The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)209 - 223
Number of pages15
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume53
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023 Apr

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Philosophy

Free keywords

  • Hope
  • Fear
  • Epistemic Possibility
  • Desire
  • Mirror Account

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