Abstract
The Grossman model has been extended recently in order to take account of the fact that most people lead their lives in a family--using frameworks in which family members, respectively, (a) have common preferences and (b) are Nash-bargainers. These models, however, do not consider individual incentives for behaving strategically. In the model presented in this paper, spouses interact strategically both in the production of own health and in the production of health of other family members. We analyse, inter alia, the impact on the distribution of health of changes in family policies, such as child allowance and custody rules.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 475-495 |
| Journal | Journal of Health Economics |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 |
Bibliographical note
The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015.The record was previously connected to the following departments: Lund University Centre for Health Economics (LUCHE) (016630120), Community Medicine (013241810), Department of Economics (012008000), Centre for Economic Demography (012019200)
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Health Care Service and Management, Health Policy and Services and Health Economy
Free keywords
- Investments : statistics & numerical data
- Investments : economics
- Human
- Health Services Needs and Demand : statistics & numerical data
- Health Services Needs and Demand : economics
- Health Behavior
- Female
- Family Health
- Efficiency
- Divorce : economics
- Decision Making
- Child
- Conflict of Interest
- Child Welfare : economics
- Male
- Models
- Econometric
- Patient Acceptance of Health Care : statistics & numerical data
- Spouses : psychology
- Adult
