Abstract
Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p (and so learns that the source is wrong about p), then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source (perhaps even the identity of the source) and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample fails. It rests on a principle of testimonial dependence that is not applicable when a source hedges his or her claims.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 154-168 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 83 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Philosophy
Free keywords
- Ramsey Test
- conditionals
- counterexample