Trouble Spots: Projects, Bandits and State Fragmentation

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Published in:
Globalization, the State and Violence

2003

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):
“Trouble Spots”

Projects, Bandits, and State Fragmentation

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WHAT GLOBALIZATION DOES

Understanding what globalization is can be best achieved by observing what globalization does. As a minimal definition, globalization is the increasing transnational movement of capital, goods, people or ideas, and cultural practices; this process is now so accelerated that these resources, groups, ideas, and practices now seem to circulate without any specifically localized base, taking on, as it were, a life of their own. Hence, we have global companies, international organizations, diasporic populations, and transnational mafias. The actors in the global arena area international managers, NGO activists, diaspora middlemen, diplomats, humanitarian aid workers, migrant laborers, political refugees, “Executive Outcomes” mercenaries, and transnational smugglers. Global practices exist in an ideological environment marked by discourses of democracy, privatization, modernization, human rights development, “one world,” consumer hunger, multicultural diversity, environmental protection, conflict resolution, peace building, institutional building, diaspora, ensuring “security,” “global organized crime,” self-determination, national identity, empowerment, and the term “globalization” itself.

Understood as long-distance or transnational contacts, globalization is certainly nothing new; after all, missionaries, traders, crusaders, pioneers, migrant laborers, and conquering armies, with their affiliated social and ideological paraphernalia, have been crossing borders for centuries, with devastating consequences for local societies. Nor is awareness of the “outside” very new to the
non-Western societies, which have borne the brunt of colonial or imperial expansion, slavery, plantations, mines, white settlers, or the imposition of European religions and languages. What is new is the speed, intensity, variation, and increasing pervasiveness of these contacts, all of which affect local societies and allow certain groups new cultural expressions and political possibilities.

At a human level, globalization widens the horizons of time and space for some people, turning some into the global elite of symbol producers, knowledge mediators, discourse creators, security demanders, and fun seekers; on the other side, global processes operate to turn others into truly global proletarians who follow the flow of capital as international managers, consulting engineers, bridge and tunnel builders, and a host of migrants, refugees, or bandits. The difference in possibilities entails uncertainty, such that globalization creates its own social and existential crises (Bauman 1998).

How do global processes affect the territorial units known as states and those citizens who identify with their states? A conventional wisdom is to regard globalization as undermining states, such that “outside forces” act to “destroy the fabric”—to use the common metaphor—of local societies and economies; the motif could best be described as “colonialist” or “imperialist.” The familiar examples are McDonaldization (Smart 2000, Ritzer 1996), American pop culture, uncontrolled migration, organized crime, all of which operate as invaders or homogenizers. Traditional structures based on kinship and neighborhood or long established societal arrangements based on citizens’ allegiance to the state are seen to be undermined. The indigenous population is confronted by immigrants, some of whom are simply parked there (Turner 1999 and chapter 2 of this book).

Along with the motif of globalization as colonizing and destroying states, we may speak of a second motif, of “development” or “empowerment.” Transnational communication and common interests spawn global movements toward democracy, human rights, environmental awareness, and civil society; these movements penetrate across borders leading to an empowerment of civil society and the undermining of oppressive or bureaucratic state control. Under the watchful eye of the international human rights community and of “global civil society,” states that deny rights to citizens can now be sanctioned, denied aid, isolated, or even bombed. Democracy does not simply “flow.” It is also imposed by the real power differential of some states over others.

Seen in this light, globalization relates to states and to local society in terms of either new threats or new possibilities. Confronted with the entry of new resource inputs, some local elites (within either the state or society) see their possibilities threatened, others see them expanded. Viewed in local terms, the “outside” is something to be latched onto as a kind of resource. When local elites come into conflict and new elites form, we may view this as the differ-
ential utilization of various global “waves.” The empirical question is which group jumps on which wave: say, humanitarian aid, beauty contests, or refugee smuggling, to name three. For those unable to seize these opportunities, the global becomes a threat to our “way of life” and bulwarks against it must be constructed. These take the form of various kinds of localist movements: environmentalism, anti-Brussels referenda, anti-World Bank demonstrations, religious fundamentalism, region separatism, anti-immigrant movements, xenophobia, and at times, banditry.

Common to both the colonialist/McDonaldization and empowerment discourses of globalization, however, is a view of a state seemingly powerless to deal with these outside forces. I will argue that this view of globalization is simplistic. It is simplistic because it views the existing states as undifferentiated, static, and passive. Rather, we should see global forces in terms of their ambivalent relationship toward the state, a relationship that can both undermine and consolidate at the same time. States, I will argue, are not going away, but in the new globalized environment need to be redefined. To see states simply as being “fragmented” is not enough. We need a more complex understanding of the “forces” by which states are ostensibly being undermined and by which other formations are being formed.

GLOBAL FORCES AND THE STATE
The idea of globalization as simply undermining local power is simplistic because it is predicated on an idea of states as passive objects of outside forces. Some of the problem is rhetorical, insofar as globalization is constantly articulated in terms of “forces,” “streams,” “flows,” that is, as dynamic impositions on some kind of seemingly stable order (Hannerz 1992; Barth 1989; Appadurai 1991, 1993). In this view, “clashes” between the forces and the state must inevitably occur (Barber 1995). What is forgotten is that states are composed of people, actors. And that these actors within states can co-opt or utilize global resources, global actors, and global ideologies for their own diverse ends. In the discussion of the undermining of states by international organizations and global forces, this dimension has been missing. In celebrating the wave of democracy or multiculturalism, or in our anxiety about global illegal migration or organized crime, we have overlooked the tenacity of states to reorganize themselves in the face of new market forces, political sanctions, cultural impositions, Internet, human rights accusations, support for guerrilla forces, and so on.

Here I propose to view states as resource-using groups, in which one of the key resources is public legitimation. Other units besides states (NGOs, private security forces, mafias, private firms), can also carry out state functions (e.g., citizen protection, provision of welfare services). What states do is carry them
out in terms of a “public” project. When states use their resources in ways of which we approve and that resemble our own concepts of states, we use terms like “administration,” “public sphere,” “good governance,” “dialogue with civil society,” “political system,” and “bureaucracy.” Such states have flags, diplomatic representations, airlines, ministries of education, post offices, currencies, infrastructure, and programs for development. When those groups acting on behalf of the state use their resources in ways that are not readily transparent to us, we speak of “weak state,” “clans,” “corruption,” political underdevelopment, “politics of the belly” (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1998) or “criminalization of the state” (Chabal and Daloz 1998). Such states may certainly possess the same institutions as above, but the ministers are busy plundering their own ministries, the mail never gets delivered, the airlines are run by foreigners, and the infrastructure, if it functions at all, is a vehicle for personal enrichment. In extreme cases, when even the trappings of states are absent, we speak of “collapse” or “mafia” or “ethnic/tribal” warfare.

This chapter retains this view of states as simple networks of interests that happen to legitimate themselves as public institutions. It examines two global processes that seemingly undermine the state. The first is “global civil society” as embodied in local civil society/NGO development programs, what I call “the world of projects.” The globalization of democracy and local NGO “capacity building” are about a specific kind of formation called “project society.” States respond to project society by trying to co-opt project resources or undermine the NGOs who use them insofar as these NGOs may threaten state power.

The second global threat to the state is global organized crime, banditry, outlaws, which for want of a better term I will call “mafia.” Mafia seeks to undermine state authority by competing with its control over territory, appropriation of funds (extortion replaces taxation), and monopoly on violence. Bandits, mafiosi, pirates, smugglers, money launderers, and the rest of “global organized crime” seemingly operate on the margins of states, but insofar as they participate in an international traffic of contraband goods, services, and people, these bandits are certainly transnational. Project society and bandit society (mafia) are two sets of global structures that tend to both undermine and consolidate state power.

In choosing to concentrate on these two global manifestations, it does not mean that people have no other strategic options. A variety of other responses to global processes are possible: movements of national identity, social movements, or “weapons of the weak” (Castells 1997, Scott 1985). The point here is to see project society and bandit society as two prominent manifestations of the ambivalence of globalization. It is this ambivalence that creates globaliza-
tion's new classes of winners and losers, and that reproduces the kind of fragment-mentation and existential insecurity that can also lead to violence. Democracy and ethnic enfranchisement, for example, can be seen as empowerment, but they also fragment kinship and status hierarchies leading to new kinds of warfare. The emergence of nongovernment organizations may be salutary for articulating citizen needs, but more NGOs does not necessarily mean a more democratic political culture.

Finally, project society and mafia society are not necessarily separate from each other. Project society has become a resource base for organized crime and corruption, as numerous scandals about EU aid in Southeast Europe, Scandinavian aid in East Africa, and French relations with its former colonies now attest (Verschave 2000). Sometimes these scandals and resources become so chaotic that states disappear. When this happens, project society and bandit society seem to compete to fill the gap of providing security and redistributing resources. This competition for resources brings with it its own form of violence, in the form of intimidation, kidnapping, and murder of officials working for “the international community.” Those places we now call “trouble spots” are places in which various mafias are battling each other and where state resources are nonexistent. But they are also objects of international humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, and global human rights concern. One might even define a “trouble spot” as a field in which project society and bandit society compete for sovereignty. As an example of this complex interaction between project society and bandit society, take the following E-mail sent to me by a colleague working in Geneva, who in late 1998 (i.e., before the second Russian invasion) offered me some advice about going to Chechnya:

Steve, I am sure that I am not the first one to tell you this but, DO NOT GO TO CHECHENYA. I was working in Daghestan, I had 4 of my colleagues taken hostages in Chechnya. It was 106 bad days. Then I had this good friend [Marc] who said he had “special arrangements” [to remain safe] and did not care. He got caught. He managed his way out, but had 2 fingers cut. Then I met with [John,] who thought he was outside the sphere of the Chechen bandits’ operations. He is still in a basement, after 9 months. One other thing. When my colleagues got caught, they were taken from the Daghestan border, through all Chechnya, crossing all checkpoints without any problems. We are not talking here about isolated groups of bandits but rather organized crime networks with strong relations with political circles. It became obvious to me when I had to deal with the case. And you must have heard that they have entered Georgia and
are threatening UN staff there. And do not think I have anything against the Chechen people. On the contrary, I enjoyed working with them very much and I had good friends there. But it is just not worth the risk. OK, you might have come up with a special plan that you think will make you invincible. I am sorry, I’ve heard this before and I do not quite believe it anymore. Even with OSCE. But if you take this risk, I would be very interested to stay in touch with you.

Of interest here is not the violence per se, but that the violence now affects members of the international community. Between 1996 and 1998, thirty-nine UN workers have been killed over the last two years. In the Caucasus, international humanitarian actors in 1996 suffered fifty-eight “total incidents” of murders, kidnapping, attempting kidnapping, shooting incidents (“targeted and untargeted”), assaults, armed robberies, local staff deaths, and expatriate staff deaths (Hansen 1998). Communications like this, from someone on the front lines of the international community’s project society, reflect the kind of structures we are dealing with: on the one hand, well-endowed international organizations with “missions,” mandates, and resources acting on behalf of a consortium of advanced states now known as “the international community”; on the other hand, paramilitary groups, and groups of bandits, especially in ex-communist areas, that seem to operate with impunity: not only kidnapping for political reasons but increasingly kidnapping for money. The problem is not kidnapping as such, it is that “they are even going after U.N. people now.” Things are getting out of hand.

Northern Albania, eastern Bosnia, sections of Kosovo, the northern Caucasus, large portions of Africa, and now East Timor and the border areas (where U.N. staff were recently murdered) are all places of fragmented political units. Except for Chechnya, they are objects of massive international assistance. These areas are now the loci of “bandit society” on the one hand, and “project society” on the other. This means that we will increasingly see a kind of triangle between existing fragile states, the bandits challenging them, and the project society trying to hold the states accountable. All three social structures—states, project society, and bandit society—are competing for resources. All organize opportunities for elites to latch on to these resources. But all three are also creating insecurity for the people caught in the middle.

We may therefore envision modern states as specific groups of people availing themselves of specific types of resources, material, social, and knowledge. In the case of projects, the resources clearly come from outside, while in the case of mafia they may also come from transnational criminals operating abroad. What is new about new elites is how they avail themselves of the resources offered by the world of projects and the world of bandits. People may
enter project society or mafia society. In between the international world of projects and the expanding, border-crossing local mafias are hapless citizens trying to find solutions. Let us therefore explore how states are affected by the two worlds, beginning with democracy assistance and NGO projects.

DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND NGOS
“Democracy” is one of the most essential of global “ideoscapes” (Appadurai 1993). Yet it is not simply a flowing of norms and principles. It is also a set of practices. Along with privatization, rule of law, human rights, and European integration, “democracy assistance” forms the cornerstone of the processes of “transition” now taking place in Central and Eastern Europe (Carothers 1996, 1999). Promoting and consolidating human rights and democracy is now a prerequisite for receiving aid. Democracy assistance began in Latin America decades ago and is not a major part of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and elsewhere. As a carrot and stick set of practices, it involves transfers of massive amounts of money, the training of promising leaders, the establishment of institutions, and the building of political parties and organizations. Democracy assistance may focus on direct aid to parliaments and election support, by aiming at reform of public administration and training of public servants at central and local levels, and most commonly, through civil society, NGOs, and institution building. This assistance is invariably administered through activities called “projects.” While humanitarian aid projects are meant to meet a particular material or medical need in a group, democracy, human rights, and civil society projects are both more abstract and long term: they are meant to build a developed citizenry that can promote and consolidate democracy. Civil society assistance, which will be the focus here, is supposed to build a strong NGO sector.

“Civil society” has a long philosophical pedigree in political theory. In the late 1980s, the term “civil society” was used largely to connote society’s opposition to repressive regimes in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. Over the last decade, however, civil society has become a category of democracy assistance focusing on activities of social self-initiative organized by networks, groups, and formal organizations. Since donors tend not to give funds to informal groups or engaged individuals, “civil society” as a donor category is restricted to organized voluntary associations such as political parties, trade unions, church organizations, press and media, informal networks, and particularly voluntary associations, also called NGOs.

Since political parties and trade unions have their own separate aid programs and specific donors, since most aid is secular, and since aid to informal
networks is risky for legal/accounting reasons, the funding category known as “civil society” is usually limited to support for media and voluntary organizations. Media aid centers on training journalists and funding what are considered to be “independent” TV and press; the idea is that an informed public provides for a better democracy.

The vast majority of civil society assistance, however, goes to non-government organizations. Such organizations may be known as well: non-profit organizations, not-for-profit organizations, voluntary associations, “ideal organizations” (Swedish), associations, foundations, charities, trusts (Britain), interest organizations, grassroots organizations, civic organizations, civil society organizations, and so on. NGOs lie between the state and the market and are thus known as the “third sector” (Salamon and Anheier 1996).

An NGO, no matter whether it is a small group or a large interest organization, is usually considered to have certain basic characteristics: it does not seek state power (i.e., nongovernmental), it has a voluntary element, it is autonomous in decision making, nonprofit (though it may have income), and it is juridically constituted. The “NGO sector,” as it is called, has its own dynamics: organizations rise and fall, some evolve into parties, some become fronts, others become profit-making firms, some unite into umbrella organizations, others split into competing organizations. While NGOs exert great efforts for government to recognize their importance in helping to formulate or implement policy, governments seek to construct NGO registration systems or regulatory frameworks. Funding questions are crucial, since NGOs want government grants or the possibility to earn income by providing services; governments, for their part, want to ensure against “abuse” of NGOs’ charity status.

From a democracy assistance viewpoint, building a strong NGO sector means initially supporting the increase in the number of NGOs, in the number of sectors covered, and in their professional quality. It involves moving from “first-generation” NGOs based on humanitarian aid or direct grassroots needs to “second-generation” NGOs, which are “professional,” “self-supporting,” and policy related. First-generation NGOs may provide aid, second-generation NGOs conduct advocacy campaigns and lobbying. “NGO assistance” involves strategic support, funding, training, and goal-directed activity consistent with the NGOs’ “mission”; this activity takes the form of “projects.” Although there may be questions as to whether the increasing number of NGOs represents a valid index of democratic development, there is no question that NGOs are now the vehicle for the expansion of projects as a way of life (Sampson 1996, 1998).
PROJECT LIFE

Projects are specific activities implemented by a group of actors having a specified goal over a limited period of time. In this sense, they are the opposite of “policy.” Projects are inherently temporary. They either end or evolve into new projects; rarely do they evolve into state-administered programs or policies. Most “pilot projects,” presumably forerunners for permanent programs, inevitably “crash.”

From a globalization perspective, project life may be viewed as a form of “traffic” in which resources, people, and ideologies move between west and east/south, or between center and periphery. In this sense, projects are global, but the traffic is not equal in all directions. Projects are not just about the movement of resources; they are also about control.

Projects invariably require money, and money is allocated according to priorities set by Western donors. In democracy assistance projects, money and strategies flow from wealthier, more democratic countries to poorer, less democratic countries; the expression often used is “democracy promotion” or “consolidation of democracy.” Those who “invest” in democracy are Western governments and their aid agencies, international organizations like UNDP, Western NGOs (many of which are government funded) and privately-funded NGOs such as Soros, Ford, Mott, Carnegie, and other foundations. In practice, funds flow from a few major centers in Western Europe and the United States, from various international organizations, and then proceed east or south. The flow of funds is mediated by a host of implementing organizations, such as large government-funded NGOs in the home country, government offices, some private consulting companies, or by aid-oriented NGOs that already have field offices abroad and have obtained the implementing contact in open or closed bidding (e.g., Oxfam, Danish Refugee Aid, or Save the Children). Take, for example, the World Bank’s effort to pursue gender equality in Bosnia. This led to the Bosnian Women’s Initiative (BWI), which received earmarked funding by USAID. The BWI was a set of projects to be implemented by various in-country NGOs. In eastern Bosnia, the organization Scottish European Aid (SEA) is charged with soliciting and controlling applications by local Bosnian organization to conduct BWI-funded projects concerning gender-related issues. SEA handles project administration. One of these projects, submitted by the Human Rights Office Tuzla (HROT), targeted women refugees returning to their home cities in Muslim and Serb parts of Bosnia (Sampson 2001). The project, called “Towards Democracy,” was a series of ten seminars in which the women acquired training in various subjects ranging from property rights, family law, and conflict resolution. HROT received funds for bus transport, meeting hall rental, meals, and photocopying.
and the making of a video. On completion of the ten seminars, HROT submitted a report to SEA, which is responsible to the USAID office funding the BWI secretariat. Following this, HROT has submitted another application to conduct a similar project in Serb regions of Bosnia. The Bosnian Women’s Initiative is a typical project system, and in fact a similar Kosovo Women’s Initiative is now operating in Kosovo with $10 million of USAID funds.

The search for money and the mechanics of project administration are complicated. Under such conditions, with the rapid deadlines, convoluted bidding requirements, and difficult accounting procedures, donors are hesitant to allow local organizations in the target country to run large projects. At most they can play a minor role as “local assistance” on the implementation side.

Project society is more than money, of course. Together with the money come consultants and specialists who provide inspiration, project management, monitoring, and evaluation. Some consultants are part of organizations or of a consortium of organizations consisting of chains of main partners and subcontracting partners. Other consultants are recruited on a short-term freelance basis for a given number of man-days to carry out tasks such as “project identification,” “staff training,” or “interim evaluation.”

Donors begin their activities with a project identification or project appraisal mission. This mission is invariably entrusted to a Western consultant. Here the possible “target groups” are identified and a “needs analysis” conducted. This involves visiting the country, contacting those with knowledge of potential partners, and interviewing them about their needs and assessing their competencies. In early stages, a crucial activity is identifying the other donors to “coordinate.” Concretely, it involves finding out who is doing what project, or whether there are other projects open for bid. Sometimes the target group is the vulnerable group itself (e.g., homeless children, refugees without housing), but just as often the target group may be the NGO or group of NGOs that is supposed to be helping a vulnerable group. The goal of such NGO projects may be direct humanitarian aid, which is the case in acute, conflict situations. In post-conflict situations, however, the aid takes on a more abstract form known as “capacity building” or “institutional development” (Sampson 2001). Capacity building involves donations of office equipment and the “transfer of skills” from the implementing partner to the target NGO or group. Transfer of skills takes place by conducting project activities or by training. Training may include courses lasting days or weeks. Typical training activities focus on fund-raising, project management, staff or board training, public relations, dialogue with government, and so on.

Every project involves a foreign or local donor and a “partner” in the target country who carries out implementation. Most donors manage to find a suit-
able “partner,” but often the best potential partners are oversubscribed, that is, they tend to be the most skilled NGOs in the capital city with experience in managing projects. Project inputs, whether it be donations of office equipment, training or support for “capacity building,” and project grants must be empirically variable: there must be concrete outputs to make the project convincing to the donor office back home. Much of the training involves explaining to the “partner” how to handle budgets and file reports according to the donor’s needs, training the NGO’s board of directors or its staff. The donor supplies expertise in the form of “expatriate staff,” local experts, trainers, and volunteers whose sole job is to build capacity among the local staff and counterparts in the receiving country. After some time, the donor may change priorities (blaming it on “the system”). Donors can “leave,” and in order to ensure the “sustainability” of its partner, leaving evolves into a suitable “exit strategy.”

One may envision the structure of project life in two ways: as a flow of resources, people, and knowledge, and as a set of concentric circles.

As a flow of traffic, the relationship between donors and recipients in the world of projects is one in which some resources go from West to East/south and others go in the opposite direction. From the West comes money, suitably transmitted in complicated tranches and often transferred by circuitous routes in countries where banking systems remain primitive. Along with money comes traffic in people: expatriate consultants, foreign project managers, and the short-term evaluators and training. These individuals often go from country to country, and much of their job is spent talking with other donors, an activity called “donor coordination,” or with government officials to smooth entry. Government officials, not being donors, are useful to smooth the administration of the program, and increasingly as copartners in applying for EU, World Bank, or UNDP funds.

The West-East traffic in money and experts is partially balanced by a circulation of promising local project managers to conferences, meetings, internships and training in the West. From Eastern Europe, thousands of NGO activists, journalists, and officials have been on shorter or longer trips abroad for training and to see with their own eyes how democracy works. In Denmark, to take a single example, the government-funded Democracy Foundation has spent about $100 million over ten years to bring thousands of foreign NGO activists, local officials or teachers, social and health workers to examine how counterparts work in Denmark. Other programs run by foreign governments have concentrated on NGO leaders, journalists, and government officials. The socialization of local NGO activists into the world of projects proceeds with their acquisition of the discourse of global civil society, which takes
place as they go about attending training courses, meeting donor representa-
tives, applying for money and managing projects.

Let us instead look at the world of projects not simply as a flow of money, 
people, and concepts, but as a system of hierarchical concentric circles. At the 
center of the circle are the elite organizations in the West (donors) and their 
funding policies (suggested by knowledge producers who help define strat-
egy). This inner circle can be seen as the most abstract type of knowledge. At 
the periphery is concrete, local knowledge of real people with real problems; 
in the periphery are the “needs” and the sought-after “target groups,” includ-
ing that most peripheral of target groups, “the vulnerable groups,” such as 
refugee women, the handicapped, or traumatized children.

Knowledge is not only located at the center, however. The periphery is also 
a site of key information simply because donors may be visiting their projects. 
Kosovo, an international protectorate where more than three hundred inter-
national organizations are operating, is rife with donors coordinating projects 
and sounding each other out. In practice, this means an enormous amount of 
meetings and follow-up memoranda.

While project life is certainly an example of global flows, viewing projects 
as a hierarchy of power circles reveals globalization with power. Resources, 
people, and ideas do not simply “flow”; they are sent, directed, channeled, ma-
nipulated, managed, rejected, monitored, and transformed on their journey 
estward by the myriad of middlemen at the source, on the way, and in the lo-
cal context. The world of projects is about control over money, knowledge, 
and ideas.

Control over money, for example, involves who is allowed to apply, who is 
allowed to spend, and who must do the accounting. Most Western programs 
require that the Western organization be accountable. While Western aid or-
ganizations may be spenders “in the field,” at home they are supplicants. This 
is why most of the funds spent on offices, hotels, restaurants and publications 
are centered on communications and information with the home office or 
donor.

Control over project personnel is carried out by the Western consultants 
and project directors, some of whom fly in, others who are resident. Such con-
trol entails the recruitment and management of additional foreign consult-
ants, local staff managers, and support staff. The Western donor representa-
tive networks with various other donors, diplomatic missions and local 
government officials in order to ensure “transparency.”

Control over knowledge involves deciding whom to tell about what; in the 
world of projects, knowledge involves deadlines, budget lines, key words on 
applications, the major conferences being held, and coordinating time sched-
ules with others. At the local level, knowledge control involves knowing which donor is about to give out funds.

Finally, since most Western donor consultants are pressed for time, there is a continual monitoring of the next bid, project, or upcoming trip. The hierarchical relations of the project system are best expressed in the various use of time of foreign consultants and the invariable waiting time for others. Meetings must be scheduled rapidly and rescheduled when the others are also involved in meetings. Meetings with donors and foreign organizations take precedence over meetings with locals or supplicant NGOs, which means that some people are kept waiting. With more information, the number of meetings increases, which means more rescheduling and more waiting. Logistical problems—local traffic, bad weather, phones that don’t work, lost messages, power blackouts, delayed flights, unexpected project application deadlines necessitating couriers—create a pressure-cooker atmosphere in which the foreign consultants are constantly moving and the hapless target group is endlessly waiting.

The final type of control in the project system is control over concepts. Ideas do not simply travel; they are sent, received, and manipulated. And ideas rarely travel alone. They are attached to resources. The activity of projects is to attach ideas to activity, and activity requires money. It involves an understanding of donors and the identification of a target group and an implementing partner. Establishing such partnerships between a donor and implementing partner organization is not difficult if there already exists a network, an NGO, or a government office with an idea about, say, establishing crisis centers for battered women, a legal aid office, or an anticorruption bureau. The problem for the donor comes when these potential implementing partners do not exist. If they do not exist, then they must be created.

Creating such NGOs may be called “institutional development,” “capacity building,” or at times “cloning.” In many cases the international donor or NGO simply uses its local secretariat to create a local NGO. Cloning of NGOs is a typical exit strategy in many former East European countries. It ensures a role for the parent organization, facilitates continuity of funding for the newly created local NGO, and deals with the postpartum sustainability problems after donors go elsewhere.

Project society is not simply fly-in, fly-out missions and the hunt for funds. Local NGOs also actually do things. In cases of successful projects, NGOs begin to carry out key services that ameliorate the damaging effects of uncontrolled markets or that supplement the government social programs. NGOs help to publicize new laws so that people know their rights; human rights NGOs may be paid to conduct training of judges or prison officials in international human
rights provisions. Environmental and health NGOs may carry out surveys on specific problems, while educational NGOs may procure textbooks and youth NGOs sponsor counseling. In this sense, NGOs take on state functions, and donors may recognize NGOs as key actors in the development process. As long as the functions between NGOs and the state are clearly delineated, there is no conflict; when they are overlapping, state officials may frequently become jealous of the attention paid to NGOs. In Western polities, strong states and strong interest groups go together; in societies in transition, project society may pose a threat to the state.

The above description of project society would on first site appear as a typical case of globalization undermining the state. The tensions between state officials and the NGO sector are illustrative. Ministers and state functionaries may complain that there are too many NGOs, that “they” are getting “our” aid money. Isolated cases of NGO overspending or inefficiency are used to smear the entire sector. Government officials may complain that many local NGOs tend to have better office equipment than most government offices. Salaries for NGO staff often exceed what one can make in a local or central government ministry. The intimate relations between NGOs and Western donors are also an object of some jealousy in some of the poorly paid, poorly equipped, government offices.

Looking at project society from outside, some state officials devise various strategies to tap into project resources. The most widespread method is for state organs to clone their own NGOs, called GOs and quasi-NGOs (or QUANGOs, a term made popular in Thatcher’s Britain as an instrument of privatization). Throughout Eastern Europe, for example, it is common to find government-sponsored youth, sport, environment, and women’s groups, some of which may be politically affiliated, others funded by or otherwise linked to the government. In former times, such organizations would have been called “fronts” but many such organs do not have a specific political profile; rather they are a means of procuring aid resources. Deloz (1998) notes that in the post–Cold-War era, Western aid can no more be procured on the basis of strategic anticommunism, rather, aid funds flow in as a result of donors’ faith that the government is promoting democracy, building civil society, pursuing development, and ensuring human rights. The GOs can put on a good presentation for a potential donor and then garner the necessary funds for their activities. Invariably much of the money goes informally to government officials who may sit on the boards of these foundations, while other funds are used for the invariable foreign trip or political campaign.

A second strategy by which state actors attempt to tap into the resources of project society is for government officials to sit on the boards of various NGOs
as an indication of state-civil society “partnership.” This practice is not in itself objectionable, since public officials may be genuinely interested in the project and can become a lobby for the organization’s mission within the government. An NGO helping handicapped youth could benefit from a board member who worked in the Ministry of Health. More often, however, state officials’ participation in the NGO sector provides government with access to knowledge about donor priorities and the means by which to channel eventual donor funds away from civil society organizations and directly into government itself. Throughout Eastern Europe, for example, one sees the emergence of government offices for “civil society partnership” or “NGO coordination.” These offices or secretariats are now the object of intense donor interest. (Curiously, no such offices exist in Western Europe where the association sector is too large and too diverse to be the object of any kind of coordination beyond very specific sectors like “women,” “youth,” “development,” or “environment”).

Finally, governments may actively seek to undermine the activities of NGOs by imposing barriers to their cooperation with foreign donors, limiting income generation, or other kinds of harassment. Some social assistance and humanitarian aid organizations can operate unhindered, since they are viewed as a supplement to state activities. Other NGOs, particularly in human rights, law, media, environment and anticorruption, may be regarded as adversaries of state agencies who see them as “political.” This conflict is exacerbated as NGOs become more influential in their lobbying and “advocacy” activities.

Project society, in its civil society variant, may thus pose a threat to the state organizations in which it penetrates. Those in the state may either seek to exploit the resources of the project society or to oppose it. What I term “project society,” however, is not a single actor but a set of practices with its associated sets of resources, social groups, and ideological constructs. The global character of project society and the strength of NGO networks means that efforts to attack or subvert a local NGO may bring on unwanted international attention to the offending government. Calling international attention to abuses is particularly the case for organizations defending human rights, since offending governments can be quickly embarrassed in international fora.

Project society is thus a threat and a resource for states. In this context, one may differentiate between “weak” and “strong” states in terms of their ability to adapt to or co-opt project society. Strong states have strong, but well demarcated NGO sectors; there are many interest organizations and policy makers listen to them. Weak states tend to be either actively opposed to project society, or they tend to overtly try to subvert it by the creation of quasi- or shadow NGOs. With unclear boundaries, states and project society have a tendency to undermine each other. Instead of partnership there is conflict.
It is precisely this unclear boundary between sectors that characterizes the relationship between states and mafia.

**MAFIA AND BANDITS**
States are supposed to provide law enforcement, basic services, and protection over a given territory. State sovereignty is legitimated internally by accountability to citizens, and externally by other states in the form of “recognition.” A sovereign state can legitimately appropriate income through taxation and can monopolize the use of violence in the form of police and armies. A “weak state” is a political unit that does not generate sufficient legitimacy, where taxation or law enforcement is conducted privately or where it is contested. A vacuum of order and legitimacy turns such states into “trouble spots.”

Trouble spots are sites of “disorder” because groups compete to exert the kinds of powers that states normally exercise. Violence is privatized and protection and taxation are carried out by coalitions based on territory, ethnicity, kinship, or political-ideological affiliation. The competing coalitions may include neighboring states and various nonlegitimated actors known as “rebels” or “bandits.”

Thomas Gallant, in a synthesis of bandit studies, has redefined bandits and mafia as “military entrepreneurs,” a clear parallel to Blok’s “violent entrepreneurs” in Sicily and to Volkov’s “violent entrepreneurship” in Russia (Gallant 1999; Blok 1974; Varesse 1994; Volkov 1999). Common to such groups is the provision of various illegal goods and services, especially the supply of “protection,” which includes protection from other mafias (Gambietta 1993). In functional terms, there is little functional difference between the security provided by states and the protection provided by bandits; the difference is that states rely on public legitimacy. Similarly, there is little functional difference between illegal mafias that provide protection and the legalized private security agencies (both tend to recruit from the same social pool). Volkov (1999) notes the similarity between the two in Russia.

In one sense, then, mafia is a form of state; in another it is simply illegal business. Where the state becomes privatized so that it is the instrument of privatized enrichment, we might speak of the criminalization of the state.

Mafia-type organizations, whether they operate in Europe or in the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, or Latin America, specialize in the sale, export, and reexport of valuable commodities, be they drugs, stolen cars, arms, cash, and illegal sex workers, or other migrants.

Most of the research on mafia and banditry, and recent reports from Eastern Europe, link the presence of organized crime with state corruption (Bayart, Ellis,
and Hibou 1998; Wedel 1998; Volkov 1999; see also Council of Europe and Southeast Europe Anticorruption program at www.nobribes.org, www.coe.org, and www.sepa.org). The debate on transnational organized crime has overlapped with the conceptualization, especially in Africa, around the concept of the “criminalization of the state.” In the latter paradigm, illegitimate activities are carried out not only by criminal gangs or bandits outside the state, but by the state apparatus itself in the form of functionaries and their retinues, by groups of privatized police, or by rogue army units that live by intimidation, plundering, or smuggling. States are simply the loci of business transactions; what is sold is either state supplies or protection from prosecution.

Criminal activities within the state apparatus are not simply found in Africa, however. Many postcommunist countries reveal examples of criminal activity: the corruption of state bureaucrats in awarding licenses and contracts, particularly to foreign firms; the emergence of small feudal dictators in the Caucasus region; the privatization of state companies into the hands of former state managers who then plunder the firms for their wealth; and various smuggling activities carried out at border crossings, ports, and airports. There are continual reports of the smuggling of illegal goods, arms, money, and refugees with the complicity of local police, border guards, and armed forces (a typical case being the planeloads of contraband cigarettes caught at Bucharest’s military airport, fuel sent by Albanians into Serbia during the Bosnian war embargo, or the transport of Kurdish refugees and drugs between Albania and Italy). Smuggling occurs in the context of local warlord regimes that exist only because local leaders have the cooperation of (or in fact are) the police authorities. This is clearly the case in parts of Albania, in eastern Bosnia, and the Caucasus. Where smuggling is uncertain, bandit activity may also include the plundering of civilians by paramilitary units, as has taken place in Bosnia, and is now going on in Kosovo in the form of burglary and robbery.

The “criminalization of the state” paradigm thus includes a range of activities: corruption, privatization of state function, and other criminal behavior carried out by state functionaries. However, there are two major problems with the “criminalization of the state” paradigm. First, the criminalization concept is overinclusive. It equates criminalization of state functionaries with lack of state control over criminal activity generally. In this case, Chicago during the gangland era of the 1920s could be an example of a “criminal state.” Here I would argue that there is a difference between criminal activities carried out within a central state apparatus and using its facilities (corrupt officials, etc.) and criminal activities carried out by competing warlords or local bandit chieftains. If we define a weak state in terms of its lack of “reach”; the
state simply lacks enough authority “out there,” such that banditry occurs in the periphery while the center remains uncorrupted. However, we could also define a weak state as one in which state functionaries lack a “public service ethic,” that is, the various groupings in the state resonate to their own morality (e.g., clan, region, party, etc.; the issue is not lack of ethics/morality but lack of an ethic of public service). In the case of this kind of weak state, there is a lack of ethics and of authority: there is corrupt/criminal behavior at the center and bandits at the periphery. The “criminalization of the state” paradigm relies on a weak state but does not tell us what constitutes such “weakness.”

A second problem of the “criminalization of the state concept” is that it operates with a reified definition of “state” as a functioning, legitimate institution, somehow above society, rather than as simply an alternative set of resources used by specific actors. Here the problem lies in a concept of state that may be good for political theory or establishing state/society contrasts, but is so abstract as to be useless. We need to know more about how state actors are recruited, how these sets of actors achieve recognition as legitimate states that represent society, and how alliances and conflicts are forged within the state apparatus. Since states are by definition hierarchical organizations of authority, we need to know how people define their belonging in this hierarchy: when do local representatives of the state become local militants against the center? How is a public service ethic constructed and how does it degenerate? When is a state a self-aware group of administrators and when is it just a platform for gangs plundering public resources? Perhaps the “criminalization of the state” concept can provide a window to understanding the complex processes related to state definition, concepts such as “sovereignty,” “territoriality” and “legitimacy,” and “monopoly on the use of force.” But this requires that “criminalization of the state” be seen as more than just “crime committed by state functionaries.” Seen as a process, state criminalization can be seen as a form of privatized authority; corruption can be viewed as a form of political influence (Scott 1972). Let us therefore look more closely at the way in which mafia and banditry make a state.

WHEN IS A STATE CRIMINAL?
Criminalization of the state exists if actors in higher positions in central administration—politicians, ministers, generals, officials—act to pursue private interests. This betrayal of public trust is known as corruption. Corrupt behavior exists on a continuum that may start with helping family members get a job to channeling millions into a Swiss bank account. Following definitions of Scott (1972) or Heidenheimer (1989), corruption entails that primordial
loyalties (nepotism) or private gain (money) take precedence over a public ethic (honest administration). This public ethic may never have been present, in which case criminalization is simply the continuation of tradition under a new guise. Alternatively, the appearance of more serious corrupt behavior could denote a decline of public spirit, a form of political decay in which primordial loyalties become resurgent; in the latter case, corruption is not a cause of state decline but a symptom. Indicators of the relative level of corruption are based on reporting by implicated actors. The anticorruption NGO known as Transparency International, for example, collects reports of foreign businessmen giving bribes in various countries and publishes a corruption index.

Empirically, corruption occurs in the Caucasus, parts of the Balkans, and in central Africa, where state and political leaders have both private armies and carry out their own entrepreneurial activities; under the rhetoric of human rights and democracy, they siphon off funds to pursue private projects. In such sites, certain market mechanisms are restricted; foreign businessmen must go through state channels to obtain contracts, which leads to the bribing of state officials or various forms of speed payments or intimidation. From eastern Bosnia to west Africa, political leaders establish state firms siphoning off funds for the import of cigarettes, fuel, oil drilling, or construction permits. In Sierra Leone and other African states, private armies are involved in the diamond trade (Traub 2000), while in Russia, military units have for long been dealing in the export of arms and precious metals from Russian ports. In Mexico, the “narco-state” joins drug smugglers, police and border guards (Massing 2000). In the north Caucasus area, one can envision the kind of pipeline blackmail that will occur as oil is shipped from the Caspian port of Baku westward through various small enclaves each controlled by nationalist or bandit groups demanding protection money. The link between national liberation movements, banditry, and state security is illustrated with the fate of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Part of the KLA has become an official police force under the tutelage of the international community, another part a political party seeking state power, and still other sections operate as independent bandit groups intimidating or corrupting local officials and robbing aid missions with military precision. Liberation armies, political projects, local protection, and banditry come together.

The criminalization of the state paradigm centers on state functionaries carrying out a particular kind of illegitimate activity: bribe taking, favoritism, pilferage, nonenforcement, establishing personal fiefdoms or hidden companies. A more productive approach would be to view these central functionaries as entrepreneurs controlling a given public domain and to contrast them with 1) other elites or warlords controlling a territory (town or region), and
2) with network coalitions that cross borders and conduct illegal trade, that is, mafia. Criminalized states would thus include a variety of actors: state officials invoking a public service ethic or “democratic” rhetoric; warlords utilizing military structures to extract taxes, perhaps invoking the rhetoric of “self-determination” or regional separatism, and the bandits acting as businessmen using illegal methods. The criminalized state would consist of state officials conducting business and private coalitions enforcing (their own) laws using violent means. Let me describe these various actors in more detail:

1. Corrupt bureaucrats working within the central state apparatus. These people link foreign networks and local warlords by taking a percentage in the form of bribes, providing protection or assistance by national armies, or by looking the other way. Such individuals and cliques exist in most East European and postcommunist countries, particularly in ministries most resistant to reform, as in industry, raw materials (forestry, energy), defense, even foreign trade. Their activities are frequently exposed by “scandal,” invariably by a disgruntled subordinate who had not been included in the network, or by a political rival. In Romania, for example, millions of cigarettes were smuggled into the country by way of the military airport, with the complicity of officers from the army and border police and airport authorities. Clearly, somebody had not been paid.

2. Local warlords, that is, local politicians or military commanders who with their loyal troops/police may control (legal/illegal) production, trade routes, and smuggling. Where warlords are strongest, they manage the police or have own paramilitary functions, often in the same ethnic or regional autonomy; and they have good connections to the corrupt bureaucrats above. This is the case in the southeast Asian Golden Triangle, in northern and coastal Albania, in parts of Bosnia and Kosovo, and even in some of the regions of the already truncated states of the Caucasus. To take one example, Albania’s clans and territorial networks became stronger after the central state apparatus collapsed in 1997 and the weapons depots looted. In Bosnia there have been local territorial warlords divided on ethnic and political lines, including the Muslim separatist enclave around Bihać. In Kosovo, the divisions are by town, with various KLA units running various towns and plundering parts of the citizens affiliated with the opposition or who do not pay protection.

Some of these warlords end up taking over the state apparatus or regional government, as in eastern Moldova, which has been effectively under the occupation of the former Soviet 14th Army. In much of the former Soviet Union, former communist leaders have now emerged as regional
chieftains; hence, the devolution of the Soviet Union into smaller units was basically a “transition from socialism to feudalism” (Humphrey 1992; see also Verdery 1996).

3. Local mafias, that is, networks of illegal entrepreneurs who move resources via unofficial channels, plunder state resources, or provide state functions (protection, including protection from other mafias) within local areas. In order to intimidate citizens, what amounts to demonstrations of authority, local mafias need the protection of local politicians and warlords. Often such local mafias are known as bandits.

4. “Organized crime,” wider networks of illegal entrepreneurs who move resources across regions and countries or between sectors (e.g., smuggling drugs, transporting stolen cars, moving illegal refugees). These networks need not only the collusion of local warlords in their own areas, but also those along the route (harbors, border zones) as well as the aid or passivity of central corrupt officials. The emergent measures to “combat organized crime” are centered upon this category.

The four types of actors described above, called either “clans” or “local mafia,” or “organized crime,” are often conceived as a “state within a state.” Indeed, like states, they 1) control allocation and redistribution of public resources, 2) collect taxes (extortion, protection money), 3) provide security to legitimate business or to the public, and 4) use force or the threat of force against those who contest their authority. Yet seeing them as ersatz states is not a complete picture, since they are also businesses, albeit illegal. Mafias are thus not the same as the state, insofar as the pyramid organization is not codified into law and they do not seek to sanctify a public sphere. Mafias, as it were, have no “mission.” They involve private interests and network coalitions. Hence, for all the rhetoric of ancient tradition, loyalty, code of silence and honor, these coalitions can be extremely unstable, as so much intramafia violence attests.

Insofar as mafias obtain a monopoly on force, they come to resemble the state, at least within the region where they have the monopoly. Mafias may impose order, but they are also entrepreneurs. Like global businesses everywhere, mafias compete with other mafias for access to resources, for example, cheap transport routes, sectors, customers, and middlemen.

An analysis of the criminalization of the state must begin with some description of which actors are pursuing what goals using what means. Criminalization of the state is not just about corrupt bureaucrats or decadent presidents. It is about state functionaries, warlords, and mafia networks who make choices on the basis of strategies and allegiances. This means that grouping a
whole set of processes as varied as smuggling, bribery, private security services, counterfeiting, embezzlement, pilferage, and so on, solely because they are illegal may not be the most effective way of understanding them (Harris 1996). In the same fashion, viewing the state as somehow prey to a criminalized “outside force” depicts the state as somehow divorced from the processes taking place in society. In the case of states versus mafia, the representation is one of “order” versus “chaos.” Let us not forget the fact that states may be extraordinarily chaotic and that mafias may impose order.

What we are in fact speaking of are alternative coalitions competing for legitimacy and support. States may be able to invoke legitimacy in terms of public accountability; mafias, however, may have more resources at their disposal due to bonds of trust and reciprocity and primordial ties. Following Tilly (1985), the mafia with the greatest support receives the “prize” of legitimacy as the state. Strong states are those coalitions where the legitimacy to extort is uncontested; such coalitions invoke ideologies of “public service” and represent themselves as “the bureaucracy” or “the system.” If weak states are simply gangs or coalitions pursuing interests, strong states are coalitions that represent a clientele. This representation is called “legitimacy,” and with legitimacy comes the authority to invoke a public service ethic. It is the authority to invoke order “in the name of” the people, the nation, the State of California, and so on. When the claim to representativeness is publicly contested, we speak of politics. When it is contested at the level of practice, by people switching loyalties, we end up with “corruption,” with “conflict between public and private spheres.” It is here we descend to level of “weak” or “soft” states (Myrdal 1968). If criminalization of the state is the result of mafia “penetration,” this only begs the question of why mafia or private moralities can penetrate some states and not others. It is one thing to assert, as does Tilly, that the state is just the mafia that wins out in imposing order. The question remains that order is imposed not simply by force but also by some kind of representational link with a public. How does mafia become “the public sector”?

**THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM OF STATE:**
**"MAFIA KINGDOMS" OR "WHITE-JEEP STATES"**
In circumstances of globalization and of globalism, of project society and mafia coalitions, what do we mean by states? Generally, we define states in terms of some kind of public apparatus that extends itself over a territory, and is recognized as legitimate and sovereign by some other state. A state is about territory, sovereignty, power, representation, public sphere, and recognition.

States also have ritual trappings. The “Kingdom of Denmark,” where I happen to live, has the trappings of a kingdom—the Queen’s castle, processions,
feudal-style estates, and even soldiers in brightly colored uniforms who march past my window every day at 12:30 P.M. Tourists who come to Denmark think it is a little kingdom. They visit the castles and watch the changing of the guard. But the “Kingdom of Denmark” is in fact a democratic welfare state where real power lies not with the monarch but with state administration, banks, trade unions, political parties, and a host of interest organizations.

In the Kingdom of Denmark, the queen is only a queen in a symbolic sense. Symbols and trappings are important, but cannot be confused with more substantive sources of power and decision making. Now if kingdoms like Denmark can really be modern states, what appear to be modern states might in fact really be kingdoms: mafia kingdoms, warlord statelets, and so forth. This is the case, I think, in several African states, and is certainly the case in northern Albania, and parts of Bosnia and Kosovo, and with much of the Northern Caucasus. In all these areas, warlords and modern chiefdoms, many of them clan based, live off of cannibalizing foreign aid, privatization of former communist activities, and the facilitation or smuggling of goods, people, drugs, money, or arms. All these states have post offices that sell stamps, ministries of finance, and police, but they do not deliver mail, the treasuries are empty, and the police are for sale to the highest bidder. Some are mafias with territory. Kosovo is an occupied country under foreign administration, its judiciary and police under severe suspicions for corruption and incompetence.

If we concentrate on the trappings of the state rather than the mechanisms of power, we overlook fundamental differences between these kinds of formations and European welfare states with their large public sectors, uncontested legitimacy, and civil-servant castes. What kind of state do we have when the treasury is empty, when the national post office does not deliver mail, when the army belongs to the leader as his personal police, and when local police extort money instead of protect people from thieves? What if the bureaucracy only sells its services instead of performing on the basis of salary, or if basic public services are lacking once we leave the main towns? What if there is no public service ethic? What is the much sought-after recognition by other states is limited to paying customs duties by Western aid agencies and by representatives of project society? Where exactly is the state but in its trappings, symbols, and rituals?

These kinds of states (call them “mafia kingdoms” if you will) are different in terms of the way in which resources are procured and distributed. Resources are mobilized and distributed according to territorial loyalties or clan ties rather than a “public service ethic.” Compliance is assured not by the force of law, but by the threat of force. Efficient administration is facilitated by paying corrupt bureaucrats. And representativeness gives way to being a “member,” being “silent,” or being in an opposing mafia, clan, or faction.
Mafia kingdoms have their trappings of power. And they have the rhetoric of a neutral public sphere, of “local government,” efforts to “reduce bureaucracy,” respect for “human rights,” administrative or economic “reform,” and pursuit of “development” as defined by the donors’ agenda. But the rhetoric is but an instrument for procuring the resources offered by project society. In a situation in which states exist only as “trappings,” social life consists only of mafia kingdoms manipulating “the world of projects.” When even these trappings disappear, the state collapses, services fall apart, and the central government is besieged by local warlords coming in from the periphery. There comes the call for aid from abroad, and we obtain the meeting of mafia kingdoms and international project aid. We get “trouble spots.”

WHITE-JEEP STATES

How do we distinguish mafia kingdoms from “normal” states? One way is to try to use the traditional definitions to define a state: sovereignty over territory, the ability to provide basic services, to impose order (security) and to collect taxes. It appears that for many so-called “states,” these functions are carried out in areas much more limited than the ostensible state boundaries. If I were to draw a map of the Albanian state in terms of the aforementioned basic state functions, it would have a strip going from the airport to the center of Tirana, and then a one-square-kilometer block linking the two major hotels, the embassy quarter, the World Bank/UNDP headquarters, the government buildings, a strip west to the coastal city of Durres, and some additional vectors to major foreign aid sites and military installations. This would be the “daytime Albanian state,” that is, the territory where “Albania” can supply minimal services and protection to its citizens and foreign residents. The “nighttime state” would be even smaller, as travel along main roads outside Tirana is hazardous and in the hills and provincial towns power lies in the hands of various informal authorities—clans, bandits, warlords, customary law. In the spring of 1997, when the Albanian state collapsed completely and arms stores were looted, the nighttime Albanian state was so small that no one was allowed on the street after 9 P.M. In effect, the state had no “reach.” People stayed in their homes, foreigners in their hotels, and one heard the sound of gunfire as each resident let potential thieves know that he, too, had a Kalashnikov. Similar daytime/nighttime contrasts can be seen in towns of Kosovo, some of which even had 6 P.M. curfews. In numerous other areas of the world, notably west Africa, there are similar complaints about “security” or “crime.”

From a territorial-soverignty definition, one might say that in Albania, in the Caucasus, in parts of eastern Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in much of Africa, the
state extends to where you can no longer drive your white jeep (white jeeps being the icon of “the international community” and of project society). We might call such places “white-jeep states.” The white-jeep state, therefore, has little to do with the official boundaries of the state as shown on maps or codified in treaties. Rather, the white-jeep state is delimited by how far one can drive one’s jeep until one is:

a) forced to pay tribute to keep going,

b) where one gets robbed

c) where one must turn back because the area is otherwise unsafe due to rebels, or because the road is impassable.

In the case of a) tribute, and b) robbery, it is simply another “regime” that has taken over taxation duties; while in the case of the impassable road c), the state is unable/unwilling to maintain order or infrastructure.

Normally, we encounter such barriers to state sovereignty on the borders between one state and another. Such boundaries mark off the limits of state sovereignty and the beginning of a no-man’s-land or war zone between recognized states. Today, however, we increasingly find such zones within the territorial borders of states, in zones where officially recognized states, mafia kingdoms, and project societies simultaneously operate; or to use the vehicular metaphor, we have an increasing number of areas with official state cars and police escorts, the mafia’s stolen Mercedes, the brown jeeps of international peace-keeping forces (NATO), and the white jeeps of the international humanitarian/project community. (In Albania it was revealed that local officials were in fact driving around in stolen vehicles, and in Bosnia the international organizations now take the logos off their white jeeps, the idea being that this gives them some kind of protection; yet another instance of the kind of magical thinking going on in the world of humanitarian aid).

We tacitly acknowledge the real boundaries of state authority when we talk about traveling to a “secure” or “unsafe” areas. Some ostensible states consist largely of unsafe areas, here understood as areas where someone with resources does not require a police escort. But if the state has no resources to provide services or maintain public order, why even call it a state? Here I think we are all too enamored of the trappings of statehood without analyzing its substance. Our tendency to reify “the state” as a single actor and complain about “the evils of the bureaucracy,” only exaggerates this abstract gap between state and society. The state, instead of being seen as coalitions legitimating themselves via the public sphere, is demonized as “the system,” what Herzfeld (1997) calls “secular theodicy.” The “criminalization of the state” paradigm maintains this fiction of the reified state as unified, floating above, and as an agent.
States have long had problems ensuring territorial sovereignty. Feudalism solves this problem by pyramids or “trees” of loyalties. The limits of the feudal state formation are the limits of these loyalties. In modern times, state sovereignty often covers lowland towns and peoples. As states develop, state coalitions obtain the strength to integrate or neutralize more independent groups in the hinterlands, borderlands, or in the more inaccessible highlands. Such periods are exceptional. In the Balkans, highland peoples were both border-crossing bandits and nationalist heroes who led revolts against central state oppression. On the coasts, the distinction between pirate and privateer was whether the state had granted a concession to plunder competing states (Bax 1997; Gallant 1999; Bracewell 1992). In central Asia, new leaders have emerged as the USSR declined. Limited sovereignty at the edges of central power is not new. Central states are always under pressure from other informal alliances.

What is new are the new resources that accrue to being recognized as a state by the international community. The international community not only exerts moral and political pressures. It is a pool of resources giving aid. Recognition by other states brings with it the possibility to exploit project society. This is truly the “success story” of African criminalization of the state as described by Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou (1998), Chabal and Daloz 1998, Verschave (2000), and others. Foreign recognition once founded on Cold War considerations is now replaced by recognition of the state as pursuing development and democracy. Local mafias gaining access to power in the center, with the corrupt bureaucrats, is now less important than becoming a center, no matter how weak. This means that mafias have an interest in becoming states; the many breakaway republics in the former Soviet Union, especially in the north Caucasus, are examples of this tendency, as are the regional wars in the Horn of Africa.

The struggle for recognition seems to replace sovereignty in the contest for making out what is a state. States are simply those units recognized as states. States do not have to provide territorial security, collect taxes, provide services, or monopolize violence. They just have to have the trappings. In a discursive sense, declarations about human rights and democracy become more important than actually ensuring human rights or democracy. It is such declarations that help facilitate the entry of project society and NGO development. It is declarations of this kind, and the Western aid agency’s or NGO’s decision to “go in” to Bolivia or Somaliland or Abkhazia, which sets in motion the traffic in project resources and power struggle about how to utilize them.

In this struggle for recognition as a state, powerful clans, warlords, and networks do not count; warlords and mafias may fulfill state functions and con-
trol wide stretches of territory in white-jeep states, but they cannot obtain aid. International assistance is given to local organizations recognized by “states,” no matter how small or powerless these states are, and much aid can be administered only by “national governments.” This means that mafia coalitions have an imperative to seek recognition as states, which can be done by struggling for recognition as separate cultural or regional movements. The impetus is there for mafias to take on territorial-nationalist-popular ambitions.

The link between organized criminal activity and nationalist struggles is not uncommon. Most nationalist or regional struggles against corrupt central governments, especially those not supported by Western governments, often rely on illegal activities to procure arms and raise funds. Recent accusations of IRA, Kosovo-Albanian, Kurdish, and other such smuggling operations are therefore not without some foundation.

Mafias, therefore, can also be nourished by the forces of global identity politics, such that they achieve recognition as speaking for a “people.” Mafia coalitions can also be nourished by appropriating the resources of project society (as has apparently occurred in the mafiaization of civil society groups in Russia, penetration of war veterans groups, and exploitation of NGO laws for illegal enterprise, that is, racketeering; see Williams 1996). The ability of mafia to appropriate global resources means that we must view globalization not simply as decapitating the state from the top, nor should we see mafia as truncating the state from below. Rather globalization, here understood as the decentralization of capital, movement of resources, and mediation of discourses, creates new conditions and new resources available for state formation. It enables mafias to struggle for recognition—and succeed. It facilitates the entry of project society. And it allows for criminalization to be not just something that “happens” to good states but to be a force in state formation and reproduction.

It is in the world’s “trouble spots” that the relationship between state formation, criminalization, and project life is most transparent. It is here that the brown jeeps driven by local armed forces or peacekeeping troops pass the white jeeps of the international aid community, the official cars of the Minister of Public Order, and the shiny new Mercedes driven by the local warlord or mafia chieftain. When the international community provides assistance to such trouble spots, it is under the pretext of giving resources to the formal, central state. In reality, it is to a coalition that only occupies state offices. Hence, aid to “Albania,” “Kirghizstan,” or “Senegal” becomes controlled by a few corrupt bureaucrats and administered by local elites and their networks, with the complicity of local criminals. Aid to privatization in Russia, administered by Harvard University, was controlled by the Chubais “clan” that channeled the money into private accounts and eventually emerged as consultants...
to the world of projects (Wedel 1998). In Kosovo, aid to police training in Kosovo goes to placate political factions and violent groups that would otherwise be preying on the new society from outside.

This aid eventually takes the form of projects, and it is via projects that the bandit society and the state come together. Globalization brings project society into a mediating role between bandit society and the state. Trouble spots are places where project society has completely replaced the state, and where project society’s jeeps cannot travel, bandit society operates. The relationship between central states, project society, and mafia kingdoms can stabilize, but often this requires some demonstrations of power on either side to mark off domains of authority; hence, the violence that characterizes trouble spots: terrorist attacks on the center, kidnapping of once immune U.N. functionaries whose fingers are chopped off to demonstrate the kidnappers’ seriousness, peacekeeping troops’ attempts to arrest criminals, and the incipient local state campaigns to wipe out organize crime, cut off smuggling routes, and so on.

The future of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former USSR reflects a combination of First- and Third World conditions. In the capitals, in the more developed regions, and along secure arteries through which flow essential goods and transport we will have a “European regime.” Here “Europe” is understood as relative public order, welfare services, market economies, strong administration, and an active, publicly oriented citizenry. Daytime and nighttime states will overlap and jeeps travel unhindered. In other regions, typically in the highlands, the peripheries, and along border zones, we have banditry and warlords plundering their own regions and exacting tribute from those who pass through, whether they be smugglers or EU aid projects.

Globalization processes produce various kinds of white-jeep states in which project society and mafia kingdoms interact. This interaction may have various degrees of boundary creation marked by violence. Mafia kingdoms may exact tribute from project society in the form of creating false NGOs or embezzlements in local project offices where expense accounts are falsified or seminars invented. Other resources may be extracted by theft or more violent means, including kidnappings of international community representatives; there will be more “missing fingers” until the groups doing the kidnapping achieve recognition.

In such trouble spots, the transnational networks of mafia entrepreneurs expedite people, money, arms, drugs, goods, and services across borders, aided by corrupt bureaucrats and warlords who help facilitate the movement of these transnational flows. Aid money flows in as “anticorruption programs” and “civil society development”; there are programs to “combat organized crime,” and this enters into the very criminalization process that aid is sup-
posed to hinder. Global processes of both the project and the mafia type help create “states,” but these states are not necessarily coterminous with sovereignty or control; they are states only in terms of their trappings or their recognition by other states or donors. They are states that attract projects. But it should be emphasized that these states are no more than coalitions of actors who utilize public resources under varying degrees of popular legitimacy.

CONCLUSIONS: IT’S ALL GLOBALIZATION’S FAULT
As an imposing force on the state, the globalization concept assumes a stable state order that is somehow destabilized. States, we are told, are being fragmented by forces beyond their control, a fragmentation that generates efforts to reassert control and redraw boundaries leading to violence. Project society, as a manifestation of global resources, certainly replaces some state functions from above just as local mafias may threaten state order in the provinces or in certain sectors. The question, however, is whether these functions or order existed in the first place.

The purpose of this chapter has been to show that the relationship between states, projects, and bandits is both simpler and more complicated than it appears. Simple in the sense that what we call states are no more than groups of individuals utilizing specific sets of resources, including means of obtaining legitimacy and recognition. More complicated in the sense that states, projects, and bandits are not necessarily antagonistic or mutually exclusive. Project society can also be used by the central state to consolidate power. Mafia and banditry can help consolidate the state. And the triangle between states, projects, and the uncivil society we call mafia can be mediated by state-centered coalitions.

Seeing states as only groups of people with access to specific kinds of resources compels us to rethink the various conceptions of “informal” relations that are usually seen as lying in between state institutions. The informal is viewed as somehow less legitimate, less stable, as something that corrupts or perverts states. Instead of conceiving of the criminal, the violent, the informal and the corrupt as something occupying the vacuum of the institutional, what Eric Wolf (1966) called the “interstices,” it is more fruitful to reverse the priorities. Let us conceive of the state as filling gaps where the informal sector does not operate. Those coalitions that achieve recognition as states have done so by virtue of their ability to mediate between other informal coalitions. They use their legitimacy and international recognition to play mafia chieftains and warlords against each other. Some states are mafias with international recognition, others are mafias with both local legitimacy and international recognition,
thereby gaining access to the resources of project society. Mafias, however, act like illegal companies while simultaneously appropriating state functions. In this way, mafias actually compensate for the inadequacies of the state and the market. Insofar as they fill the vacuum between state and market, mafias act like an ersatz civil society. In their uncivil way, mafias are the ultimate non-government organization.

Weak states exist in an environment of project society and bandit society. Those involved in the coalitions that we call “the state” can mobilize other kinds of resources, including the legitimacy and recognition that comes from invoking a public sphere based on administration, representation, citizenship, and national mission. They can do this more effectively by utilizing the resources of project society and bandit society. Strong states are those that utilize both, under the guise of public service. They appropriate or co-opt project funds, utilize the mafia networks of trust and loyalty, but maintain the state’s monopoly on violence. Strong states do not eliminate primordial ties; they organize them.

States are therefore not simply the mafia that wins, since states are supposed to have some kind of public project while mafias and warlords pursue private interests. When states fail to impose themselves on the local, privatized mafias, we get “trouble spots.” Trouble spots are characterized by decentralized violence. Yet it is not enough to say, as does Bax (1997) in discussing Bosnia, that this violence is a result of “decivilization processes” linked to decline of the state or that there are “cycles of violence” between dependent groups. What is it that makes states weak in the first place? Why does informal organization sustain itself even when formal organizations collapse? Why are states and project society undermined by primordial ties of kin, ethnic, region, or religion?

We observe here two contradictory processes: primordial ties seem to undermine the state and corrupt project society, while global projects and states try to replace primordial ties with those based on civil society or citizenship ties. In some cases, global project society succeeds, but this success is better understood as people latching onto new kinds of resources, the kind that project society offers. This entails changing loyalties, and the various social groups in the global world are indeed people who have forsaken local loyalties to join another world. Like the Freemasons, traveling merchants, international civil servants, gypsy academics, and human rights activists, they have evolved “other priorities.” To the extent that peoples’ private projects overlap with global discourses, we speak of “development” or of the “power of globalization.” Global forces, abstract as they are, appear in people’s everyday practice: the young Albanian NGO activist who must decide whether to visit her grandmother back in the village or attend the conference in Geneva. Where there is conflict between the private and global projects, we speak of corruption or
criminalization. “Transnational organized crime” is but the linkage of such private projects. It is the mirror image of “global civil society.”

Just as we must be more concrete in understanding “the state,” we must also stop assuming the automatic strength of primordial ties. Under conditions of transnational movement of resources, people, and ideological constructs, when does kinship, friendship, trust, ethnicity, regional affiliation, and so on, become unimportant? Why do promising intellectuals in the Balkans organize and run NGOs? Why do young men and boys in Africa leave their families to join rebel armies led by warlords or ethnic leaders? Perhaps it is not the “pervasiveness of the informal” that should be problematized, but the demise of informal loyalties, those unique settings we call “institutions” or “bureaucracy.” The threat of globalization is precisely this threat to informal ties. It can turn locally grounded leaders into global project office managers in a new world; and it provides the impetus for local mafias to aspire to state power, preferably with the necessary public ethic and rhetoric of democracy. The conventional wisdom is that globalization undermines states in the form of projects and bandits. But fragmentation is only part of the story. Projects and bandits do not just threaten states; they are now helping to constitute them.

NOTE

I would like to thank the participants at the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation conferences on Globalization and Violence for stimulating discussion, and especially Jonathan Friedman for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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