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The Effect of Dominance on Food Hoarding: A Game Theoretical Model

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abstract: Many food hoarding animals live in small groups structured by rank. The presence of conspecifics in the hoarding area increases the risk of losing stored supplies. The possibility of stealing from others depends on a forager’s rank in the group. Highly ranked individuals can steal from subordinates and also protect their own caches. Since storing incurs both costs and benefits, the optimal hoarding investment will differ between individuals of different rank. In a game theoretical model, we investigate how dominant and subordinate individuals should optimize their hoarding effort. Our model imagines animals that are large-scale hoarders in autumn and dependent on stored supplies for winter survival. Many examples can be found in the bird families Paridae and Corvidae, but the model can be used for any hoarding species that forage in groups. Predictions from the model are as follows: First, subordinates should store more than dominants, but in a predictable environment, this difference will decrease as the environment gets harsher. Under harsh conditions, dominants should store almost as much as subordinates and, later, spend almost as much time retrieving their own caches as subordinates. Second, if on the other hand, bad winter conditions were not expected when storing, dominants should spend more time pilfering caches from subordinates. Third, in populations that are highly dependent on stored supplies, dominants should store relatively more than in populations that are less dependent on stored supplies. Fourth, harsher environments will favor hoarding. And finally, if dominant individuals store, it implies that hoarders have a selfish recovery advantage over conspecific pilferers.

Keywords: food hoarding, dominance rank, game theoretical model, optimization model, foraging theory, behavioral ecology.

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Am. Nat. 2001. Vol. 157, pp. 66–75. © 2001 by The University of Chicago. 0003-0147/2001/15701-0006$03.00. All rights reserved.
ditional hoarding. If dominants can pilfer from subordinate
individuals’ supplies without being attacked, they can reduce
costs by investing less in their own storing. Since the de-
cision of how much to invest in food storing depends on
the balance between the benefits and costs, the optimal
storing effort should differ for birds of different rank.

Here, we present a game theoretical model designed to
predict rank-dependent hoarding investment in a sim-
plistic two-rank system. Our imagined model animal is a
hoarding parid, like the willow tit or the black-capped
chickadee Parus atricapillus, but the model applies to any
hoarding species that lives in stable nonkin groups.

The Model

The model considers the effect of autumn hoarding on
fitness. Since there is no reproduction in winter, it is rea-
sonal to model fitness as survival. To reduce the length
of this article, we here assume that survival increases linearly
with the amount of stored food and present the effect of
nonlinearity elsewhere (A. Brodin, K. Lundborg, and C.
Clark, unpublished manuscript). Hoarding is not only ben-
eficial but also has costs that reduce survival in proportion
to the amount of food stored.

There are two individual ranks, a dominant and a sub-
ordinate, each with its own foraging niche within the ter-
ritory. Such niches could be a subdivision of a group ter-
ritory into smaller individual areas. Here, we consider the
niches to consist of the above mentioned vertical or hor-
izontal separation of foraging trees, such as those that can
be seen in several species of hoarding parids (Ekman and
Askenmo 1984; Ekman 1990; Hogstad 1992; Lens et al.
1994). In these, the dominants exclude the subordinates
from the upper or inner parts of the trees. A system with
two ranks is a reasonable simplification of the system in
winter flocks of most parids and many corvids (e.g., Ek-
flocks are frequently small in hoarding species, and this
can enhance the evolution and stability of food hoarding
strategies (Smulders 1998).

The dominant can choose to forage in the subordinate’s
niche but not vice versa. At the beginning of the winter,
the amount of stored food will be at its maximum. This
means that the optimal option for the dominant is to start
in the subordinate’s niche and then to switch to its own.
Otherwise, the subordinate would reduce the food supply
before the dominant could benefit from it. For the sub-
ordinate, this is the worst case scenario since loss of food
will be at a maximum. After pilfering from the subordi-
nate, the dominant can benefit from the still intact food
in its own exclusive niche. The subordinate can only ben-
efit from its own caches and has to accept the dominant’s
pilfering. We start by assuming that hoarders have no ad-
vantage in relocating their own caches but, later, also in-
vestigate the effect of a recovery advantage.

In the autumn, both ranks decide how much food to
store. The dominant also must assess how much time it is
going to spend foraging in its own and in the subordinate’s
niche later during retrieval. The total food available for
consumption in winter in niche $i$ will consist of stored food,
h, and food that is present without storing, $h_e$. We will
henceforward call $h_e$ “background food.” The total food
available in niche $i$ will then be $h_e + h_i$, if we, for simplicity,
assume that both niches contain equal amounts of back-
ground food. Besides cache pilfering by conspecifics of su-
perior rank, there can also be other forms of cache losses,
like interspecific pilfering. Scatter-hoarding birds with large
winter territories normally experience very low rates of
cache loss (Brodin 1993a). For simplicity, therefore, we dis-
regard such losses here. The consumption curve of the food
supply can be described by $e^{-rt}$, where $r$ is the depletion
rate and $t$ is time spent foraging. If a forager has exclusive
access to its own niche, $i$, the food eaten, $g_i$, will be

$$g_i = (h_i + h_e)(1 - e^{-rt}). \tag{1}$$

We can now use equation (1) to make expressions for both
ranks. If the dominant starts in the subordinate’s niche,
the amount of food eaten by the dominant in winter, $g_D$,
will be

$$g_D = \frac{1}{2}(h_0 + h_1)(1 - e^{-rt})$$

$$+ (h_1 + h_D)(1 - e^{-rt}), \tag{2}$$

where $h_0$ is the dominant’s stores and $h_1$ the subordinate’s,
$T$ is the total winter time, $t$ is the time the dominant feeds
in its own niche, $r_j$ is the rate of food depletion with two
competing foragers present, and $r_i$ is the rate of food de-
pletion for a single forager, with $r_i \leq r_j \leq 2r_i$. The first
term in equation (2) is multiplied by 1/2 since there are
two foragers sharing the food. It shows what the dominant
gets from foraging in the subordinate’s niche. The second
term is what it gets from its own niche.

The subordinate gets the same amount of food as the
dominant when they both forage in the subordinate’s
niche. After that, the subordinate may feed on what is left
when the dominant has switched to its own niche. With
the same notation as above, the food for the subordinate
in winter becomes
\[
g_s = \frac{1}{2} \left( h_0 + h_s \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-r_s(T-t)} \right]
+ \left( h_0 + h_s \right) e^{-r_s(T-t)} \left( 1 - e^{-r_s} \right).
\]

To get the effect of the act of food hoarding on survival, we must also include the costs, which will be \(e^{-kt}\) (app. A). Here, \(k\) is a coefficient for the cost of hoarding, and \(h\) is the amount of hoarded food. Assuming a linear relationship between the food (\(g\)) and fitness, the effect of food storing on fitness will be

\[
F_h(h_D, t, h_s) = e^{-kh_0} g_D,
\]

\[
F_s(t, h_s) = e^{-kh} g_S,
\]

where \(F_h\) and \(F_s\) are the fitnesses of the dominant and the subordinate, respectively. To find the optimal hoarding investments, we must maximize these quantities. The dominant optimizes \(h_D\) and \(t\), whereas the subordinate only optimizes \(h_s\). We denote the optima by \(h^*_D\), \(t^*\), and \(h^*_S\), respectively.

For most cases, \(h^*_S\) cannot be found analytically (see "Results"). We then use stepwise numerical iteration, although other methods like graphical solutions or partial derivatives may also be possible. The iteration is explained in detail in appendix A and leads to a Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951), that is, a pair of strategies \((h^*_D, t^*)\) and \((h^*_S)\) that are mutual best replies:

\[
F_h(h^*_D, t^*, h^*_S) \geq F_h(h_D, t, h^*_S) \quad \text{for all } h_D \text{ and all } t,
\]

\[
F_h(t^*, h^*_S) \geq F_h(t, h^*_S) \quad \text{for all } h_s.
\]

If there is a recovery advantage for the hoarder, equations (2) and (3) become

\[
g_D = \frac{1}{2} \left( h_0 + (1 - p_s)h_s \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-r_d(T-t)} \right]
+ \left( h_0 + h_d \right) e^{-r_d(T-t)} \left( 1 - e^{-r_d} \right),
\]

\[
g_s = \frac{1}{2} \left( h_0 + p_s h_s \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-r_s(T-t)} \right]
+ \left( h_0 + h_s \right) e^{-r_s(T-t)} \left( 1 - e^{-r_s} \right)
\]

for the dominant and subordinate, respectively. The notation is the same as in equations (2) and (3), except for \(p_s\), which is the proportion of caches recovered by a hoarder. The expression \(1 - p_s\) is then the proportion taken by the pilfering dominant. Equations (4) and (5) are still valid expressions for \(F_0\) and \(F_s\) if \(g_0\) and \(g_s\) are calculated as in equations (7) and (8).

For numerical solutions, the exact values of the parameters are not as important as it is that they are reasonable in relation to each other. The depletion rates, \(r_i\) and \(r_j\), must scale to the chosen time interval, and the coefficient for the cost of hoarding, \(k\), must be reasonable in relation to the number of items hoarded, \(h_s\) and \(h_s\). Also, the relative importance of hoarded food is set by the value of \(h\) in relation \(h_0\) and \(h_s\). We scale the parameters according to estimates from the literature. For baseline values of parameters and their justification, see appendix B.

### Results

**Analytical Solutions of Optimal Hoarding Efforts, \(h^*_D\) and \(h^*_S\)**

Equilibrium occurs when both ranks store optimally and the dominant’s allocation of time between the niches is also optimal. Differentiating \(F_h\) in equation (5) with respect to \(h_s\) gives a somewhat surprising result (see app. A). The optimal subordinate hoard size depends on the cost coefficient and food available without storing but not on the time spent pilfering by the dominant:

\[
h^*_s = \frac{1}{k} - h_0,
\]

provided that this is positive; otherwise, \(h^*_s = 0\). The optimum hoard of the dominant is easy to find in the limiting cases, \(t = T\) and \(t = 0\) (see app. A). In cases when the dominant spends all time in its own niche \((t = T)\), the optimal hoarding effort for the dominant, \(h^*_D\), is the same as that for the subordinate (eq. [A6]). If the dominant spends all foraging time in the subordinate’s niche \((t = 0)\), it should not store any food since investment in its own caches cannot increase fitness (eq. [A7]). Since \(0 \leq t^* \leq T\), the lowest and highest possible values of the dominant’s optimal storing effort are \(0 \leq h^*_D \leq h^*_s\). Provided that this is positive; otherwise, \(h^*_D = 0\).

For the cases when \(0 < t < T\), there is one assumption that still makes it possible to find \(h^*_D\) analytically (app. A): if two foragers deplete a niche at the same rate as one \(r_2 = r_1\), for example, if there is interference. A similar relation as in equation (A6) still holds, but the dominant should now be more sensitive to the costs of hoarding:

\[
h^*_D = \frac{1}{2k} - h_0.
\]

As expected, the optimal hoard decreases for both categories with an increasing cost or if more food is available.
Hoarding in Rank-Structured, Nonkin Groups

Figure 1: Optimal hoarding effort \( h^*_i \) as a function of the cost of hoarding \( hi \) (top panel) and food availability without stores (bottom panel). The solid lines are for the subordinate; and the dashed lines, for the dominant (if and ). If the dominant spends all time in its own niche \( r_p \), the dominant’s optima will be the same as the subordinate’s (solid lines).

Solutions to More Complex Cases of Optimal Hoarding Efforts, \( h^*_i \) and \( h^*_S \)

For most conditions, \( h^*_i \) cannot be found analytically. Inserting the 43.6 d (from eq. [A8]) in equation (4) and iterating the equilibrium (app. A) would give a negative optimum, that is, \( h^*_i = 0 \). This shows that the dominant should refrain from storing under baseline conditions. However, we assumed that both ranks had equal access to the subordinate’s caches. Realistically, a hoarder will find more of its own caches than a competitor searching more randomly. Considering empirical evidence, we introduce, therefore, a recovery advantage of 4 : 1 for the hoarding subordinate (app. B). Then we can no longer use equation (6) to calculate \( h^*_S \). Instead, we must now include one more factor in our stepwise iteration since \( h^*_S \) also depends on \( t \) (app. A). With our baseline values, there is a strict Nash equilibrium (e.g., Bulmer 1994) when the dominant stores 22,943 items and spends 79 d in its own niche and the subordinate stores 31,615 items.

Altering Winter Conditions

A simple way to model harsher winter conditions is to decrease background food, \( h_0 \). This can be seen either as an environment containing less background food at retrieval or as one requiring more energy for metabolic expenditure, that is, one that is colder. Here “harsher” can mean two different things. First, an environment can be predictably harsh. We investigate this by iterating new equilibria for different values of background food. Starting with no background food, the dominant should store almost as much as the subordinate. As \( h_0 \) increases, the dominant should hoard less and spend less time in its own niche (fig. 2, dashed line). At some point, we will reach a value of \( h_0 \) (around 18,250 with our baseline values) when it no longer pays for the dominant to store. Increasing background food even more now means, instead, that the dominant should spend more time in its own niche (fig. 2, solid line).

Second, when冬天 arrives, it can be worse than was expected when food was stored in autumn. We model this by allowing the dominant to reoptimize time allocation, \( t^* \), for different values of background food while keeping the optimal hoards, \( h^*_i \) and \( h^*_S \), constant at the values obtained above for the baseline value of \( h_0 \) (10,000). The less background food there is, the less time the dominant should spend in its own habitat (fig. 2, solid line).

If we consider the simultaneous optimization of \( h^*_i \), \( h^*_S \), and \( t \) again, the retrieval advantage means that changes in \( h_0 \) will affect not only \( h^*_i \) but also \( h^*_S \). The values of some of the parameters (e.g., \( k \) and \( h_0 \)) are difficult to estimate. Since errors in such estimates will be similar for both ranks, the quotient \( h^*_S / h^*_i \) is more robust and empirically testable than predictions of numbers of stored items. At \( h_0 = 0 \), there is no food available in winter except stores. Then the dominant should store almost as much as the subordinate (fig. 3). As \( h_0 \) increases, \( h^*_i \) decreases faster than \( h^*_S \), and in accordance with figure 2, we find a value of \( h_0 \) over which the dominant should refrain from storing.
Figure 2: Optimal number of days the dominant should forage in its own niche as a function of the amount of background food, $h_0$. Decreasing $h_0$ can be seen as simulating a harsher environment. The predicted response depends on whether a low $h_0$ was expected (dashed line) or not expected (solid line). In the former case, less background food will be met by more food hoarding.

**The Effect of Other Factors when Reassessing $t^*$ at the Start of Winter**

If time is allocated differently in winter than expected during storing, other factors than winter conditions (i.e., background food) should also be considered. It is evident from equation (A8) that the dominant should spend more time in its own niche if the subordinate has stored less than expected (not shown). The effect of prolonging the winter is trivial: if $T$ increases, $t$ increases in a proportional way. If the dominant should experience more interference from the subordinate than previously expected, the emptying rates for two foragers ($r_2$) will be less than expected. Decreasing $r_2$ from 0.02 to 0.01 (the same as $r_1$) means that $t^*$ first decreases to a minimum around $r_2 = 0.0176$ and then increases again (not shown). Values of $r_2$ below $r_1$ or above $2 \times r_1$ mean that the dominant should spend even more time in its own niche (not shown).

**Discussion**

An important message of the model is that dominants should refrain from storing if there is no recovery advantage for hoarders. In a game theoretical model with no dominance asymmetry, Smulders (1998) has shown that a recovery advantage is not necessary for a hoarding strategy to evolve. We do not know of any species in which high-ranked individuals refrain from storing. Our model suggests that there are adaptive mechanisms for cache recovery present, and empirical evidence seems to support this. Such mechanisms could be any of the following: first, a spatial memory for caching locations (e.g., Sherry et al. 1981; Shettleworth and Krebs 1982; Kamil and Balda 1985; Hitchcock and Sherry 1990; Hårdling et al. 1995; Healy and Suonen 1996; Brodin and Kunz 1997; Hårdling et al. 1997; Clayton and Dickinson 1998); second, an individually exclusive hoarding area (e.g., Andersson and Krebs 1978); or third, a different individual preference for types of locations (Brodin and Kunz 1997). Such a recovery advantage will have the effect of making caches more individually exclusive. In our model, this will specifically protect the subordinate’s caches, but the assumption that separation of caches will promote food hoarding is general and in accordance with earlier models (Andersson and Krebs 1978; Smulders 1998).

Another important message is that the optimal behavior of the dominant under harsh conditions depends on whether such conditions were expected or not. It should store more and forage more in its own niche before a predictably cold winter compared to a more benign environment. Here, our model is in accordance with Smulders (1998), suggesting that more severe (and expected) conditions will promote food hoarding. On the other
hand, if the winter unpredictably gets worse than expected, the dominant should spend less time in its own niche. This may seem counterintuitive, but as a result of insufficient hoarding, the dominant’s own niche is less valuable than the subordinate’s niche. As far as we know, there are no empirical tests of these predictions.

Changing background food, \( h_0 \), in relation to the amount of stored food, \( h_i \), is not only a way to simulate changes in the severity of the climate; it is also a way to compare species that are more or less dependent on stored food in winter. Setting \( h_0 \) to 0 will then give predictions for a species that eats only stored food in winter. For species like nutcrackers that are almost entirely dependent on stored food, figure 3 suggests that we would expect birds of different ranks to store almost equal amounts of food in autumn. In parids, on the other hand, where stored food may constitute around 50% of the winter diet, we can expect subordinates to store notably more than dominants.

Under reasonable assumptions, there is only one Nash equilibrium. Both ranks should store, and the subordinate should store more than the dominant since it has to hedge for pilfering. This may seem obvious but has not previously been explicitly stated. There are few empirical studies of hoarding as a function of rank. In willow tits, Lahti and Rytkönen (1996) found that subordinates stored more than dominants during natural foraging. At feeders that were only available for a short time, however, dominants stored more than subordinates (Lahti et al. 1998). We can also compare this prediction with rank-dependent differences in the regulation of fat reserves. Fat is another way of storing energy for future use but in a shorter time perspective. Ekman and Lilliehöld (1993) found that subordinate willow tits maintained larger fat reserves than dominants. Although fat inside the body cannot be stolen like caches, the underlying mechanism is similar. Dominants have priority when the flock encounters food and, hence, need to invest less in building reserves. In the hoarding case, dominants steal stored food, and in the body fat case, dominants have a more predictable access to food since they can displace subordinates from food sources.

If there is no recovery advantage for hoarders, the optimal hoarding investment for the subordinate, somewhat surprisingly, only depends on the cost of hoarding, \( k \), and the amount of food without stores, \( h_0 \). The best behavior for the subordinate is, then, to store, independently of what the dominant does. This prediction results from our simplifying assumption (eqq. [4], [5]) that fitness is proportional to food intake; we will discuss the effects of relaxing this assumption in a future article. Analyzing a symmetrical game with equal players playing “against the field” (but foraging in small groups), Smulders (1998) showed that a hoarding strategy could invade a nonhoarding population even if hoarders do not have a retrieval advantage. The result would be a mixed ESS with hoarders and pilfering nonhoarders.

Figure 3: The ratio \( h_S^*/h_D^* \) as a function of \( h_0 \). It shows how much the dominant should invest in storing relative to the subordinate. In harsh environments (low \( h_0 \)), dominants should store almost as much as subordinates, whereas they should refrain from storing when winter food is abundant (high \( h_0 \)).
In reality, such groups will be rank structured, and with the assumptions in our model, pilfering could be an effect of rank rather than a strategy. As mentioned above, however, a hoarding strategy without a retrieval advantage is probably not realistic. The assumptions that made a simple, analytical solution possible for the dominant’s optima (and not only for the subordinate’s) are even more unrealistic. For example, a dominant will, in reality, probably always visit a subordinate’s niche \((t > 0)\), at least to sample the foraging possibilities there.

The baseline value of the coefficient for the cost of hoarding, \(2.5 \times 10^{-5}\), implies a winter mortality of around 40%–50% for hoarding 20,000–30,000 items (app. B). Such high mortality occurs only during severe winters (Jansson et al. 1981), and the costs incurred by hoarding are probably not the only source of mortality. A coefficient of \(2.5 \times 10^{-7}\) would give a mortality of around 5%. According to equation (6), the subordinate could then afford to store over 3 million items. With such a low cost, the limit for hoarding may instead be set by time restrictions.

Pravosudov (1985) reported that willow and Siberian tits (Parus cinctus) stored 150,000–170,000 spruce seeds in northern Russia. This estimate is considerably higher than just using the mean (A. Brodin, K. Lundborg, and C. Clark, unpublished manuscript). Second, the conclusion that the cost of hoarding might be insignificant.

In conclusion, the model predicts that both low- and high-ranked individuals should store winter supplies if there is separation of caches. The model also suggests that if we observe hoarding by dominant individuals, such a separation (probably consisting of a recovery advantage for hoarders) is present. Further, subordinate birds should store more than dominants, but the difference should be smaller the harsher the environment gets. If conditions at retrieval should be worse than expected when the storing occurred, the dominant should spend more time foraging in the subordinate’s niche. Finally, during years of very high food abundance, like extreme mast years, the cost of hoarding might be insignificant.

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**Appendix A**

If the cost of hoarding is proportional to the amount of food stored, the fitness loss \((L)\) from hoarding will be

\[ L = 1 - e^{-kh} \]  
(modified from Schoener 1971). The probability to survive will then be

\[ 1 - L = e^{-kh}. \]

From equation (5) we have

\[ F_s = e^{-kh} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( h_0 + h_s \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-r(T-t)} \right] + \left( h_0 + h_s \right) e^{-r(T-t)} (1 - e^{-rT}) \right); \]

differentiating \(F_s\) with respect to \(h_s\) then gives

\[ \frac{dF_s}{dh_s} = \frac{1}{2} e^{-kh} \left[ -1 - e^{-r(T-t)} + 2e^{-r(T-t)} e^{-rT} \right]\]

\[ (kh_0 + kh_2 - 1); \]

setting \(dF_s/dh_s = 0\) gives optimum hoard size

\[ h_s^*_1 = \frac{-kh_0 - 1}{k} = \frac{1}{k} - h_0. \]

If the dominant decides to spend all foraging time in either niche, we have the two limiting cases, \(t = T\) and \(t = 0\). If \(t = T\), the first term in equation (2) becomes 0, and the optimization is, then, analogous to the one in equations (A3)–(A5):

\[ h^{*}_{t(T-t)} = \frac{1}{k} - h_0. \]
In the second case, when $t = 0$, there is no $h_0$ for which to solve since the dominant does not spend any time in its own niche:

$$h^*_D(t=0) = 0. \quad (A7)$$

In cases when $0 < t < T$, we need an expression for the optimal time spent foraging in the dominant’s own niche, $t^*$. Differentiating a given amount of food, $g_o$, with respect to $t$ and setting this equal to 0 gives

$$t^* = \frac{\ln \left[ \frac{2r(h_o + h_D)}{r_1(h_o + h_D)} \right] + r_1 T}{r_1 + r_2}. \quad (A8)$$

With this cumbersome expression for time, there is only one assumption that makes it possible to solve $h^*_o$, analytically for $0 < t < T$. If the interaction between the foragers is strong enough to make $r_2 = r_1$, we have for the dominant:

$$F_o = e^{-kh} \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left( h_o + h_D \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-(T-t)} \right] + \left( h_o + h_D \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-t} \right] \right\}. \quad (A9)$$

Inserting equations (5) and (A8) into equation (A9) gives

$$F_o = e^{-kh} \left( \frac{1 - e^{-(T-(1/2)\alpha + Tr/r)}}{2k} + \left( h_o + h_D \right) \left[ 1 - e^{-((1/2)\alpha -(1/2)T)r} \right] \right), \quad (A10)$$

where $\alpha = \ln \left[ 2(h_o + h_D)k \right]$. Setting $dF_o/dh_o = 0$ then gives two solutions for $h^*_o$:

$$h^*_o = \frac{1}{2k} - h_o \quad \text{and} \quad h^*_o = \frac{2e^{-(1/2)Tr^2}}{k}, \quad (A11)$$

of which the first is a maximum. For most cases, however, the dominant’s optima must be iterated stepwise. Taking $h_0$ from equation (6), we start with $t = 43.6$ from equation (A8), insert this into equation (4), differentiate this with respect to $h_0$, and calculate the maximum. We then take the new value of $h_0$, insert it into equation (2), and differentiate this with respect to $t$. After the derivation, we calculate the maximum $t$ and insert this again in equation (4) and so on: $h_D \rightarrow t \rightarrow h_D \rightarrow t \rightarrow h_D$, until we reach an equilibrium.

If there is a recovery advantage for a hoarder, the optimum hoard for the subordinate is obtained from inserting equation (8) into equation (5). Then the subordinate’s optimum must also be iterated since $dF_o/dh_s = 0$ gives a useless and complicated expression (not shown). The stepwise iteration is analogous with the one above, except that $h_0$ also must be included: $h_s \rightarrow h_D \rightarrow t \rightarrow h_s \rightarrow h_D \rightarrow t \ldots$ until we reach the stable equilibrium (eq. [6]). With our baseline values, this is at $h^*_0 \approx 22,943$, $r^* \approx 79.2$, and $h^*_o \approx 31,615$.

Appendix B

We simulate a winter of 100 d, so $T = 100$ and $0 \leq t \leq 100$. If we assume that 80% of the available food will be consumed during the whole winter, the amount left at the end of winter will be 20%. The slope for an exponential depletion rate can then be found from $e^{-rT} = 0.2$, giving an $r$ of approximately 0.016. Since two individuals should deplete a patch faster than one, we start with $r_1 = 0.01$ and $r_2 = 0.02$.

Nutcrackers have been estimated to make around 10,000 caches in one autumn (Tomback 1982). Parids like the willow tit, the marsh tit Parus palustris, the coal tit Parus ater, and the crested tit have been estimated to store between 40,000 and 80,000 items (Haftorn 1959; Brodin 1994). We assume that the optimal storing effort will lie between 0 and 50,000 items. Some caches will be left or forgotten, and since we want cached food to be at least 50% of the winter food, we start by setting $h_0$ to 10,000.

The cost of hoarding is difficult to assess but will have strong effects on the predictions of the model. From equation (9), hoarding 30,000 items would give $k = 2.5 \times 10^{-5}$ for the subordinate. Hoarding 20,000 items would give the same value of $k$ for the dominant (eq. [10]). Winter survival, $S_W$, can then be calculated from logging both sides of $S_W = e^{-kh}$. For the subordinate, the probability of surviving the winter is then 0.47; for the dominant, 0.61. Such mortality is normal during cold winters in species like willow and crested tits (Jansson et al. 1981).

With the technique of radio-ptilochronology (Brodin 1993b), it has been possible to precisely estimate how large a proportion of their own caches that hoarders recover and how much that other flock members steal. In willow tits and Siberian jays, hoarders found five to seven times as much of their own caches as pilferers did (Brodin and Ekman 1994; Ekman et al. 1996). To be on the conservative side, we set the proportion of caches found by the hoarder, $p_h$, to 0.8.
Literature Cited


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