Abstract
There are many fashion words in AI, such as introspection, reflection, metalanguage, belief and intention. The usual way of looking at such concepts is proof theoretical even if it is not at all clear that these concepts can be described in a formal language. I shed light on some of these concepts from a semantical point of view, and show that it is impossible to describe them to a computer. This implies that there can be no agent other that of being instrumental. I also present a new theory of anticipatory systems that runs counter to the prevalent idea.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Qualification | Doctor |
| Awarding Institution | |
| Supervisors/Advisors |
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| Award date | 1997 Oct 10 |
| Publisher | |
| ISBN (Print) | 91-628-2680-8 |
| Publication status | Published - 1997 |
Bibliographical note
Defence detailsDate: 1997-10-10
Time: 10:15
Place: Lund Institute of Technology, E-building, Lecture hall E:1406
External reviewer(s)
Name: Devlin, Keith
Title: Prof.
Affiliation: Saint Mary's College of California & CSLI, Stanford University
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Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Computer Sciences
Free keywords
- Systems engineering
- Anticipatory systems.
- Autonomous Agents
- Artificial Intelligence
- Describability
- Induction
- computer technology
- Data- och systemvetenskap
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