Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies

Research output: Working paper/Preprint › Working paper

Original language	English
Publisher	Department of Economics, Lund University
Publication status	Published - 2004

Name	Working Papers. Department of Economics, Lund University
No.	14

Subject classification (UKÄ)

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title = "Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies",

keywords = "Antitrust Policy, Experiments, Collusion, Costly Communication, Weakly Renegotiation-proof Equilibria",

author = "Ola Andersson and Erik Wengstr{\"o}m",

year = "2004",

language = "English",

series = "Working Papers. Department of Economics, Lund University",

publisher = "Department of Economics, Lund University",

number = "14",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Department of Economics, Lund University",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Wengström, Erik

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

KW - Antitrust Policy

KW - Experiments

KW - Collusion

KW - Costly Communication

KW - Weakly Renegotiation-proof Equilibria

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Working Papers. Department of Economics, Lund University

BT - Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies

PB - Department of Economics, Lund University

ER -