Abstract
Scholars studying international democratization have recently shown a
greater interest in how elections in authoritarian contexts per se, could
function as leverages for democratic improvement. This study contributes to
this knowledge by asking; when do elections in electoral authoritarian
regimes result in democratic consequences?
Recognizing that elections can be a tool for democratic breakthrough as
well as authoritarian legitimization, this study tries to avoid an obviously
democratic bias and seeks the causes for both democratic improvements and
erosion in connection with elections. To perform this task, the study utilizes
a quantitative method with a global population of 252 non-founding
authoritarian elections, in the period 1973-2004. This is a population
significantly larger than earlier studies on this subject.
The main argument of this article is that structural conditions have been
overlooked in earlier studies within this field. Even though it is true that the
more actor-centered factors such as the presence of oppositional coalitions
and the number of popular demonstrations have a significant effect on both
a country’s democratic electoral outcome (DEO) and on the probability of
an oppositional victory, actors are affected by structures.
The dependence on foreign trade but foremost short-term economic growth
is demonstrated to have a direct respectively indirect effect on the DEO.
Economic stability seems to contribute to authoritarian stability in regard to
elections in authoritarian contexts. Economic crisis, on the other hand,
increases the probability of oppositional coalitions and popular
demonstrations, which in their turn increases the probability of a positive
DEO.
greater interest in how elections in authoritarian contexts per se, could
function as leverages for democratic improvement. This study contributes to
this knowledge by asking; when do elections in electoral authoritarian
regimes result in democratic consequences?
Recognizing that elections can be a tool for democratic breakthrough as
well as authoritarian legitimization, this study tries to avoid an obviously
democratic bias and seeks the causes for both democratic improvements and
erosion in connection with elections. To perform this task, the study utilizes
a quantitative method with a global population of 252 non-founding
authoritarian elections, in the period 1973-2004. This is a population
significantly larger than earlier studies on this subject.
The main argument of this article is that structural conditions have been
overlooked in earlier studies within this field. Even though it is true that the
more actor-centered factors such as the presence of oppositional coalitions
and the number of popular demonstrations have a significant effect on both
a country’s democratic electoral outcome (DEO) and on the probability of
an oppositional victory, actors are affected by structures.
The dependence on foreign trade but foremost short-term economic growth
is demonstrated to have a direct respectively indirect effect on the DEO.
Economic stability seems to contribute to authoritarian stability in regard to
elections in authoritarian contexts. Economic crisis, on the other hand,
increases the probability of oppositional coalitions and popular
demonstrations, which in their turn increases the probability of a positive
DEO.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publication status | Unpublished - 2009 |
| Event | University of Connecticut Conference on Democracy and Democratization - University of Connecticut Duration: 2009 Feb 27 → … |
Conference
| Conference | University of Connecticut Conference on Democracy and Democratization |
|---|---|
| Period | 2009/02/27 → … |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Political Science
Free keywords
- trade
- oppositional coalitions
- comparative
- authoritarianism
- demonstrations
- democracy
- elections
- economic growth
