Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding


Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusUnpublished - 2010
EventWorkshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - Münster, Germany
Duration: 2010 Apr 292010 Apr 30


ConferenceWorkshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Philosophy

Free keywords

  • agent-relative reason
  • agent-neutral reason
  • couter-factual
  • subjunctive facts


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