Is Presence Perceptual?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Perceptual experience and visual imagination both offer a first-person perspective on visible objects. But these perspectives are strikingly different. For it is distinctive of ordinary perceptual intentionality that objects seem to be present to the perceiver. I term this phenomenal property of experience ‘presence’. This paper introduces a positive definition of presence. Dokic and Martin (2017) argue that presence is not a genuine property of perceptual experience, appealing to empirical research on derealisation disorders, Parkinson’s disease, virtual reality and hallucination. I demonstrate that their arguments fall short of establishing that presence is not perceptual.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)160-168
Number of pages8
JournalPhenomenology & Mind
Issue number22
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Philosophy
  • Ethnology
  • Other Humanities not elsewhere specified

Free keywords

  • Perceptual presence
  • Perceptual experience
  • Phenomenology
  • Intentionality


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