Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Ulrik H. Nielsen; Jean-Robert Tyran; Erik Wengström

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Ulrik H. Nielsen, Jean-Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	136-139
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	122
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021
Publication status	Published - 2014

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Economics

Free keywords

Response Time
Free Riding
Public Goods
Experiment

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

Cite this

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title = "Second Thoughts on Free Riding",

abstract = "We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.",

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AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

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AB - We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

KW - Response Time

KW - Free Riding

KW - Public Goods

KW - Experiment

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JO - Economics Letters

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Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Abstract

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Free keywords

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Cite this