Abstract
Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and very helpful reply to my article (2012a) concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang (2012) defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some of Chuang’s critical points to advance the position I advocate.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 37-41 |
| Journal | Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue number | 9 |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Educational Sciences
- Philosophy
Free keywords
- causal explanation
- Elster
- social explanation
- mechanistic explanation