.
control is exercised through contradictory protocols nested within one another, producing hierarchies along a different axis than the tree – if the image of the tree can be described in terms of \(x\) and \(y\), the control society’s hierarchies are along the \(z\) axis.

The nested and contradictory character of the Network-image sometimes surfaces, but it is habitually brushed aside. One illustrative example is the famous dictum of the founder of the Whole Earth Catalog, Stewart Brand: “information wants to be free.” This oft-repeated line indicates a tendency toward dissolving power relations in the network; however, the first half of the quote tends to be omitted in most cases. It states that “On the one hand, information wants to be expensive because it’s so valuable. The right information in the right place just changes your life.”\(^553\) There is, I argue, a tendency to simplify and bestow the network and in extension the Network-image with a utopian potential that is binary and arboraphobic, returning time and again in the obfuscations of the power relations and hierarchies within the network.

Protocols permit the network to simultaneously function as anti-authoritarian and authoritarian; there is no contradiction, only different levels. The authoritarian part frames the anti-authoritarian; or where the horizontal protocol is dependent on the less visible vertical protocol, there is not a struggle, but an integration of one into the other.\(^554\) The contradistinction between anti-authoritarian networks and authoritarian, perverted networks is in that sense inaccurate, and too one-dimensional to achieve comprehension of the network’s intricate, nested and paradoxical configuration of power.

The distributed network of Paul Baran and the RAND Corporation that undergirds the Network-image was never about dissolving power relations, but rather about concealing a chain of command beyond any identifiable center (or target).\(^555\) Galloway’s analysis from Protocol of the double protocols of the internet – the horizontal protocol of TCP/IP and the catalogue of addresses in the vertical DNS protocol – shows a similarity in the framing, hierarchical protocol and a

\(^553\). See the transcript from EDGE 338, January 24, 2011: https://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge338.html (accessed March 27, 2017)

\(^554\). Galloway, Protocol.

framed, flat protocol to the examples discussed in the chapter on the platform.

There is an illustrative example of the nesting of different, contradictory protocols in “Lethal Theory,” an article by the architectural theorist Eyal Weizman, published in Log in 2006. Weizman’s interviewee, Shimon Naveh explains the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) approach to critical theory:

A state military whose enemy is scattered like a network of loosely organized gangs […] must liberate itself from the old concept of straight lines, units in linear formation, regiments and battalions, […] and become itself much more diffuse and scattered, flexible and swarmlike […] In fact, it must adjust itself to the stealthy capability of the enemy […] Swarming, to my understanding, is simultaneous arrival at a target from a large number of nodes – if possible, from 360 degrees.556

Naveh explains the versatility of critical theory and the applicability of the network logic in terms of the aims of the Israeli Defense Force thus:

We must differentiate between the charm, and even some values, within Marxist ideology and what can be taken from it for military use. Theories not only strive for a utopian sociopolitical ideal with which we may or may not agree, but are also based on a methodology that wants to disrupt and subvert the existing political, social, cultural, or military order. The disruptive capacity in theory [elsewhere Naveh uses the term nihilist] is the aspect of theory that we like and use. […] This theory is not married to its socialist ideals.557

In his article, Weizman puts a finger on the problem with the Network-image. It is in this sense absolutely able to be used by the IDF, while at the same time defining itself in opposition to trees. By adopting a network logic, the IDF can transform its operations and become a rhizomatic structure, while maintaining the vertical protocol underneath, providing the framework or structure for the horizontal protocol. The IDF can, in other words, integrate network logic without losing control. The introduction of a horizontal protocol in the protocols of the IDF does not diminish its capabilities, but enhances them. The power relations, the tree or the chain of command, remain intact.

I argue that the arboraphobic presupposition – that if the tree is the problem, the network is the solution – produces the illusionary Hopeful Monster Utopia. This is a utopian
expression that is actively unthinking its own protocological elements of control by simply repeating the arboraphobic proposition as if this was given. This obfuscates power relations within networks, and it provides a mediation of contradictions; it "ward[s] off anguish by understanding and absorbing its causes," as Tafuri put it.558

The tree in the Network-image is not identifiable in a single opponent. It is an insidious tree that works through protocols that frame and create exclusionary mechanisms that constitute the foundation for a society of control. This makes arboraphobia a questionable point of departure for those wishing to resist the dominant ideology, as the examples analyzed above have shown.

This brings us back to Tafuri’s critique of the avant-garde, now reformulated to bear on the Network-image: how is it that every transformative practice accepts the network as the given? What, then, does this do? Tafuri’s lament of the avant-garde’s failure to critically address its ideological presuppositions can readily be transposed onto the present theory and practices, whose failure to address the Network-image in any meaningful way is palpable. As Alexander Galloway notes: “grassroots organizations, guerrilla warfare, anarcho-syndicalism and other rhizomatic movements” are all “formally within” the network logic.559 The failure to challenge the Network-image is what makes the Hopeful Monster as a utopian expression a failure; they do not challenge the shared beliefs. Instead, they accept the tree as that which needs to be solved by starting out with the network as the solution.

Without critical reflection on and challenge to the Network-image, the Hopeful Monster imagined as the fire-breathing chimera of revolt may simply end up as a Wolperting: A sad chimera of taxidermy, poised on the hunting lodge mantelpiece for the momentary wonder and delight of the Bourgeoisie. Architectural history is full of Wolpertinge that we architects like to imagine as fire-breathing monsters that have been misunderstood and betrayed.

We must instead begin to discuss the Network-image, its implications, and the fact that it is a horizon of thought, not a true underlying order. This is a point of beginning to recog-
nize the peculiar sides of arboraphobia, and that arboraphobia well may leave the broader “us” in a situation where we define ourselves through the negation of trees and thus open ourselves up for being dominated with our enthusiastic consent.

Utopology & the Monstrous

This brings us to the fourth and final question, which concerns the future — the simple, yet complicated question of Where to? This question is perhaps especially pertinent as the argument until now has partly been a transposition of Tafuri’s critique that the Modernist avant-gardes failed to rid themselves of the ideological presuppositions on the Hopeful Monsters utopias’ failure to confront the Network-image. Where does that leave utopia and the monstrous?

While I am repeating Tafuri’s critique to an extent, this is only one aspect of the utopian. The utopian concept I have outlined in this study is certainly critical, but it is not solely critical; it is negative, but not solely negative. Utopia is never

Figure 30: “Felid Orthrus,” Wolpertinge and photo by Sarina Brewer.

560. Particularly so as Tafuri saw “sublime uselessness” and “form without utopia” as the only path for architecture. Architecture and Utopia, ix.
only an anti-thesis, particularly if one looks to its effects rather than its proposed content. Based on an impulse, a (utopian) proposition does several things in the same gesture. I would argue that the mind does not have access to an unfiltered perception of the world. We cannot eliminate all images of thought and the question is rather which image of thought permits the clearest thought? Or, how can the plane of immanence be modified in order to better perceive the world? How to commit less violence?

Over the years, depending on how the discipline has been defined, the architect has considered herself in many guises: craftsperson, scientist/engineer, autonomous architect, and project manager. Each of the roles the architect assumes has effects that are not immediately recognized. The media used has effects, and as each of these identities is transformative, each has a relation to power. Yet as Tafuri showed, architects erroneously assumed that by defining themselves as, e.g. scientists acting in the name of the universally rational, they could transcend the image of thought (or, as Tafuri saw it, ideology) and directly challenge the dominant ideological order. The same can be said of the project manager. And, as Tafuri concluded, the architect aspiring to a rationally ordered city failed to understand their role within the image of thought – how they were in fact mediating contradictions rather than resolving them.

Something similar can be said of the architect as project manager. Architects practicing with managerial undertones fail to critically address their role within the Network-image. This does not exclusively apply to architects, but elements can be found in a range of other disciplines or practices as well, including art and curatorial practices, political activism, and more. The arboraphobic logic and the nested protocols of the Network-image serve to conceal the project manager’s position within the relations of power, defined by her protocols, and through the direct instrumentality of which she imagines herself capable, while ignoring the protocols framing her own practice.

This is the critical dimension that fails in the Hopeful Monsters. The role of the monster is etymologically related to showing, and what it shows in terms of the utopian is si-
multaneously negative and positive; it shows us the ungrounded nature of the world and the folly in the systems we impose on the world, but with this also come new horizons and new opportunities.

The potential of utopia is in the virtual, which is real but stands in opposition to the actual. Virtual problems and actual propositions do not overlap; problems of a utopian nature are never comprehensively solved. In this sense, the role of utopia is perhaps best summarized in an imperative borrowed from Samuel Beckett: “Fail better.” The utopian proposition is thus never exclusively a negation of the Network-image; it invariably puts something different in its place, another image of thought. Changing the horizons of imagination is an act of shifting them, not only of removing something.

One comparison that illustrates this point is Fredric Jameson’s “anti-anti-utopianism,” a rallying call that also needs modification in terms of the utopian concept outlined here. If we focus for a moment on the double negation of Jameson’s call, this transforms in relation to the monstrous – one can, as Jonnie Eriksson does, discuss the monster in terms of the “Not-not-human.” This forms a challenge to the category or the limit of classification of what is human and what is not-human. It is not an antithesis locked into Hegelian dialectics. Where Jameson’s anti-anti-utopianism produces a utopia-shaped hole at best, the monster as the not-not-human redefines another unity in confronting the presupposed distinction between humans and nature that long dominated humanism. Architecture, according to this line of thought, is always-already not-not-utopian. Utopia, then, is not “architecture’s dirty little secret,” as Koolhaas puts it, but something that opens up the category of the utopian for thinking monstrously.

The critical aspect of utopia, its function is to un-settle the future through challenging presuppositions, is essential. The utopian monster is simultaneously a positive, something more than a negation; it points to something beyond the set-


563. Koolhaas, Content, 393.
tled future. The Hopeful Monster, then, is a not failure because it is a monster, but because it is not monstrous enough.

With a utopian concept predicated on a desire for survival, utopia is monstrous. Unquestioned presuppositions are the reason the Hopeful Monsters can be considered failed monstrous utopian expressions. Any form, community, or platform is a system, of a different order, and defines an identity, working by exclusion. This aspect of networks and platforms is constantly underplayed. Only that which is connected exists – that which is not is rendered invisible. As already observed, the network is essentially formless in how it is considered and conceived. As Galloway notes, focus is invariably on connectivity rather than form or space, graph theory rather than geometry.\footnote{564}

The monster utopian is an iconoclastic utopia rather than a prescriptive one. Russell Jacoby noted that in iconoclastic utopias, “[o]ne could ‘hear’ the future, but not see it.”\footnote{565} The utopian, like the monstrous, is not a model as such; instead, it works on different planes, or strata; it is in the experience rather than an object in itself. Here, we can recall Jeffrey Kipnis’ suggestion of an architecture employing sonic dissonance, where a critical architecture would function like a soundtrack that clashes with what appears on the screen, producing entirely different affects in another register.\footnote{566} Something similar is certainly imaginable in terms of the utopian. But experience produced through utopian expression is far from universal, the monstrous utopian is again in the reception rather than the intention, and even if we discuss examples, these may well be experienced differently.\footnote{567} These different planes or strata are not reducible to one another, but condition one another all the same. Such a utopian expression focuses on the embryonic spark of a problem rather than the entirety.

Utopia is not an image. I abstain from providing a proposition that defines a utopian solution, an exemplar of a utopian platform, which would perhaps be expected. Such a proposition would only serve as a return to the image; it would
reduce the utopian to another solution rather than maintain focus on the problem, the paradoxes, and questions.

Utopology is a question of outlining the conceptual tools for thinking with a different utopian concept, one that opens other doors and at the same time provides a critical dimension for discussing different propositions. It is here that the contribution of this study can be discussed. By providing a reformulated utopian concept rather than content, it becomes possible to unmoor the utopian from its claustrophobic and haunting undead state. This does not resolve utopian questions such as “How to live (better)?” but it does open for a different discussion on utopia, where the intensity rather than category enables a focus on the problem rather than a blind focus on the solution.

The utopian concept developed in this study changes the utopian paradox outlined by Koolhaas at the outset of this study and revisited in this inapplicable unless utopia is a category. As the utopian concept transforms, so does the paradox. Utopia is paradoxical. It is a problem that cannot be comprehensively resolved, but there is more than one utopian paradox. According to the concept I have outlined here, one utopian paradox can be formulated in this way: the architect is utopian, whether or not she intends to be; she proposes a solution to a utopian problem, and at the same time, she can never solve the problem her proposition sets out to resolve.

This is a different utopian paradox, and the degree or intensity of monstrosity is what distinguishes one utopian proposition from another. The French philosopher Georges Canguilhem reminds us: “The normal type is the degree zero of monstrosity.” Reintroducing utopia then seeks to refocus on the monstrosity of the utopian. It opens for a critical perspective which is per definition itself faulty. Utopology provides a reference point – not in terms of the solution, but in terms of the problem. Where the colloquial utopia is defined as the ultimate resolution of the utopian question, the monstrous utopian of Utopology plays the very opposite role, keeping the utopian question alive by focusing on understanding the problem better.
APPENDICES
UTOPOLOGY’S KEY TERMS

The following is an overview of some of the key terms in this study. The terms included are either introduced here, or have been appropriated for use in a specific meaning in this context, or they have used in other contexts without further elaboration. I have not included concepts from literature, for instance, nor have I included concepts that I consider to be in common use. The role of this list is to provide a basic sense of how I use terms; the terminology presented here thus is subordinate to the more precise use in the text, and the terms may well also be tweaked, or bent in the text. In some ways, the terms and concepts listed here could perhaps also be understood as a very reductive alphabetical summary of the study’s output.

**Anticipation-production:** Architects do not produce buildings (see architectural production), but something that is Not-Yet building. In this sense, architects engage in producing anticipation for a future to come. Anticipation production is very real – it is not simply an indication, but has very real effects on property prices etc. in an economy where the future is, as the German philosopher Joseph Vogl has noted, always already priced in.⁵⁶⁹ One could even argue that it is within anticipation-production that the architect adds value; construction becomes secondary to the anticipation.

Arboraphobia: A fear of trees. Arboraphobia is a key term in the definition of the Network-image. In many ways, the utopian potential of the network lies in its difference to the tree-structure. The rhizome or the distributed system are two network structures that respond to the arboraphobic. Since the emancipatory potential of the Network-image is defined along this via negativa – through that which it is not – the positive entity of the network is usually assumed rather than interrogated. Emancipation and justice are assumed intrinsic to the network structure, as it is not a tree: the fundamental principle is that the tree is the problem, and the network is thus the solution. Arboraphobia is in this sense instrumental in obscuring the elements of control prevalent in networks.

Architectural discipline: Architecture means different things to different people. It is sometimes assumed that architecture is centered on the erection of edifices – as the etymology of architect would indicate – but this assumption is problematic. The answer to the perennial question what is architecture? comes with many presuppositions. One way of turning this question on its head is to instead discuss the role that the architect imagines for herself in the world. If the architect is a craftsperson, then craft, client, and building occupy central positions in the definition of architecture. If she sees herself as an artist in the Beaux-Arts tradition, then the school or the academy, an architectural community or culture, and the self-image of this culture become central. And if the architect is a scientist, an engineer engaged in the solving of society’s problems, architecture is, at least hypothetically, measured by the extent to which the solution solves the perceived problem; and so on. I use the term architectural discipline to cover a wider range of practices, professions, educational systems, definitions, and centers. The architectural discipline is in this sense not precisely a category with a definable border, but rather a territory or set of territories that I collect under one umbrella term. When I write “we, architects,” I am usually referring to this wider discipline of architecture.
**Architectural production:** Architects do not necessarily produce buildings; instead it could be argued that they produce building assemblage instructions and rhetorical components. The utopian expression is located in these, rather than in the built structure itself. A study of the utopian must concern itself with the agency of the architectural proposition rather than focusing on the hypothetical effects of the proposed structure alone. Both the building assemblage instructions and the rhetorical component can engage in anticipation-production; there is in other words an instrumentality of the drawings and plans in themselves. This is a reductive understanding of architectural production, but it serves to emphasize the immaterial aspects of what architects do and the necessity to see images and blueprints precisely as images and blueprints. This is contrary to the educational culture of architecture, which tends to look through the drawings and images to see the building contained therein.

**Building assemblage instructions:** Part of architectural production. Building assemblage instructions include drawings, specifications, contracts, etc. – all of the documents that are necessary for the construction of a building to take place or at least appear immanent. The nature of the building assemblage instructions is determined by the professional body representing architects, whose protocols define what constitutes building assemblage instructions.

**Chimera:** A monster composed of different identifiable parts that have been displaced or hybridized to make a different beast; centaurs and sphinxes are examples of chimeric monsters. A chimeric monster is deformed, and is essentially a positive entity that constitutes the exception to the norm or the underlying order. It is terrifying in its capacity of being unknown and exceptional. In this sense, the chimera is different from Deleuze’s notion of the monstrous; see monster.

**Colloquial Utopia:** In the context of this study, the term denotes the utopian concept as defined through common sense. Colloquial utopia denotes the presupposed utopian problem, i.e. the perfect societal order, and thereby determines the utopian solution as an image of the perfect societal order. This utopian problem is a false problem in so much as the solutions
to it are readily falsifiable; it presumes both a universality and the end of time. As an extra twist, discussion on utopia will focus on the solution, not the problem, and whether or not the solution belongs to the category of the utopian, which in itself is evidence of the solution’s fallibility. Colloquial utopian solutions are responses to the question what is the perfect organization of society?. Challenging this utopian definition is one of the principal aims of this study.

**Control:** Control is a regulating element in any network. Control is the influence of protocols that determine interaction, and basically how power-relations are integrated into the network structure. Control is habitually obscured through the nesting of multiple protocols or by a simple arboraphobic logic.

**Framed/Framing protocols:** Protocols are usually multiple. Framed/framing protocols refer to the relation between protocols. The principle here is nesting, whereby one protocol sits within another. The framing protocol determines aspects of what the framed protocol can do. Connections are managed and network-topological forms are determined through the framing protocol.

**Function:** I consider utopian expressions in terms of what they do, specifically how they perform their function; that is, how they challenge presuppositions. Utopian expressions are thus considered in terms of their instrumentality. This instrumentality should not be confused with the content of the proposition. Nor should function be confused with intention; it is more closely related to effect. In other words, it is located in the experience of something, not the utopian expression in and of itself.

**Hopeful Monster:** Here, this term is used for a type of utopian expression predicated on the logic of the Network-image. The utopian proposition is in a utopian potential that the Hopeful Monster is intended to generate, and scale. The Hopeful Monster is intended to work by delineating a territory (topological or geographical) for bringing together known heterogeneous entities that – in theory – form new syntheses. As the
Hopeful Monster is based on protocol rather than physical form, it can be replicated and spread, and thus the potential is utopian in that it can theoretically multiply seamlessly.

**Medium:** This is a study about architects and their relations to the utopian. Medium is used here in an unorthodox way to denote that through which architects work. This may be a material medium (drawing, image, model, etc.), but also an immaterial medium (protocol, project, platform). While this admittedly stretches the notion of a medium and perhaps does so beyond reason, such an extended concept of medium is necessary to capture the protocological aspects of architectural practice. A second meaning is that within which architects work, which places the medium in the context of the Network-image. In some senses, the medium is the message, and this means that interrogating the media of architecture (partially defined through the self-identification of the architect) is imperative.

**Monster:** Utopia is monstrous in that it challenges the presuppositions about how to live. It is however essential to remember that there are different kinds of monsters. Perhaps the most important distinction here is the distinction between the monster as rising to the surface from the underlying abyss, as something that is discernible but cannot be separated from the abyss; and the chimera, a monster comprised of recognizable, displaced parts. The first kind of monster is in the experience, in the failure to see something according to the systems of order that the mind uses to recognize the world, and it focuses on the problem. The latter, the chimera, is rather an exception to the underlying order, an entity in itself, and ultimately a curiosity rather than a fundamental unsettling.

**Monster-utopian:** Where colloquial utopia is understood as the end of history and the establishment of the perfectly balanced societal order, monster utopias are instead concerned with the act of opening up the future, to see the future as fundamentally undetermined. This is what is here considered monstrous utopian thinking. Such thinking shows us the underlying chaotic nature of the world, which is terrifying but at the same time invariably exhilaratingly open. Monster utopias are in this sense showing us that the system within which we find ourselves is
Monster utopias are consequently measured through intensity, the extent to which they challenge existing images of thought. The monster-utopian serves to keep the question alive rather than provide solutions to questions presumed given.

**Nesting:** Control in the Network-image takes place primarily through protocols. Protocols are invariably multiple, contradictory, and importantly, nested within one another. This means that protocols sit within one another; a framed protocol sits within a framing protocol in one simple description of the relation between protocols. The nesting furthermore applies to media as well, as McLuhan was well aware: the content of any medium is another medium, and this in turn tends to distract us from the medium itself.\(^{570}\)

**Network-image:** The Network-image is described in detail in the eponymous chapter. I argue that the Network-image is the dominant image of thought at present. Its foundation is an arboraphobia, which also obscures the comprehension of the Network-image as an image of thought.

**Platform:** A medium through which utopian desire is expressed. Hopeful Monsters are often platforms. The platform is a topological or Euclidian shape, defined either through protocol, a border, or both. The role of the platform is to make possible connections that are unorthodox or unlikely outside of the platform. In terms of the utopian, platforms have a utopian potential in that they produce (chimeric) monsters.

**Project:** A project is on one level a commitment to another time. In the context of this project and in terms of the architect as project-manager, the term is understood more in terms of a protocol that enables certain actions with certain (and uncertain) effects. Projects tend to be nested in other projects, which are sometimes contradictory, and the sequence of projects is usually beyond comprehension within the local project. Protocols enable projects to be compatible with one another.

**Protocological architecture:** Architects design, but when the architect defines herself as a project manager, she primarily designs protocol for interaction. This is a topologi-
Network-form that distinguishes e.g. a platform from a non-platform. In the context of this study, I refer to protocol mostly in terms of the interface between the social and the material, which is where protocological architecture has become increasingly influential in recent years. Within the protocol designed by the architect there can be other protocols that are democratically defined and evolutionary. The role of material structures within protocological architecture is strictly instrumental; its purpose is to encourage social formations within the project.

**Rhetorical component:** Architectural production has usually involved some sort of rhetorical component, a visualization to convince the client, planners, or similar. However, I argue that the visual component is currently operative in ways that have yet to be studied properly. The rhetorical component is used to build brands and amass fans by attracting attention. Attention and anticipation create value in a future-oriented economy – the actual or eventual construction of the edifice is a secondary, the apartments are sold off-plan. The image that sells the apartment is real, and it is an actual thing, offering something for sale that has yet to be built. It is not an ideal to which the built structure has to live up; rather the image is the commodity itself.

**Scaling:** A central term to the utopian potential of the Hopeful Monster. Here, it is borrowed from "startup culture" and its vocabulary. In software production, it refers to the moment when a software producer exponentially increases its revenue by finding new users, but since the software’s protocol is already written, expenses do not rise correspondingly, as they would if a similar expansion were to take place with a physical product rather than an immaterial product. Scaling is part of the utopian promise of the internet: the ability to conquer the world from a garage.

**Sonic dissonance:** The term is used here in relation to a contradictory play on different senses. The principal example is of a film where the soundtrack produces other affects than the visual material on the screen.
**Unsettle:** The monster unsettles the presumed given. In terms of utopia, the monster-utopian unsettles the future by showing that the future is open.

**Unthinking:** This is a term borrowed from Reinhold Martin’s *Utopia’s Ghost*, where it denotes the active suppression of utopia, interpreted here as the suppression of utopian desire in a context where the colloquial utopian definition makes utopia, as Rem Koolhaas puts it, “architecture’s dirty little secret.”

**Utopology:** The title of this work refers both to the explorations of the topologies of the utopian, how different geometries of utopia condition the utopian propositions. One could also consider Utopology to be a topological version of utopia itself. Traditionally defined in categorical terms – a project is either utopian or not-utopian – this study instead sets out to consider utopia in topological terms and explore how the properties of utopia are maintained when what is considered utopian is squeezed, folded, and stretched. In this sense, it explores the possibility of a topological utopian concept.

**Utopia:** Here understood as expressions of utopian desire that challenge the status quo in one way or another; a proposition addressing a utopian problem. Thomas More’s *Utopia* from 1516 is habitually discussed in terms of the content of the utopian proposition, but one could just as well consider the book itself, showing that society’s order is not given, but subject of discussion the utopian aspect. What the book *Utopia* shows us in that sense is not an island of a different societal order, but something much more radical: a fundamentally open future. Utopia is here specifically not understood as a category, but as intensity. Every artifact contains minimal utopian sparks to some extent; the hierarchy or value of these is based on how intensively they challenge the predominant images of thought.

**Utopian concept:** Here, the utopian concept denotes a meta-level, discussing what the concept of utopia is, rather than the utopian expression. The utopian concept can be associated with the problem rather than its proposed solution. In the colloquial definition, the concept is presupposed. It is...
understood in terms of an image of perfection. Discussion concerns instead the extent to which any one image corresponds to this definition or not. That is precisely the concept that I attempt to upend.

**Utopian image:** Utopia is colloquially associated with an image – literary or visual – that depicts the static, perfect societal order. It is the nature of the image to be static and non-changing. This partly means that the medium through which we envision is beyond time. This propensity for considering the future in static terms rather than as a flow is found in other methods, such as vision planning, scenario-building, and to an extent in back casting. Although the latter two involve alternatives, they nevertheless tend toward very static understandings of the future. The image of course has close connotations with perfection, in perspective, likeness, or beauty. A flow is on the other hand never perfect; instead, it changes. The presuppositions inherent in the image as medium appear undertheorized.

**Utopian potential:** Utopia is not a blueprint in the Network-image. The problems of universality and the end of time that come with the colloquial utopia require another way of expressing utopian desire. Perhaps most central among these is the term utopian potential, which turns up regularly in discussion. Here, the aim is not to author a utopian blueprint, but to generate a cybernetic utopia through feedback loops (usually without acknowledging elements of control and power in networks). Utopian potential is then the potential of an open structure that can change through the collective will of its participants, and in this sense it both represents the utopia it wishes to generate and sets out to generate it at the same time. Utopian potential is the promise of the Hopeful Monster.

**Utopian problem:** The utopian problems are multiplicities, and they are formed in the unconscious. There are an infinite number of solutions to utopian problems. Utopian problems can be described in the question *How to live (better)?*. What this means is conditioned by horizons of imagination, ideology, and experiences, and it is expressed through utopian propositions. If this problem is overdetermined, as in the colloquial definition of utopia, the solutions will invariably be falsifiable solutions to a false problem.
Utopian proposition: A utopian proposition responds to a utopian problem. It can be described as one way of articulating a solution to an unconscious utopian problem. I maintain that every artifact is a utopian proposition in one way or another. However, what distinguishes the more effective artifacts from the everyday artifacts is the intensity of the utopian proposition, the extent to which it challenges the presuppositions that condition the perceived order of the existing.
NOTES ON LITERATURE

Undergirding this study is a literary canon that could justifiably be described as eclectic. This however does not necessarily mean that it is incoherent or lacking a line of argument; it merely serves to state that there is a wide group of thinkers and architects who inform this study.

Each of the questions outlined in the introductory framework has its own set of references and textual material. The first question, which relates to the utopian concept itself, uses texts by Ernst Bloch as well as texts that discuss the philosophical implications of Bloch’s theories. Bloch is unique in that he redefined theories on utopian impulses and hope in The Principle of Hope,\(^572\) which serves as a point of departure for thinking about utopia as a desire. These are developed through texts by primarily Gilles Deleuze, and predominantly excerpts from Difference and Repetition, Empiricism and Subjectivity, and What is Philosophy?\(^573\) Additionally, albeit to a lesser extent, I refer to Jacques Derrida\(^574\) and specifically to how Martin Hägglund interpreted his work in Radical Atheism.\(^575\) In this relatively recent interpretation of Derrida, and in particular Specters of Marx, Hägglund has cast Derrida as a “radical atheist” in stark contrast to the conventional readings of Derrida, all of which ascribe a spiritual “turn” in Derrida’s thinking. Hägglund throws new light on this by re-orienting Derrida’s entire project based on “negative infinity” (infinite finitude) rather than “positive infinity” (uninterrupted duration).\(^576\) Through such a re-orientation, Derrida is focused on survival


\(^576\). Ibid., 3, 44, 91.
rather than immortality as the unconditional affirmation in humanity.

The second question, which focuses on the theory and history of architecture and utopia read next to one another, is informed by three different types of textual material. The first, documenting the emergence of the utopian concept, uses material from historian Reinhart Koselleck, who has written extensively on utopia, the notion of futurity, and what he refers to as “the philosophy of history,” and how history and the future were used as political means, always from a perspective which links the idea to an immanent context and instrumental use. Apart from this history of ideas and of how concepts came to be formed by and reform their milieu, I also refer to works on the emergence of the architect, how and what characterizes the architect’s self-definition, and how this relate to ideals such as progress and utopia. Notable in this category is for instance Françoise Choay’s The Rule and the Model, which traces the relationship between Thomas More and the 19th century emergence of urbanism.

Choay’s work is coupled with authors who focus more on the very medium of projection and the conditions of architectural practice. In this category, architectural historian and theorist Robin Evans takes on an important role, as he has specifically investigated the relationship between architects, what they design, and their media in the article “Translations from Drawing to Building.” These texts focus on the discipline of architecture, the practice of architecture, and the architect, rather than on the object of architecture. In order to relate to the utopian concept developed in this study, it is necessary to understand more about how architecture is produced – under what conditions, and with what media, rather than about the architectural objects themselves.

Something similar can be said for the third category of texts. These texts focus on what could broadly be called critical texts on architectural theory. This category centers on the work of Manfredo Tafuri, particularly on the short book Architecture and Utopia, where Tafuri focuses on the effects of architectural practice and the myths that architects are complicit in covering up. Tafuri’s stance in relation to utopia itself is very categorically

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defined, and I attempt to add nuances to this definition. Another section is built around architectural theorist Reinhold Martin’s *Utopia’s Ghost*, which investigates the period after utopia’s alleged demise. Martin and Tafuri have a common interest in the architect’s production and how architects’ production in the form of drawings and media affect or reaffirm ideological contexts. Again, these are not necessarily focused on the object of architecture, but rather the relationship between architects and ideology.

The third question, regarding the contemporary situation, is somewhat more complicated. Several texts keep returning in different forms. Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control”; has been very important, as has Boltanski and Chiapello’s *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, as well as Alexander R. Galloway’s *Protocol* and his short article succinctly entitled “Networks,” and finally, Seb Franklin’s *Control* from 2015.

Within this field, I attempt to pick up the utopian thread again – utopian desire – now conditioned through the Hopeful Monster. Here, Jonnie Eriksson’s *Monstret och Människan* from 2010 serves to provide a better articulated link between monstrosity and Deleuze, along with Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto.” In addition to these, there are a number of works on both the project and the platform that inform the analysis of the specific utopian expressions.

Two philosophers appear throughout the whole of this work, and they play a central role in the theoretical framework of utopia that I have set up. They are Ernst Bloch and Gilles Deleuze, and their roles and influence warrant a brief outline.

**Ernst Bloch**

The utopian concept developed here is based on Ernst Bloch’s *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* or *The Principle of Hope* (3 parts, published consecutively in the late 1950s). Bloch, in a sense, provides starting points for thinking around the utopian in this context. This means that I do not necessarily follow Bloch, but build on some aspects of Bloch’s theories.

Bloch belonged to the early Frankfurt School, but his influence on critical theory is perhaps more indirect than direct. There are a number of possible explanations for Bloch’s...
relative obscurity. One is his politics, which can be considered “naïve;” another is his style of writing, which appears to oscillate between Marxist and theological.

For example, one of Bloch’s biographers, Ivan Boldyrev, notes that Bloch opposes the idea of predetermination in favor of a process philosophical perspective, but on the other hand, he puts great emphasis on the very messianic moment of redemption at the end of this process. To Bloch, this is not necessarily problematic, as the present is shrouded in “the darkness of the lived moment” and we cannot see the direction in which we are headed; at the same time, the redemption awaits at an end which is less than certain.

There is, as Ruth Levitas notes, a tension between the transcendental and the immanent, between the religious and the secular – between God and Marx, essentially. Depending on how one reads Bloch, he will appear either as a man far ahead of his time, or as a prophet with highly problematic theories. These two discourses rarely overlap, for natural reasons. At the risk of stating the obvious: Bloch is invariably controversial, regardless of perspective.

Additionally, Bloch has also been criticized for idealism. Fredric Jameson, for instance, writes in *Marxism and Form* about Bloch’s ubiquitous utopian impulse that there is a “primal figure” underneath all the distortions in the artifact. Similarly, Leszek Kolakowski writes in his damning account of Marxism about Bloch that:

Both of these are, I argue, reading Bloch in a way which is perhaps too simplistic. Bloch does not have to be read as Platonist nor eschatological in the traditional sense. It is true however that Bloch sought to restore a lost link that he perceived be-


tween the utopian and Marxism. In Bloch’s perspective, Marxism had prioritized reason over will; Kołakowski notes that

> Utopian philosophy is not eschatology in the sense of merely awaiting the eschaton, but is a way of attaining it; it is not a contemplation but an action, an act of the will rather than of reason. Everything we were promised by the Messianism of past ages, there is a possibility of actuating by our own power. There is no God to guarantee that we shall succeed: God himself is part of the Utopia, a finality that is still unrealized.\(^594\)

At the same time, Bloch is adamant that utopia is by no means the inevitable outcome. On the contrary, the outcome may just as well be a “fascist Nothing.”\(^595\) In this sense, Bloch opposes the standard Marxist teleology.

There is, as Ivan Boldyrev notes, little doubt that Bloch was deeply inspired by religion and mysticism.\(^596\) At the same time, as Boldyrev points out, there is no religion that would not consider Bloch a heretic. There is also very little doubt in that Bloch was deeply inspired by the works of Marx; he writes so himself in *The Principle of Hope*. Regarding Bloch, Boldyrev notes that critical theory itself certainly has many of these influences, not least the gnostic, if one by the gnostic understands hidden knowledge that empowers those in the know by enabling them to see the world as it is.\(^597\) This can be compared with Raymond Geuss’ first criterion for critical theory, which stipulates that critical theories are “aimed at producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their true interests are.”\(^598\) In Bloch, as Boldyrev notes, there are a number of gnostic references, not least “the darkness of the lived moment,” however, as opposed to most other Marxists, Bloch maintained that it was impossible to understand the “Not-Yet” from the lived moment.

**Gilles Deleuze**

Another key reference for this study is Gilles Deleuze, who figures throughout in a variety of capacities. Deleuze was a French philosopher whose wide and sprawling œuvre covers a wide spectrum of subjects, and while it would be erroneous to suggest that he focused on one question or topic, certain strands of thought are perhaps more associated with him than others – for example rhizomes, transcendental empiricism,

\(^594.\) Ibid., 423-24. 


\(^596.\) Boldyrev, *Ernst Bloch and His Contemporaries*, 91. 

\(^597.\) Gnosis is mainly understood as hidden knowledge, only accessible to the consecrated, of both the origins of the universe and the future redemption (which is also possible only for the chosen). Boldyrev, *Ernst Bloch and His Contemporaries*, 93. 

immanence, “Bergsonism,” the distinction between the actual and the virtual, intensities, flows, micropolitics, etc. The list goes on.

Deleuze has come to play a very specific role in architecture and architectural theory, and I set out to challenge it. Architectural theorist Douglas Spencer has, in a very specific take on “Deleuzism,” suggested that Deleuze came to play the role of replacing the previous demigod of architectural philosophy, Jacques Derrida, and the centrality of text in Derrida is replaced with a centrality of folds, flows, and creativity. To Spencer, Deleuzism is the banal and reductive usage of Deleuze in architectural theory since the early 2000s, rather than the production of bastards that Deleuze claimed as his working method.

Spencer is adamant that the contrast built up between Deleuze and Derrida is in reality a precise rhetorical construction. Thus, according to Spencer, Deleuze has come to play the role of lending philosophical legitimacy to the overthrowing of Derridean deconstruction in architecture. I certainly agree with Spencer regarding the banality and peculiar uses of Deleuze and Deleuzian philosophy, explicitly and implicitly, by architects, but I suggest that Deleuze’s philosophical œuvre is broad enough to permit a critique of such philosophical adaptations from within Deleuze’s philosophy. Just like other architects, I will select the parts of Deleuze’s philosophical works that propel this argument forward. The difference is that my motivations, intentions, and framework differ significantly. Deleuze’s own writing on the subject of utopia is very limited, although I will argue that his influence concerning the utopian is very strong, in architecture and elsewhere.

**General notes on literature**

There are a few eminences grises whose influence is palpable in all of the theories referenced here. These eminences grises are perhaps unsurprising, considering their influence on the history of philosophy and critical theory. The first of them is Immanuel Kant. Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* is, according to the philosopher Joe Hughes, modeled after Kant’s *Critique of Pure
Reason; but, as Joe Hughes notes, only as this text appears from the point of view of Critique of Judgment. 600

According to Martin Hägglund, part of Derrida’s Specters of Marx was written to deconstruct the unconditional in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 601 Crucially however, Hägglund argues that Derrida cannot be read through Kant, as for instance Daniel W. Smith does 602: “For Kant, the unconditional is the Idea of a sovereign instance that is not subjected to time and space (e.g., God). For Derrida, on the contrary, the unconditional is thespacing of time that undermines the very Idea of a sovereign instance.” 603 The two perspectives are in other words incompatible in Hägglund’s view.

In Bloch, the influence is perhaps less explicit, but nevertheless there are plenty of references to Kant and his “Ding-an-sich” or “Thing-in-itself”. 604 Bloch remained critical that Kant failed to acknowledge the Possible in Objective-real form, as Kant, according to Bloch, assigned the possible on the side of the ideal in his schema. 605

Another eminence gris whose impact on this study should not be underestimated is of course Karl Marx. His spectral presence is articulated in Specters of Marx and Derrida, but the influence of Marx, particularly in his younger days, was Bloch’s major reference in The Principle of Hope. Marx brought Bloch’s early work, such as The Spirit of Utopia, 606 to a more concrete and more immanent orientation; Bloch maintains that Marx was the person who enabled thinking of the future in useful ways. 607 Marx’s influence on Deleuze is perhaps less explicit, but nevertheless, Deleuze himself acknowledged the profound and lasting influence of Marx. There are a number of other influences that could merit more discussion, including Benjamin, Hegel, Nietzsche, and others; however, these all fall outside the immediate scope of this project.

The combined assortment of references in this project certainly has its shortcomings. There are many imbalances; Euro-centricism and eclecticism are perhaps two of the most blatant ones. Additionally, I have written this in English, all the quotes are likewise presented in English, translated by myself where necessary. I have used the English translations of the texts not originally written in English or Swedish, consulting

601. Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 43.
603. Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 19.
604. Boldryev, Ernst Bloch and His Contemporaries, 125.
605. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Volume 1, 244.
the German, French or Italian originals for clarification purposes when no English translations were available.

My approach to the literature has been a rather heretic one. I have used a method which is not unrelated to Deleuze’s idiosyncratic approach, in which he used, or abused rather, the works of other philosophers that had never become institutionalized in order to breed monsters that resulted from his encounter with their work. In the same sense, my primary interest is not strictly confined to what the intentions of the different thinkers addressed in this study were, but rather what they can do: how they can propel this project forward.

608. Deleuze notes in “Letter to a Harsh Critic” that his approach to the history of philosophy was troubled, but that he coped by “see[ing] the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.” Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 6. And Eriksson, Monstret och Människan, 459.
VAR HAMNAR VI OM VI SLÄPPER DET VI TROR OSS VETA OM UTOPIER, OCH ISTÅLLET FÖRSÖKER FÖRSTÅ UTOPIBEGREPPET FRÅN GRUNDEN?

Om det utopiska inte är statiskt, utan istället förändringsfritt, vilken roll spelar det för arkitektur, och, vice versa, vilken roll spelar arkitektur för det utopiska?


De allra flesta människor tycker sig känna igen en utopi när de ser en, de kan skilja på utopier och icke-utopier. Diskussioner i ämnet tenderar att haka upp sig på gränser och människan mellan dessa absoluta ytterligheter: är en artefakt utopisk eller inte?

Om vi istället helt sonika lämnar den frågan, och istället närmar oss det utopiska genom hur och varför något är utopiskt kan vi börja studera självabegreppet närmare. Det visar sig snabbt att dess innebörđ på intet vis är självklart. Ordet
utopi myntades av Sir Thomas More i boken Utopia, publicerad 1516. Associationer till framtiden och perfektion kom långt senare. Detta, kombinerat med den inbyggda etymologiska dubbelheten i begreppet, som ständigt skiftar mellan ou-topia, ingenstans, och eu-topia, en bra plats, leder oss till att förstå att utopibegreppet nog inte är så enkelt eller kategoriskt som en lätt föreställer sig.

Det är till viss del just det kategoriska i hur vi ser utopier och icke-utopier som denna avhandling finner problematiskt. Den binära uppdelningen genom vilken en artefakt antingen är utopisk eller inte är det som avhandlingen söker vända ut och in på.

Eftersom utopin har skiftat form såväl som dimension (från fjärran ö till framtiden) är det svårt att se någon av dessa parametrar som konstituerande för utopibegreppet, och det blir intressant att plocka isär själva begreppet.

Jag menar att utopin är uttryck för ett begär efter en bättre tillvaro. Vad som avses med bättre är i sin tur där diskussionen om utopins underliggande problem, det som utopin vill besvara, tar sin början. Begäret efter en bättre tillvaro är uttryckt, med olika intensitet i nästan varje artefakt, som den tyske 1900-talsfilosofen Ernst Bloch betonade.

Dessa utopiska uttryck är, menar jag, i första hand intressanta på grund av vad de gör, inte det innehåll de presenterar. För att illustrera återvänder vi till More: Utopia, boken, beskrev landet Utopia, och hur detta samhälle var reglerat. Genom historien har fokus varit på beskrivningen av samhället på ön Utopia, men samtidigt är vad boken Utopia visar oss minst lika intressant: att samhällsordningen inte är given av Gud, utan en i högsta grad mänsklig konstruktion.


I samtidsarkitektur kommer utopin till uttryck genom att arkitekter inte främst engagerar sig i produktionen av byggnader, att arkitekter inte längre ser sig själva som hantverkare, konstnärer eller ingenjörer, utan som project managers. Arkitekten ingår på detta vis i det vi kan kalla Nätverksbild, en Deleuziansk "bild av tänkandet" som prioriterar nätverk och förbindelser över annat med starka utopiska undertoner. I mångt och mycket definieras dess utopiska aspekter av det som här kallas Arboraafobi, eller rädslan för trä. Nätverk framhålls ideligen som den rigida och hierarkiska trädstrukturers naturliga motsats: om trädet är problemet är nätverket lösningen. Denna negativa definition leder till att de problematiska och hierarkiska aspekter som återfinns i nätverkens mekanik ofta lämnas dolda.

Nätverksbildens kännetecknas av en stark tro på det distribuerade nätverkets transversala och emancipatoriska potential, en tro som framkommer genom diverse metaforer som t ex "bottom up", "brukarstyrt", "deltagande", "självorganiserade" m.fl. lösningar.

Arkitekten framställer inte längre projekterar av framtider som ska realiseras, utan arbetar snarare med att etablera olika protokoll som ramar in, sätter gränserna för, det "självorganiserade". Arkitekten ser sig själv som en katalysator, och detta arbetssätt ger arkitekten en uppsjö nya arbetsredskap och vad som ibland refereras till som "utopisk potential". Samti-
dig är det viktigt att betona att varje nätverk alltid är styrt av flera protokoll, och genom dessa protokoll utövar arkitekten en annan typ av kontroll av framtiden än hon traditionellt ägnat sig åt (genom projektion).

Denna kontroll är långt ifrån oproblematisk, men har tidigare ägnats liten eller ingen uppmärksamhet inom arkitekturdiskursen. Genom arkitektens ändrade självbild blir arkitekten inskriven i en logik, Nätverksbildens logik har långtgående konsekvenser för de effekter arkitektens arbete har. Vidare blir resultatet att Nätverksbilden förstärks istället för att dess verkningar och mekanismer ifrågasätts och analyseras.

ABSTRACT

Utopia – the word is simultaneously evocative of hope and dread. As a concept it is stupendously problematic, and yet despite its alleged passing into irrelevance, utopia still remains a household word. Why is this so?

Utopia has been reduced to a category. We place a solution in the category of the utopian or, conversely, the not-utopian. Without fail, discussions involving utopia will eventually veer toward debates on whether a book, project, or building is utopian or not.

Utopia reduced to such a category invokes both a problematic universality and a convoluted end of history – perhaps nowhere more so than in the field of architecture. However, if we begin with the problem to which the solution is a response rather than the solution being proposed, we soon realize that utopia is more complicated than a simple image of a perfect future.

The study at hand re-interrogates the utopian concept. The question is not what architecture is utopian, but how and why architecture is utopian. Utopia is reinterpreted as a concept predicated on survival and a desire for a better way of living, rather than on immortality and perfection. Utopia in this sense is monstrous; its function is to challenge the presuppositions that define the horizons of our imagination, and to show us that the future is not predetermined: the future is fundamentally open.

What assumptions, then, are formative of how architects relate to the future and utopia when projections of that future perfect have become irrelevant?
If the projection of a perfect future is impossible, yet intimately associated with the architect, utopia becomes paradoxical for architects. Utopian desire is instead expressed in other ways, consciously or unconsciously. The study argues that the present worldview is dominated by what is here dubbed the Network-image; we think of everything in terms of networks, privileging connections over form, and the architect is again assuming a new role for herself as a manager, rather than an expert.

Networks offer different ways of working with architecture. Rather than specifying the forms of the future (projections), architects can and do work by defining and elaborating protocols that enable and cultivate connections which, according to the prevalent narrative, build transversal collectives that can potentially transform the world.

However, there are other implications linked to these new opportunities. Any network is governed by multiple protocols, and the architect as manager becomes inscribed in a logic of control. There is an implicit notion that architects can produce architecture that is self-governing, participatory, and implicitly egalitarian (and instrumental in opening up the future) through designing protocols. This assumption urgently needs to be interrogated.

The discussion in this study centers on the need to challenge the Network-image itself, and not only to take our role in it as given. The dissertation is an argument for considering the how of imagining the future with more scrutiny, and it offers a set of principles and a terminology for discussion to enable further research on the subject.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many more people to thank for inspiring and helping me over the course of the last five years than would be realistic to list here.

I would however like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude:

To the national research school in architecture, ResArc, which I have had the privilege to be part of, and FORMAS for funding my research studies.

To my supervisor, Lars-Henrik Ståhl and my co-supervisor Catharina Sternudd for guidance and inspiration, but also for believing in me and permitting me to find my own way.

To my reviewers, Mats Rosengren and Sven-Olov Wallenstein, at my interim seminars, 90% and 50% respectively for very useful input, encouragement, and feedback.

To the senior researchers at my department who have also taken the time to read and discuss the content of this thesis, particularly Mattias Kärrholm and Gunnar Sandin, who have both been extremely helpful and have provided very skillful feedback.

To researchers at the other schools of architecture in Sweden who have offered feedback and encouragement. There are many, but I would particularly like to thank Hélène Frichot, Roemer van Toorn and Nel Janssens, who have been providing useful advice and feedback during the process of writing.
To my fellow research students within ResArc, Here, I particularly want to thank my fellow Lo-res accomplices Helen Runting and Erik Sigge for great collaborations. In addition to these, there are many others within the ResArc cohort to whom I’m grateful, including Sepideh Karami, Katja Hogenboom, Janek Ozmin, Brady Burroughs, Hannes Frykholm, and many others who have provided feedback and support.

To my colleagues and friends at my own department, including Jesper Magnusson, Ida Sandström, Paulina Prieto de la Fuente, Emma Nilsson, Sandra Kopljar, Kajsa Lawaczeck Körner, Anna Petersson, Marwa Al Khalidi, Anna Wahlöö, Maria Rasmussen, and many others.

To my mother and father, who have provided me with invaluable advice along the way and who never doubted my ability to put together a dissertation even if it was not in engineering.

To my brother Gustav for support, inspiration and discussions.

To my daughters, Siri and Ada, who keep helping me discovering new things constantly, and who put work into perspective in a wonderful way.

And finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to Justina Bartoli, for all the support, advice and inspiration you have provided as my wife, copy editor and discussion partner throughout these years.

Thank you all.
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