Abstract
In international law, the exercise of legal discretion is constrained by criteria, such as the abuse of rights doctrine and the principle of legal certainty. The hitherto research of these criteria gives reason to take up a discussion on the appropriate way of conceptualising discretion and constraining criteria. This article, in contrast to the belief of other scholars, makes a case for the understanding of the exercise of discretion as an activity separate from legal interpretation. As it insists, the application of a constraining criterion is wholly distinct from the form of arguments that can be derived from rules of interpretation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 407-430 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | German Yearbook of International Law |
Volume | 62 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Law (excluding Law and Society)
Free keywords
- Constraining Criteria
- Discretion
- Exercise of Discretion
- Interpretation
- Rules of Interpretation