CEO compensation in venture-backed firms

Ola Bengtsson, John Hand

Research output: Contribution to specialist publication or newspaperSpecialist publication articlePopular science

13 Citations (SciVal)


We hypothesize that because fast-growing young companies must raise money in private capital markets that contain significant financing frictions, the CEOs of such firms will be compensated for successful fundraising. Using a sample of 1585 private venture-backed U.S. firms, we find that the cash pay of entrepreneur-CEOs is increasing in both the quantity and quality of financing secured and is more sensitive to successful fundraising the more challenging and difficult is the fundraising task. Successful fundraising also increases the gap between the pay of CEOs and other executives. Finally, we show that while VC financing dilutes the CEO's fractional equity ownership, it increases the dollar value of that ownership.
Original languageEnglish
Specialist publicationJournal of Business Venturing
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics


  • Finance
  • Venture Capital
  • Compensation


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