A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We defend two theses: (1) Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; (2) Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, on multiple levels of analysis, cohere in supporting the distinction between two separate forms of knowledge. The upshot is a neuro-psychologically plausible understanding of knowledge.
Original languageEnglish
Article number21
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophies
Volume5
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Sep 5

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Keywords

  • intellectualism
  • anti-intellectualism
  • knowledge
  • knowledge how
  • knowledge that
  • naturalism
  • slips
  • basic activities

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