A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

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Abstract

New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, PD(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if PD{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log2 b bits and that this bound is tight.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
PublisherIEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages180
Number of pages1
ISBN (Electronic)0780300564
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1991
Event1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 - Budapest, Hungary
Duration: 1991 Jun 241991 Jun 28

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
ISSN (Print)2157-8095

Conference

Conference1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991
Country/TerritoryHungary
CityBudapest
Period1991/06/241991/06/28

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Telecommunications
  • Probability Theory and Statistics

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