@techreport{4255eb22b3cd4bbeba918c8a4512f78e,
title = "Beyond Truth-telling: A Replication Study on School Choice",
abstract = "In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 52 of the 58 investigated data sets (P-value threshold 0.05).",
keywords = "school choice, deferred acceptance algorithm, truth-telling, stability, replication study, D12, D82, I23",
author = "Tommy Andersson and Dany Kessel and Nils Lager and Elisabet Olme and Simon Reese",
year = "2024",
language = "English",
series = "Working Papers",
publisher = "Lund University, Department of Economics",
number = "2024:1",
pages = "1--13",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lund University, Department of Economics",
}