A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

Ben Smeets

doi:10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236

A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

Ben Smeets

Department of Electrical and Information Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Paper in conference proceeding › peer-review

Abstract

New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, P_D(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if P_D{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log₂ b bits and that this bound is tight.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
Publisher	IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	180
Number of pages	1
ISBN (Electronic)	0780300564
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236
Publication status	Published - 1991
Event	1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 - Budapest, Hungary Duration: 1991 Jun 24 → 1991 Jun 28

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
ISSN (Print)	2157-8095

Conference

Conference	1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991
Country/Territory	Hungary
City	Budapest
Period	1991/06/24 → 1991/06/28

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Telecommunications
Probability Theory and Statistics

Access to Document

10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236

Cite this

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title = "A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication",

abstract = "New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, PD(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if PD{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log2 b bits and that this bound is tight.",

author = "Ben Smeets",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.; 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 ; Conference date: 24-06-1991 Through 28-06-1991",

year = "1991",

doi = "10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236",

language = "English",

series = "IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings",

publisher = "IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

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Smeets, B 1991, A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication. in Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory., 695236, IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings, IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 180, 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991, Budapest, Hungary, 1991/06/24. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236

A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication. / Smeets, Ben.
Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 1991. p. 180 695236 (IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Paper in conference proceeding › peer-review

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AB - New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, PD(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if PD{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log2 b bits and that this bound is tight.

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A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Access to Document

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Cite this