The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations

Jonas Tallberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Decision-making in the European Union is subject to the risk of negotiation failure, because of governments' incentives to conceal their true preferences. This article argues that the EU Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can help unlock incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient agreements, while simultaneously allowing the government in office to shape distributional outcomes. Drawing on general bargaining theory and rational choice institutionalism, it presents a theory of the demand for, and supply of, brokerage by the chair. The explanatory power of this theory is demonstrated through two case studies: Germany's chairing of the negotiations, and France's chairing of the IGC 2000 negotiations.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)999-1022
JournalJournal of Common Market Studies
Volume42
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Political Science

Free keywords

  • Förhandlingar
  • Politik i Europa

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