Difference-making and responsibility

Description

Abstract: In Complicity, Kutz presents the Individual Difference Principle: ‘I am accountable for a harm only if what I have done made a difference to that harm’s occurrence.’ (C. Kutz (2000) Complicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 125). As Kutz acknowledges, the Individual Difference Principle has a great deal of intuitive plausibility. However, Kutz rejects it, because he believes that it conflicts with our judgements about moral responsibility in cases of overdetermination. In this talk, I argue that Kutz’s rejection of the Individual Difference Principle is based on an inadequate understanding of difference-making. To show this, I present a more nuanced notion of difference-making, and argue that, given this more nuanced understanding of difference-making, the Individual Difference Principle is consistent with our judgements about moral responsibility in cases of overdetermination.

Period	2019 Jan 24
Event title	Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy
Event type	Seminar
Location	Lund, SwedenShow on map
Degree of Recognition	Local