Risk and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Stochastic Public Good Games

Erik Wengström, Stepan Vesely

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

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Abstract

Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationLund
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Lund University
Number of pages32
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Mar 2

Publication series

NameWorking Papers
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Lund University
No.3
Volume2017

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Free keywords

  • risk pooling
  • risk sharing
  • social norms
  • linear public goods game
  • cooperation decay
  • stable cooperation
  • H41
  • D03
  • D80

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