A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

Ola Andersson; Erik Wengström

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

Ola Andersson, Erik Wengström

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	398-401
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	95
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014
Publication status	Published - 2007

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Economics

Free keywords

repeated
noncooperative game theory
weak renegotiation-proofness
bertrand games

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

Cite this

@article{5f9995af01874a6e827d92cb2a2c55d7,

title = "A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies",

abstract = "Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "repeated, noncooperative game theory, weak renegotiation-proofness, bertrand games",

author = "Ola Andersson and Erik Wengstr{\"o}m",

year = "2007",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014",

language = "English",

volume = "95",

pages = "398--401",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Wengström, Erik

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - repeated

KW - noncooperative game theory

KW - weak renegotiation-proofness

KW - bertrand games

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/34248584416

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 95

SP - 398

EP - 401

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

Abstract

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Free keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this