@techreport{e230b278dd6a4a7fa72952fe1d450005,

title = "Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited",

abstract = "We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices. ",

keywords = "Characterization, House-allocation, Strategy-proofness, Multiobject auction, D44, D47, D63, D78, D82",

author = "Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson",

year = "2018",

language = "English",

series = "Working Papers",

publisher = "Lund University, Department of Economics",

number = "2018:21",

pages = "14",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Lund University, Department of Economics",

}