Abstract
The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object (the “enabling maneuver”). In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a new explanatory objection, to the extent that the explanatory role played by the constitutive properties of attitudes in value facts is assumed to be different from the explanatory role they play in fittingness facts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1845-1860 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Philosophia |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Philosophy
Free keywords
- Fitting attitude
- account of value
- Value
- Fittingness
- Normative explanation
- Enabling conditions