Projects per year
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are commonly proposed to enable search in a protected unstructured documents such as email archives or any set of sensitive text files. However, some SSE schemes have been recently proposed in order to protect relational databases. Most of the previous attacks on SSE schemes have only targeted its common use case, protecting unstructured data. In this work, we propose a new inference attack on relational databases protected via SSE schemes. Our inference attack enables a passive adversary with only basic knowledge about the meta-data information of the target relational database to recover the attribute names of some observed queries. This violates query privacy since the attribute name of a query is secret.
|Title of host publication||Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings|
|Editors||Liqun Chen, Mark Manulis, Steve Schneider|
|Number of pages||21|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|
|Event||21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018 - Guildford, United Kingdom|
Duration: 2018 Sept 9 → 2018 Sept 12
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018|
|Period||2018/09/09 → 2018/09/12|
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Information Systems
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2017/10/01 → 2021/03/31