Abstract
The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 239-253 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | International Journal of Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Philosophy
Free keywords
- Blame
- disposition
- emotion
- moral responsibility
- sentiment