An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

Abstract

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Publication series

NameWorking Papers
PublisherLund University, Department of Economics
No.2021:2

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Envy-freeness
  • Budget-balance
  • Least manipulable
  • Algorithm
  • C71
  • C78
  • D63
  • D71
  • D78

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