Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper


We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Publication series

NameWorking Papers
PublisherLund University, Department of Economics

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics


  • Characterization
  • House-allocation
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Multiobject auction
  • D44
  • D47
  • D63
  • D78
  • D82


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