Abstract
This post presents a political and legal analysis of the emergency brake in criminal law in Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU. It suggests that the emergency brake offers a powerful discretionary prerogative for Member States seeking to protect the integrity of their criminal justice systems. This strong legal shield for Member States in the form of a ‘quasi-veto’ is contrasted with a tendency to decision-making under the ‘shadow of the vote’, cautiously moving towards supranationalism. On the basis of general theories of Council decision-making and a comprehensive review of EU criminal law legislation adopted to date, the post argues that majority rule rather than general agreement appears to be the current driving force behind decision-making in EU criminal policy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Short description | Publication of blog post |
| Media of output | European Law Blog |
| Publisher | European Law Blog |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Publication status | Published - 2021 Oct 11 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Law
Free keywords
- EU law
