Abstract
New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, PD(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if PD{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log2 b bits and that this bound is tight.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory |
Publisher | IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 180 |
Number of pages | 1 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 0780300564 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1991 |
Event | 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 - Budapest, Hungary Duration: 1991 Jun 24 → 1991 Jun 28 |
Publication series
Name | IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings |
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ISSN (Print) | 2157-8095 |
Conference
Conference | 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 |
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Country/Territory | Hungary |
City | Budapest |
Period | 1991/06/24 → 1991/06/28 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Telecommunications
- Probability Theory and Statistics