Put a bet on it: Can self-funded commitment contracts curb fitness procrastination?

Devon Spika; Linnea Wickström Östervall; Ulf Gerdtham; Erik Wengström

doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102943

Put a bet on it: Can self-funded commitment contracts curb fitness procrastination?

Devon Spika, Linnea Wickström Östervall, Ulf Gerdtham, Erik Wengström

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We investigate the use of a highly scalable intervention to help individuals achieve their physical activity goals: self-funded commitment contracts. Using a randomised experiment, we compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) and hard (incentivised) contracts among 1629 members of a gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one's contract goal. Relative to the control group, being offered a hard contract significantly increases gym visits by 21%, while being offered a soft contract leads to an 8% increase.

Original language	English
Article number	102943
Journal	Journal of Health Economics
Volume	98
Early online date	2024 Nov 12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102943
Publication status	Published - 2024 Dec

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Public Health, Global Health, Social Medicine and Epidemiology

Free keywords

Commitment contract
Gym attendance
Incentives
Self-control

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102943Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "Put a bet on it: Can self-funded commitment contracts curb fitness procrastination?",

abstract = "We investigate the use of a highly scalable intervention to help individuals achieve their physical activity goals: self-funded commitment contracts. Using a randomised experiment, we compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) and hard (incentivised) contracts among 1629 members of a gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one's contract goal. Relative to the control group, being offered a hard contract significantly increases gym visits by 21%, while being offered a soft contract leads to an 8% increase.",

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AU - Wengström, Erik

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KW - Commitment contract

KW - Gym attendance

KW - Incentives

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