On abduction, dualities and reason

We integrate dualistic conceptions of the real with Peirce's perspectives
about reality and abduction, emphasizing the concept of reason underlying
Peirce's thoughts. Peirce's abduction is related to the notions of retrogression and grounding in Hegel, later re-encountered in Hansonian-abduction. Abduction in turn is considered in relation to abstraction acquiring its fullest sense as a stage in the process of producing a theory. The process is iterative and self improving, it incorporates ``turbid thinking'' making it increasingly ``clear'' at successive iterations that incorporate the lessons taught by failed predictions, i.e., refutations.
The cycle of thoughts promoted by doubts comes to rest when belief is reached. We discuss how this coming to rest depends on a criterion for cessation of doubts. The observation is illustrated with two criteria, one proposed by Mach that only demands analogy and the criteria of dualists such as Goethe and Whewell that inspire the present work. Hence, it is possible to produce, and socially accept, imperfect theories unless we demand the highest level of rationality, avoiding any leftover of the turbid thoughts that have been used in the early developments.
Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss conditions that are characteristic of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology incorporating dualistic perspectives.