Abstract
This article provides an overview of different formal models that could be of interest to epistemologists interested in assertion. It also says something about where they fit into the general picture of assertion as a phenomenon involving both an asserter and an assertee. The author’s perspective is that of the philosopher rather than that of the logician. A semiformal level of description is employed, partly because some models are highly complex and merely introducing the basic formal machinery, let alone some elementary results or proofs, would consume too much space. The term “formal” is used in a broad sense to include theories that have mathematical or logical elements, even if they are not completely formal. The discussions cover Bayesian models of assertion and logical models.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Assertion |
Editors | Sanford Goldberg |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Number of pages | 23 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780190675233 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 Jun |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Philosophy
Free keywords
- assertion
- formal models
- epistemiologists
- Bayesian model
- logical model