Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Lund University
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Publication series

NameWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
No.11

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Indivisible objects
  • fairness
  • coalitionally strat

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