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Resisting Economic Integration when Industry Location is Uncertain

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

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Abstract

This paper analyses the political determination of transportation costs in a new economic geography model. In a benchmark case with certainty about where agglomeration takes place, a majority of voters favour economic integration and the resulting equilibrium is an industrialised core and a de-industrialised periphery. Allowing for uncertainty, a high level of trade costs may win the election and maintain the initial distribution of industry. The reason is that a coalition of risk-averse immobile factors of production votes for the status quo due to uncertainty about which region will attract industry if economic integration is pursued. Finally, the standard view that agglomeration is unambiguously beneficial to residents in the industrial centre is challenged by introducing costs of undertaking economic integration
Original languageEnglish
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Lund University
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Publication series

NameWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
No.22

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Free keywords

  • footloose entrepreneur model
  • majority voting
  • new

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