Abstract
The paper proposes a way for adherents of Fregean, structured propositions to designate propositions and other complex senses/concepts using a special kind of functor. I consider some formulations from Peacocke's works and highlight certain problems that arise as we try to quantify over propositional constituents while referring to propositions using "that"-clauses. With the functor notation, by contrast, we can quantify over senses/concepts with objectual, first-order quantifiers and speak without further ado about their involvement in propositions. The functor notation also turns out to come with an important kind of expressive strengthening, and is shown to be neutral on several controversial issues.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 331-344 |
| Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Philosophy