Blame as a sentiment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)239-253
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies
Volume30
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Philosophy

Free keywords

  • Blame
  • disposition
  • emotion
  • moral responsibility
  • sentiment

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