Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

Christian Gehrmann

doi:10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Paper in conference proceeding › peer-review

Abstract

Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	CRYPTO '94
Editors	Yvo Desmedt
Place of Publication	Berlin, Heidelberg
Publisher	Springer
Pages	121-128
Number of pages	7
Volume	839
Edition	IACR
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-540-48658-9
ISBN (Print)	978-3-540-58333-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
Publication status	Published - 1994 Aug 21
Event	14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94 - California, Santa Barbara, United States Duration: 1994 Aug 21 → 1994 Aug 25 Conference number: 14

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Volume	839

Conference

Conference	14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94
Abbreviated title	CRYPTO '94
Country/Territory	United States
City	Santa Barbara
Period	1994/08/21 → 1994/08/25

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Other Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering

Free keywords

Hash functions
Block code
Impersonation attack
Message length

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

Cite this

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abstract = "Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.",

keywords = "Hash functions, Block code, Impersonation attack, Message length",

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N2 - Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.

AB - Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.

KW - Hash functions

KW - Block code

KW - Impersonation attack

KW - Message length

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/1842755386

U2 - 10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

DO - 10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

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SN - 978-3-540-58333-2

VL - 839

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 121

EP - 128

BT - CRYPTO '94

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PB - Springer

CY - Berlin, Heidelberg

T2 - 14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94

Y2 - 21 August 1994 through 25 August 1994

ER -

Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Free keywords

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