Paying to remove advertisements

Joacim Tåg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an ad-based product. We formally examine an ad-based monopolist's incentives to introduce this option. When deciding whether or not to introduce the option to pay, the monopolist compares the potential direct revenues from consumers who pay, with the lost advertising revenues resulting from the subsequent ad removal. If the pay alternative is introduced, the media firm increases advertising quantity to make the option to pay more attractive. This outcome hurts consumers but benefits the media firm and the advertisers. Total welfare may increase or decrease. Perhaps surprisingly, more annoying advertisements may lead to an increase in advertising quantity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-252
Number of pages8
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Volume21
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Nov 1
Externally publishedYes

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Free keywords

  • Advertising
  • Damaged goods
  • Media markets
  • Price discrimination
  • Two-sided markets
  • Vertical differentiation
  • D42
  • L15
  • L59
  • M37

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Paying to remove advertisements'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this