Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem; Tobias Andersson; Christian Gehrmann; Cornelius Glackin

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem, Tobias Andersson, Christian Gehrmann, Cornelius Glackin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Paper in conference proceeding › peer-review

Abstract

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are commonly proposed to enable search in a protected unstructured documents such as email archives or any set of sensitive text files. However, some SSE schemes have been recently proposed in order to protect relational databases. Most of the previous attacks on SSE schemes have only targeted its common use case, protecting unstructured data. In this work, we propose a new inference attack on relational databases protected via SSE schemes. Our inference attack enables a passive adversary with only basic knowledge about the meta-data information of the target relational database to recover the attribute names of some observed queries. This violates query privacy since the attribute name of a query is secret.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings
Editors	Liqun Chen, Mark Manulis, Steve Schneider
Publisher	Springer
Pages	171-191
Number of pages	21
ISBN (Print)	9783319991351
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10
Publication status	Published - 2018
Event	21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018 - Guildford, United Kingdom Duration: 2018 Sept 9 → 2018 Sept 12

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11060 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Guildford
Period	2018/09/09 → 2018/09/12

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Information Systems

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

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1 Active

Sec4Factory: Cyber Security for Next Generation Factory (SEC4FACTORY)
Gehrmann, C. (PI), Kihl, M. (CoPI), Hell, M. (CoI), Fitzgerald, E. (Researcher), Toorani, M. (Researcher), Fitzgerald, E. (Researcher), Tärneberg, W. (Researcher) & Akbarian, F. (Researcher)
Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, SSF
2018/04/01 → 2024/12/31
Project: Research
CloudiFacturing: Cloudification of Production Engineering for Predictive Digital Manufacturing
Gehrmann, C. (PI)
European Commission - Horizon 2020
2017/10/01 → 2021/03/31
Project: Research

Cite this

Abdelraheem, M. A., Andersson, T., Gehrmann, C., & Glackin, C. (2018). Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption. In L. Chen, M. Manulis, & S. Schneider (Eds.), Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings (pp. 171-191). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11060 LNCS). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

Abdelraheem, Mohamed Ahmed ; Andersson, Tobias ; Gehrmann, Christian et al. / Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption. Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings. editor / Liqun Chen ; Mark Manulis ; Steve Schneider. Springer, 2018. pp. 171-191 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption",

abstract = "Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are commonly proposed to enable search in a protected unstructured documents such as email archives or any set of sensitive text files. However, some SSE schemes have been recently proposed in order to protect relational databases. Most of the previous attacks on SSE schemes have only targeted its common use case, protecting unstructured data. In this work, we propose a new inference attack on relational databases protected via SSE schemes. Our inference attack enables a passive adversary with only basic knowledge about the meta-data information of the target relational database to recover the attribute names of some observed queries. This violates query privacy since the attribute name of a query is secret.",

author = "Abdelraheem, {Mohamed Ahmed} and Tobias Andersson and Christian Gehrmann and Cornelius Glackin",

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Abdelraheem, MA, Andersson, T, Gehrmann, C & Glackin, C 2018, Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption. in L Chen, M Manulis & S Schneider (eds), Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11060 LNCS, Springer, pp. 171-191, 21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018, Guildford, United Kingdom, 2018/09/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption. / Abdelraheem, Mohamed Ahmed; Andersson, Tobias; Gehrmann, Christian et al.
Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Liqun Chen; Mark Manulis; Steve Schneider. Springer, 2018. p. 171-191 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11060 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Paper in conference proceeding › peer-review

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T1 - Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption

AU - Abdelraheem, Mohamed Ahmed

AU - Andersson, Tobias

AU - Gehrmann, Christian

AU - Glackin, Cornelius

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are commonly proposed to enable search in a protected unstructured documents such as email archives or any set of sensitive text files. However, some SSE schemes have been recently proposed in order to protect relational databases. Most of the previous attacks on SSE schemes have only targeted its common use case, protecting unstructured data. In this work, we propose a new inference attack on relational databases protected via SSE schemes. Our inference attack enables a passive adversary with only basic knowledge about the meta-data information of the target relational database to recover the attribute names of some observed queries. This violates query privacy since the attribute name of a query is secret.

AB - Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are commonly proposed to enable search in a protected unstructured documents such as email archives or any set of sensitive text files. However, some SSE schemes have been recently proposed in order to protect relational databases. Most of the previous attacks on SSE schemes have only targeted its common use case, protecting unstructured data. In this work, we propose a new inference attack on relational databases protected via SSE schemes. Our inference attack enables a passive adversary with only basic knowledge about the meta-data information of the target relational database to recover the attribute names of some observed queries. This violates query privacy since the attribute name of a query is secret.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

M3 - Paper in conference proceeding

AN - SCOPUS:85053994380

SN - 9783319991351

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

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EP - 191

BT - Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings

A2 - Chen, Liqun

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T2 - 21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018

Y2 - 9 September 2018 through 12 September 2018

ER -

Abdelraheem MA, Andersson T, Gehrmann C, Glackin C. Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption. In Chen L, Manulis M, Schneider S, editors, Information Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings. Springer. 2018. p. 171-191. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_10

Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Access to Document

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Projects

Sec4Factory: Cyber Security for Next Generation Factory (SEC4FACTORY)

CloudiFacturing: Cloudification of Production Engineering for Predictive Digital Manufacturing

Cite this