Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC

Elena Dubrova, Mats Naslund, Gunnar Carlsson, Ben Smeets

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPaper in conference proceedingpeer-review

Abstract

As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014
EditorsOndrej Daniel, Peeter Ellervee, Dragomir Milojevic, Jari Nurmi, Tommi Paakki
PublisherIEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781479968909
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Dec 2
Externally publishedYes
Event2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014 - Tampere, Finland
Duration: 2014 Oct 282014 Oct 29

Publication series

Name2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014

Conference

Conference2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014
Country/TerritoryFinland
CityTampere
Period2014/10/282014/10/29

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 IEEE.

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Computer Science

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