Morality and Agent Relativity

Many moral issues concern whether there are any absolute constraints on a person's actions and whether she is morally allowed to favour herself. Questions like these have made moral philosophers ponder whether morality is agent-relative. In the project, we attempt to clarify this concept, and determine whether there s any sense in which it is reasonable to maintain that morality is agent-relative.

Many fundamental moral problems concern whether there are any absolute moral constraints on our actions and whether we are morally allowed to favour ourselves, and our family and friends.

Questions like these have made moral philosophers ponder whether morality is agent-relative. According to this view, what is right and wrong for a person to do depend on facts about the person herself. According to the opposite view, morality is agent-neutral.

Renowned moral philosophers believe the question whether morality is agent-relative is the central issue of ethical theory. The term ‘agent-relative’ has however been used in more than one sense. In the project ‘Morality and Agent-relativity’ we attempt to clarify these senses, relations between them, and determine whether there is any sense in which it is reasonable to maintain that morality is agent-relative. We believe that such an investigation reveals that there are important connections between problems in moral philosophy and agent-relativity that have not received the attention they deserve. For example, the normative view that morality in agent-relative is intimately connected to the meta-ethical view that what a person has reason to do is grounded in what she desires to do.