Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions

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This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-59
Number of pages19
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics


  • rationing price equilibrium
  • (extended) english price sequences
  • iterative English auction rule
  • C78
  • D44
  • D45


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