Predicting the Effects of Intervention and Sabotage in a Boundedly Complex Game

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Abstract

Conditions for predicting the effects of intervention with certainty are derived. An outside observer studies sequences of actions from a two-person repeated prisoners' dilemma. The sequences are generated by finite automata, which are optimal at each stage of the game and also minimize the number of states. An intervention is a change of action for one of the players and a prediction is a statement about what action the other player will choose in the next period. One result is that predictions can always be made certain at some stages of the game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)321-342
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume24
Issue number2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1992

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Free keywords

  • Complex game
  • finite automata
  • prisoners' dilemma

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