This paper examines whether Sherlock Holmes’ “Science of Deduction and Analysis,” as reconstructed by Hintikka and Hintikka (in: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), exemplifies a logic of discovery. While the Hintikkas claimed it does, their approach remained largely programmatic, and ultimately unsuccessful. Their reconstruction must thus be expanded, in particular to account for the role of memory in inquiry. Pending this expansion, the Hintikkas’ claim is vindicated. However, a tension between the naturalistic aspirations of their model and the formal apparatus they built it on is identified. The paper concludes on suggestions for easing this tension without losing the normative component of the Hintikkas’ epistemological model.
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Logic of discovery
- Merill B. and Jaakko Hintikka
- Sherlock Holmes