Are all opposites equal - or are some more equal than others?

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Published: 2013-01-01

Citation for published version (APA):
Paradis, C. (2013). Are all opposites equal - or are some more equal than others?. Abstract from Irony and antonymy.
Are all opposites equal – or are some more equal than others?

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At the one extreme, antonyms show up as strongly associated pairs such as long–short, heavy–light, hot–cold and good–bad along the dimensions of LENGTH, WEIGHT, TEMPERATURE and MERIT, respectively, while other pairs appear to be less obviously or felicitously opposable and more clearly bound up with specific domains and situations, e.g. calm–high-strung, calm–flowing, calm–agitated, as in ‘I prefer calm dogs to high-strung dogs’, ‘I prefer calm waters to flowing waters’, ‘I prefer a calm public to an agitated public’. In spite of this difference, all of them are used to express binary opposition. In that sense they are all equal. But, what makes the former pairings more felicitously opposable than the latter ones still remains a mystery, at least in part. There are indications that it is the ‘goodness’ of the relations as such that is of importance, not lexical associations or co-occurrence frequency (van de Weijer, Paradis, Willners & Lindgren 2012). But, what then is this goodness?

The purpose of this contribution is to try to determine why some pairs are felt to be “better” antonyms than others and therefore more apt to take on special status as canonical antonyms. What is the difference between pairs such as heavy–light and hot–cold on the one hand, and most other antonymic construals such as calm–high-strung or calm–flowing on the other? In order determine this we first need to explain how two expressions can be understood as antonyms, and for that we need a theoretical framework that is capable of accounting, not only for some couplings in language, but also for antonymic meaning creation in text and discourse. Couched in the framework of Lexical Meaning as Ontologies and Construals (Paradis 2005), this contribution treats antonymy as a spatial configuration construal grounded in perception and effected through comparison of the opposing properties. Whenever we think of something as ‘long’, ‘good’ or ‘dead’, it will be in contrast to something that lacks or has little of this property, i.e. their opposites. The proposal is that form–meaning pairings in language are antonyms when they are used as binary opposites in a given context. Characteristic of antonyms is that they share an important segment of meaning at the same time as they differ prominently along the same dimension. Configurationally, this translates into a spatial configuration construal where this simple content dimension, bounded (e.g. dead–alive) or unbounded (short–long), is divided in two parts by a BOUNDARY.

In contrast to a categorization by configuration, categorization by contentful meaning structures forms a continuum ranging from the strongly related pairings, referred to as canonical antonyms (e.g. long–short) to more peripheral members (e.g. calm–high-strung). In order to explain why some lexical semantic couplings tend to form conventionalized pairs, this proposal appeals to (i) their ontological set-up in terms of the simplicity, entrenchment and perceptual basicness of dimensions along which they evoke opposing properties, e.g. long–short of LENGTH as opposed to calm–high-strung of EMOTIONAL TENSION OF ANIMATE CREATURE, (ii) the configurational clarity and symmetry of the antonyms in relation to the BOUNDARY dividing the meaning structure, e.g. small–large is a better pair than small–huge because the properties are at the same distance from a middle-ground reference point (Paradis, Willners & Jones 2009, Bianchi, Savardi & Kubovy 2011, Paradis & Willners 2011, Jones, Murphy, Paradis & Willners 2012, van de Weijer, Paradis, Willners & Lindgren forthcoming). Data from a range of textual, behavioural and neurophysiological techniques are used to support the claims.
Abstract for UCL, 27 November, 2013

References